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INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION
OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

OF THE

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

NOVEMBER 27, 28, 29, AND 80, 1978

VOLUME VII

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Assassinations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
39-936 0 WASHINGTON : 1979

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402
Stock Number 052-070-04877-8

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

LOUIS STOKES, Ohio, Chairman

RICHARDSON PREYER, North Carolina
WALTER E. FAUNTROY,

District of Columbia
YVONNE BRATH WAITE BURKE,
California

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
HAROLD E. FORD, Tennessee
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, Indiana
ROBERT W. EDGAR, Pennsylvania

Subcommittee on the
Assassination of
Martin Luther King, Jr.

WALTER E. FAUNTROY, Chairman
HAROLD E. FORD
FLOYD J. FITHIAN
ROBERT W. EDGAR
STEWART B. McKINNEY
LOUIS STOKES, ex officio
SAMUEL L. DEVINE, ex officio

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, Ohio
STEWART B. McKINNEY, Connecticut
CHARLES THONE, Nebraska
HAROLD S. SAWYER, Michigan

Subcommittee on the
Assassination of
John F. Kennedy

RICHARDSON PREYER, Chairman
YVONNE BRATH WAITE BURKE
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD
CHARLES THONE
HAROLD S. SAWYER
LOUIS STOKES, ex officio
SAMUEL L. DEVINE, ex officio

(II)

CONTENTS

Hearings: Pa e e

November 27, 1978:

Narration by Prof. G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director . 1

Testimony of Cartha D. DeLoach, former assistant to the Director,

FBI 18

November 28, 1978:

Narration by Prof. G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director . 117

Testimony of:

William Ramsey Clark, former Attorney General of the United

States 120

William Ramsey Clark — (resumed) 135

Afternoon Session

Stephen J. Poliak 163

November 29, 1978:

Narration by Gene Johnson, deputy chief counsel 173

Testimony of:

Russell George Byers 177

Murray L. Randall, special judge, St. Louis, Mo 204

Afternoon Session

Lawrence Weenick, attorney, Clayton, Mo 238

Russell George Byers — (resumed) 245

Edward Evans, chief investigator, (staff SCA) 247

November 30, 1978:

Narration by Prof. G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director . 311

Testimony of Jerry Ray 318

(ill)

INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1978

House of Representatives,

Select Committee on Assassinations,

Washington, D.C.

The select committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 9:10 a.m.,
in room 345, Cannon House Office Building, the Hon. Louis Stokes
(chairman of the select committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Stokes, Devine, Preyer, McKinney,
Fauntroy, Fithian, and Edgar.

Also present: G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director;
Peter Beeson, staff counsel; and Elizabeth L. Berning, chief clerk.

Chairman Stokes. The committee will come to order.

The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey.

NARRATION BY PROF. G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL
AND STAFF DIRECTOR

Mr. Blakey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Over the past 3 days of hearings the committee has heard dis-
turbing testimony on FBI programs that were aimed at discrediting
Dr. King and undermining the progress of the civil rights move-
ment that he directed. An examination of those FBI programs
ultimately led to the stark question, Did the FBI kill Dr. King?

Today other implications of the FBI issue will be explored. They
can be stated in a single, troubling question: Was the Bureau
willing or able to conduct a thorough and far-reaching criminal
investigation of the King assassination despite its long history of
an adversary posture toward Dr. King?

The committee has completed a comprehensive, 2-year review of
the FBI investigation. Voluminous files, assembled, as it was con-
ducted both at FBI headquarters in Washington and in major field
offices, were carefully studied; some two dozen officials of both the
Bureau and the Department of Justice were interviewed; and testi-
mony was taken in executive session from certain key individuals.

The results of the committee investigation have been compiled in
a staff report, 1 copies of which have been given to each of the three
witnesses who are scheduled to testify today or tomorrow. They are
Cartha DeLoach, former assistant to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover;
Steven Pollack, former Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights;
and former Attorney General Ramsey Clark.

1 The committee's staff report is included in full as an appendix to the hearings. See Vol. 14,
HSCA-MLK Hearings.

( 1 )

A copy of the staff report has also been released to the public, so
I will only summarize at this time for the record its major findings:

In 1968 the FBI was divided into 10 internal divisions.

I would ask at this time, Mr. Chairman, that Martin Luther
King exhibit F-435 be inserted into the record and appropriately
displayed.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the
record.

[The information follows:]

FBI FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION CHART - 1968
INVESTIGATIVE BRANCH

MLK Exhibit F-435

Mr. Blakey. It is an FBI organization chart.

Division Six, the General Investigative Division, headed by As-
sistant Director Alex Rosen, was responsible for Federal criminal
investigations, including those of civil rights violations. In the as-
sassination of Dr. King, Federal jurisdiction was predicated on the
Federal Civil Rights Statute — 18 U.S.C. Section 241 — that covers
conspiracies to interfere with someone’s constitutional rights.

Within the General Investigative Division, day-to-day manage-
ment of the case was handled by the civil rights section headed by
Clem McGowan, and responsibility filtered down to the civil rights
unit headed by Edward McDonough. Richard Long, a headquarters
case agent, was assigned to the investigation.

As the case progressed, information on developments was passed
up through the chain of command to the Assistant to Director
DeLoach, Associate Director Clyde Tolson, and ultimately to Direc-
tor Hoover. Major developments were summarized and sent along
daily, if not more frequently.

Out in the field, the Memphis office, designated the “office of
origin,” initiated its investigation shortly after the assassination.
While day-to-day direction of the case resided in Washington, Mem-
phis had a pivotal role to play in the administration and coordina-
tion of the case. It was sent copies of most of the reports from 57
other domestic field offices; it initiated and coordinated leads; and
it produced a prosecutive summary report after James Earl Ray’s
arrest in June 1968.

There were no specific guidelines in 1968 for an FBI investiga-
tion of an assassination, but the King murder was promptly classi-
fied as a “special investigation” and it was handled in a way that
was quite distinct from that of the ordinary criminal case. A 24-
hour deadline was set for the running down of leads. The special
agents in charge — the SAC’s — of field offices were held personally
accountable for investigative errors. The staff of the Memphis Field
Office was augmented by additional agents and administrative per-
sonnel. An inspector selected from the Headquarters staff, Joseph
Sullivan, was sent into the field to help direct the effort.

The committee found that the FBI files indicate that the Bu-
reau’s investigation represented a broad and extensive effort to
identify and apprehend Dr. King’s assassin. In fact, it might be
argued — at least from the files — that the antagonism that had been
demonstrated by Director Hoover toward Dr. King and the Bu-
reau’s campaign to discredit him, had the effect of inspiring an
intensified investigation. The apparent reason for this desire — iron-
ically — to protect the Bureau and Mr. Hoover from charges that
the FBI made anything short of a total effort in the case.

The files indicate, for example, that there were exhaustive inter-
views and record checks of every conceivable information source —
banks, telephone companies, credit agencies, police departments,
motor-vehicle bureaus, motels, hotels, dry cleaners, and dancing
schools.

At the same time, extensive work was done on physical evidence,
with some major breakthroughs coming from scientific analysis in
the FBI’s Washington laboratories. A pair of pliers was traced to a
California hardware store, underwear to a dry cleaner in Los Ange-
les, the rifle found at the scene to a retail outlet in Birmingham.

Then on April 19 a left thumbprint from the rifle was traced to
James Earl Ray. It was the first major break in the case.

Following the identification of a suspect, a massive manhunt,
focused on Ray, was begun. Ray's family was approached, both
directly — by interviews — and indirectly — by surveillance. Inmate
associates of Ray at Missouri State Penitentiary were questioned
and as Ray’s activities from his escape from MSP to the assassina-
tion became clearer, efforts were made to learn more about his
sources of funds, as they might reveal evidence about his move-
ments.

On May 10, after the FBI had learned of Ray’s entrance in
foreign countries, it launched a domestic passport review project. It
had 36 agents assigned to it and the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police were also asked for assistance. It was a worthwhile endeav-
or, for, on June 10, an RCMP officer turned up a Canadian pass-
port in the name of Ramon George Sneyd that bore a photo of a
man who looked remarkably like Ray. After making positive iden-
tification and learning that Sneyd left Canada on May 6, the FBI
extended its search overseas.

On June 8 Ray was arrested by officers from Scotland Yard as he
was about to board a flight for Belgium.

I would ask at this time, Mr. Chairman, that Martin Luther
King exhibit F-500 be inserted into the record and appropriately
displayed.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it will be entered into the
record.

[The information follows:]

FBI INVESTIGATION OF KING ASSASSINATION:

MLK Exhibit F-500

Mr. Blakey. It shows the month-by-month cost of the Murkin
investigation, as provided by the FBI.

In April, $781,403 was spent; in May, $336,467. Because the fig-
ures for June are not broken down by days, it is impossible to
determine precisely how much of this amount — $135,375 — was
spent before June 8. In part, these figures reflect a natural de-
crease in the expenses of any criminal investigation.

It is also clear, however, not only from this chart but from the
FBI files themselves that after July a dramatic reduction occurred
in the time and expense devoted to the investigation. Efforts were
made in the Springfield, 111., office to solve the Alton bank robbery,
considered a possible source of Ray's funds; but largely with that
exception, major investigative efforts were limited.

It might be appropriate, Mr. Chairman, to comment that these
statistics, particularly as represented in this chart, are perhaps
misleading, to the degree that they show such a sharp breakdown
in expenditures. Nevertheless, their general direction is clear and
is fully supported by the record.

By June 20, Mr. Hoover had apparently come to the conclusion
that Ray was the assassin and he had acted alone, out of hatred for
Blacks, Dr. King in particular. Summarizing a conversation with
Attorney General Clark on that date, the Director wrote:

I stated that in Ray’s case we have not yet found a single angle that would
indicate a conspiracy. I said the only significant thing is the money he had and
which he spent freely in paying bills, and I thought that could have been obtained
from a bank robbery.

Mr. Hoover went on to describe Ray:

I said I think we are dealing with a man who is not an ordinary criminal in the
usual sense but a man capable of doing any kind of sly act. * * * I said Sirhan
Sirhan is a different individual, as he is a fanatic * * * and Ray is not a fanatic in
that sense.

I said, I think Ray is a racist and detested Negroes and Martin Luther King, and
there is an indication that prior to the Memphis situation he had information about
King speaking in other towns, and then picked out Memphis. I said I think he acted
entirely alone but we are not closing our minds that others might be associated with
him, and we have to run down every lead.

But as can be seen from the downward progression of expendi-
tures in the chart, while the Bureau — at least theoretically — was
willing to consider new evidence, it considered the case, in fact,
largely closed with Ray’s arrest.

In addition to showing an exhaustive manhunt, the FBI files do
indicate that there were innumerable efforts to check individual
conspiracy leads.

Early in the investigation the files on Dr. King were reviewed
and about 50 previous death threats were assembled. On April 26
leads were sent to the field office with instructions that they and
others indicating conspiracy “be thoroughly resolved, no matter
how remote.”

Nevertheless, candor requires the comment that the evidence
indicates that the performance of the FBI, as well as the Justice
Department, was flawed, not in pursuit of the fugitive but in the
search for others who may have been involved in the assassination.

For example, there is reason to question the adequacy of the
FBI’s response to substantial evidence of contacts between Ray and
his brothers, Jerry and John, at various times between his escape

from prison and the assassination. That evidence includes such
items as: (1) Statements of several witnesses pointing to meetings
between Ray and a brother; (2) denials by Jerry and John of
preassassination contact with James that are in conflict with infor-
mation established independently; (3) Missouri State Penitentiary
records indicating John visited James the day before he escaped; (4)
information that Jerry, on two occasions, admitted knowledge of a
conspiracy in the assassination; and (5) Ray’s statement to a sales-
man in a gun store, just 6 days before the assassination, that he
wished to exchange the rifle on advice from his brother.

Coupled with these indications of a possible family based associ-
ation that pointed toward a criminal relationship were the indica-
tions that the mysterious Raoul might actually have been one or
both of the brothers. Even so, the FBI never made a concerted
effort to check out the possibility of a Ray family conspiracy in the
assassination. Instead, it treated the brothers and other relatives
almost solely as information sources as to James’ whereabouts.

In fact, the Bureau became so preoccupied with the fugitive
search that on May 13 Mr. Hoover recommended — with the concur-
rence of Mr. DeLoach, Mr. Rosen, and Mr. Tolson — the placing of
electronic surveillance devices in the homes of John Ray, Carol
Pepper— a sister— and John’s place of business— the Grapevine
Tavern in St. Louis.

This clearly illegal action was never endorsed by the Department
of Justice but the request itself is disturbing enough. Not only does
it show a lack of concern for the constitutional rights of the rela-
tive, it establishes the Bureau’s lack of interest in a possible con-
spiracy involving the brothers. Had the taps picked up evidence of
such a conspiracy, the illegality of the surveillance would almost
surely have tainted the evidence in any subsequent conspiracy
trial. Internal FBI memoranda, moreover, indicate that Mr. Hoover
and his assistants were well aware of the problem but made the
request in any event.

I would ask at this time, Mr. Chairman, that Martin Luther
King exhibits F-501 and F-502 be inserted in the record and appro-
priately displayed.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, they may be entered in the
record at this point.

[The information follows:]

MLK Exhibit F-501

^tfTTED states government

Memorandum

zh\ a

:r ’

]v. tu—

JUNE ’

date; Mays, 2968

<2 ar;

* . 1 - Mr. DeLoach **«■*— — y

1 ^ .1 - Mr. Bo sen ST, ■ /

i X. «. jjr. MaHey

* X -Mr* McGowan

— X -Mr. Lang O '

X -Mfc Conrad 1 - Mr. Gale

PURPOSE: To recommend the installation erf a technical surveillance^. . .
(TESXXR) on the telephones of Albert and Carol Pepper, St- Lauis, P y

Missouri, and the telephone listed to the Grapevire Tavern in. St. I>jnisy~ 4 A
Missouri, owned by Carol Pepper, subject's sister, and operated by (J

John Iarry Ray, subject’s "brother, and the installation of a mic rophone
surveillance at the residences of Carol Pepper, and John lorry Ray, * \Jr*'
\and at the Grapevine Tavern. These installations could assist in the
l early apprehension of the subject, which could possibly be instrumental
kn reducing the stresses and tension placed on our national security
Subsequent to the death of Martin Luther King, Jr. •>*

BACKGROUND: We are presently conducting eadansthre and extensiv e ,* ;*
r , imyp5?H^r!an ta dete rmi ne the present whereabouts of the subject James **•

•• Earl'Ray,- who is on® of the TEN MOST WANTED FUGmVES. Although c \‘
many hundreds of interviews have been conducted and leads ran cut^ we /V
: have not been able to locate the subject nor have ve .located any person Ni
r who can fpmich us any information as to the subject’s present whereab out s.

; It has been determined that Carol Pepper, the s is ter of the subject, and
; John Larry Ray, the brother of the subject, are fee closest relatives to , ^
him. Xarol is married to Albert Pepper a^d they reside at 2025 Belle view,

St. Louis, Missouri, telephone number 645-2948. Jfchn Larry Ray resides
at 1900 A Cherokee, St. Louis, Missouri, no telephone listed. CJdroi’ ^ ^
presently owns the Grapevine Tavern, 1982 Arsesal, St. Louis, Missouri^ *
telephone number PR 6-9417. This tavern is operated by John Laxjry Ray- .

John Larry Ray has expressed a cooperative attitude; however,

■s is .felt that he is not giving us complete and accurate inform ation . ^ Carol
Pepper refuses to submit to interview and is not cooperative. - R is felt that
if the subject telephones or personally contacts any of the relatives, it will ^ .
most likely “be Carol Pepper or brother John LanyBajc f \^PY^h O l '

I n. cue subject ceiepnones or personally cun acts any m. uio xswufca, «^ ***** ^ ,

most likely “be Carol Pepper or brother John LamyBajc /£/ •*. 3 / ;

En^sar'e

^ * — CQNU Nuh.u — O V t* 1 ^ -

Memorandum to Mfr^DeLoach
EE; MURKIN

EE COMMENDATION; That a technical surveillance he installed on. the *
telephones of Albertand Carol Pepper and the Grapevine Tavern and a
microphone surveillance he installed at the residences of Albert and
Carol Pepper and John Larry Ray and at the Grapevine Tavern.

- 2 -

MLK Exhibit F-502

Onited states governmi

Memorandum

• • — we p pnp vff mas© micxupjauiies caa ua uuumeu atju useu w tmu ut

[ prejudging the cose against the subject. In a very recent decision of the United
.States District Court lor the Southern District of New York, a listening device
installed oxx/the premises of one Levine. Later, a subject named Granello,
an adnata of Levine, «**** up for trial an d claimed that the listening device
installed on Levtx2s premises, which was installed by trespass, was illegal as
to him, Granello. It was not contended that any info rmation obtained from the
Levine microp hon e was used as evidence against Granello at tzzal either directly
or as a The co ur t held that yri-nn* Granello had no interest in the Levine

premises, monitor was not Illegal as to him and he could not obtain a new
trial or dismissal of the 1 ndic fe m en k U»S. v. Gr^^Uo, 230 F. Snpp. 482 (1968).

Applied to instant case, this rule of law could work out in different
ways . that tfa> subject of this case is not on thdfpr praises to bel. v

surveilled by the means suggested, and has no possessory or other right In - ? *

those premises, any information disclosed by the surveillance in some •’way,
such as conversation among the Peppers, could be used to learn the whereabouts
of the Subject for purposes of arreshr The problem becomes somewhat more
complicated, however, if tfo* subject of, this case a telephone -call to those
premises that foi were Recorded and used as the basis^for his

apprehensiocu He c ou ld elaiip that the. surveillance viol Ike right of
privacy in the telephone cofe^^cdtrOi^ke ^T! a rip to that place, citing the Katz,
decision in the Supreme Court. rf/I 'JS ^ /

"ccwrmrnrn - ovfw 1

Memorandum J. J v Gasper to Mr. Mp hr
HZ.* MAHKEN

; .The -worst that could happen in either of ths afc>v£ circmnstances,

uuwvYfzr, - assuming that we follow the precautionary measures listed below - *
that we Illegally learn where the' subject Is located and tons irfe ahla to arrest
Wm o n toat k nowledge. Tha role that comes into play here, established l £ ~ £fe
last century by toe Supreme Coart tn gar v. HUnots. 30 UlS. 347 (1886), is that
aafflfigai azrest is no -bar to-prosecution. Wong Son v. U.S. . 371 U.S. 471 (1963
g. S ti T . Hoffman , 385 F2d 501 (1967); Keegan vu U.S. , 385 F2d&60 (1967) A
p«seo.fflay be arrested unlawfully and actually: kidnapped into toe court having
Jnrisdictton at toe criminal case; yet tha «rortstil^«tains-)nrisdic±ton to to
the person tor the offense. The court would, not affine toe prosedbttoato use-
as evid ence, any Info rma ti on obtained t h r ou gh the fljegal surveHlacce but the
ffl^al surveillance would nottaint the use cfiatqr otherevidence«btained either
r!** 0 .?? ^ wblc ^' wa3 gottrai to alegal. m an n er/ Nor, toirepeat, would

the ille gality of the arrest a£dne r resta t i ng , from whereaboutk disclosed bytmlawfu

•orveillance, prevent the court from trytog the subject tor the offense. *-t-

^ •«&*. u , * . ■ . • *

v. - . -K toe action being' considered is taken;' we-strongly suggest three-

procanttonary measures, as follows: . • \ 11

. W ^ wortfings be preserved intact, it may be necessary

to disclose some of them to the court or, even to the defense. '

... * /. ‘ . ■ *- *r ’

(2) That so use be made of any intoraatton obtained against
*nyeme whatsoever or in any way whatsoever except tor the single purpose of
to^ngtoe subject in.tois case. As .we weUlmow by this ttow.-evidene* of
toe offe nse obtained in this mahner is not admissible, ttwouMnoTbeadmissihre
agato^toe subject and it would not be admissible a gainaf the Peppers on a charge
ox harboring. ^ ®

• ./ - W Be aware that since this search and seizu&ds unconstitutional
as to the Peppers, they have at least a theoretical cause of action tor damages
£Si!w the .devices by trespass. Here again, however, if

nothing learned by this surveillance Is used against the Pepped In any way. their
< Hr ? <r tll,l ? d *“***• lowest possible degree, becoming that for a

technical violation only rather toan one of substantial harm to toem. Moreover

to any such case toe government of toe United States sluqld surely be willing to’
pick up the tab tor any judgment had against those who installed tha microphones.

RECOMMENDATION:

For infer

&L:

Mr. Blakey. These are the FBI internal memos reflecting consid-
eration of the propriety and the legality of the electronic surveil-
lance.

While the FBI was proposing unlawful electronic surveillance, it
apparently failed to take advantage of a legal way to accomplish
the same objective. There is nothing in the FBI files to indicate
consideration was given to title III of Public Law 90-351. Signed on
June 19, 1968, it empowered the Department of Justice to conduct
court-ordered electronic surveillance in the investigation of a vari-
ety of crimes, including murder.

The committee has uncovered two incidents in which the consti-
tutional rights of Ray himself were also apparently a matter of
little concern to the FBI: The first occurred while Ray was waiting
trial in Shelby County, Tenn.

On September 30, 1968, Judge W. Preston Battle issued an order
emphasizing Ray’s written communications with his attorney at
the time, Arthur Hanes, Sr., were privileged. Battle directed that
they could be monitored only for the purpose of detecting attempts
to break prison security but not in order to learn their full content.

It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to introduce
Martin Luther King exhibit F-503, an FBI memorandum, incorpo-
rating Judge Battle’s order.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the
record at this point.

[The information follows:]

39-935 0 - 79 -2

TELETYPE

Mr. Blakey. Nevertheless, during the month of October at least
three Ray-to-Hanes letters were intercepted, photocopied, passed
along to the FBI’s Memphis field office and subsequently transmit-
ted to FBI headquarters in Washington.

On October 31, 1968, after a directive issued from headquarters,
no further letters were Xeroxed. MLK exhibit F-504 — which I
would request be entered into the record at this point — is a copy of
this headquarters directive.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the
record.

[The information follows:]

MLK Exhibit F-504

mtm

T ’v'ly ’ r

it jfiji fi-mm |ji|i
!! Kzh InJ 1

•| tall |RiM!|i ill'
H iW\* f«*iHH|f S«*f

H mi mi

fs? a||E| IfftSgatar !&*
:u b * 1 1 «ls- 5s *is :-P»

•5 2 . fa*
« 2 ?aS°

Mr. Blakey. The second occurred shortly after Ray pled guilty in
March 1969.

Ray was interviewed by the agents-in-charge of the Memphis
field office for the purpose of obtaining information on an assassi-
nation conspiracy. Ray was not accompanied by an attorney nor
was he informed of his Miranda rights — that is, his right to have
an attorney, paid or appointed, present; his right to terminate the
interview at will; his right to remain silent; and the fact that the
Government could use his statements against him.

Of course, the use of Ray’s self-incriminatory statements in a
later conspiracy prosecution would have depended on the ability of
the Government to survive a motion to suppress them. So not only
were Ray’s rights disregarded but the FBI again was risking de-
struction of valuable evidence in a conspiracy case if one was ever
to be made.

Finally, the committee has taken into account the notable ab-
sence of active participation in the assassination investigation by
attorneys for the Department of Justice.

It seems reasonable to attribute this to the state of relations
between the Department and the FBI in 1968. That they were poor
and counterproductive is demonstrated by Mr. Hoover’s criticism of
Attorney General Clark’s press policy, FBI complaints of intrusion
by the Department into its investigative territory, and a general
lack of respect for the Department’s leadership by the FBI.

Departmental attorneys received digests of investigative reports,
often in a superficial form and weeks late, as the day-to-day inves-
tigation was directed at FBI headquarters without consultation
with the Department. This was the case, even though it had been
common practice in major conspiracy investigations — for example,
in antitrust and organized crime areas — for the Bureau and the
Department to work together, and to work together successfully.

When major investigative steps were taken — an interview with
Ray, for example — there was no participation by a Departmental
attorney; and not once during the investigation was grand jury
interrogation — with its sophisticated techniques such as immunity
grants — put to use to prove or probe a possible conspiracy.

The committee is aware that the blame for any deficiencies in
the relationship of the FBI and the Department of Justice must be
shared. While we are addressing the performance of the Bureau in
today’s hearing, that of the Department itself will be the subject of
attention tomorrow.

Mr. Chairman, the next witness, Cartha DeLoach, was one of two
assistants to Director Hoover between 1965 and Mr. DeLoach’s
retirement in 1970. Mr. DeLoach supervised the activities of four
separate divisions which together constituted the Bureau’s investi-
gative arm. Included among them was domestic intelligence, which
managed both the security and the Cointelpro cases against Dr.
King; and the general investigative, which provided supervision for
the assassination investigation.

Mr. DeLoach, therefore, is in a unique position to comment on
FBI programs against Dr. King and the performance of the Bureau
in its investigation of his death.

At this time, Mr. Chairman, it would be appropriate to call
Cartha DeLoach.

Chairman Stokes. The committee calls Mr. DeLoach.

Mr. DeLoach, would you please stand and raise your right hand
and be sworn?

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before the
committee is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth,
so help you God?

Mr. DeLoach. I do, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. You may be seated.

Will counsel for the witness please identify himself for the
record?

Mr. Morgan. Edward P. Morgan, Welch & Morgan, Farragut
Building, Washington, D.C.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, sir.

The Chair recognizes staff counsel, Mr. Peter Beeson.

TESTIMONY OF CARTHA D. DeLOACH, FORMER ASSISTANT TO

THE DIRECTOR, FBI, ACCOMPANIED BY EDWARD P. MORGAN,

COUNSEL

Mr. Beeson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Can you hear me, Mr. DeLoach?

Mr. DeLoach. Very well; thank you.

Mr. Beeson. Would you state your full name for the record,
please?

Mr. DeLoach. Cartha D. DeLoach.

Mr. Beeson. Would you give the committee a brief rundown of
your employment history from the time you entered the FBI until
your retirement from the FBI in 1970?

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, Mr. Beeson. I graduated from college in 1942.
I entered the FBI in a clerical capacity the same year, I believe in
either July or August 1942. I became an agent after being in the
FBI about 6 weeks.

I served in offices in Norfolk, Cleveland, in the various capacities
as a special agent of the FBI.

I left the FBI in 1944 to go in the service, in the U.S. Navy,
during World War II. After being honorably discharged from the
Navy in 1946, I returned to the FBI, again as a special agent in
Cleveland, Ohio.

After serving there for some period of time, I was transferred to
Washington headquarters of the FBI in 1947. In 1951, if my
memory serves correctly — and it has been 9 years since I left the
FBI, quite a long time — but I think I became an inspector in 1951. 1
became an Assistant Director in 1959, I believe, and an Assistant to
the Director in 1965, and retired in July 1970, after 28 V 2 years
service in the FBI.

Mr. Beeson. If I could just cover a couple of points in that
chronology: In 1959 you became an Assistant Director. Which divi-
sion?

Mr. DeLoach. Crime Records Division, Mr. Beeson.

Mr. Beeson. In 1965 you became Assistant to the Director, Mr.
Hoover. Would you describe briefly your responsibilities as an As-
sistant to the Director, Mr. Hoover?

Mr. DeLoach. As an Assistant Director in charge of the Crime
Records Division, I had supervision of one division.

When I became an Assistant to the Director in 1965, I had
supervision under — reporting to — Mr. Clyde Tolson, who, in turn,
reported to Mr. Hoover — I had supervision of four divisions. That
was the General Investigative Division which handled general
criminal matters; the Special Investigative Division which handled
organized crime and special investigations; the Crime Records Divi-
sion — which I had just left — which handled public relations mat-
ters; and the Domestic Intelligence Division.

Mr. Beeson. The Domestic Intelligence Division was a division
within the Bureau, Division 5, which was responsible for the secu-
rity case against Mr. King; is that correct?

Mr. DeLoach. The security case involving Mr. King, but the
General Criminal Division handled the special investigation involv-
ing Dr. King’s assassination.

Mr. Beeson. And that would be the General Investigative Divi-
sion, which was Division 6 in the FBI?

Mr. DeLoach. That’s correct, sir.

Mr. Beeson. So in 1968 at the time of Dr. King’s assassination
you were No. 3 man in the Bureau underneath Mr. Tolson and Mr.
Hoover and had direct supervisory responsibility for the activities
in both the Domestic Intelligence Division and the General Investi-
gative Division, as well as other divisions, correct?

Mr. DeLoach. The facts aren’t exactly correct, Mr. Beeson. We
didn’t play the numbers game. There was no No. 3 or no No. 4
man. There were two Assistants to the Director. I was assistant to
the Director in charge of Investigative Activities and Crime Rec-
ords, which included public relations; and Mr. John P. Mohr was
was an Assistant to the Director in charge of General Administra-
tive Matters. In fact, your chart is incorrect; it puts me on a
parallel with Mr. Tolson. I reported to Mr. Tolson.

Mr. Beeson. All right. Well, we certainly would like to clarify it
for the record.

In terms of your specific responsibilities, you had superiors only
in the persons of Mr. Tolson and Mr. Hoover, is that correct?

Mr. DeLoach. That’s correct, sir.

Mr. Beeson. I would like to focus your attention now on the time
of the assassination of Dr. King — April 1968.

Would you describe for the committee how the decision was
made to involve the Federal Bureau of Investigation in a crime
which to some people may have appeared to be a local murder
case, primarily the responsibility of the local authorities in Tennes-
see.

Mr. DeLoach. That responsibility lay with the Department of
Justice, Mr. Beeson, and not the FBI. We, of course, could have
gotten in on the matter if the fugitive had more or less been
identified and the local authorities had requested the FBI under
the Fleeing Felon Statute, previously established by the Congress
to look for James Earl Ray; but the matter of the civil rights
investigation being under that particular category was established
by the Department of Justice almost immediately after the crime
occurred.

Mr. Beeson. Do you recall who was involved in that decision?

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall that, sir. I know that Mr. Clark
called me several times immediately following the assassination,

during the night, and I called him several times; and I also recall
that a memorandum was received from the Department of Justice
at FBI headquarters, indicating the FBI had jurisdiction under the
civil rights statutes, so that we followed the instructions of the
Department in that regard.

Mr. Beeson. You certainly are correct in describing the paper-
work involved. There is a memorandum coming from the Depart-
ment of Justice on the same day as the assassination, asking you to
investigate a possible civil rights violation — conspiracy to violate
the civil rights of Dr. King.

Do you recall any concern within either the FBI or the Depart-
ment of Justice about whether or not there was, in fact, an appro-
priate statutory jurisdiction for the Federal investigation in this
case?

Mr. DeLoach. Not for me personally, I don’t recall any concern.
We had a job to do and we were prepared to do it.

Mr. Beeson. To your right is a chart which details the chain of
command in Division 6, the General Investigative Division, that
was responsible for the assassination investigation.

As was briefly explained by Mr. Blakey before, within the Gener-
al Investigative Division, Mr. Rosen was the Assistant Director,
and then for purposes of the assassination investigation, the Civil
Rights section under Clem McGowan, and the Civil Rights unit
under Mr. Edward McDonough, were responsible for the day-to-day
operation of that investigation.

Would you give the committee a brief idea, please, of the roles
that were played by yourself, Mr. Rosen and the other headquar-
ters personnel primarily involved in the assassination investigation
in terms of the day-to-day operations of that division?

Mr. DeLoach. Certainly, Mr. Beeson. The agents on the supervi-
sory desk — Mr. McDonough, Mr. Long, Mr. Martindale — did a ma-
jority of the paperwork; they reported to Mr. McGowan. Mr.
McGowan reported to Mr. Rosen, and Mr. Rosen reported to me.

Mr. Rosen and I had daily conferences. As a matter of fact, Mr.
Rosen and I had lunch together almost every day, either in our
office or outside, and we constantly discussed the case while it went
on. But primarily that was the situation. Mr. Rosen and I made the
high level decisions as recommended in various memoranda by the
supervisory agents.

Mr. Beeson. How was Mr. Hoover himself informed on the prog-
ress of the investigation?

Mr. DeLoach. Occasionally a telephone call from me. I would
advise him as to any breaks in the case, the progress of the case, as
I did Attorney General Clark on an almost daily or certainly
several times a week basis.

Verbally and through memoranda, Mr. Hoover would be advised
about — both the Attorney General and the Department of Justice,
through various communications being sent to them, written com-
munications.

Mr. Beeson. In terms of actual command responsibility within
the chain of command at the FBI, what was the lowest level of true
command responsibility? By that I mean at what stage was an FBI
official able to independently send out a directive or lead in the
assassination case?

Mr. DeLoach. The section chief, Mr. McGowan, could do that on
his own if it was nothing of any great importance. Mr. Rosen, of
course, could, being the Assistant Director in charge of the division.
I could.

But primarily in this particular case, being the major case that it
was and treated accordingly by the FBI, I would — to the best of my
recollection — in most instances they would go up to Mr. Tolson and
Mr. Hoover prior to being sent on.

Mr. Beeson. But at no time, or at least only on rare occasions,
would something be done independently by somebody below the
level of Mr. McGowan; is that fair to say?

Mr. DeLoach. It could have been done, Mr. Beeson. I am not
aware of it.

Mr. Beeson. The committee has received testimony from at least
one witness testifying previously that the responsibility for the
day-to-day investigation in this case was, in fact, that of the Domes-
tic Intelligence Division; is that, in fact, correct?

Mr. DeLoach. The responsibility of the criminal-type investiga-
tion?

Mr. Beeson. Of the assassination investigation itself.

Mr. DeLoach. Absolutely not. The Domestic Intelligence Division
assisted in some minor respects, to the best of my recollection, but
the responsibility for the investigation of the assassination of Dr.
King was with the General Investigative Division of Mr. Rosen.

Mr. Beeson. What role do you recall the Domestic Intelligence
Division played in the actual assassination investigation itself?

Mr. DeLoach. I have no recollection of any, specifically, Mr.
Beeson; but just looking back upon the logical possibilities, furnish-
ing intelligence concerning hate groups, who might have been in-
volved in a conspiracy, for instance, the Ku Klux Klan, extreme
right-wingers in some respects that had possibly made threats.

For instance, I do recall in one particular instance — to give you
an example — that the General Investigative Division wanted a col-
lection, a summary, of every individual who had ever made a
threat against Dr. King or against high ranking Blacks in the civil
rights movement; and this would have been a natural thing for the
Domestic Intelligence Division to prepare and furnish to the Gener-
al Investigative Division.

Let me add at this point, Mr. Beeson, that in any major case of
this nature, not only would it be handled in a very intensified
manner, but everyone in the FBI who could possibly help out was
called upon to help out — the FBI laboratory handling all specimens
of investigation; the Fingerprint or Identification Division, who
handled all matters of identification; the Training Division who
handled the liaison with the police, the Domestic Intelligence Divi-
sion furnishing information concerning hate groups and threats to
Dr. King and other leading Blacks; and, of course, the General
Investigative Division who handled the criminal matters; the Spe-
cial Investigative Division who handled organized crime matters,
where any threats might have been represented against leading
Blacks.

The point is that all divisions of the FBI, and all FBI men, were
involved in this overall case.

Mr. Beeson. OK. I understand that. I only wanted to clarify that
the actual control and day-to-day operation of the investigation was
within the province of the General Investigative Division, Division
6 .

Mr. DeLoach. That’s absolutely correct, sir.

Mr. Beeson. The investigation itself has been referred to, Mr.
DeLoach, as a special investigation.

What are the implications of characterizing an investigation as a
special investigation?

Mr. DeLoach. A crime so horrible, a crime that was of immense
importance to the Nation, a crime in which so much pressure was
put on by outside, external forces. In some situations responsibility
is fixed by the Department of Justice, that made it a major case;
tremendous publicity that was involved in such a crime. Many
things would enter into such a matter making it such a major case.

Dr. King, being a major figure, why, this naturally was a major
case.

Mr. Beeson. In terms of the operation of the investigation, how
was it handled any differently from a normal criminal investiga-
tion?

Mr. DeLoach. In major cases, to the best of my recollection —
and, again, I have been gone almost 9 years, Mr. Beeson — but I do
have recollection that we would demand, insist, with the true
discipline in the FBI, that daily teletypes be sent in, that summary
reports be sent in on a frequent basis, that any major breaks in the
case or changes in the case be called in, on a constant basis; in
other words, that FBI headquarters be kept constantly up to date
by the field, so we in Washington would know what to do at all
times.

Mr. Beeson. It would be fair to say, would it not, Mr. DeLoach,
that a special investigation was not a category created for this
investigation; it was one which was created for all major cases
handled by the FBI at that time?

Mr. DeLoach. I think all major cases were handled pretty much
on the same basis. However, I must say that in this particular case
I believe more pressure was put on than any other case that I can
recall; and I supervised other cases, including the Mackle kidnap-
ping case, and quite a number of others.

Mr. Beeson. I would like to change the focus of questioning
somewhat now.

As Professor Blakey stated during the narration, a committee
staff report was issued today summarizing the current findings of
the committee concerning the Department of Justice and the FBI’s
assassination investigation.

Have you had an opportunity to review a draft copy of that
report previously?

Mr. DeLoach. I received the report last night upon arriving in
Washington. I have scanned through it twice, Mr. Beeson, not
thoroughly, but I have scanned through it twice.

Mr. Beeson. We also sent you a draft copy of the report approxi-
mately 3 weeks ago, is that correct?

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir.

Mr. Beeson. You have not seen a draft copy of the report prior to
last night?

Mr. DeLoach. I have seen a draft copy of the report. I have not
seen a final copy of the report. The draft copy of the report was
delivered to my attorney’s office, not to me, and my attorney called
me, I believe last Thursday or last Friday, and indicated he had
received it; and I believe it was sent to the wrong man in his office.

However, I received a draft copy only last night, inasmuch as it
was not sent to my home, and I have not seen a final report yet,
Mr. Beeson.

Mr. Beeson. Let me summarize then — before getting into special
areas of questioning — the report’s findings.

The findings in the report indicate that the involvement of the
Department of Justice and specific attorneys within the Depart-
ment of Justice was in a background role. They received informa-
tion on the progress of the investigation. Major reports were sent
summarizing the investigation on a monthly basis of field offices.

Also, formal letterhead memoranda were sent summarizing the
resolution of specific issues under investigation, but in terms of the
actual day-to-day investigation and the control and operation of the
day-to-day Federal investigation, the report sees little evidence of
active participation by Department of Justice attorneys. In fact,
the investigation appears to have been in the exclusive province of
the FBI, with the Department of Justice maintaining a background
role, receiving information on a periodic basis but not involved in
the actual decisions and the focus and direction of the investiga-
tion.

Would you agree with that assessment of the investigation?

Mr. DeLoach. No, Mr. Beeson, simply because of the fact that I
took it upon myself to see Attorney General Clark not daily but
almost daily, and to brief him thoroughly on almost every aspect of
the investigation, in my opinion, and Mr. Clark from time to time
made suggestions as to things to look for and things to do; and I
certainly followed them out.

Mr. Beeson. Well, in terms of leads, directives from headquar-
ters, directives out of the Memphis field office — would you not
agree that the primary leadership and direction came from FBI
headquarters and that the role of the Department of Justice was
one of being informed after the fact, of investigative developments
in the field?

Mr. DeLoach. I think this, Mr. Beeson, that Mr. Clark and Mr.
Vinson, as indicated by your report, your draft report, indicated
they had complete faith in the FBI and were content to allow the
FBI to conduct the investigation and to report to them, which was
done.

Mr. Beeson. Yes, I don’t contest that, I just want to secure your
position on that.

Do you consider the background role of the Department of Jus-
tice attorneys to have been an appropriate role for them to take in
the investigation?

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Beeson, I think that the actions of Mr. Vinson
and Mr. Poliak in following the investigation were quite thorough.
I had no discrepancy with them concerning their supervision of the
investigation from a prosecutorial standpoint.

Mr. Beeson. Well, let me ask you the question this way: Do you
recall any efforts by the Department of Justice attorneys, either

Mr. Clark or Mr. Poliak, or any attorneys within the Civil Rights
Division, to become actively involved on a day-to-day basis in the
direction of the investigation?

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t personally recall that — on a day-to-day
basis. I would be terribly surprised if they had not offered sugges-
tions as to conducting the conduct of leads, possible suggestions as
to the conduct of the case.

I think you’ve got to remember that in my position I was dealing
more or less with Attorney General Clark on a constant basis, and
the supervisory agents were dealing with Mr. Poliak and Mr.
Vinson more or less on a constant basis; so I am not in a good
position to answer your question.

The only thing I can say is, I dealt quite frequently with Mr.
Clark, and I kept him fully advised, in my opinion, and Mr. Clark
did from time to time discuss the case with me, thoroughly, and did
make some suggestions from time to time.

Mr. Beeson. The report also — in line with this line of question-
ing — finds substantial amount of evidence that relations between
the Department of Justice and the FBI were at times strained, at
at times counterproductive. Incidents were discussed which indicat-
ed mutual distrust on the part of FBI officials and Department of
Justice officials during the course of the investigation, and inci-
dents were located which indicated a lack of respect for the leader-
ship provided in 1968 by the Department of Justice over the activi-
ties of the FBI.

Do you consider this an accurate characterization of the relations
which existed at the time between the Department of Justice and
the FBI?

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir, Mr. Beeson, I do not.

With all due respect to the committee — and I want to be as
helpful to the committee as I possibly can — and I am testifying to
the best of my belief, and based on my opinion— there was a
distrust between Mr. Hoover and Attorney General Clark; there
was more or less a feeling of hostility between Mr. Hoover and
Attorney General Clark, but on a working level, for instance, on
my own level, I had very pleasant relations with the Department of
Justice, and I don’t recall but one specific instance, an isolated
instance, where there was a feeling or incident which occurred
which one might express distrust or lack of confidence.

I have here, for instance, Mr. Beeson, a number of letters, includ-
ing one from Mr. Clark:

Dear Deke: Warmest congratulations on your appointment as an Assistant to the
Director. This is a high and well-deserved honor indeed. It is a privilege to be
associated with you in the Department and reassuring to know that the great
Bureau will now employ your talents to even higher purposes.

Sincerely,

Ramsey.

Mr. Beeson. This would have been in 1965?

Mr. DeLoach. That was in 1965, yes, sir.

Mr. Beeson. Would you care to have these introduced in the
record, Mr. DeLoach?

Mr. DeLoach. I would be perfectly glad to, sir, if I could get
them back.

Mr. Beeson. I am sure we could make copies and give you back
the originals.

Mr. DeLoach. Fine. I have other copies of letters here, simply to
express my own relationship with the Department of Justice, but
there is no need for me to take the time of the committee or the
people here to read these; but my point is that while there was a
feeling on the part of Mr. Hoover from time to time that the
Department of Justice was trying to take headlines away from the
FBI, there was no such — there was a very pleasant working rela-
tionship among the troops, so to speak.

Mr. Beeson. Your recollection then, in terms of your own — let
me ask you this first: The date of Mr. Clark’s letter commending
you on your appointment as Assistant to the Directorship, what is
that?

Mr. DeLoach. The date on it?

Mr. Beeson. Yes, sir.

Mr. DeLoach. December 2, 1965.

Mr. Beeson. In 1968, which is the focus of my questioning, is it
your recollection today that in fact your relations with Mr. Clark
were harmonious?

Mr. DeLoach. With the exception of one isolated incident, Mr.
Beeson, yes.

Mr. Beeson. Did this incident occur on June 8, the day of Mr.
Ray’s arrest, Mr. DeLoach?

Mr. DeLoach. That’s correct, it did, sir.

Mr. Beeson. Is it not, in fact, the case that following a confronta-
tion with Mr. Clark on that day, your functions as liaison with the
Department of Justice were terminated by Mr. Clark?

Mr. DeLoach. I have read your report, Mr. Beeson, and it states
that; but frankly I have no such recollection of any — Mr. Clark
calling Mr. Hoover, whatsoever, and terminating me as liaison. As
a matter of fact, let me make it very clear to the committee and to
you, sir, that I was never established formally, to the best of my
knowledge, as liaison with the Department of Justice. There was
no such title, to my recollection. I took it upon myself to keep the
Attorney General advised because I had a very close personal
friendship with him and close relationship with him.

Mr. Beeson. Was there any other Headquarters official who was
more involved in the briefing of Mr. Clark during the assassination
investigation than yourself?

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir.

Mr. Beeson. OK. I did not mean to imply that there was an
official designation of “liaison”; but that was, in fact, one of the
roles that you served during the assassination investigation, cor-
rect?

Mr. DeLoach. But I do not recall Mr. Clark calling over and
indicating that my services should be terminated as liaison to him.
It may have happened, but I certainly don’t recall it.

Mr. Beeson. In other words, if Mr. Clark were to testify to that
effect, it is your opinion that his recollection would be erroneous on
that matter?

Mr. DeLoach. I have no recollection of Mr. Clark calling Mr.
Hoover. As a matter of fact, Mr. Hoover, to the best of my knowl-

edge, never told me that I was terminated or that I should not see
the Attorney General or officials of the Department again.

As a matter of fact, Mr. Beeson, I quite frequently conferred with
the Department of Justice following the apprehension of James
Earl Ray on many cases.

Mr. Beeson. Let me ask you this, Mr. DeLoach: Did you confer
specifically with Mr. Clark

Mr. DeLoach. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. Beeson [continuing]. Following the apprehension of Mr. Ray?

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir, I would not have, unless Mr. Clark called
me, and I did not take it upon myself to contact Mr. Clark.

I have seen Mr. Clark since then within recent months and we
had a very cordial, brief conversation, shook hands. There is no — to
my knowledge — certainly not on my part — there is no feeling of
hostility toward Mr. Clark.

Mr. Beeson. If I understand your testimony correctly, you met
with Mr. Clark on a weekly, if not daily basis, prior to Mr. Ray’s
arrest, and you have no recollection of being with him after Mr.
Ray’s arrest, is that correct?

Mr. DeLoach. After the isolated incident that I referred to, I
have no recollection of being with him. It may have been that
happened but I don’t recall it.

Mr. Beeson. So that would be consistent with Mr. Clark’s recol-
lection that your function as liaison with Mr. Clark was, in fact,
terminated?

Mr. DeLoach. Yes; as long as you understand Mr. Beeson there
was never any such designation or never any such title with Mr.
Clark. The records should also reflect that I had frequent liaison
with the Department of Justice.

Mr. Beeson. I understand that. I am dwelling now on your
relation with the Attorney General of the United States, Mr. Clark
at the time. Your testimony today remains that, beyond this isolat-
ed incident on June 8, you recall harmonious relations only be-
tween the FBI and the Department of Justice?

Mr. DeLoach. As far as I personally am concerned, as far as Mr.
Rosen is concerned, as far as many of the agents working under
Mr. Rosen’s supervision or, as a matter of fact, the Intelligence
Division or other divisions. There were frequent not only official
conferences but social intercourse between the FBI and the Depart-
ment of Justice numerous times.

Mr. Beeson. Investigative files reflect no use of grand jury
during the assassination investigation, Mr. DeLoach. The grand
jury, of course, was an investigative method which required close
coordination between the Department of Justice and the FBI in
whatever investigation is involved; attorneys working closely with
agents in the development of witnesses, strategy conferences, im-
munization decisions.

Can you explain why the grand jury method was not employed
during the assassination investigation?

Mr. DeLoach. To the best of my ability, sir, frankly, as I said in
executive testimony previously, did not recall any request concern-
ing the grand jury investigation. After reading the report refresh-
ing my memory, there was one request for either a search warrant
or grand jury investigation, so the Bureau did make a request.

However, the matter of an establishment of a grand jury is entirely
up to the Department of Justice. Based upon the facts furnished to
them by the FBI, the FBI could not in my opinion, to the best of
my recollection, go to the Department of Justice and say we want a
grand jury.

It is not up to us to do that. We were an investigative agency.
We determined the facts, the Department handles the prosecution.
They determine whether or not a grand jury is to be established.

I would like to go further, if I may, please. I agree thoroughly
with Attorney General Clark and Attorney General Vinson of the
Criminal Division, as expressed in your report, that a grand jury
would have been laborious, inefficient, might even perhaps slow
down the investigation, when we were looking throughout the
world as intensively as we could for James Earl Ray, and would
have been of little usage. I agree with that because I think we have
established that grand jury investigation during the fugitive inves-
tigation, would have taken the time of agents, would have taken
the time of officials of the Department of Justice, and agents of the
FBI. I doubt very seriously whether it would have been productive,
as later investigation has more or less established.

Mr. Beeson. Is your view any different for the situation after Mr.
Ray’s incarceration, in terms of the possibility of then utilizing
perhaps in more leisure a grand jury investigation in order to
determine whether or not there might have been associates of Mr.
Ray involved in the assassination?

Mr. DeLoach. As your report reflects, the FBI did make a re-
quest for grand jury investigation or search warrant in one particu-
lar instance, and it was turned down. I do not recall this. I am
testifying strictly based on opinion. But I would certainly think
that after a turndown by the Department of Justice in this one
instance, expressed a philosophy that would have kept the FBI
from making further requests for grand jury investigation. It ap-
peared very obvious that the philosphy of the Department of Jus-
tice was there should be no grand jury investigation.

Mr. Beeson. The one instance that you are referring to was a
request by the FBI to the Department of Justice to consider using
grand jury subpena to obtain the notes of William Bradford Huie,
who was an author who was in indirect communication with Mr.
Ray at the time and possibly had information in his possession
indicating a possible conspiracy.

The decision of the Department of Justice not to pursue a search
warrant in that case, based on memos that we have reviewed,
appears to have been based on the rather narrow grounds that
there were serious first amendment problems; also a question of
whether or not Mr. Huie was in fact an agent of Mr. Ray and
therefore subject to the attorney-client privilege, which might be
violated by an attempt to compel the production of those notes.

In other words, there were serious legal questions involved in
that specific instance which would not appear in a grand jury
investigation, say, of Mr. Ray’s associates, a grand investigation
perhaps of the associates of Mr. Ray’s brothers, a grand jury inves-
tigation of Mr. Ray’s escape from the Missouri State Prison, and
possible involvement of a family member there.

In light of that review of the basis of the Department of Justice’s
decision not to use it in that one instance, you still think that in
fact provided guidance for the use of grand jury throughout the
investigation?

Mr. DeLoach. In my opinion; yes, Mr. Beeson.

Mr. Beeson. Let me just review one other point you have made
in this area, Mr. DeLoach. You stated the ultimate decision to
employ grand jury is the Department of Justice’s. I agree with you.
But it is certainly not beyond the ability of the FBI to recommend
areas which might be fruitfully explored through the grand jury
investigation. Is that correct?

Mr. DeLoach. In consultation with the U.S. attorneys or with
representatives of the Department of Justice, the FBI could have
made a suggestion.

Mr. Beeson. In fact, it was the recommendation of the FBI to use
the grand jury against Mr. Huie’s notes that brought the Depart-
ment of Justice into that consideration in the first place?

Mr. DeLoach. You are absolutely correct.

Mr. Beeson. Following Mr. Ray’s guilty plea in 1969, a decision
was made to interview Mr. Ray to determine whether or not you
had evidence of possible conspiracy in the case. Several alternative
approaches to Mr. Ray were considered, including a grand jury,
placing him before a grand jury and taking sworn testimony, and
also a basic field interview by an FBI agent, in the end the decision
was made for Mr. Ray to be interviewed one-on-one by the head of
the Memphis FBI office.

Do you recall whether or not any consideration was given to the
possible participation by a Department of Justice attorney in that
interview of Mr. Ray?

Mr. DeLoach. I do not, sir. I have no such recollection.

Mr. Beeson. What would your position have been concerning the
involvement of a Department of Justice attorney in an interview of
that nature?

Mr. DeLoach. Looking back over 9 years, Mr. Beeson, and know-
ing of the thoroughness of Mr. Vinson, I would have recommended
and can now think of no objection to Mr. Vinson accompany SAC
Jensen to such an interview. It may have happened, but, again, I
am testifying — and just trying to be of help to the committee —
testifying based on opinion, that it might have been felt at that
time — I don’t know this to be true but having some knowledge of
investigative activities, it was felt at the time you might get more
from an individual like James Earl Ray, a loner, a bigot, a man
that was somewhat of an egotist if there was a one-on-one investi-
gation rather than two against one. The FBI has always had some-
what of a rule that not over two agents should interview one
defendant, because one, the possibility of deprivation of civil liber-
ties of the defendant, or, two, the fact that the defendant would be
more willing to talk to one or two men rather than talking to an
“army.” So that may have been the idea here, but I don’t recall
specifically in this particular instance.

Mr. Beeson. As you heard in Mr. Blakey’s narration, no Miranda
warnings were given prior to the initiation of this interview. Do
you consider this proper or improper investigative procedure?

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t know what was in Mr. Jensen’s mind, who
conducted the interview, and again this was many years ago — but
again, based on opinion, I can only consider the fact that the FBI
went to great lengths to get the opinion of the Department of
Justice to get approval and permission from the Department of
Justice to conduct this interview; and second, to get the opinion of
the defendant’s attorney at the time to conduct the interview on a
singular basis. So Mr. Jenson, possibly believing he had approval of
both the Attorney General and the Department of Justice and the
defendant’s attorney, possibly felt there was no need to warn him
of his rights at the time of interview while he was in incarceration.

Mr. Beeson. Your speculation is certainly correct. The interview
was authorized by the Department of Justice and in fact the FBI,
through one of their Texas regional offices, made contact with Mr.
Percy Foreman, then the attorney of record for Mr. Ray, and Mr.
Foreman gave permission for the interview of his client out of the
presence of FBI agents — I don’t want any misunderstanding
there — or rather out of the presence of himself.

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir.

Mr. Beeson. My question goes to whether or not Mr. Ray himself
should have been advised of his constitutional right to have an
attorney present at that time and the other particulars which are
always given or which are normally given to a defendant prior to
the initiation of an interview by government authorities.

Mr. DeLoach. I can only say again, Mr. Beeson, having the
approval of the defendant’s attorney and the Attorney General and
the Department of Justice, Mr. Jensen, who conducted the inter-
view at the time possibly felt there was no need to warn him of his
rights. That is strictly sheer speculation, not based on knowledge.

Mr. Beeson. What would your recommendation have been if you
had been consulted on whether or not Miranda rights should have
been given in that situation?

Mr. DeLoach. Let me point this out. Mr. Jensen was a very
thorough, experienced FBI special agent in charge. I am certain in
my own mind, my opinion, is that he knew of Miranda, that on
many occasions in the past he had given subjects their rights in
advance of an interview, so being an experienced man, he undoubt-
edly felt, having the approval of the Attorney General and the
Department of Justice, having the approval of the defendant’s at-
torney, there was no need to advise him of his rights.

I am certain, knowing Mr. Jensen as I do, under no circum-
stances would he or any member of the FBI in interviewing James
Earl Ray or in the conduct of an interview with James Earl Ray,
anyone in the case, have had any idea of depriving anyone of their
civil liberties.

Mr. Beeson. So there is no mistake, in authorizing the interview,
the Department of Justice did not authorize the interview without
Miranda rights. Similarly, Mr. Foreman did not authorize the in-
terview without Miranda rights. But if I could repeat the question,
what would your advice have been to Mr. Jensen if you had been
consulted concerning the administration of Miranda rights in this
situation?

Mr. DeLoach. I think Mr. Jensen was perfectly in his rights to
conduct the interview as he did.

39-935 0 - 79 -3

Mr. Beeson. Without the administration of Miranda rights?

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, having the approval that he did, I feel he
acted properly.

Mr. Beeson. Mr. DeLoach, I would like to change the focus now
to another area of the assassination investigation. Some brief back-
ground facts: Mr. Ray is arrested in June 1968; he is, after some
extradition hearings in England, taken to Shelby County, Tenn.,
where he is placed in the custody of Shelby County authorities in
the Shelby County Penitentiary. His first attorney is Arthur
Hanes, Sr. Mr. Hanes represents Mr. Ray until November 1968,
when Mr. Foreman comes into the case.

Approximately 2 months before the termination of his represen-
tation, Mr. Hanes submitted a motion to Judge Battle, who is the
trial judge in the case, concerning certain conditions of confine-
ment for Mr. Ray. In responding to that motion, Judge Battle ruled
that communications going between Mr. Ray and his attorney, Mr.
Hanes, were privileged communications, that they could be perused
by the prison authorities in an attempt to ascertain any breach of
security of the prison, but that they were not to be reviewed in
order to ascertain the full contents of the letters, which were
privileged communications between a criminal defendant and his
attorney facing trial.

Do you recall this general situation?

Mr. DeLoach. As I testified in executive session, Mr. Beeson, I do
not recall the specific incident. My memory has been refreshed
after reading your report.

Mr. Beeson. Mr. Chairman, if I could have the committee clerk
give to Mr. DeLoach a copy of Martin Luther King exhibit F-503 at
this time.

[Handed to witness.]

Mr. Beeson. I will describe this for the record. It is a copy of the
September 30 teletype, going between the Memphis field office of
the FBI and the Washington headquarters of the FBI. It is two
pages long. It is dated September 30, 1968.

Mr. DeLoach, please familiarize yourself with it first.

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir.

Mr. Beeson. I will read for the record the portion of the second
paragraph on page 1 which starts:

Judge Battle ruled that written notes exchanged between Ray and his attorney
are privileged; however, the Shelby County sheriff or his designated agent has the
authority to peruse these notes to determine if there is any attempt to breach
security of the jail. These notes should not be perused for the purpose of ascertain-
ing the full contents of the messages.

Again, this is a summary of the proceedings in Memphis being
sent from the Memphis field office to Washington headquarters. Do
you recall seeing this teletype, Mr. DeLoach?

Mr. DeLoach. I do not, sir.

Mr. Beeson. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would ask that the
witness be able to review Martin Luther King exhibits F-508, F-
509, and F-510. 1

If we could start with exhibit F-508 and go through these togeth-
er, perhaps that would save some time. F-508 — you will notice the
numbers in the upper right-hand corner— is a memorandum. It is

MLK exhibits F-508, F-509, and F-510 appear at pp. 81-87 of this volume.

sent from the special agent in charge of the Memphis field office
again to the Director in Washington. It is dated October 11, 1968.
The memorandum indicates:

Enclosed are two Xerox copies of the letter and envelope addressed by subject
James Earl Ray to Mr. Arthur Hanes, Sr., Attorney. This letter was written by Ray,
October 3, 1968, while incarcerated in Shelby County Jail, Memphis, Tenn.

The memorandum includes as an attachment a Xerox copy of
Mr. Ray’s letter to Mr. Hanes dated October 3. This is, of course, 3
days after Judge Battle’s order concerning Mr. Ray’s correspond-
ence with his attorney. Do you recall seeing a copy of this letter at
FBI headquarters?

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir, I don’t, Mr. Beeson. As a matter of fact I
believe none of these memoranda have my initials on them.

Mr. Beeson. Let me turn to F-509, Mr. DeLoach. So the record
can be clear on what we are reviewing here, this is a similar
memorandum from the field office in Memphis to the Director of
the FBI. It is dated October 14, 1968. This memorandum also
includes as an attachment a letter dated October 14, 1968, from the
subject Mr. Ray, to his attorney Arthur Hanes, this letter being
sent 2 weeks after Judge Battle’s order. I take it from your previ-
ous testimony you do not recall seeing this. Your initials are not on
this memorandum or on the accompanying letter; is that correct?
Mr. DeLoach. That is correct.

Mr. Beeson. Finally, Martin Luther King exhibit F-510, a third
communication from the Memphis field office to Washington,
which encloses, among other things, a letter from subject Ray to
his attorney Arthur Hanes. This memorandum also directs the
attention of Washington headquarters to portions of Mr. Ray’s
letter to Mr. Hanes and states:

Of significance, Ray in his letter to Hanes requests that Mr. Huie not go to any of
the addresses in Miami until after the trial.

In this connection, Ray also states:

* * * that part of the story just covers a few days anyhow and is not too
important.

This is sent on October 24, after Judge Battle’s order. Your
initials do not appear on the memo. Is it your testimony you do not
recall seeing this letter or memorandum?

Mr. DeLoach. That is correct, sir, to the best of my knowledge.
Mr. Beeson. Mr. DeLoach, my question to you is this: What we
have here derived from FBI files is, first of all, the September 30
communication from the Memphis field office indicating an under-
standing of Judge Battle’s orders concerning the privileged nature
of Mr. Ray’s communications with his attorney. We then have, on
at least three separate occasions after that order, the Memphis
field office sending to Washington Xerox copies of letters that Mr.
Ray is sending to his attorney at the time.

Can you provide the committee with any explanation for the
conduct of the Memphis field office in systematically collecting
copies of letters sent from a criminal defendant to his attorney
during the course of trial preparation?

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Beeson, I can only speculate or give you my
personal opinion since my initials do not appear on any of these
and I do not recall any of these as specifically stated in the record

prior to this. My opinion is that, as Mr. Jensen has previously
testified, I would certainly agree with his testimony that these
were not solicited by the FBI. These were voluntarily given to the
FBI. Whether Mr. Jensen and the FBI may have accepted them
under the perogative of Judge Battle’s opinion. In other words,
they could be perused for security reasons. I don’t know, but I
would presume this was what happend.

Mr. Beeson. Let’s take this up point by point. Do you find a
significant difference in terms of analyzing the conduct of the
Memphis field office in the issue of whether or not they were
merely willing recipients of these letters or in fact initiated the
mail interception?

Mr. DeLoach. The only way I can answer that question, Mr.
Beeson, if someone were to hand me a letter following Judge
Shelby’s decision that these notes could be perused for security
reasons, the FBI having the leading responsibility for investigation
in this case and knowing full well the background of James Earl
Ray to have a record of previous escapes, certainly had the respon-
sibility to review these for security reasons to see if James Earl
Ray had planned an escape from prison. As a matter of fact, this
later did happen after he was transferred to another institution.

Mr. Beeson. The FBI had absolutely no responsibility for the
custody of Mr. Ray in Memphis, is that not correct?

Mr. DeLoach. They still had a responsibility for the investiga-
tion of the case, but they had no responsibility that I can recall for
the custody of Mr. Ray at that time.

Mr. Beeson. They were not in a position to take any direct
action concerning possible breaches of security. In fact, that was
the responsibility of the Shelby County authorities, is that not
correct?

Mr. DeLoach. Would you repeat the question, please.

Mr. Beeson. They had no jurisdiction concerning Mr. Ray’s in-
carceration in Shelby County. This is the responsibility of the
Shelby County authorities, is that correct?

Mr. DeLoach. As far as incarceration is concerned, this is cor-
rect, but if this man had escaped once again, the FBI certainly
would have had increased responsibility all over again. We still
had the leading responsibility from the standpoint of conspiracy or
the investigation of the case.

Mr. Beeson. Let me ask you this, Mr. DeLoach. If it is your
feeling that what the FBI was involved in here was perusing these
letters to attempt to ascertain a breach of security of Shelby
County Prison, why does there appear in the third memorandum
going to the Washington headquarters a paragraph describing Mr.
Ray’s comments concerning witnesses in Miami, and the fact that
that only covers a small part of the story anyway?

Mr. DeLoach. Which exhibit are you referring to, Mr. Beeson?

Mr. Beeson. Martin Luther King exhibit F-510.

Mr. DeLoach. And your question please, again.

Mr. Beeson. You will note that in the memorandum which is
accompanying Mr. Ray’s letter, it is pointed out by the Memphis
field office that Mr. Ray comments on witnesses in Miami, and that
that part of the story “only covers a few days anyhow.”

If in fact the FBI was perusing these letters solely to see whether
or not there was an attempt to breach the security of Shelby
County penitentiary, what conceivable purpose is there for high-
lighting that portion of Mr. Ray’s letter?

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Beeson, how was the FBI to know, one way or
another, whether or not the witnesses referred to were not people
who would assist him in an escape?

Mr. Beeson. If, in fact, as was the case, the order of Judge Battle
was these letters could be perused to attempt to ascertain breaches
of security of the Shelby County Prison situation, does it not go far
beyond the authorized action to Xerox these letters, receive them
in the Memphis field office and then to transmit them to Washing-
ton headquarters? If in fact the only purpose was to attempt to
ascertain breaches of security, what purpose was there in sending
these letters, after they had been perused, to Washington head-
quarters?

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Beeson, the Memphis field division was only
one field division that had responsibility. It was the office of origin
but Bureau headquarters had the coordination of the entire investi-
gation. There were many things in the FBI files which are not
included in the files of the Memphis division, as the committee
knows from its perusal of files during this investigation.

Again, this is sheer speculation and not based on knowledge, but
I am trying to help the committee by giving my opinion. Obviously
these letters were sent to FBI headquarters to determine if the
supervisory agents saw anything in these letters which represented
a breach of security and a possible attempted escape on the part of
James Earl Ray. I can assure you that I believe I never heard of
any desire to abrogate or to violate the civil liberties of James Earl
Ray.

Mr. Beeson. Mr. DeLoach, there are indications in FBI files that
the initial interception of this correspondence occurred at the
Shelby County Prison by Shelby County Prison authorities. They,
of course, perused the mail themselves under Judge Battle’s order.
What additional purpose could have been served in terms of the
security of the prisoner for them to pass the mail on to the FBI
after they had themselves perused the mail and determined what-
ever implications it had on the security of the prisoner?

Mr. DeLoach. Simply because of the fact, Mr. Beeson, the FBI
had responsibility for the case, the overall investigative responsibil-
ity. The sheriffs office had custody of the man, but they had little
knowledge of the overall investigation of this case.

Mr. Beeson. Mr. DeLoach, I would like to turn to another area
now, the area of electronic surveillance or its use or attempted use
during the assassination, if you recall, about the use or attempted
use of electronic surveillance in the assassination investigation.

Mr. DeLoach. I do not, sir. However, my memory was refreshed
by reading your report.

Mr. Beeson. Let’s go to the documents that lay at the foundation
of that report, then.

Mr. Chairman, if Mr. DeLoach could be given a copy of Martin
Luther King exhibits F-501, F-502, and F-507.

Mr. Beeson. If we can go through these again in order starting
with exhibit F-501, I will describe that for the record. If you would

like to familiarize yourself with the document at this time, it is a
copy of a memorandum dated May 9, 1968.

It is directed from Mr. Rosen, the Assistant Director in charge of
the General Investigative Division, to Mr. DeLoach, captioned
“MURKIN.” The purpose described in the memorandum is:

To recommend the installation of technical surveillance on the telephones of
Albert and Carol Pepper, St. Louis, Missouri, and the telephone listed to the
Grapevine Tavern in St. Louis, Missouri, owned by Carol Pepper, subject's sister,
and operated by John Larry Ray, subject's brother, and the installation of a micro-
phone surveillance at the residences of Carol Pepper, and John Larry Ray, and at
the Grapevine Tavern.

It is then stated:

These installations could assist in the early apprehension of the subject which
could possibly be instrumental in reducing the stresses and tension placed on our
national security subsequent to the death of Martin Luther King, Jr.

The recommendation portion of the memorandum, the recom-
mendation is:

That a technical surveillance be installed on the telephones of Albert and Carol
Pepper and the Grapevine Tavern and a microphone surveillance be installed at the
residences of Albert and Carol Pepper and John Larry Ray and at the Grapevine
Tavern.

Does your initial appear on this memorandum?

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir.

Mr. Beeson. Along with the initial is a note you appended to the
end of the memorandum, is that correct?

Mr. DeLoach. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Beeson. Could you read the note, please.

Mr. DeLoach, “It is doubtful that the A.G. — meaning the Attor-
ney General— “will approve. These could be of great assistance.”

Mr. Beeson. Would you explain that comment first? Why did you
consider it doubtful the Attorney General would approve this rec-
ommended electronic surveillance?

Mr. DeLoach. I believe, Mr. Beeson, that my thoughts are ex-
pressed quite well in the memorandum. I don’t recall this but my
memory has been refreshed after reviewing your report. Down in
the third paragraph, where it was suggested in a memorandum
dictated by Mr. Long:

John Larry Ray has expressed a cooperative attitude; however, it is felt that he is
not giving us complete and accurate information. Carol Pepper refuses to submit to
interview and is not cooperative. It is felt that if the subject telephones, meaning
James Earl Ray, or personally contacts any of the relatives, it will most likely be
Carol Pepper or brother John Larry Ray.

There is obviously a second reason. In the first paragraph it says,
“These installations could assist in the early apprehension of the
subject.” We were spending hundreds of thousands of dollars of
taxpayers’ moneys, and we had the FBI tied up to a great extent on
this particular case. There was another overriding reason, again on
sheer speculation, as to why we thought it was necessary, and that
was spelled out in this sentence, “This could possibly be instrumen-
tal in reducing the stresses and tension based on our national
security subsequent to the death of Dr. King.”

Because of pillaging and rioting throughout our country, a time
of stress and strain, it is my opinion at this late date that the FBI

was very anxious to cause an early apprehension of the subject and
a solution of this case as early as possible.

As to the legality or illegality, Mr. Beeson, that is a matter
entirely up to the Department of Justice. The FBI can recommend
investigative leads to the department but in a matter of this
nature, as the committee well knows, at that particular time the
FBI was not placing any wiretaps or microphones, to the best of my
knowledge, unless they had the approval of the Attorney General.

The FBI felt if the Attorney General did approve, this would be
sufficient legal status. So there was no question in the FBI’s mind
as to the legality or illegality. It was a matter of putting an
investigative lead up to the Attorney General of the United States.

Mr. Beeson. Right now if you are responding, I am sorry that I
cut it off. “It is doubtful if the A.G. will approve,” what were you
thinking of at that time when you were speculating about the
possibility of having this proposal rejected by the Attorney Gener-
al?

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Clark’s philosophy that he was against wire-
taps unless they were under the aspect of national security. As
expressed in this memorandum by Special Agent Long, he felt this
did have a connotation of national security in view of the rioting,
pillaging, and burning that was going on in our country. However,
I felt that was not a strong enough case and the Attorney General
would probably disapprove as later turned out to be the case.

Mr. Beeson. To the best of your recollection, Mr. DeLoach, is it
not a fact that 5 weeks after the assassination major portions of
the rioting and pillaging had subsided in the country?

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, but some was still going on, Mr. Beeson, to
the best of my knowledge, and it could arise at any time. The
situation was still tense. Washington has never seen such things as
went on during the middle and late sixties — brickbats thrown
through the windows of the Department of Justice, the Pentagon
stormed, bombs going off in various hallowed institutions. There
was a very bad feeling in our country at that time.

Mr. Beeson. I just want to clarify. The situation you are current-
ly describing was not going on in Washington as of May 9, was it?

Mr. DeLoach. What date?

Mr. Beeson. May 9, the date of this memo — fires going off,
pillaging.

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall whether there was or not, Mr.
Beeson, but throughout the country there was considerable tense-
ness.

Mr. Beeson. If I could ask you to refer to Martin Luther King F-
502, the next memorandum in your pile. And if you would like to
familiarize yourself with that, I will describe it in the record. It is a
memorandum sent from Mr. J. J. Casper to Mr. Mohr. Its date is
May 10, 1968, 1 day following the initial memorandum. The pur-
pose of the memorandum is essentially to analyze within FBI head-
quarters the legality and constitutionality of the proposed electron-
ic surveillance, and also to recommend certain precautionary meas-
ures that might be taken by the FBI in order to avoid prejudice to
the case against Mr. Ray.

Mr. DeLoach. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Beeson. Do your initials appear on that memorandum, Mr.
DeLoach?

Mr. DeLoach. They do, sir.

Mr. Beeson. Do you recall this memorandum?

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir.

Mr. Beeson. Would you take an opportunity now to completely
familiarize yourself with the contents then, please?

Mr. DeLoach [reading]. OK, sir.

Mr. Beeson. Would it be fair to state, Mr. DeLoach, that the
conclusion reached in this memorandum is that the electronic sur-
veillance that was proposed would in fact be illegal and unconstitu-
tional but that by taking certain precautionary measures, prejudice
to the case against Mr. Ray could be avoided?

Mr. DeLoach. That apparently was the opinion of the training
division of the FBI and the attorney in the training division, Mr.
Dalby, who wrote this memorandum, Mr. Beeson.

Mr. Beeson. That the electronic surveillance would be illegal and
unconstitutional, correct? Referring, for example, to point 3 on the
second page, “Be aware since this search and seizure is unconstitu-
tional as to the Peppers”

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, I see that, Mr. Beeson.

Mr. Beeson. You did review this memorandum as indicated by
your initials on the document; is that correct?

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir, over 10 years ago.

Mr. Beeson. If I could ask you to refer to Martin Luther King F-
507, the final exhibit in front of you. 1 This, Mr. DeLoach, is a copy
of the actual authorization request that was sent by the FBI to the
Department of Justice and the Attorney General. It is dated May
13, 4 days after apparently initial consideration of the electronic
surveillance began at FBI headquarters, and the recommendation
of the FBI to the Attorney General is to implement the electronics
surveillance which is discussed in the previous memos. Is that not
correct?

Mr. DeLoach. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Beeson. My question to you is to request an explanation, for
the purposes of the committee’s investigation, of this attempt by
the FBI and yourself and Mr. Hoover to use what was analyzed
and recognized within FBI headquarters as unconstitutional and
illegal electronic surveillance in the assassination investigation?

Mr. DeLoach. My only answer, M-. Beeson, is that I do not
recall these memoranda. You have given me the opportunity of
reviewing them. I recall none of the circumstances surrounding
them. The Department of Justice makes the legal determination
insofar as FBI actions are concerned. The FBI was following an
investigative lead through the Department of Justice and the De-
partment of Justice had the responsibility of either accepting it or
turning it down in accordance with the rules of the United States
as understood by the Attorney General.

Mr. Beeson. Would it be fair to conclude from these memos that
the FBI in recommending this investigative step was willing to
engage in what it recognized as a violation of constitutional rights
of the Peppers and perhaps of other people in order to achieve the
investigative ends of the proposal?

1 MLK exhibit F-507 appears at p. 80 of this volume.

Mr. DeLoach. The conclusion I draw from it is the FBI was very
seriously concerned about the national security of the United
States by the incident I mentioned previously and a very fervent
desire to apprehend the man responsible for the assassination of
Dr. King. As a result, they forwarded an investigative lead to the
Attorney General, and the Attorney General would make a deci-
sion as to whether or not this would be conducted.

Mr. Beeson. Mr. DeLoach, do you recall any consideration given
to the taint problems that this recommendation could raise in a
possible conspiracy case against relatives of the Ray family?

To make my question clearer, evidence intercepted by these taps,
if they had been installed, would not have been admissible against
any of the family members of Mr. Ray because it was obtained in
an unconstitutional manner. In addition, that evidence could not
have been used as the basis for any type of investigation against
the family.

Did you consider the possible jeopardy that you were posing to a
possible conspiracy case against family members of Mr. Ray when
you recommend this proposal?

Mr. DeLoach. The question is moot, Mr. Beeson, because, as I
testified previously, I don’t recall the memoranda at all, so I do not
recall any taint. That was considered over 10 Vz years ago. It does
express to me a very sincere desire on the part of the FBI to look
into all aspects of the case including the possible conspiratorial
aspects of the case.

Mr. Beeson. Mr. DeLoach, in June of 1968 — to continue ques-
tions on electronic surveillance — title III was passed. It was a Fed-
eral statute which provided a basis for legal, court-authorized elec-
tronic surveillance in certain criminal investigations. Do you recall
any additional consideration being given to the use of legal elec-
tronic surveillance in this case following the passage of title III?

Mr. DeLoach. I have no such recollection, Mr. Beeson.

Mr. Beeson. One Final area of questioning, Mr. DeLoach. I be-
lieve you testified previously that Mr. Hoover was informed on the
progress of this case through telephone calls and conferences on
occasion. Is this the only basis or are there other bases on which he
was informed of the progress of the investigation?

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Beeson, I don’t recall ever personally face to
face briefing Mr. Hoover on this case. I did call him, I believe,
frequently to advise him of progress concerning the case, or else he
called me. But I don’t recall going to his office and briefing him
concerning the case at any time. As a matter of fact, Mr. Hoover
left the running of this case, the supervision of this investigation
largely up to Mr. Rosen and to me and the agents who were
handling it. But to be specific again, I don’t recall going to Mr.
Hoover’s office and briefing him on a face-to-face or one-to-one
basis. I did call him, I do recall vividly, using as an example, of
calling him, telling him about the identification of James Earl Ray
through fingerprints. I was so delighted, I called Mr. Hoover and I
immediately thereafter went over and briefed Attorney General
Clark on a one-on-one basis concerning this identification.

Mr. Beeson. Was it strange in your experience with Mr. Hoover
that you did not brief him in person on a case of this magnitude?

Mr. DeLoach. It wasn’t strange at all, Mr. Beeson. Despite the
fact that I was in charge of all investigative activities, it was the
policy in the FBI and historical policy you did not see Mr. Hoover
unless you had an absolute reason for doing so. And while I talked
to him on the telephone, I did not go to his office. At the times, I
saw him I requested an appointment ahead of time with his secre-
tary and was called in when his time allowed. I was handling this
investigation along with Mr. Rosen and the other agents that have
been mentioned here today, and I saw no reason to go in and brief
him.

I might say also, Mr. Beeson, that Mr. Hoover left the supervi-
sion of this case up to Mr. Rosen and to me.

Mr. Beeson. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if the witness could see one
final exhibit, Martin Luther King exhibit F-511. 1 For the record,
this is a seven-page memorandum dated June 20, 1968. It is written
by Mr. Hoover himself. The time on it is 1:05 p.m. The memoran-
dum is directed to Mr. DeLoach as well as Mr. Tolson, Mr. Rosen,
Mr. Bishop, and Mr. Sullivan, officials in the FBI at the time.

Mr. DeLoach, I don’t think there is need to go through this
entire memorandum. If I can direct your attention to the second
page, second full paragraph, the memorandum written by Mr.
Hoover is discussing a conversation he had with Attorney General
Clark, and he summarizes that conversation in the following way:

I stated that in Ray’s case, we have not found a single angle that would indicate a
conspiracy. I said the only significant thing is the money he had and which he spent
freely in paying bills and I thought that could have been obtained from a bank
robbery. The Attorney General said that if we could show he robbed the bank at
Alton, it would be helpful. I said we were working on that because he was paying
his bills with $50 bills up to his arrest. I said on the other hand he stayed at flop
houses and never stayed at first-class hotels but at the same time he spent, I
thought, $1,200 or more in buying guns and the car, which I thought was $1,500,
and then he took dancing lessons, bartender lessons, and lessons in picking locks,
and that is why I think security is so exceedingly important not only in England but
on the way back to this country and when he gets here.

Then, Mr. DeLoach, if you could refer to page 5 of the memoran-
dum starting with the second full paragraph in the second to last
sentence:

I said this shows his shrewdness. I said I think we are dealing with a man who is
not an ordinary criminal in the usual sense, but a man capable of doing any kind of
a sly act. The Attorney General said he was exceptionally clever.

I said Sirhan Sirhan is a different individual as he is a fanatic and killed Robert
Kennedy because he spoke in favor of Israel and this fellow being an Arab became
intensely bitter against Kennedy and felt he should be killed, which he did, but he
is a fanatic and Ray is not a fanatic in that sense. I said I think Ray is a racist and
detested Negroes and Martin Luther King and there is indication that prior to the
Memphis situation, he had information about King speaking in other towns and
then picked out Memphis. I said I think he acted entirely alone, but we are not
closing our minds that others might be associated with him and we have to run
down every lead.

In essence, Mr. DeLoach, Mr. Hoover appears to be indicating
the conclusion on his part, personal conclusion on his part, that the
evidence as of this point indicated no conspiracy and that most
likely Mr. Ray’s motive was racism, and that he indicated racism
and a personal dislike of Martin Luther King.

Did you personally and do you now agree with Mr. Hoover’s
general assessment of the case?

1 MLK exhibit F-511 appears at p. 88 of this volume.

Mr. DeLoach. I do, sir. In my opinion, Mr. Beeson, there is no
concrete evidence whatsoever established by this committee or by
witnesses before this committee that there is a conspiracy. When I
left the FBI in 1970, over 8 years ago, I believed that, I still believe
that. I do think that just as in the assassination of President
Lincoln, who was assassinated — what — on or about 116 years ago,
that from time to time people will write books, people will attempt
to exploit the situation, people will attempt to make money out of
the situation, people will attempt to bleed the taxpayers by trying
to perpetuate their own names and reputations out of these unfor-
tunate incidents.

But again, I repeat, to the best of my knowledge there is no
conspiracy, and I do agree with these statements. But at the same
time I think that committees of this nature do valuable service to
the people of the United States and the Congress by assisting in
running down leads and putting out fires of emotion that happen
from time to time as a result of such unfortunate incidents. I think
that the FBI in all instances should continue to run down leads
that continue to come up to prove whether or not there is a
conspiracy. But as of this time, based upon my knowledge in the
case, admittedly many years have passed, but nevertheless I know
of nothing which would indicate a conspiracy.

Here you had a subject who was a loner, an egotist, a bigot, a
man who had verbally in prison threatened to kill Dr. King, or said
he was going to kill Dr. King, a man that hated Blacks, a man that
wanted to be known, a man who stalked Dr. King; the evidence is
overwhelming that he did assassinate Dr. King.

Mr. Beeson. You have had an opportunity to review the staff
report concerning the conspiracy investigation which was conduct-
ed by the Department of Justice and FBI. The report finds evidence
and indicates a failure of the FBI and the Department of Justice
together to adequately explore the possibility of family involve-
ment in the assassination investigation. Would you care to com-
ment on those findings?

Mr. DeLoach. Your report makes that allegation, Mr. Beeson,
but, on the other hand, your report is somewhat contradictory in
that the report stated there was an intense effort to interview the
family and to stick with that phase of it, to continue interviews,
and there were frequent interviews of the family, as given the
example of the fact that the FBI at a late date wanted to put on an
electronic surveillance. If the Attorney General, the highest legal
officer in the United States, had approved, that was a direct exam-
ple of the FBI bringing pressure or at least attempting to find out
if there was a conspiracy involving the particular family.

Mr. Beeson. Mr. DeLoach, isn’t it clear from your recent review
of the documents surrounding the electronic surveillance request,
that the sole purpose stated for implementing that request was to
attempt to ascertain whether Mr. Ray made contact with family
members in order to locate the subject?

In other words, the use of electronic surveillance there was not
in order to ascertain possible evidence of a conspiracy but only to
attempt to track down a fugitive in the case?

Mr. DeLoach. While the memorandum may not have reflected
that, I feel certain it was in the minds of the FBI, certainly in my

mind at the time, any phase of the investigation including the
conspiracy that came about as a result of that microphone or
telephone surveillance, would have been beneficial to the FBI,
providing the chief legal officer of the United States, the Attorney
General, had given authority and thought it had been legal.

Mr. Beeson. Don’t you think it would have made a stronger
authorization request to the Department of Justice to include as
one of the reasons for it possible interception of evidence in the
conspiracy, if, in fact, that was in the minds of the FBI agents
involved in this request?

Mr. DeLoach. I doubt the necessity of the supervisory agent
including everything in a memorandum going to the Department of
Justice. I think he felt in his own mind — again this is sheer specu-
lation, Mr. Beeson — but that his case had been made strong enough
by considering the national security, by considering the absolute
necessity of the early apprehension of James Earl Ray, and deter-
mining whether or not other people were involved in that. It might
lead to the apprehension of Ray.

The very fact that he wanted to find out if the relatives were
involved certainly indicates a feeling that the FBI wanted to run
down any conspiratorial element.

Mr. Beeson. Mr. DeLoach, I don’t have any further questions for
you myself. Thank you very much.

Mr. DeLoach. Thank you, sir.

Chairman Stokes. At this time the Chair yields such time as it
may consume, after which the committee will operate under the 5-
minute rule.

Mr. DeLoach, you are aware, I am sure, that the committee has
received testimony of several former agents prior to your testimony
this morning, two of them, Mr. Brennan and Mr. Mohr, whom I am
sure you also know. Based upon the testimony already received, let
me ask you

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Chairman, excuse me, sir. I have not seen
their testimony. I have seen newspaper accounts.

Chairman Stokes. Yes; I didn’t mean to indicate that you had
seen the testimony. I meant you are aware of the fact they had
testified.

Mr. DeLoach. Yes; I’m sorry to interrupt you.

Chairman Stokes. Let me ask you a couple of general questions.
Maybe we can avoid an indepth interrogation on a couple of sub-
jects. Would you agree that between 1962 and April 4, 1968, the
Bureau conducted a security investigation of Dr. King and the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference to determine the extent
of Communist influence being exerted upon him?

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Kennedy, the Attorney General of the United
States, first requested — I am testifying strictly from knowledge
over a long period of time. Let me state first, Mr. Chairman, that I
was not on the investigative side of the House at that time and had
nothing to do with the request for the investigation of the electron-
ic surveillance on Dr. King — the initiation of it. I was then Assist-
ant Director in charge of the Crime Records Division, as I previous-
ly have testified. But to the best of my knowledge, Mr. Kennedy
requested the FBI to put an electronic surveillance on Dr. King,
and Mr. Hoover at that time felt this was not the thing to do and

sent the liaison man with the Attorney General back over to see
Mr. Kennedy and to talk him out of it.

Several months later when it was discovered there was a possibil-
ity of Dr. King being affiliated with a high-ranking member of the
Communist executive board, board of trustees, or whatever it was,
Mr. Hoover brought that to Mr. Kennedy’s attention immediately,
and Mr. Kennedy at that time authorized the surveillance. That
did initiate the surveillance on Dr. King, and it was handled by the
Domestic Intelligence Division. As I say, I did not have supervision
of the Domestic Intelligence Division and so consequently my
memory is somewhat hazy.

Chairman Stokes. Would you agree that between 1963 and 1968
the Bureau engaged in a campaign to discredit and neutralize Dr.
King as an effective civil rights leader?

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would like to answer
that question in this way. Dr. King made an allegation that FBI
agents were not to be trusted in the handling of civil rights cases
in Albany, Ga., inasmuch as they were all southern born, reared,
and educated. That cast great doubts upon the integrity of FBI
agents in the handling of civil rights cases. In those particular
cases the FBI was “damned if you do and damned if you don’t.” In
a certain State, agents had rattlesnakes put in the driver’s seat of
a car so they would be bitten when they sat down. Agents were spit
upon. Agents were refused service in restaurants. One agent’s wife
heard a knock at her door and she went to the front door and there
were four men carrying a coffin. They simply told her that her
husband’s body was contained in that coffin, dumped it on the floor
and left.

What I’m trying to point out— it was hard enough to investigate
civil rights cases at that time without allegations being made cast-
ing aspersions against the integrity of FBI agents. I can easily
understand that Dr. King at an emotional moment might have
made that statement, but it was not a true statement.

The fact was that four out of five agents in Albany were nothern
bom, reared, and educated. But this touched off a feud between
Mr. Hoover and Mr. King. In my opinion it was an unfortunate
feud. The feud alienated civil rights forces and prevented some
from furnishing badly needed information.

In a press conference that Mr. Hoover held, he indicated that Dr.
King was the most “notorious liar” in the United States. I was
against him making that statement and I think the feud was very
unfortunate as was the alleged campaign that you alluded to.

I sent Mr. Hoover during that press conference with 22 ladies,
three different notes asking him to withdraw that statement or at
least to indicate to the ladies that it was off the record, the
women’s national press group in the Washington area. He refused
to do so.

On the third occasion I sent him a note — he said to the effect:
“You mind your own business.” The ladies could not wait to get out
of the room and report this to the wire services and their papers.
This touched off the feud between Mr. Hoover and Mr. King.
Allegations flew back and forth

Dr. King later called Mr. Hoover “senile” and said he was
bowing under the weight of his office. Mr. Hoover again repeated

his notorious liar statement. Mr. Hoover again repeated this in a
statement later on to a reporter and I asked the reporter if he
would withdraw the statement from his article because it was
causing the FBI difficulties from a public relations standpoint, but
it did become more or less of a feud between the two men.

I was responsible for trying to contact Dr. King. Dr. King would
not return my calls. I did eventually talk to the now Ambassador
to the United Nations representing the United States and we ar-
ranged a meeting between Mr. Hoover and Dr. King and it turned
out to be a very peaceful meeting.

To specifically answer your question, there was a feud and a
campaign Mr. Hoover carried on and supervised and there were
unfortunately incidents that went on between the two men, mostly
on Mr. Hoover’s part to discredit Dr. King, to specifically answer
your question, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. When we strip your answer of the surplusage,
the answer to my question would be yes, wouldn’t it?

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir, it would, but on the part of both men.

Mr. Fauntroy. Would the chairman yield?

Chairman Stokes. I certainly yield to the gentleman from the
District of Columbia.

Mr. Fauntroy. It appears that the burden of Mr. DeLoach’s
testimony is that the feud began or surfaced at the time Mr.
Hoover had a press conference in 1964. Is that your testimony?

Mr. DeLoach. That is when Mr. Hoover answered Dr. King
insofar as the Albany, Ga., allegation is concerned. That is my
recollection, Mr. Fauntroy.

Mr. Fauntroy. Were you aware that Mr. Hoover exhibited hos-
tility for Dr. King much earlier?

Mr. DeLoach. I am not aware of that, sir.

Mr. Fauntroy. You are not aware of memos?

Mr. DeLoach. At least I don’t recall that, Mr. Fauntroy.

Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding. I will
look forward to my 5 minutes.

Chairman Stokes. Mr. DeLoach, let me ask you this: The com-
ments that were made by Dr. King with reference to the FBI and
Albany had occurred some 2 years prior to the statement made by
Mr. Hoover at the press conference when he called Dr. King a
notorious liar, had it not?

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall the specific dates, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Well, the press conference was in 1964, was it
not?

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall, sir.

Chairman Stokes. You don’t recall that the Albany situation
occurred in 1962?

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall that, sir. In the best of my knowl-
edge the two incidents were quite close together.

Chairman Stokes. Are you aware of the fact that Mr. Murtagh, a
former FBI agent, testified before this committee, and with refer-
ence to the FBI and their investigation of civil rights violations and
complaints, testified before this committee that the FBI was drag-
ging their feet?

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Chairman, I have every respect for you and
every respect for this committee, but I wonder if any member of

this committee or any member of the staff can name one FBI case
where the FBI dragged its feet in the civil rights field? I don’t
recall any.

Chairman Stokes. I am referring to the testimony of a former
FBI agent before this committee.

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t mean to discredit Mr. Murtagh in any way
whatsoever. I have not seen his testimony. But let’s consider Mr.
Murtagh for a minute, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Murtagh was never a supervisory agent. To the best of my
recollection Mr. Murtagh was an agent assigned to the Atlanta,
Ga., office. He was never assigned to FBI headquarters in Washing-
ton, D.C. Mr. Murtagh had no overall knowledge of the FBI and its
responsibilities. Mr. Murtagh had no responsibilities or knowledge
of the immense field of civil rights investigations, only those in
perhaps his narrow sphere of category of Atlanta or the surround-
ing area.

To be an expert witness, and I am not alluding to the fact that I
am an expert witness because there are many things that I don’t
know that may have happened at that time, but to be an expert
witness and make sweeping statements before this committee, he
had to have had knowledge or supervisory responsibility or knowl-
edge of the overall responsibility of the FBI which he did not have.
He was 1 agent of some 8,500 agents assigned to the field at that
time. I had never heard of Mr. Murtagh before he started volun-
teering to testify before various committees.

Chairman Stokes. Wouldn’t you agree that this is not necessarily
an area where one must possess expertise if one is testifying as a
result of his having been an employee stationed in that particular
branch of the FBI, testifying before this committee as to his own
personal knowledge and observations. That doesn’t require his
being an expert in that area, does it?

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Chairman, it would depend entirely upon why
that individual wanted to testify, what was his reason for testify-
ing, or whether he had an ax to grind against the FBI. Had he
written a book previously? Did he want publicity? What was his
reason for testifying?

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Murtagh was a former agent who retired
under honorable conditions. He is presently a professor of constitu-
tional law at a university who twice or three times during his
testimony before this committee broke down and professed his love
for the agency and the fact that he disliked having to testify to
these type of events that occurred in an institution that he loved.

Mr. DeLoach. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am not attempting to dis-
credit Mr. Murtagh in the least or his background. I do question,
however, his background of knowledge concerning the FBI consid-
ering his very narrow jurisdiction and responsibilities in the orga-
nization.

Mr. Fauntroy. If you will yield, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DeLoach, do you question his knowledge of the fact that the
FBI committed 15 agents in the Atlanta office to the task of run-
ning an electronic surveillance operation out of a hotel on Dr.
King? Do you question his knowledge?

Mr. DeLoach. I am not aware of the incident.

Mr. Fauntroy. But do you question his knowledge?

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t know whether I can question it or not. I
am not familiar with the incident.

Mr. Fauntroy. Do you question his knowledge that the request
was made of him to find an informant and get copies of the SCLC
stationery and copies of the handwriting of Andrew Young so that
it might be used against him in his effort to be elected to Congress?

Mr. DeLoach. I am not aware of the incident you speak of. I am
only aware of Mr. Murtagh’s background or assignment as an
agent and the fact that he had no overall knowledge of the FBI.

Mr. Fauntroy. Do you question that he had specific knowledge
of what was happening in that office that perhaps you were not
aware of?

Mr. DeLoach. Certainly there are things I am not aware of Mr.
Fauntroy, but I question his knowledge concerning the sweeping
allegations he has made.

Mr. Fauntroy. Were you aware the FBI was spending the time
and money of 15 agents full time to surveil Dr. King and the
SCLC?

Mr. DeLoach. I have no knowledge of that, Mr. Fauntroy.

Chairman Stokes. Mr. DeLoach, let me ask you, do you agree
that the campaign which you referred to that Mr. Hoover had
against Dr. King included efforts to convince the public as well as
members of Government that Dr. King was a person who should be
held in low esteem?

Mr. DeLoach. There were incidents ordered by Mr. Hoover
which would have caused that, Mr. Chairman, in various isolated
incidents.

Chairman Stokes. Would you agree that this campaign included
efforts to convince these same groups that Dr. King was a traitor
to his country and to his race?

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall that, Mr. Chairman. I don’t recall
any statements by Mr. Hoover or by agents that Dr. King was a
traitor, or a traitor to his race. I do recall at the meeting which a
member of this committee, Mr. Fauntroy, was present, and I was
present in Mr. Hoover’s office when they met, that Mr. Hoover
made the statement that Dr. King being the symbol of leadership
for millions of Blacks in the United States should be very careful
in picking his associates and his personal conduct because of that
very symbol of leadership.

Chairman Stokes. Now, even prior to the notorious liar state-
ment by Mr. Hoover, you were aware, were you not, of the intense
dislike Mr. Hoover had for Dr. King?

Mr. DeLoach. Your report, Mr. Chairman, says it was a hatred. I
don’t think Mr. Hoover ever hated anyone. I think he was incensed
that Dr. King would cast aspersions upon the integrity of FBI
agents and particularly an organization that he, himself, had de-
voted his life to and more or less had sacrificed his life to.

I think that that overrode Mr. Hoover’s judgment to some extent
and colored his supervision of these particular matters. But I don’t
think there was any deep-seated hatred on the part of Mr. Hoover
against Dr. King as exemplary of the meeting between the two
men which was very peaceful.

Chairman Stokes. Would you agree that when the Bureau first
began its electronic surveillance of Dr. King it was for the purpose

of monitoring the influence of others over him in terms of any
Communistic infiltration of the civil rights movement, but that
subsequently what the Bureau did was to utilize the information
obtained through that electronic surveillance for the purpose of
discrediting Dr. King?

Do you understand the question?

Mr. DeLoach. There are two parts, I believe, sir, and I will try to
answer both of them.

Former Attorney General Katzenbach has testified that in his
opinion the reason for Attorney General Kennedy first requesting
the investigation and later on authorizing the electronic surveil-
lance was to determine the extent of Communist influence over Dr.
King.

The second part of it was usage of the information. I do recall
the request of high ranking Members of Congress to obtain infor-
mation concerning Dr. King and Mr. Hoover approving giving this
information to those high ranking Members of Congress.

I do recall that Mr. Hoover from time to time not only furnished
information to the Attorney General but to the White House con-
cerning Dr. King.

Chairman Stokes. In terms of this COINTELPRO operation, you
had a specific role, did you not?

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir, not a specific role. I would like to make
the record clear in that regard, Mr. Chairman. This program was
initiated while I was on the administrative side of the house. I had
nothing to do with the initiation of this program. It was initiated
by Mr. William C. Sullivan, Assistant Director of International
Intelligence, and Alan Belmont, Assistant to the Director at that
time. They supervised and operated that program under Mr.
Hoover long before I became Assistant to the Director.

After I became Assistant to the Director and inherited this pro-
gram under Mr. Tolson and Mr. Hoover, up to that time I was not
privy to all aspects of this particular program.

Chairman Stokes. The program started August 25, 1967. What
were you doing at that time?

Mr. DeLoach. The program started to the best of my recollection
long before 1967.

Chairman Stokes. Well, the program, but not the COINTELPRO
aspect of it, the security aspects started long before, that is right.

Mr. DeLoach. To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Chairman, and I
could be corrected, but the program started long before that, the
COINTELPRO part of it.

Chairman Stokes. Did you at any time become a part of the
COINTELPRO part of it?

Mr. DeLoach. Occasionally Mr. Hoover would give me certain
assignments to handle in that area, yes, sir, and I operated strictly
under his orders.

Chairman Stokes. Part of the assignment given you by Mr.
Hoover was for you to participate in an operation where you would
discredit Dr. King in the press and in the general public; isn’t that
true?

Mr. DeLoach. To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Chairman, I
recall one incident — there may have been others — one incident
where Mr. Hoover ordered me to, by memorandum sent through

39-935 0 - 79 -4

him and then down to my office, to give one matter to the press. I
don’t recall any others. There may have been, but I don’t recall.

Chairman Stokes. Didn’t you have a role in attempting to block
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference from being able to
obtain funding? Did you have a specific role in that?

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall that, sir.

Chairman Stokes. Would the clerk furnish the witness with
MLK F-449A, F-449B, F-449C, F-449D, and F-449E?

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Have you had a chance now to review those
documents?

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir.

Chairman Stokes. Having reviewed them, does it refresh your
recollection?

Mr. DeLoach. I do not recall any of the memoranda previously,
Mr. Chairman, but I have reviewed them.

Chairman Stokes. I am sorry?

Mr. DeLoach. I say I do not recall having previously seen these
memorandum, so much time has passed, but I do appreciate the
chance to review them.

Chairman Stokes. Having reviewed them, does this now refresh
your recollection as to the question posed to you?

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir, I don’t recall these incidents at all, Mr.
Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. These memoranda that I have just shown you
do refer to a campaign to block the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference from receipt of funding by virtue of disseminating de-
rogatory information regarding Dr. King; does it not?

Mr. DeLoach. I believe all these memorandum originated with
the domestic intelligence operation. They were sent to my office
and I sent it to Mr. Hoover in view of his orders that he wanted to
see anything pertaining to Dr. King and his organization.

Chairman Stokes. I am not trying through my questions to give
you personal responsibility for it. All I am trying to do is get you to
testify to the campaign that was under way at that time. That
seems to me very simple to do.

Mr. DeLoach. I am testifying to the best of my ability, Mr.
Chairman, and I will get to that.

On one of these memorandum I believe I put on the bottom of it,
“I doubt this would be of any purpose.”

On the memorandum dated October 26, 1966, 12 years ago, it is
designated as D-31 MLK F-449C, that appears to be my memoran-
dum, Mr. Chairman, where I talked with Mr. John Bugas who was
the vice president of Ford Motor Co. and discussed with him the
facts contained therein.

Chairman Stokes. Was the purpose of your discussion with him
to block funding for SCLC?

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, as recommended by the Domestic Intelligence
Division and approved by Mr. Hoover, yes, sir.

Chairman Stokes. Mr. DeLoach, also didn’t the campaign include
a dissemination of derogatory information to Senators, college
presidents, and others to keep Dr. King from receiving honorary
degrees and awards?

Mr. DeLoach. I believe on one occasion, sir, a very high ranking
Senator of the United States asked Mr. Hoover for information, if I
recall correctly, and Mr. Hoover directed me to see this Senator
and give him the facts concerning Dr. King’s background.

The Bureau’s feeling at that time was that Congress had the
right to know. That is sheer speculation.

I also recall to the best of my recollection, Mr. Chairman, that on
one occasion a high ranking Senator of great seniority called down
and requested that a college president that he would send down to
FBI headquarters be advised of Dr. King’s background.

Chairman Stokes. Weren’t there other universities that were
approached, given derogatory information for the purpose of stop-
ping Dr. King from getting honorary degrees from those universi-
ties?

Mr. DeLoach. That could be, Mr. Chairman, but I don’t recall
any such incidents.

Chairman Stokes. If that was done, that had nothing to do with
national security, did it? This was totally for the purpose of dis-
crediting Dr. King, wasn’t it?

Mr. DeLoach. As I said previously, Mr. Chairman, it was part of
the orders issued by Mr. Hoover in connection with the feud with
Dr. King.

Chairman Stokes. Didn’t you also sit down with Speaker McCor-
mack and give him certain derogatory information about Dr. King?
Didn’t you go to the White House, sit with Walter Jenkins, give
him derogatory information about Dr. King? Isn’t that part of the
role you played?

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall any such incidents with Speaker
McCormack. It could have happened. If I did so, it was done strictly
at the orders of Mr. Hoover.

Insofar as Mr. Jenkins, I do not recall the incident, but Mr.
Jenkins was the highest ranking staff officer to the President and
it is possible that the FBI at Mr. Hoover’s instructions sent infor-
mation concerning Dr. King to the President and that I would have
delivered them, serving in a liaison capacity to the White House as
I was at that time.

Chairman Stokes. If I understand your testimony correctly, you
don’t deny that you did those things?

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir; Mr. Chairman, I do not deny it. I have no
recollection of it.

Chairman Stokes. Mr. DeLoach, didn’t the Bureau respond to
Dr. King’s criticism of the Vietnam war by using that to further
justify the campaign to neutralize and discredit him?

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall that, sir.

Chairman Stokes. Will the clerk please furnish the witness with
Martin Luther King exhibits F-458, F-441B, F-450B?

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Have you had a chance now to read those
documents?

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir.

Chairman Stokes. Having read them, do they refresh your recol-
lection as to the question posed to you?

Mr. DeLoach. I do not recall the memorandum, Mr. Chairman,
but I have reviewed these memorandum.

Chairman Stokes. I am sorry?

Mr. DeLoach. I do not recall at the time, 11 years ago, having
seen these memorandum, but I have reviewed them. These memo-
randum emanated from the Domestic Intelligence Division and
were sent to Mr. Hoover through my office.

Chairman Stokes. With your initials appearing thereon, it would
indicate at that time that you had seen those documents.

Mr. DeLoach. That is correct, sir.

Chairman Stokes. Therefore, you would have knowledge of the
information contained therein; isn’t that true?

Mr. DeLoach. It indicated that I had knowledge at that time, 11
years ago, Mr. Chairman, yes, sir.

Chairman Stokes. And now seeing it, does it or does it not
refresh your recollection as to what you learned 11 years ago?

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir; it has been so long ago, ancient history.

Chairman Stokes. Mr. DeLoach, you know that Dr. King was not
a Communist, don’t you?

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Chairman, I was not supervising the Domestic
Intelligence Division.

Chairman Stokes. No, no, no. I just asked you a very simple
question. The question is — I think you can answer this yes or no,
and if you want to elaborate, I am not going to shut you off, but
let’s be honest here — the question is: You know he was not a
Communist, don’t you?

Mr. DeLoach. I will answer this to the best of my ability, Mr.
Chairman.

I believe this committee has had before it an FBI informant who
testified to the fact that if Dr. King was not a Communist, he was
certainly close to it. I know of no indication that Dr. King was a
card-carrying member of the Communist Party.

As I say, I was not supervising the Domestic Intelligence Division
at the time and I was not privy to all the communications concern-
ing this matter. Later on when I became Assistant to the Director
in December 1965, 1 did learn more of the situation.

To the best of my recollection there was a high ranking member
of the Communist Party, or certainly a man alleged or reputed to
be a high ranking member of the Communist Party, who had great
influence over Dr. King. Whether or not this means Dr. King was a
puppet for the Communist Party, or for this man, I am not in a
position to state. That would take a legal mind to do that Mr.
Chairman. I only carried out my orders as given by Mr. Hoover.

Chairman Stokes. You have just made a very interesting state-
ment. You told us there was a high ranking man in the Communist
Party who had great influence over Dr. King.

Mr. DeLoach. As testified previously by an informant who ap-
peared before your group.

Chairman Stokes. You are not testifying from your own knowl-
edge?

Mr. DeLoach. I will testify from my own knowledge, Mr. Chair-
man. I don’t know, frankly, in my own opinion whether Dr. King
could be classified as a “member” of the Communist Party or not.

Chairman Stokes. And with reference to your statement about
someone high in the party exerting influence over him, do you
have any knowledge of that?

Mr. DeLoach. I recall, to the best of my recollection, there was
such a man, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Would you tell the committee, then, how you
know that this man had influence over Dr. King?

Mr. DeLoach. I was told, Mr. Chairman — and, again, I am testi-
fying from facts of 10 or 11 or 12 years ago and even beyond that,
Mr. Chairman — that this man wrote speeches for Dr. King, that
this man gave financial advice to Dr. King, that this man made
policy decisions for Dr. King, and consequently having been told
that, there certainly would have been some association between
this individual and Dr. King.

Chairman Stokes. Are you familiar at all with Dr. King’s intel-
lectual and educational attainments?

Mr. DeLoach. I have read some of Dr. King’s sermons, Mr.
Chairman. From the standpoint of my own knowledge, I know that
he was a symbol of leadership of the civil rights movement. I have
not gone into depth as to Dr. King’s intellectual education, no, sir.

Chairman Stokes. Well, maybe it would help you if I said to you
that Dr. King graduated from Morehouse College with honors,
graduated at the top of his class from Prozier Theological Semi-
nary, and acquired a doctorate in philosophy from Boston Universi-
ty-

Now, on what do you base the facts that someone else has
influenced this man who has this kind of educational attainment?
What evidence is there?

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Chairman, I am not contesting Dr. King’s
brilliance in the least or his symbol of leadership. The only way I
can answer your question is that the facts given to the Department
of Justice and the Attorney General of the United States, and he
felt they were sufficient to determine on the basis of electronic
surveillance, not initiated by me because I was not in domestic
intelligence at the time, or had supervision over that, but I was
told the Attorney General had approved it, based upon those par-
ticular facts, that he wanted to find out further the extent of
Communist leadership over Dr. King.

Again, I was not in a supervisory position at that time so my
memory is quite hazy based upon facts determined so long ago.

Chairman Stokes. Well, with reference to infiltration of the civil
rights movement by the Communist Party, you are aware, are you
not, that they did not infiltrate the movement?

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Chairman, it is my opinion that the Commu-
nists desperately tried to infiltrate the civil rights movement but
failed miserably.

Chairman Stokes. Failed miserably?

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir. I still believe that.

Chairman Stokes. And their failing miserably, the only credit
that could be given for their having failed miserably would be both
to the leadership of the civil rights movement and the people
involved in the movement and not the FBI; isn’t that true?

Mr. DeLoach. I think the FBI investigation in internal security
matters and in civil rights matters assisted greatly at that particu-
lar time, Mr. Chairman. But as to the specific answer to your
question, as to the FBI preventing the Communist Party from

infiltrating into the civil rights movement, yes, I think the FBI
assisted there. I think the FBI investigative efforts assisted greatly.

Chairman Stokes. What did they do to stop the infiltration?
They were running around bugging Dr. King’s home, SCLC’s head-
quarters, and Dr. King’s hotel rooms. What did they do to stop the
infiltration of the civil rights movement by the Communist Party?

Mr. DeLoach. Well, I think the FBI communications both to the
Attorney General and to the White House on occasion caused the
Department of Justice to brief civil rights leaders as to the dangers
involved.

To the best of my recollection — and I am not clear on this, Mr.
Chairman — I think the FBI communications to the White House
caused the White House officials on occasion to brief the civil
rights leaders of the dangers involved. In my opinion, even at this
late date it certainly would have assisted the civil rights leaders in
knowing who was trying to undermine and infiltrate them and it
caused them to be worried.

I think Mr. Hoover’s meeting with Dr. King where Mr. Hoover
indicated he should be very careful of his associations with certain
people assisted Dr. King from then on in being wary of such
associations.

Chairman Stokes. Then you really feel that a man who had the
education and intelligence that Dr. King had, that he needed Mr.
Hoover or somebody else to tell him about the dangers of the
Communist Party infiltrating the civil rights movement in Amer-
ica?

Mr. DeLoach. Not that isolated example, Mr. Chairman, but I
feel that men with equal brilliance over the years have been taken
in by the Communist Party and by Communist supervision. I do
feel there have been unfortunate incidents in our society where
great men of stature have been taken in and have possibly even
become Soviet espionage agents.

Therefore, I say, with some gratification that the Communists, in
my opinion, failed miserably to take over the civil rights movement
or make a dent in the civil rights movement.

Chairman Stokes. Mr. DeLoach, you were familiar with the con-
ditions existing in this Nation that brought about the civil rights
movement, aren’t you?

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir.

Chairman Stokes. You know that in that period of history all
over the South that Blacks and whites were segregated by law,
they had separate drinking fountains for Blacks and whites in
public accommodation places. Blacks had to get on the back of
buses.

You are aware of Selma when dogs were put on the civil rights
marchers and cattle prodders were used on them and things of that
nature.

You don’t think, do you, that a race of people subjected to that
kind of condition in this country needed Communists or anybody
else to tell them about their status in this country, do you?

Mr. DeLoach. Absolutely not, Mr. Chairman. That is why I say
the Communist attempt failed miserably.

But let’s look at the facts, Mr. Chairman, over the years in our
society. The Communist Party has attempted to undertake any

campaign or to enter into any venture which is going to, at an
emotional moment particularly, gain them any stature in the
United States, particularly from a political and philosophical
standpoint. That is why they were so interested in the civil rights
movement as they were any movement that would give them added
stature.

Chairman Stokes. I am really intrigued by your giving the
Bureau some credit for what you describe as this miserable failure
to infiltrate the civil rights movement.

Did you ever participate in any briefing where Negro leaders
were being briefed and given this kind of information about the
Communist Party?

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir.

Chairman Stokes. And do you want to name some of the leaders
that were briefed?

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall the leaders specifically, Mr. Chair-
man, but I do know that on one or two incidents I talked to Black
leaders. I don’t recall their names. I know Mr. William C. Sullivan,
the Assistant Director in charge of the Domestic Intelligence Divi-
sion, on occasion talked to Black leaders.

Chairman Stokes. Do you know anything about the tape that
was mailed to Mrs. King, a letter that was sent to Dr. King
subsequently from the FBI suggesting that he commit suicide?

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir, Mr. Chairman. I heard it rumored that
there was such an incident. I have seen such an account in the
papers, but those tapes were not in my possession and consequently
I had nothing to do with it and have no recollection of the situation
to the best of my knowledge.

Chairman Stokes. You had attended a meeting between Dr. King
and Mr. Hoover. There is a memorandum which indicates that you
suggested to the Director that there was no need then to further
transcribe other tapes which, at that point, had not been tran-
scribed, and that the Director even after that meeting indicated
that he thought differently and that he felt that the tapes should
be transcribed while they were still fresh in the agent’s mind. Do
you recall that?

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir.

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Hoover was a strong man, wasn’t he?

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Hoover was a strong man.
He was a genius in many respects. I think he created the best law
enforcement agency in the world, but I think he stayed on in office
too long.

Chairman Stokes. And you and other agents, knowing of his
intense feeling about Dr. King, carried out his orders with a cer-
tain degree of fear?

Mr. DeLoach. Certain degree of what, sir?

Chairman Stokes. Fear.

Mr. DeLoach. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would answer that on the
basis that unless you didn’t carry them out, you would lose your
job, yes, sir. But I would like for the record to clearly state, clearly
reflect, that on two different occasions I did disagree with Mr.
Hoover and did cause in one instance, cause him to refrain or at
least not attack Dr. King, and I would hope that men with Mr.
King would have caused the same thing toward Dr. King, because

in my opinion it was a most unfortunate feud. But when he repeat-
ed the second time that in his opinion Dr. King was the most
notorious liar in the world, I asked him to recant that and he did. I
did fail in the women’s press conference that I testified about
previously.

Chairman Stokes. I know you did. That was the occasion when
you sent him three notes asking him to refrain from such an
accusation. He finally even said to the women present that Mr.
DeLoach has advised me on three separate occasions not to make
this statement, but I am going to make it anyway. Isn’t that true?

Mr. DeLoach. That is basically correct, sir.

Chairman Stokes. So to go back to my original question to you,
your answer, then, would be yes, that with the knowledge that
even if you stood up to him, when he made the final decision, and
that the rest of you would react out of fear for the loss of your jobs
if you did anything different?

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Chairman, he was the Director and we had to
follow his orders or else we would not stay in our positions.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, Mr. DeLoach. I have nothing fur-
ther.

Mr. DeLoach. Thank you.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr.
Preyer.

Mr. Preyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DeLoach, I gather that your theory on assassination is that
James Earl Ray was the lone assassin and that his motive was
racism. It would have to be pretty hard racism to cause him to
track Dr. King across the country at a time when he was an
escapee and had a long prison sentence hanging over him should
he be picked up at any moment.

Certainly there is considerable evidence in the record of James
Earl Ray’s racist attitudes, but it has been somewhat troublesome
that there is evidence which I think the FBI was aware of that
seems to cut the other way. It would seem to show that he was not
such an intense racist, that is, the motive could have been some-
thing else, for example, money.

For example, I believe the FBI was aware that he had frequented
a bar in Los Angeles for some period of time when he was there
and that that bar was about a one-third Black clientele. Apparent-
ly he visited there regularly without expressing any racial feelings.

There is evidence of a liaison with Miss Morales in Mexico,
possibly with Miss Marie Martin in Los Angeles, both of whom
appear to be women of color.

My question is: Did these incidents raise any questions in the
minds of the FBI concerning racism as a motive? Do you consider
those consistent with racism as a motive for the killing?

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Preyer, I don’t remember those specific inci-
dents. I do remember that Dr. King, while in prison, according to
the investigation to the best of my recollection — I am sorry, sir,
when James Earl Ray was in prison, to the best of my knowledge,
he refused to go on work orders out on the prison farm with blacks
because of his dislike of blacks.

I think, also, that to the best of my knowledge that on one
occasion he told an inmate in prison that he was going to get Dr.

King. He did have a general reputation, I believe, in prison as
being bigoted, anti-Black.

As to specifically answer your question, then, and I would like to
do that, sir, if I had the knowledge, but I don't recall the specific
incidents you mentioned such as frequenting bars, Black women, or
attempting to engage in social activities with Black women. I don’t
recall that, sir.

In my opinion, he definitely hated Blacks. He definitely was a
loner. He was a bumbling yet at the same time a very cunning
individual. I think because of being a bigot, a racist, that he
wanted to kill, in his opinion, the biggest man he could find in
order to make a name for himself as more or less suggested by the
fact that his brother on one occasion told, whether it was FBI
agents or not I am not sure — he said: “Why is the FBI making all
this fuss trying to find my brother. All he did was to kill a nigger.”

This, in my opinion, expresses the anti-Black feeling not only of
King but that of his family.

Mr. Preyer. I would certainly grant you there is ample evidence
of that sort of racist attitude and there is evidence from his prison
experience of the kind that you mentioned. There is also evidence
on the other side from his prison experience indicating that he was
not as intense a racist.

But I gather from your answer that the question of intensity of
his racism, whether it was sufficient to motivate a killing, would
seem to be against all of his interests as far as staying out of jail
and it was not a matter that was discussed with the FBI.

You knew of no evidence going against the idea that he was an
intense racist?

Mr. DeLoach. As of this late date I don’t recall that, those
particular incidents, Mr. Preyer. I do hope they were fully investi-
gated by the FBI. I am not aware of the fact whether they were or
not to tell you the truth but I don’t recall the matter.

Mr. Preyer. Just one other area.

The Ray brothers, you mentioned earlier, there is evidence that
John Ray visited James Earl Ray the day before he escaped from
prison, that Jimmy Ray on two occasions made statements tending
to show that there was a conspiracy involved, and perhaps most
important, that one of the brothers or that James Earl Ray when
he exchanged his rifle for a heavier rifle and made the statement
that it was done on his brother’s advice.

Those statements would seem to indicate a considerable involve-
ment of the brothers in James Earl Ray’s activities. Did the FBI
ever attempt to link the brothers of James Earl Ray in the assassi-
nation? Do you recall any discussion in the FBI concerning these
remarkable coincidences in James Earl Ray’s activities?

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired, but
the witness may respond.

Mr. DeLoach. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Preyer, I recall the intensive efforts to interview the broth-
ers and all members of the family as exemplified by the fact that
they were uncooperative to some extent. One woman refused to
testify or refused to give us any information, and further the FBI
felt so strongly about it that they recommended to the Attorney

General the electronic surveillance that I testified to previously
here today.

So to answer your question, at all times the FBI had this in mind
in my opinion and attempted to get corroborative evidence from
the brothers, but that has not come to light.

Mr. Preyer. Thank you.

Mr. DeLoach. Thank you, sir.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine.

Mr. Devine. Mr. DeLoach, for purposes of the record, could you
outline for the committee the jurisdiction of the Bureau as it
relates to Dr. King, both preassassination, during assassination,
and postassassination? How did the Bureau get involved? Start
with the preassassination. Was that purely on a security issue?

Mr. DeLoach. That is correct, Mr. Devine, and the orders of
Attorney General Kennedy to establish the electronic surveillance.
The investigation did go on prior to that, but that culminated in
the authorization by Attorney General Kennedy. It was conducted
as a security investigation or what I believe was security matter —
C, security matter — Communist, to determine the extent of infiltra-
tion by the Communist Party.

At the time of the assassination, of course, as has been testified
to earlier, the Department of Justice gave the FBI jurisdiction by
order of the Attorney General under the civil rights statutes that
Dr. King’s civil rights had been interfered with and consequently
the FBI should determine who had perpetrated this particular
incident — the assassination.

The FBI could, as I testified to earlier, Mr. Devine, could have
done a fugitive investigation under the Fugitive Felon Act, as
passed by the Congress, giving the FBI the authority to investigate
a fugitive case when local law enforcement officials determine that
a felony has been committed and possibly the fugitive has crossed
State lines. They may step in and ask the FBI to investigate the
matter and the FBI does that at their specific request.

Mr. Devine. Was it true Mr. DeLoach, that following the appre-
hension of James Earl Ray that the Bureau virtually lost interest
in the case? I ask that question on the basis of that chart to your
far right showing FBI activity both as far as dollars are concerned
and automobile mileage are concerned, that measurably, dramatic
drops occurred in Bureau activities following the apprehension.
Would you care to comment on that?

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, Mr. Devine.

With all due respect to the committee, I believe that would be a
gross exaggeration insofar as possible loss of interest is concerned. I
am not with the FBI today and I have not been for 9 years, but I
think the FBI is still interested in this case and will still carry out
any leads with respect to conspiracy, not only this case but the
Kennedy case and any other major case.

To my knowledge that case is still pending in the FBI and will
never be closed as long as leads are being received.

But the fact that the fugitive investigation has been completed
certainly would curtail some use of automobiles and curtail to
some extent expenditures. It does not mean the FBI has lost inter-
est in the case. It means that one phase of the case has been

completed and they are still working on other phases of the case
such as conspiracy angle.

Mr. Devine. While you were still in the Bureau, and still in the
high supervisory capacity, did you issue any orders or direct any
orders from Mr. Hoover to discontinue active participation in the
investigation of the King case following the apprehension?

Mr. DeLoach. No, Mr. Devine.

To answer your question, I believe that Inspector Joseph Sulli-
van, who was the major case inspector, was called off for other
duties following the location of James Earl Ray because the FBI
felt he was the man who assassinated Dr. King.

Whether any other curtailment of activities went on at that time
or not, I don’t recall, but definitely the case was still kept in a
pending status and every lead was still investigated very thor-
oughly.

Mr. Devine. On another issue, Mr. DeLoach, earlier I think you
testified that you never heard of Agent Murtagh prior to his ap-
pearance before this committee.

If I accurately recall some of Mr. Murtagh’s testimony, he said
that he had never met Mr. Hoover personally, although he had
been in the Bureau for 10 or 11 years. But he did at one time
describe Mr. Hoover as a maniac.

I would ask you, Mr. DeLoach, as one of the highest officials in
the Bureau under Mr. Hoover’s supervision — probably there was no
one much closer to him than perhaps Mr. Tolson and then you in
your capacity as Assistant to the Director — would you care to make
any descriptive analysis of Mr. Hoover during the time you were
under his direction and control?

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir. I testified previously, Mr. Devine, that I
think Mr. Hoover was a genius in many respects, that he created,
in my opinion, the best law enforcement agency in the world. I
think, however, he stayed on too long. I believe Mr. Hoover should
have retired some years earlier than he did. I believe Mr. Hoover
had somewhat of a towering ego as a lot of men have in our
society, but by the same token I think he was a humanitarian to a
great extent.

I have seen Mr. Hoover break down and almost cry on occasions,
at moments of emotion, when cases were solved, or when an agent
had a tragedy happen to him. I think the man was a deeply
religious man in many respects, but at the same time he was
somewhat egocentric in his handling of matters and his personal-
ity. He came from a very strict religious background and he was a
prime mover in his church, always had been, in the Boy Scout
movement, and many other activities.

I think that Mr. Hoover in creating the FBI and giving his life to
it sometimes mistakenly felt that this was more or less his baby, to
put it crudely, or his agency. He overreacted to any allegations
that concerned the organization.

Mr. Devine. I think you have responded to the inquiry, Mr.
DeLoach. Just one more question, please.

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir.

Mr. Devine. I think you made reference either in your direct
testimony or during the questioning by someone that a meeting
was arranged between Director Hoover and Dr. King and I think

Mr. Fauntroy or Dr. Abernathy and some others. Would you please
tell the committee for purposes of the record who made the actual
arrangements for the meeting and what brought about the meet-
ing?

Mr. DeLoach. I did for the FBI, sir.

Mr. Devine. You made the arrangements personally?

Mr. DeLoach. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Devine. Do you recall what year this occurred roughly, how
long before the assassination perhaps?

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir, I don’t recall a specific incident, Mr.
Devine, but it was some period of time prior to the assassination.

Mr. Devine. What brought about your arranging the meeting?

Mr. DeLoach. I told Mr. Hoover, and I believe the FBI records
will reflect this, that I felt this feud was very unfortunate, that I
felt there should be a meeting with Dr. King, and for both of them
to discuss the matter and to possibly come out with some basis of—
I didn’t say friendship, Mr. Devine — but some feeling of mutual
trust insofar as this name calling was concerned.

Mr. Devine. I would suggest the date of December of 1964.
Would that refresh your recollection?

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall the specific date, but it could have
been, Mr. Devine.

Mr. Devine. Do you recall who was there specifically, Mr.
Hoover, Dr. King, Mr. Fauntroy, Dr. Abernathy?

Mr. DeLoach. Dr. Abernathy and I believe the current Ambassa-
dor to the United Nations. I was with Mr. Hoover at the time and
took notes on the meeting at his specific orders.

Mr. Devine. Would you say the meeting was reasonably cordial
and no hostility was displayed?

Mr. DeLoach. I have termed the meeting before Mr. Devine as
more or less of a love feast. The men discussed matters very
cordially; they parted very cordially. Dr. King went to Mr. Hoover’s
reception room and gave out a press release indicating accordingly.

Mr. Devine. Finally, you have heretofore testified, I believe,
before the Warren Commission?

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir; I did not testify before the Warren Com-
mission.

Mr. Devine. Before the Church committee in the Senate?

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. Devine. Before any other investigative agencies on the King
matter?

Mr. DeLoach. I believe before a Federal grand jury, Mr. Devine.
I’m not certain. Since I left the FBI — I might state for the record,
Mr. Devine — I have been down here for approximately — to the best
of my recollection — 17 times, to testify to the activities of the FBI
during the time I was in the FBI. Most of the testimony has been
duplication, time and time again. I’m always glad to help out.

Mr. Devine. You testified before this committee here in execu-
tive session at an earlier time?

Mr. DeLoach. That’s correct.

Mr. Devine. That’s all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from the District of Columbia, Mr. Fauntroy.

Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

May I request that the witness be provided with MLK exhibits
F-437A, F-438A, F-438B, F-442J, F-442K, F-444A, F-444B, and F-
450B?

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Fauntroy, do you wish me to review these one
at a time, or do you wish me to read all of them?

Mr. Fauntroy. I think perhaps we can probably have you to
scan them as I bring them up.

Mr. DeLoach. All right.

Mr. Fauntroy. MLK F-437A is, of course, a response to a re-
quest by Mr. Hoover that the agency initiate an investigation into
Communist influence in the civil rights movement among Blacks,
and this memo — as it indicates — is Mr. Sullivan’s synopsis that the
Communist Party has not influenced the civil rights movement.

This memo and several others are designed to refresh your
memory on when the FBI began its campaign with respect to Dr.
King, and I was just wondering if you recall discussions with Mr.
Hoover during this period, this memo dated August 23, 1963, just
prior to the historic March on Washington, at which a response
was tendered by him similar to the one which appears on this
memo.

It is in his own handwriting, that this reminds him of a memo
that Mr. Sullivan did on Castro and suggesting that he go back and
do a better job.

Were you aware of that at that time?

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir; I was not, Mr. Fauntroy.

As you can see from this memorandum, this was not sent
through me, going up to Mr. Hoover; so, therefore, I had nothing to
do with it. After Mr. Hoover reviewed it, sent it back to Mr.
Belmont, and to Mr. Mohr, and other individuals, it was later sent
to my office simply for information. I do not recall the memoran-
dum.

Mr. Fauntroy. Turning to exhibit F-438A, were you aware of a
conference which was called, in a memo dated Christmas Eve in
1963, a conference held in the Atlanta office with the seat of
government personnel which had as its purpose how best to carry
out an investigation to produce results without embarrassing the
administration, the Bureau, and how to come up with a complete
analysis of the avenues and approaches to neutralize King as an
effective Negro leader, and concerning some development of his
continued dependence upon the Communists? Were you aware of
that?

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir, Mr. Fauntroy, I was not.

As you could observe from the memorandum, this was not sent
through me for consideration or approval and was only sent to my
office later on, for review or just simply for information, after Mr.
Hoover had already approved it, or after the action had taken
placo

Mr. Fauntroy. MLK F-438B is a list of questions to be explored
at that conference in 1963. Are you aware that these questions
were posed:

Can colored agents be of any assistance to us in the Atlanta area, and if so, how
many will be needed?

Could we convert any of their weak points to strong points for us?

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir; Mr. Fauntroy.

As observed by the previous memoranda, I was not on the inves-
tigative side of the house at the time; I was strictly on the adminis-
trative side, and had little or no knowledge, or wasn’t consulted,
regarding such matters.

Mr. Fauntroy. I am trying to refresh your memory.

You were not aware at this period?

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir.

Mr. Fauntroy. They asked:

What do we know about King’s housekeeper? Can we use her? What do we know
about the background of people presently employed in the office of SCLC and can
we use any of them? Are there any disgruntled employees at SCLC and/or former
employees who may be disgruntled or disgruntled acquaintances?

You weren’t aware that they were considering those things at
that time?

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir; I was not a party to that.

Mr. Fauntroy. Were you aware of any comment or memo after
the march on Washington that Dr. King’s speech was a demogogic
one and proved that he was dangerous to the country?

Mr. DeLoach. Which exhibit is that, Mr. Fauntroy?

Mr. Fauntroy. That is actually exhibit F-437B — I’m sorry —
which you do not have and which I will not trouble you with.

Mr. DeLoach. All right.

Mr. Fauntroy. But you don’t recall Mr. Sullivan ever having
expressed that view, or Mr. Hoover?

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir.

Mr. Fauntroy. Do you recall 438D?

Mr. DeLoach. “D” as in David, Mr. Fauntroy.

Mr. Fauntroy. “D” as in David, which references

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t see that, sir.

Mr. Fauntroy. Sorry. We do not have 438D; and I won’t trouble
you with that, save to reference a memo of January 8, 1964, which
began, “It is your responsibility as Assistant Director in charge of
and having the DID to report to you,” a reference to the impor-
tance of developing a new leader once you had discredited Dr.
King — not you, but the FBI — according to the memo.

It might be important if you have 438D, to provide it to the
witness, because here in Mr. Hoover's writing he indicates that he
is glad to see that Mr. Sullivan has finally seen the light, though it
is dismally delayed, that he struggled for months to convince him
that the Communists had very definite influence over Dr. King.

I would like to move now, Mr.

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Fauntroy, before you move on, this memo
apparently was not sent to me, and I was not a party to it.

Mr. Fauntroy. So you were not aware of it?

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir; it was sent back to my office, for informa-
tion apparently after Mr. Hoover had ordered the action to be
taken.

Mr. Fauntroy. But now you are aware, at least from the record,
that a campaign was underway at that time?

Mr. DeLoach. From what you told me, yes.

Mr. Fauntroy. I would like to turn now to 442J. You mentioned
the fact that electronic surveillance was approved by Mr. Kennedy.
Were you aware in January of 1964 of this memo and the intent to
install microphone surveillance of’ Dr. King at the Willard Hotel

when it was reported through Mr. Sullivan that Dr. King had
plans to stay there?

Mr. DeLoach. To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Fauntroy, I was
not aware of this situation. Again, this memorandum was not sent
through my office and was simply apparently sent by Mr. Hoover
over to my office for information after the action had been ordered.
In other words, I was a party after the fact.

Mr. Fauntroy. But were you aware of it?

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir; not to my knowledge.

Mr. Fauntroy. Even though the memo was sent to you, you
weren’t aware of that happening?

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir.

Mr. Fauntroy. Were you aware that once the transcript, memo-
randa, from that surveillance was prepared, that a memo came
from Mr. Sullivan indicating that they should hide this fact from
the Attorney General, lest he inform Dr. King of the kind of
surveillance that was being accorded him?

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall any such incident, Mr. Fauntroy.

Mr. Fauntroy. You don’t remember this language:

The attached document is classified “Top Secret” to minimize the likelihood that
this material will be read by someone who will leak it to King. However, it is
possible despite its classification, the Attorney General himself may reprimand
King on the basis of this material. If he does, it is not likely we will develop any
more such information through the means employed. It is highly important that we
do develop further information of this type in order that we may completely
discredit King as a traitor of the Negro people.

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall any such language. Again, I was not
on the investigative side of the House, would not have been privy
to such planning.

Mr. Fauntroy. They sent no copy to the AG. Were you aware
that the practice was, on matters like this, to hide it from the
Attorney General?

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall any such practice, Mr. Fauntroy.

Mr. Fauntroy. You see the note on the bottom of the memo

Mr. DeLoach. Which exhibit are you referring to now, sir?

Mr. Fauntroy. F-442K.

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir; I see that. But, again— —

Mr. Fauntroy. Is that Mr. Hoover’s handwriting?

Mr. DeLoach. That looks like Mr. Hoover’s handwriting, Mr.
Fauntroy.

Mr. Fauntroy. Of course, you weren’t talking to him, so you
weren’t aware of that?

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall this.

Mr. Fauntroy. Now I would like to move to efforts to discredit
Dr. King at a time when you were officially the Assistant to the
Director and had at least Mr. Sullivan to report to you.

Are you aware of 444A?

Mr. DeLoach. I have it in front of me, sir.

Mr. Fauntroy. It was an effort to publish an article apparently
written by the FBI in an effort to discredit Dr. King. You will note
that it says, “Can be given to a friendly newspaper contact such as
David Lawrence, who is the editor of the U.S. News & World
Report.”

You were aware of

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall this, sir. It obviously was emanated
by Mr. Baumgardner and sent — after approved by Mr. Baum-
gardner — was sent to Mr. Sullivan for approval as Assistant Direc-
tor in charge of the Domestic Intelligence Division, which handled
the program, and then was sent to my office, and this does appear
in my handwriting: “U.S. News & World Report will not use article
of this nature. Suggest Ray McHugh of Copley Press.”

It was sent on to Mr. Hoover and Mr. Hoover apparently ordered
the action be taken.

Mr. Fauntroy. So you now recall that you were aware of it and
that you did pencil it at that time?

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall the memorandum or the action, Mr.
Fauntroy.

Mr. Fauntroy. Is that your handwriting there?

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir, it is; but I don’t recall the action.

Mr. Fauntroy. You don’t recall that

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir.

Mr. Fauntroy. But you don’t deny this is your handwriting, that
you wrote it?

Mr. DeLoach. I do not deny it.

Mr. Fauntroy. 444B has reference to an article which the FBI
wanted circulated that would try to create the impression that Dr.
King was attempting to blackmail the Teamsters Union into giving
contributions to SCLC because of some 450,000 members of Hoffa’s
union who were Black.

Were you aware of that effort to circulate

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir; I don’t recall this specific memorandum. It
has been 12 years ago, Mr. Fauntroy, and it appears that this is a
memorandum that, again, was initiated by Mr. Baumgardner, his
idea, went to Mr. Sullivan; Mr. Sullivan approved and sent it to my
office, and I sent it in to Mr. Tolson, who sent it to Mr. Hoover;
and Mr. Hoover apparently — I don’t see Mr. Hoover’s initials on it;
I see Mr. Tolson’s initials.

Mr. Fauntroy. Why did they send it to you?

Mr. DeLoach. Because I was Assistant to the Director at that
time, and the natural flow of mail would go through my office, on
into Mr. Tolson and Mr. Hoover.

Mr. Fauntroy. And you made no judgments on the advisability
of these things?

Mr. DeLoach. Well, I was under instructions on such matters to
always send them in to Mr. Hoover for approval.

Mr. Fauntroy. You were instructed by whom?

Mr. DeLoach. By Mr. Hoover.

Mr. Fauntroy. I see; and you don’t recall these now; but you do
recall that you did not send them with your recommendations?

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir; I made no recommendation on this partic-
ular memorandum.

Mr. Fauntroy. OK. If you will look at MLK F-450A, this is
another memo which suggests using an article written by a Black
newspaper editor discrediting Dr. King, and you wanted to expand
the coverage of that by disseminating it to friendly news sources?

Mr. DeLoach. That is not correct, Mr. Fauntroy. You say “You
wanted to expand it.” This is a memorandum that was initiated by
Mr. Brennan

Mr. Fauntroy. I’m sorry. Please forgive me. I didn’t mean you. I
meant the gentleman, Mr. Sullivan, apparently?

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir; Mr. Brennan.

Mr. Fauntroy. Mr. Brennan was under Mr. Sullivan’s supervi-
sion?

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir.

Mr. Fauntroy. Mr. Sullivan was under Mr. Hoover’s supervision;
is that it?

Mr. DeLoach. Supposedly, yes, sir. At times I wonder, but sup-
posedly.

Mr. Fauntroy. Sometimes then they sent you memos and you
had no input on them?

Mr. DeLoach. But this is a memorandum that Mr. Hoover ap-
parently approved, because he said, “OK. H” and Mr. Hoover or-
dered that Mr. Wick and the Crime Records Division handle the
matter.

Mr. Fauntroy. But the instruction that it was felt if this article
is given widespread publicity on how thinking Negroes would feel
about King, that you would accomplish two objectives: One publi-
cizing King as a traitor to his country and race and, second, it
reduces income from these shows because he has five more perfor-
mances to give — in reference to Harry Belafonte’s concert designed
to raise funds for SCLC?

Mr. DeLoach. I am not familiar with the newspaper article, Mr.
Fauntroy, but apparently that was Mr. Brennan’s idea.

Mr. Fauntroy. But you were aware of the effort to portray Dr.
King as a traitor to the country?

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir; I don’t recall.

Mr. Fauntroy. Even though it appears frequently in memos at a
period when you had some responsibility for at least overseeing the
work of DID, whence this memo came?

Mr. DeLoach. I think you’ll agree, sir, that the majority of the
memoranda reflect that I was on the administrative side of the
House at the time and therefore would have had no decisionmak-
ing policy in connection with that?

Mr. Fauntroy. Mr. DeLoach, one of the things that the commit-
tee is seeking to determine is whether the FBI created a moral
climate in which the assassination of Dr. King, as unthinkable as it
is, became not only thinkable but also could be thought of being
justified in the Nation; and I wonder if you think the FBI officials
should have known their conduct in not only writing articles like
this and seeing to it that they were disseminated around the coun-
try could have unjustifiably risked the life of Dr. King?

Mr. DeLoach. What was the last part of your question, sir? I’m
sorry.

Mr. Fauntroy. Is it your opinion that the FBI should have
known that the kinds of activities to which we refer in these
memos would unjustifiably risk the life of Dr. King?

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Fauntroy, I think it would be absolutely ridic-
ulous to assume that any of the FBI’s few attempts to discredit Dr.
King, as ordered by Mr. Hoover, Mr. Sullivan, or whoever partici-
pated in that, caused an atmosphere which would have resulted in
his assassination — I doubt if James Earl Ray had ever seen any of
the articles — that Mr. Hoover had wanted two or three articles to

39-935 0 - 79 -5

be put in the newspaper which you have explained to me here
today. No one has shown me the articles. I don’t know whether
they appeared or not, to tell you the truth; but I doubt that James
Earl Ray — or I doubt that anyone to amount to anything — had ever
seen the articles, if they did appear, that would have been perpe-
trated by the FBI or knew of a discreditation program to any
extent. Consequently, in my opinion, the facts would overwhelm-
ingly indicate that the FBI did not create any atmosphere which
would cause harm to Dr. King from a physical standpoint or, in my
opinion, any other standpoint.

Mr. Fauntroy. In your testimony, Mr. DeLoach, you alluded to
the fact that over the years the FBI compiled files on death threats
directed at Dr. King. Is it fair to say that at the time of this period,
between 1963 and 1968, that it would not have surprised you that
Dr. King received death threats?

Mr. DeLoach. I wouldn’t have been surprised, sir. I think almost
any individual in the public limelight, as Dr. King was, or any
public leader in our society today, receives death threats.

Mr. Fauntroy. Again, in view of those death threats and in
retrospect, didn’t the release of derogatory and inflammatory infor-
mation describing him as a traitor to the race and the country run
the risk of further poisoning the minds of people who might vio-
lently oppose what Dr. King stood for?

Mr. DeLoach. Again, sir, I was not on the investigative side of
the house at the time that language was used and, frankly, I am
not aware of the fact that such language was ever given out from a
public standpoint. That appears to be Mr. Sullivan’s usage of in-
flammatory language, and whether or not it was given out or not, I
am not aware of that fact, Mr. Fauntroy.

Mr. Fauntroy. I just read to you, and you have before you,
Martin Luther King exhibit F-450A, which has to do with the
Houston article.

Were you not

Mr. DeLoach. I don't recall the article, sir.

Mr. Fauntroy. You don’t recall?

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir.

Mr. Fauntroy. You don’t deny the FBI did that, do you?

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t deny that Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Brennan,
made this request, and that Mr. Hoover ordered that it be done;
but

Mr. Fauntroy. Is that your initial at the end of that memo?

Mr. DeLoach. It is, sir; yes, sir. In the natural flow of mail, it
went through my office, and then on in to Mr. Tolson, and then on
in to Mr. Hoover; and in these particular cases Mr. Hoover indicat-
ed that anything pertaining to this matter he should see personally
and make the decision.

Mr. Fauntroy. So you didn’t read this?

Mr. DeLoach. I beg your pardon?

Mr. Fauntroy. You didn’t read this?

Mr. DeLoach. I do not recall reading it.

Mr. Fauntroy. What does your signature mean?

Mr. DeLoach. My signature?

Mr. Fauntroy. I mean your initial.

Mr. DeLoach. My initial means that this piece of mail was
received in my office and I read it, and I sent it on in to Mr.
Tolson’s office, approximately IIV 2 years ago.

Mr. Fauntroy. And it doesn’t mean approval?

Mr. DeLoach. It means that I thought that Mr. Hoover should
see this piece of mail. That was my duty, to weed out mail which
he should not see and to approve it and send it on my own, or else
send it on to him for final approval.

Mr. Fauntroy. So, finally — Mr. Chairman, I do appreciate the
extent on which you have allowed me to go on — in your view, the
FBI was not sensitive to the possible implications of the derogatory
information it attempted to disseminate around the country about
Dr. King as a traitor to the race and to the Nation for his own life?

Mr. DeLoach. No, Mr. Fauntroy, I simply stated this, that the
few attempts on the part of the FBI to discredit Dr. King, as
ordered by Mr. Hoover, did not result, in my opinion, in an atmos-
phere which would have caused physical harm to Dr. King.

Mr. Fauntroy. I appreciate that opinion, but that is not the
question I asked.

The question is: Whether you believed it or not, were you or any
of the other persons responsible for these kinds of memos and the
carrying out of this campaign against Dr. King — were you aware or
sensitive to the fact that this might result in creating a climate
within which Dr. King’s life might well be taken?

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Fauntroy, I can’t answer that question be-
cause, as I testified previously, the greater majority of these memo-
randums took place prior to my assuming any supervision of the
Investigative Divisions of the FBI; but I am not aware of any
overall feeling of hysteria as a result of the FBI’s actions; just
sheer speculation at this late date.

I am trying to testify to the best of my ability.

Mr. Fauntroy. But you recall never having anyone — either in
discussion or by memo — expressing some concern about the effect
that this campaign could have upon Dr. King’s life?

Mr. DeLoach. I have no such recollection, Mr. Fauntroy.

Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

I would like to have the clerk provide the witness with MLK
exhibit 438E, please.

Mr. DeLoach. Do you want me to read the entire memorandum?

Chairman Stokes. I just want you to refresh yourself and then I
will refer to certain parts of it. This is a memorandum prepared by
you?

Mr. DeLoach. That is correct, sir.

Chairman Stokes. It went to Mr. Mohr?

Mr. DeLoach. That is correct. He was my superior at the time.

Chairman Stokes. And the date of the memorandum?

Mr. DeLoach. Is December 2, 1964.

Chairman Stokes. The subject matter?

Mr. DeLoach. Is Martin Luther King. Appointment with Direc-
tor 3:35 p.m., December 1, 1964.

Chairman Stokes. Bearing upon the part of your reply to Mr.
Devine with reference to how the meeting came about, would you
read us the first paragraph of that memorandum.

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir.

At Reverend King’s request, the Director met with King; Rev. Ralph Abernathy,
Secretary of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC); Dr. Andrew
Young, executive assistant to King; and Walter Fauntroy, SCLC representative here
in Washington, at 3:35 p.m., 12-1-64, in the Director’s Office.

Chairman Stokes. The memorandum goes on in the next para-
graph and makes reference to the fact

Mr. DeLoach. May I interrupt just one second? I would like the
privilege of stating, despite the fact this specifically reads at “Rev-
erend King’s request,” I made overtures to Mr. Hoover to have this
meeting take place, as I have testified to the best of my recollection
previously. I still insist on that.

Chairman Stokes. What overtures did you make to Mr. Hoover
to try to get him to comply with Dr. King’s request for such a
meeting?

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir. That too took place, but prior to that I
made the suggestion that such a meeting take place.

Chairman Stokes. I am sort of at a loss as to why you would, in
your own written memo, say at Dr. King’s request.

Mr. DeLoach. Only for the record, Mr. Chairman. Obviously Dr.
King initiated the request also for a specific date and time.

Chairman Stokes. Wouldn’t it be logical in these circumstances
that you would say pursuant to my request to the Director, or
something of this sort, rather than at Dr. King’s request?

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir. Not on the basis of the telephone call that
I received in my opinion — again I am testifying to something that
is about 14 years ago — telephone call, to the best of my recollec-
tion, I received from the current Ambassador to the United Na-
tions, Mr. Young, who asked the meeting take place, and they
wanted it to take place, and I previously tried to contact Dr. King
personally, and Dr. King had not returned my calls but obviously
had Ambassador Young call me.

Chairman Stokes. Be that as it may, it also appears to me from
the way your memo reads that it seems to give further weight to
Dr. King having made the request, because in the second para-
graph you mention the fact you met King and associates in the
hallway and attempted to rush them into the Director’s office
through the reception room. “King slowly posed for cameras and
newsmen before proceeding.”

Then you say:

Upon being introduced to the Director, Reverend King indicated his appreciation
for Mr. Hoover seeing him and then stated that Reverend Abernathy would speak
first.

And then you tell us what Reverend Abernathy told the Direc-
tor. Then your next paragraph — why don’t you read the next para-
graph for us, paragraph 4.

Mr. DeLoach.

Reverend King spoke up. He stated it was virtually necessary to keep a working
relationship with the FBI. He wanted to clear up any misunderstanding which
might have occurred. He stated that some Negroes had told him that the FBI had
been ineffective, however, he was inclined to discount such criticism. Reverend King
asked that the Director please understand that any criticism of the Director and the
FBI which had been attributed to King was either a misquote or an outright
misrepresentation. He stated this particularly concerned Albany, Ga. He stated that
the only time he had ever criticized the FBI was because of instances in which

special agents who had been given complaints in civil rights cases regarding brutal-
ity by police officers were seen the following day being friendly with those same
police officers. King stated this, of course, promoted distrust inasmuch as the police
sometimes “brutalized Negroes/’

Chairman Stokes. Then, of course, on the second page Reverend
King goes into telling the Director he personally appreciated the
great work the FBI had done in many instances and refers to what
they had done in Mississippi, and so forth, In the next paragraph
he specifically states he had never made any personal attack upon
Mr. Hoover; is that correct?

Mr. DeLoach. Which paragraph are your referring to now?

Chairman Stokes. Paragraph 2 on the second page. That is the
paragraph that reads

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir, I see that.

Chairman Stokes [reading]:

Reverend King stated he had never made any personal attack upon Mr. Hoover.
He stated he had merely tried to articulate the feelings of the Negroes in the South
in order to keep a tradition of nonviolence rather than violence. He added that the
Negro should never be transferred from a policy of nonviolence to one of violence
and terror.

Mr. DeLoach. Excuse me, sir, which page are you reading from?

Chairman Stokes. The second page of the memorandum, 438.

Mr. DeLoach. I have the same memorandum but — are you refer-
ring to the second paragraph or the first paragraph? Mine starts
off: “The Director told Reverend King that the FBI had put the
Tear of God’ in the Ku Klux Klan.”

Chairman Stokes. That is the third page. You don’t have the
second page.

Mr. DeLoach. It is the second page of my memorandum, Mr.
Chairman. I am sorry, sir.

Mr. Fauntroy. Mr. Chairman, that may be an error with respect
to the Xerox machine. My second page is a blank.

Chairman Stokes. We will take a moment to get this straight-
ened out.

[Additional copy handed to witness.]

I think they have given you now the correct second page which
starts out, “Reverend King stated he personally appreciated the
great work of the FBI which had been done in so many instances.”
Is that the way your first paragraph of the second page reads?

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Chairman Stokes. Prior to making reference to this next section
on that second page, I would like to have the record clear that this
committee has not received any evidence whatsoever or testimony
from any informant, as you stated earlier today, relating to the
fact that such an informant had said to this committee Dr. King, if
not a Communist, was almost a Communist. There has been no
such testimony before this committee. Are you aware of that?

Mr. DeLoach. I am not aware of that, sir.

Chairman Stokes. Since you were dictating this memo, I think it
is important for us to make reference to the fifth paragraph there,
which I would ask you to read:

Mr. DeLoach. Certainly, sir.

Reverend King stated he has been, and still is, very concerned regarding the
matter of communism in the civil rights movement. He stated he knew that the
Director was very concerned because he bore the responsibility of security in the

Nation. Reverend King stated that from a strong philosophical point of view he
could never become a communist inasmuch as he recognizes this to be a crippling
totalitarian disease. He stated that as a Christian he could never accept commu-
nism. He claimed that when he learns of the identity of a communist in his midst
he immediately deals with the problem by removing this man. He stated there have
been one or two communists who were engaged in fund-raising for the SCLC.
Reverend King then corrected himself to say that these one or two men were former
Communists and not Party members at the present time.

Shall I read the names?

Chairman Stokes. I think we can leave it blank.

Mr. DeLoach [reading]:

He then identified (blank) as an example. He stated that he insisted that (blank)
leave his staff because the success of his organization, the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference, was more important than friendship with (blank).

Chairman Stokes. This is what was said there in your presence;
is that correct?

Mr. DeLoach. To the best of my knowledge, sir, I took copious
notes of what was said in my presence.

Chairman Stokes. I have nothing further at this time.

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian.

Mr. Fithian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry I had to step
out for a previous commitment.

Mr. DeLoach, was the Justice Department modus operandi differ-
ent in the King case from other special investigations?

Mr. DeLoach. To the best of my knowledge, sir, I believe there
was more emphasis placed on this major case than on previous
major cases because of the importance of it. As to the modus
operandi, I believe that the FBI, trained as it was in investigative
matters, carried out very much the same procedures that they
would in any case of a similar nature or matter pertaining to this
or a similar nature.

Mr. Fithian. During counsel's questioning much was made of the
potential failure, I guess, to convene a grand jury and interview
the Ray family, et cetera or even interview Ray later. The implica-
tion at least I gather from the staffs question was they thought it
would have been a good idea, particularly regarding John Ray,
Jerry Ray, and so forth. As a law enforcement official, what was
your view? Do you think it would have or would not have? I am
not asking now whose jurisdiction it was or the territorial turf
question. I am really not interested in that at all.

Mr. DeLoach. In my opinion, Mr. Fithian, I think the matters at
this particular stage in the fugitive investigation, which was char-
acterized as a civil rights-type investigation but looking at all
phases including conspiracy, I think a grand jury would have been
very laborious, inefficient, and I think it would have slowed down
the investigation.

Mr. Fithian. That is the conspiracy thing you think would not
necessarily have been furthered by the grand jury?

Mr. DeLoach. Not in my opinion.

Mr. Fithian. Tell me, have you ever worked with or supervised
or been associated with or known about a conspiracy investigation
conducted by the Bureau?

Mr. DeLoach. I do not recall when I was an agent in the field —
and I came up from the ranks just like every other agent in the
FBI does — ever working on a conspiracy case, Mr. Fithian. When I

became Assistant to the Director I don’t recall any, but I am sure
there must have been hundreds of them passing through my office
where I read the memorandums.

Mr. Fithian. As a career porofessional, if I were a new agent and
I was being indoctrinated in working with you, and so on, and I
asked you how would we be going about conducting a conspiracy
investigation in case X, Y, or Z, what kind of steps would you
recommend that I undertake if I am to conduct the investigation of
a conspiracy?

Mr. DeLoach. First I would want you to tell me whether or not
there were any facts which would lead to a conspiracy rather than
wasting the taxpayers’ money and the time of the FBI going on a
fishing expedition. If you could give me facts, then certainly it
should be investigated very thoroughly to determine if there was a
conspiracy involved.

Mr. Fithian. That didn’t answer my question, though, did it?

Mr. DeLoach. No. I am sorry, that is the best I can answer it.

Mr. Fithian. You said if there were facts, then you would give
me some advice. Setting aside the preamble, give me the advice.
How would you conduct a conspiracy investigation? That was the
question.

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Fithian, I think that all parties should be
interviewed to determine the proof or negative aspects

Mr. Fithian. All parties would mean what?

Mr. DeLoach. All parties involved in the possible or potential
conspiracy.

Mr. Fithian. So if you had a prime suspect or even had him in
hand, or you were on his trail, and somebody said this job couldn’t
have been pulled off by a single person, let’s simultaneously as we
hunt for him conduct a conspiracy investigation, or now that we
have him in hand let’s conduct a conspiracy investigation. How
would you go about it?

Mr. DeLoach. Again you would interview all parties concerned
with it.

Mr. Fithian. By parties you mean whom — his acquaintances?

Mr. DeLoach. If you had indications indicating they were in-
volved in a conspiracy, yes, sir.

Mr. Fithian. You said you wouldn’t go on a fishing expedition. If
I thought that you were engaged in a crime and you had friends,
contacts that might have helped you escape from prison or conduct
this crime, I don’t think I would have to have any evidence that
your friend there might have helped you. I would go sort of sur-
veilling him or start questioning him or bringing him in for inter-
rogation. Isn’t that the logical way you would go about it?

Mr. DeLoach. If you start surveilling him, Mr. Fithian, you
would certainly be violating his civil liberties. If you start an
investigation without any facts, you would be wasting hundreds of
thousands of dollars considering the fact that the FBI at that time
had over 300,000 investigative matters.

Mr. Fithian. What you are saying is even if you had reason to
believe there had to be a conspiracy involved, you wouldn’t do
anything until somebody gave you the evidence that there was
conspiracy involved?

Mr. DeLoach. Not necessarily, I think I would first look to see if
there are any facts indicating whether or not there was a conspir-
acy. In the particular instance you are talking about, as the com-
mittee report reflects, there was intense emphasis put

Mr. Fithian. Let me cut you off there. You said the first step
would be to interview all the parties potentially involved?

Mr. DeLoach. That is correct.

Mr. Fithian. What else would you do?

Mr. DeLoach. Based upon the knowledge or information you
gained there, you would determine the next step of the investiga-
tion, and that would be the possibility of going to the Department
of Justice and presenting the facts to them to see what they would
suggest if a grand jury was necessary or any other type of investi-
gative activity.

Mr. Fithian. So then, if you really thought there was a conspir-
acy involved, you might have used a grand jury in case X. I am not
talking about the King case. I am not a lawyer and not a law
enforcement person. I would like to figure out how people in your
profession would track down a conspiracy.

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Fithian, the former Attorney General of the
United States has testified, as has the Assistant Attorney General
in charge of the Criminal Division that they feel a grand jury
would be laborious, inefficient and ineffective.

Mr. Fithian. So you would not have used a grand jury?

Mr. DeLoach. No, sir.

Mr. Fithian. But you would have interviewed anybody that you
thought might have been involved or any acquaintances?

Mr. DeLoach. To the best of my knowledge, yes, sir.

Mr. Fithian. Would you have done anything else?

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t know anything else that could be done,
unless you had proof of the fact that they were certainly involved.

Mr. Fithian. Let me sketch out for you what it looks like to a
layman. A man escapes from prison, he might have been able to do
that without any help; right, possibly?

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir.

Mr. Fithian. He sustains himself over a very long period of time,
and the FBI did a marvelous job, by the way, tracking down how
much money he had spent here and there. I compliment you for
whatever part you had in that. I think it was a superb investiga-
tion on that level.

Mr. DeLoach. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Fithian. But the man did sustain himself a considerable
period of time and spent a considerable amount of money over that
time. Shouldn’t it have loomed in someone’s mind that he had to
get that money from somewhere?

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir, and it did in our minds, Mr. Fithian. I
allude to the possibility of a bank robbery investigation in Illinois,
and there was an intensive investigation by the FBI to determine
whether or not James Earl Ray was involved in that bank robbery.
As a matter of fact, to the best of my recollection, several witnesses
indicated that his physical characteristics very closely resembled
one of the bank robbers in that bank robbery. Again, if I may
complete this, excuse me, but to the best of my knowledge there
was some $44,500 involved in that bank robbery, or even more,

which would have given him ample funds to carry out his various
travels in stalking Dr. King.

Mr. Fithian. So is it your best guess that is the way he financed
himself?

Mr. DeLoach. That is my opinion, Mr. Fithian.

Mr. Fithian. And the passport that he managed to manufacture,
that did not raise any problem for you?

Mr. DeLoach. If you will recall, sir, in Canada at that time — the
law has since been changed — but it was very easy to get a passport.

Mr. Fithian. So you don’t think there had to be any assistance
on that score?

Mr. DeLoach. Not as far as passports are concerned, no, sir.

Mr. Fithian. You made one request to surveil family members,
as I understand it, with electronic surveillance. I didn’t quite un-
derstand. Are you saying that if you suspect person X in having
been implicated in a crime, that you couldn’t do a stakeout without
violating his civil rights?

Mr. DeLoach. No; my answer did not allude to the Ray brothers,
Mr. Congressman; it referred to any instance where the FBI might
initiate a physical surveillance without having ample proof as re-
quired.

Mr. Fithian. I understand that. You are saying, then, that you
could not have said, you know, I think he had some help from the
family, so let’s put a couple agents out there in that neighborhood
to just kind of watch and see what happens and watch his or her
motions? You couldn’t have done that legally?

Mr. DeLoach. Yes, sir, that could have been done, in my opinion,
legally, and whether or not it was done I don’t recall. I know that
when I was in the field in a bank robbery and espionage cases we
previously had stakeouts.

Mr. Fithian. What other kinds of things could you have done,
what other observations could you have made on the Ray brothers
without having violated their constitutional rights and their civil
rights that might have shed light? It’s difficult 10 or 15 years later
for us to go back and reconstruct that. It seems to me it would
have been easier at the time, with the thousands of agents you had
in the field, to do, quite frankly, considerably more than I believe
you did.

Mr. DeLoach. I believe if you will read the record, Mr. Fithian,
you will find that hundreds and hundreds of interviews were con-
ducted not only with members of the Ray family, as the committee
indicated in their report, in an intensive effort to get information
from them, but all associates of that family that were known to the
FBI, hundreds of interviews. An intensive effort was made in that
regard to find out if there was conspiracy involved or if there was
any effort to assist their brother; furthermore, to find out the exact
location of James Earl Ray.

Mr. Fithian. Two other questions, Mr. Chairman, if I may.

One: Is it then your opinion that if James Earl Ray robbed a
bank in Alton, he did it alone?

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t know that, sir. To the best of my knowl-
edge —

Mr. Fithian. Didn’t the police cite two individuals involved?

Mr. DeLoach. Yes; to the best of my knoweledge, there were one
or two other individuals, but, you see, James Earl Ray had a record
of — again to the best of my knowledge — attempting to rob grocery
stores with other individuals, to do this and that. He had a record
of crime. So I wouldn’t put it past him to have lined up other
individuals to assist him in this regard, if in fact a man closely
resembling him committed the robbery as our witnesses indicated.

Mr. Fithian. Did you pursue the possible participation of John
or Jerry in the bank robbery at all?

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall that, sir. I feel the record will reflect
that but I am sure — I can’t say I am sure but I certainly think it
would have been a logical investigative lead for the FBI to follow.

Mr. Fithian. Finally, then, what is your best judgment; do you
think that James Earl Ray killed Martin Luther King, and if so,
that he did or did not have any assistance in that whole matter?

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Fithian, I think the evidence is overwhelming
to prove James Earl Ray killed Martin Luther King, and to the
best of my knowledge there are no facts to indicate a conspiracy at
this date in time.

Mr. Fithian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
Chair recognizes Professor Blakey.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could ask Mr. DeLoach
at least two questions.

Mr. DeLoach, I am sure you will recall in 1965 and 1967 you and
I worked with the President’s Crime Commission, you representing
the Bureau and I was a consultant to that Crime Commission.

Mr. DeLoach. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Blakey. At least my concern in that Commission was on the
Crime Task Force.

Mr. DeLoach. That is correct.

Mr. Blakey. I am sure you recall that. That task force recom-
mended to the Commission and the Commission ultimately adopted
a recommendation that said that the investigation of sophisticated
conspiracies required the integrated use of compulsory process in
the context of a grand jury, community techniques and electronic
surveillance. I am sure you recall those recommendations.

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall them specifically, Mr. Blakey, but it
sounds logical.

Mr. Blakey. You have testified here this morning that you were
satisfied with the contours of development of the King conspiracy
case even though it did not involve, except perhaps for one small
suggestion, the use of the grand jury, it never involved any effort
to secure testimony through immunity grants, and the only elec-
tronic surveillance was the one that was suggested by the Bureau
but not adopted by the Department, they could not have obtained
lawful evidence of a conspiracy.

That is correct, isn’t it?

Mr. DeLoach. I have given my opinion concerning that, Mr.
Blakey, yes.

Mr. Blakey. I am sure that you may also recall with me that in
1968 the Congress passed the Crime Control Act of that year. It
gave to the Department of Justice a fairly extensive immunity

power in 18 U.S.C. 2514, and wiretapping authority in 18 U.S.C.
2516. Do you recall that?

Mr. DeLoach. I don’t recall that, no, sir.

Mr. Blakey. Would you accept my statement that it, in fact, did
occur?

Mr. DeLoach. Certainly, sir.

Mr. Blakey. Suppose I were to tell you, Mr. DeLoach, that this
committee, since it began its investigation of this year, utilizing its
executive session as if it were a grand jury, and utilizing its con-
gressional subpena power as if it were a grand jury subpena power,
and utilizing the immunity techniques that were granted to the
Congress by the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, was able to
pick up on information that reasonably could have been available
to the FBI in 1967, and, utilizing those techniques recommended by
the President’s Crime Commission in 1967 but not utilized by the
FBI or the Department of Justice together or separately in 1968,
was able to develop even 10 years after the fact the outlines of a
conspiracy case, that may well have involved individuals who plot-
ted the death of Dr. King and may well have involved actually
bringing about the events in Memphis.

If that were true, would that lead you to reconsider your judg-
ment that what was done in 1968 was satisfactory?

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Blakey, I have testified to the fact that to the
best of my knowledge I know of no conspiracy involving the assassi-
nation of Dr. King, and to the best of my knowledge, also in my
opinion, definite opinion, James Earl Ray committed this crime. I
am not aware of any conditional facts and you have not given me
any additional facts which would indicate there is a conspiracy.

Mr. Blakey. Let me see if I can’t go back again. Suppose I
suggested to you that this committee had been able to obtain that
kind of evidence, utilizing in however a fashion in a congressional
context those techniques — in other words, I am telling you in fact
that that evidence was developed — would that lead you to reconsid-
er your judgment that you are satisfied with what happened in
1968?

Mr. DeLoach. If you could show me any facts which indicated a
conspiracy, Mr. Blakey, I would certainly be glad to reconsider. But
as your report indicates, you have no evidence indicating a conspir-
acy.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. DeLoach, I am not aware that report indicates
that.

Mr. DeLoach. You would not rule out a conspiracy but you did
not indicate that you had facts indicating a conspiracy, to the best
of my knowledge, after scanning your report.

Mr. Blakey. I suspect the record will have to speak for itself on
that.

In response to Chairman Fauntroy’s question, you indicated that
you did not feel that the FBI’s harassment or propaganda cam-
paign directed at Dr. King in fact so created an atmosphere that
the assassination may have occurred as it did in Memphis because
no evidence had been brought to your attention that James Earl
Ray or others that he may have been associated with had ever
been reached by that propaganda.

Suppose I were to tell you that this committee has, in fact,
developed evidence that to some degree at least, that circle of
people who may have plotted the death of Dr. King and whose
actions may have contributed to James Earl Ray’s conduct in Mem-
phis were, in fact, touched by the FBI propaganda campaign?

Mr. DeLoach. I am not aware of that.

Mr. Blakey. But, Mr. DeLoach, the question is, suppose I told
you that this committee has developed that evidence; would that
lead you to reconsider the degree to which the FBI may be respon-
sible in some degree for Dr. King’s death?

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Blakey, if you can show me indisputable facts,
certainly I would reconsider. But you have shown me no such facts.
You asked me for my opinion and I gave you my opinion.

Mr. Blakey. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Mr. DeLoach, you have indicated there were
certain documents that you would like to provide for the record
and have included in the record here today.

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Chairman, it is only a letter which I read
from Attorney General Clark, and I would certainly be glad to turn
that over, and any other letters that I have, plus a statement from
Mr. Hoover concerning my personal handling of this case along
with Mr. Rosen and others, but I see no need for it unless the
committee wants it. I read the letter to Mr. Clark, and that is
sufficient, in my opinion. But you are certainly entitled to have
this if you wish.

Chairman Stokes. It is up to you. If you would like to have it
included in the record, we would be glad to mark it appropriately
and have it entered into the record.

Mr. Devine. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have it included in
the record.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, then, the documents will be
marked appropriately MLK F-530, F-531, F-532, F-533, F-534, and
F-535 and made a part of the record at this point.

[The information follows:]

MLK Exhibit F-530

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC INFORMATION
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON

December 2, 1965

JACOB ROSENTHAL

Dear Deke:

A fine news manager you are — leaking the story
of your own promotion to Ben Bradlee.

Seriously, let me offer my wannest congratula-
tions on your promotion. I know that in your new position
you will, as you have in your present position, bring great
credit to the Department, the Bureau and yourself.

Best wishes.

Sincerely,

(JtUA

Mr. Cartha D. DeLoach
Assistant Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C-

MLK Exhibit F-531

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL

WASHINGTON

J. WALTER YEAGLEY

December 6, 1965

Mr. Cartha D. DeLoach
Assistant to the Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Deke:

I was delighted to learn that the Director
intends to promote you to the position of Assistant
to the Director. Heartiest congratulations and
best wishes. It is a tremendous job but I know
you will come up with a top flight performance.

Whenever we can be
please let me know.

Good luck and with

I am

of any assistance here

best personal regards,
Sincerely: yours.

J. Walter Yeagley

MLK Exhibit F-532

A ; s svwr «->rro*«4rr GchMm.

S ecu * , nr D>v>i<QM

^cpartmriii of Justice

205 30

DEC 6 1955

Mr. Cartha D. DeLoach
Assistant to the Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C. 20535

Dear Deke:

I could not let this occasion pass without extending
to you my sincere congratulations on your new appointment
to the position of Assistant to the Director.

In you, once again Hr. Hoover has selected a dedicated
and devoted public servant to assist him In the maintenance
of the high standards which has made the Federal Bureau of
Investigation great.

Best of luck and Godspeed to you and your family in
your new assignment.

Sincerely,

wohn F. Doherty
First Assistant

MLK Exhibit F-533

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20S30

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MLK Exhibit F-534

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON

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MLK Exhibit F-535

Mr. Beeson. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Beeson.

Mr. Beeson. Along those lines, Mr. Stokes, if I could ask official-
ly at this time that Martin Luther King exhibits F-441B, F-507, F-
508, F-509, F-510, and F-511 be incorporated in the official record
of this hearing.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, they may be entered into
the record at this point.

[The information follows:]

MLK Exhibit F-441B

LVrfED STATES CO

Memorandum

CCMEX
>

PROM

Hr. W. C. Sullivan-

C. D. Brennan

subject: CO’JKBBIST EULLTKCE nr .RACIAL
HATTERS - A CURRENT AKALYSIS

PURPOSE:

1 - Hr. U. U.j-DeLoach
1 - Ur. J. P. llfthr

DATE; April 10, 1367

1 - Ur. R. E. Rick
1 - Mr. R. C. Sullivan
1 - Ur. C. D. Brennan
1 - Liaison
1 - Ur. Shackelford
1 - Ur. 0. U. Re 11s

^ — '

A t \Yl

l r r

To obtain authorization lor high level dissemination \

1 0 f a document captioned as above which shows the degree of fj' r
communist influence on Martin Luther King. _

* V~'- ~

Enclosed is a document captioned as above, which ^ r
depicts communist influence in the civil rights field, y

emphasizing the key role of Martin Luther King, Jr. This
document is a current revision of the previous analysis J .Lu.

■ captioned "Communism and the Kegro Movement - A Current Analysis .

1 prepared anc cissemnatea xn novenber, Zu uuu«LlJLi«g

we have emphasized these areas: (1) continued reliance of King

upon former Communist Party, USA, members, particularly
; (2) facts relating to Ki r.g * s T X-

land (3»

(i * I

King f s strong criticism and condemnation of the

) Administration's policy on Vietnam in a speech he mace at Xew Ycrv
on d/4/67 shows how much he has been influenced by communist
advisors. Kis speech was a direct parallel of the communist
position on Vietnam.

It is felt that the President would be interested is

1 a summary on King which shows the degree of communist influence
on him. The attached paper constitutes a complete picture and
strong indictment of King in that regard.

RECorxarDATions :

It is recommended that

(1) The attached letters, with enclosures, to the
TThite House and the Attorney General be forwarded to Assistant
to the Director Do Loach for transmittal to Mrs. Mildred Stegall,
the Vhite House, and the Attorney General . /An JJA-f. 0 -- '

V BEC-71^

COSTIOTED - OVER ?• P

.* m W:cn ii-

Ji/by
Ursat^

Enclosure'/ '

100-442529

RLS : DlTrf/j uv/cs t . _ f

5 6 ^yzziizh

' tliscwaa*

• .

Memorandun to Sir. Sullivan
Be: COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IK RACIAL

HATTERS - A CURRENT ANALYSIS
100-442529

(2) The attached letters, with enclosures, to
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the
Director of the Secret Service be forwarded to the Liaison

KOUTQFT ENVELOP^.

'O/ , 2 ^ 3

f-&7

The Attorney General

JUNE

Hay 13, 1968

m 1-* Mr. D eTaarh

Director, FHI 1-Mr. Rosax

7 1 - Mr, McGowan

ASSASSINATION OF MARTI N LU THV.R KTN G , JR. ^1-Mr. Lox ®

James Earl Bay has been Identified as the subject in the
case Involving the murder of Martin Lather King, Jr.

Extensive Investigation las been conducted, and no Information
has been developed Indicating his present whereabouts. In order to
possibly assist in locating and apprehending the subject. It would be
of extreme vanxe to know if the subject has made any contact, either
personal or by telephone, with his sister, Carol Pepper, as well as
his brother, John Larry Bay.

MM-C8

i iiwL In view of the above. It Is requested that you authorize

ft**’ installation of a technical surveillance at the residence of Carol
Pepper and at the Grapevine Tavern, owned by Carol Pepper and
operated by John Larry Bay. It Is also requested that you authorize
installation of microphone surveillance on the resldenceof Carol
Pepper , aj 2fthn Larry Bay, as well as the Grapevine Tavern.

These installations could assist In the early apprehension
of the subject, which could possibly be instrumental in reducing the
stresses and tension placed on our national security subsequent to
the death of Martin Luther King, Jr. •

s J

BEL*ez /

on or-

NOTE: See memorandum^. Rosen to Mr. DeLoach dated 5*9*68,

captlo pMDRiaiy - RE arg. EX-J25 ^ 3S <yj

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MLK Exhibit F-507

MLK Exhibit F-508

• rsasEL. p.rg

■ . * . _UWTZD STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

70 r Director, 7BX

datk: 10/11/68

““ ^ «— Phi* (44-1887) (P)

• / .

subject: ^rrewTir •

Enclosed are two Xerox copies of a letter and
envelope addressed by subject JAMES EARL RAY to Mr. ARTHUR
SHANES, SR. f Attorney, 617 Prank Kelson Bid*. , Birain*baa*J
„Ala. Tbls letter vas written by RAT, 10/3/68, while Incar-
cerated In Shelby County" Jail, Memphis, Tenn.

Copies of tbls letter' are furnished to the Bureau
for Information only.*

- <2

\2 3 Bureau (£nc.-2)
He aphis
RCJ :KE
(3)

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MLK Exhibit F-509

| ^tthTstates l vernment j

* ■' -Memorandum #

■ : A ^6,Z;

70 : Director, FBI - ^(44-38861) V-

/ a:

/*) / '•’-‘SWlSr * * *. ■ >

ne ^W SAC, , Memphis (44-1982) (P) ■

10/14/68

subject:

KURKIN

Submitted herewith for the Bureau* s informat ion are
two copies of an Order issued by Judge If. PRESTON BATTLE,
Hemp his, Tenn., relative to seating accommodations in the
courtroom in anticipation of forthcoming trial.

Also submitted are two copies of an "Order on Scire
Facias," Issued by Judge BATTLE.

BATTL?, ]

. In addition to the above Orders Issued by Judge
there are enclosed two copies each of the following:

. Letter prepared by subject JAHES EARL HAY to his
brother JERKY, dated October 14, 1968.

-Letter dated October 9, 1968, addressed to subject
by his brother, JERKY RAY, St. Louis, Mo.

latter dated October 14, 1968 from subject to Attorney
ARTHUR r*

6> - Bureau (Enc,
1 - Memphis
RGJ :UE
(3)

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MLK Exhibit F-511

12 /

-317

fcOSFM

20, 1968

MEMO HAKDUM FOB lifi, T0LS02T

KH. DS LOACH
HEL ROSES

vm ,

While talking to Attorney General Eamsey Clark on another matter,
ha asked bow the Jamee Earl Say Investigation locked taw. 1 said Z fhnnghi
It was more or leu stymied ia legal technicalities la Great Britain as it has
to go through a lccg process oa eatr adit Ion. 1 commented that, of course, the
lawyer who has goat over to repr*3£at Ha/ la a loranr FBI Agent; that ha la
no good and fU the attorney la the Mrs. Viola Lhasa case, tut, cf course,
we get convictions la that, hut His lawyer has always hesa strongly pro- K3 an.

1 raid ha was LLijgt of Birmingham* Alabama, at oas time end at that time
ha was a strong supporter ol "Bali" Cosaox tad Z thought it eigallicaat that
Bay get a ZeXLjs who certainly a strong &rrrii q£ j jj - y ^rian about Mwv

X said be denies that ho la a fflssarran or that he ever alttaicd any o t their
meetings and he claims he docs not know how Hay came to ask for him as his
lawyer, I said that Ha/ claims he reml about him la the a rasps per when ha
was is the penitentiary la lOsaoorL Hie Attorney General said he does act
see how Bay would remember that, 1 agreed 2 nd told the Attorney General
that the lawyer and his son, who la a partner, west over to England and we
alerted our London OCXce to alert the British as to his background Wo they
would know with whom the/ are dealing. .

tbs Attorney General ashed how Zcsg ago the fallow was with the
Bureau sad Z stated it must have been before tha war. The Attorney General
then asked how long he was with the Bureau and I told him abcut three years
and that he weuTIhto the practice al law and got Into politics la Birmingham
end, as I had said, ha was a vary strong supporter of "Bull" Connor In the use
of police dogs, ct cetera, ia civil rights matters. X said he was the lawyer
la the Lhzzao won ia the local court and then it went into the Federal

court on civil rights and he lost, I said he has made maay jtthlic statements
against Jdartia Latt e r when gfag was living and he has strong animosity
-j. _ ictmy «fv4 Kennedy, X St was that ho Is the

airway selected by Kay to represent 2dm la the trial la this country, X said

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Memorandum for Meurs, Talson, Loach, Romo, Bishop Jon * 20, 1963

he does not tat end to ash for a change of rexaie if he Is to be tried in Memphis*
The Attorney General asked if we vers getting any evidence that Bay had
somebody helping him and supporting him and I told him acne whatsoever.

X said we were gHrV<^ various lines as to Bay and Slrhan Slrhan in the
Bobest J. Banned/ ease as to the mysteries* woman in the pantry of the
Ambassador Hotel and so far they have all fallen through* X said the girl *
la the Sir baa case has refused to take a He detector test, but I thought the
police were going to give her one although so far she has refused to taka oca*
The Attorney General asked if this were the woman in the polka dot dress and
X told Mm It was the one who claimed she saw the woman In the polka dot dress*
the Attorney General said he had read the report on her and got the feeling
she was unbalanced. X commented that she was seeking publicity* .

I continued that we are also checking a a to who was with Slrhaa
Slrhan at the rifle range when he was practicing with the revolver as well
as persons with him when he bought the ammunition* I stated in these
Instances they were men* *

X stated that In Bay v s case, we have net found a single angle that
weald Indicate a conspiracy. I said the only significant thins is the money
he had end which he spent freely in paying bills and I thought that could have '
been obtained from a bank robbery* The Attorney General said that If we
could show he robbed the bank at Alton, it would be helpful* I said we aro
working on that because he was paying his bills with $50 bills up to his arrest*

I said on the other hand he stayed at flop houses and never stayed at a first*
class hotel but at the same time he spent, X thought, 51200 or more iabpjisg
guns and the car, which I thought was $1500, and then betook dancing less on s,
bartender lessons, and lessens in picking locks, and that is why X think security
is so exceedingly important not only in Knjland but on the way back to this . v ,
country and when he gets hero*. * ' > . * :•/. 'J 'V?

The Attorney General commented that he hoped my men can bring
him tack and asked if that were satisfactory* X told him it was and that! V.
would be strongly of the opinion, unless there is a compelling reason to the
contrary, that ha ought to be brought back by military plane; that 1 could not
see any difference between a military plana, a Cunard liner, or Pan Americas;
and on the Military plane we would have cur Agents end hare Bay c o n f ined with

~ 2 -

Memorandum lor Messrs* Xolicn, De Loach, Rosea, Bishop Ana 20, 1003

leg Irons and handcuffs. I said he is a dangerous individual and is act a damp
fool; that he Is desperate and will make an j effort to .escape that he can* 1
said X thought he should be lasted at the Naval airport in Memphis and not
the regular airport* The Attorney General a sk ed IX we should have a repre-
sentative of the Memphis Police Department on board or not, and I said I
would act think do. I said 1 would think we would be responsible for taking
him from the British and arrange with Frank Holloman to have the Memphis
Police at the airport In Memphis on arrival, but to do it almost on an "eyes
only" basis so there will be no leak as to where or when he U coming In
because we will be plagued b7 the press, as they are trying everything they
can In England to get a Has cn when he Is being moved. X said I noted the
lawyer says he expects to be advised exactly when and where he will depart.

The Attorney General commented that he will know when he gets In*

I said there Is a military airport In London and I thought that is
wture the military plane should land if it goes from this country with
absolute silence on the part of the Commanding General as to its departure; .
that tha first knowledge In thin country would come when he Is delivered to
the Memphis Police with sufficient time to get him into Jail* I said the
plane should a rr i v e so u not to allow them to go through the City in the daytime
but to arrive around 2:00 or 5:C0 in the morning. The Attorney General said
he was sure that was exactly right* I said otherwise there will be Gloria to
UU Mo if there is a conspiracy and If there is no conspiracy, the supporters
of Dr. King will do everything in their power to kill him. X said the same
th i r tf ta true in tha case of Sir ban Sir ban In Los Angeles because the feelings
on behalf of the Kennedy followers is so strong that they will have to taka
great precautions to see he is not killed. X said it would be a horrible thing
as tt would be charged it was done by the Federal Government or so me t hi ng
Uka that mod for that reason it mast he very carefully handled both as to
transportation of Hay from London and incarceration. If he Is ever extradited -
as X think tt Is going to drag on for five or six weeks* I said what 1 am afra id of
HUol there Is going to develop In this country criticism on tha part of ihs British
in getting this fellow back hare. I said people have aakod how soon ho will be
brought back and I have told them it is up to tha British as tt Is not our re-
spoosihiUty as wa have done everything so that ho has le^al representation.

Memoranda^ for Mesin« Thlsoe, ©•Loach, Rosea, Bishop 20, 1963

The Attorney General stated that Assistant Attorney General Fred
Fiasco, Jr., will be going back over to England idooday nig h t as the Boms
Secretary and oar Ambassador asked that he come back* Be said that we hare
wa ge d In every way that it be speeded up because of toe strong feeling In this
couatx j about it. • - :

• * . * -• >.:• *: v .

The Attorney G«n&ral asked then if I tho u gh t a military pl ane is
better than leasing a commercial plane sod I said 1 did because whan you
lease a commercial plane, you would here s crew, unless ycu put a military
crew cm It, but there would be no purpose putting a military crew on a
commercial plane, I said 1 could not see any legal difticulty as the method *
of getting him back does act make much ciiiereac* as to the legality of the
thing or the image of it. Toe Attorney Gvotrai commented that he had been
ttiA other way. X said he is a dangerous pan and has proven himself
to be vary clever as he headed fur various parts oi the world as I thought
be was headed for Brussels to Jo m the mercenaries sod he had pirns to go
to Rhodesia be was in where ha laid around for soout a week sod

came back to London. X said the London Police have never been able to pick
up what he was doing far the tM lance of the time. 1 said he is a slippery,
shrewd individual ani ho is most coots in passer and actios with
the prison auihrupftiAi* over there. I said ftnMVfv scout the British is
that they are not tight on security as they do not search & parses unless he is ;
convicted sad they uo sot search anybody visiting someone in Jail, but that ~
is the old British procedure. The Attorney General commented that it is
absolutely wrong. I said I thought any person visiting a prisoner might to be
necsched. Tbs Attorney General he Hv*>yhi my men talk ed them Into doin g
*h**\ l said they finally did, but they always talk about traditions over than.
The Attorney General commented that they wen aboil as strict as anybody oq

r * 1 n iA i we have a very serious problem in moving this fellow

and we ought to do it with very carefully laid out plans and take him into the
Naval airport la Memphis and arrange to turn him over to Holloman and then '■
announce he is In the custody of the Idomphls Police. The Attorney General
yaid he hoped my men were working on that so we will be ready and X told
him we were.

- 4 -

Memorandum for Mesirs, Toleon, DeLotch, Boms, Bishop June 20, 1908

1 told the Attorney General that the men who were In London were
back here, aa one man's father had a serious heart attack* I said one is
Special Agent Zeiss, whom he may remember, and the Attorney General said
he did, that he was a close Mend of his father's and his son knows him, too*

1 said he will be on the plane and so would John X. Mlnnlch, The Attorney
General cfwr.Trwnt.Td this would be Ideal,

The Attorney General asked bow we thought Bay got the three names
he need* 1 said this again shows his astuteness as all three are Lying people
residing in Canada who never knew him and never heard of j said on
the other hand. Bay spent last year, when he was wandering around the country,
a great portion of the time In Canada and I thought he was planning this thing
asd seeking a doable Ideality like Sneyd, Galt, and Brldgemaa and checking
out these names so U there were any check made on his application for a birth
certificate, they .culd ascertain such a person existed. I said this shows his
shrewdness* I said I think we are dealing with a can who is net an ordinary
criminal in the usual sense, but a man capable of doing any kind of a sly act.
The Attorney General said he was exceptionally clever#

I said SIrfaan Slrfaan is a different individual as he is a fanatic and
killed Robert Kennedy because he spoke In favor of Israel and this fellow
being an Arab became intensely bitter against Kennedy and felt he should be
killed, which he did, but he is a fanatic and Ray Is not a fanatic In that sense*

I said 1 think Bay is a racist asd detested Hegroes and Martin Luther King
and there is indication that prior to the Memphis situation, he had Information
about King speaking in other towns and then picked out Memphis* I said I
thick ha acted entirely alone, but we are net dosing our minds that others
m ig h t be associated with him and we have to run down every lead,

X said we are getting more crank letters and letters about other
people woo are going to be killed who are in high office, such as Senator
Edward Kennedy, et cetera* X said one does not realise how many nuts
are loose in this country until we have a cane like this. The Attorney General
said 11 bring! them out* i said we have to be careful of all of them; that we
taka about three awaj a week who coma to my office who complain about
persecution asd sometimes they are armed and we send them to the hospital
ana then they are sent to &t, Elizabeth's and in two or three months they are
back on the streets* The Attorney General said we are going to have to
find new ways to deal with that problem as it la net lixectivo now* I said it

8 -

ltenoranrtam for Uem*. Tolsca, Dt Loach, Bomb, Bishop An* M, 1963

Is & problem lor the psychiatrists bet they are apparently rifting little to can
frhc»r-i t tut they are mentally unbalanced. The Attorney General said It is a
public safety problem sow. X said X do not favor the view that the country
la depraved and all X i we have a great block oof line people
to this country; that there may be some depraved citizens, bat it is sot a
depraved society. The Attorney General said he tho ag b t there was too much
emphasis today la the press that society Is sick; that it is the fashionable
thing to do. ^

X said X hoped the new Comm Us ion the President has appointed
will keep a balanced viewpoint as to that because the other Commission
went far astray in regard to white racism. X said there is racism bat not as
predominantly as the Earner Commission found U to be* The Attorney
General said he had never it so* X said as an example taka the meeting
yesterday (Solidarity Day); t^* 3 * more than 3C% of those who attended were white
and it was not predominantly Negro* The Attorney General said that was
surprising to him and ha felt better to see it that way. X said this shows
frai white racism is cot as predominant as we have been led to believe.

I X hope the Eisenhower Commission when they get around to their
findings view it with an unemotional a tt l t cd e . The Attorney General said
there are some good people on the Commission. X said It seems It fibroid
be docs without emotionalism or crying fire. I said X get annoyed with the
editorials about cur sick society as X do not believe there Is such a t h ing
In country although there are some sick citizens* The Attorney General
ffgjM ^ 2 fmM T r-riir» iht* fa Law Enforcement Dnil&tin on the
Director 1 * page, ha thought It would be helpful* X said I have been working
on that Just recently; t^t the Iri** was given to me by KcGill of the A tl anta
Constitution* t said he had a line editorial about the attacks ca the FSX
because we bad i v>t found tbs Kiag murderer after two months and the cracks
t**»» were not trying to find him and then he quoted several verses of the
Bible which portrayed Christ as not Interested lathe poor, bat It showed
again there la always on effort to tear down and destroy. I commented
that X there was a tendency to debusk our Patriots In history* X said

It was that sort of that i thought drove President Johnson from running
tor a second term and the Attornay General agreed*

• 6 «►

39-935 0 - 79 -7

Itosearaatoua for Mean*. Tolaon, PcLoach, Rosen, Bis bo; . jaa* 20, 1983

Z mentioned the Students for & Democratic Society as a minority '
group dominating and tbs Attorney General said it was a tiny group. X said . *

It Is a bad group sad it played a big part yesterday at this meeting as they
attended hot It was just Ills tbs Columbia University thing. I said that was staged b;
only about thirty individuals who closed tha salvers ity which has thousands of
stadeats. 3Ba Attorney General said they are a pretty clever and elZectty* ■
gr o u p and have to be watched carefully. I said they are more effective tbaa
out and cut coonaaists. Thu Attorney General said they are doing nor*
bans. I said they are storing into every area they can tad we bare bees
watching them closely sad we have some good Informants. The Attorney •

General said he tboaght that is really vital becaase they are a daagercss .
group. . . V; . , . v

The Attorney General expressed his appreciation and said he would
They me posted on this registration of guns.

Very truly yours.

t Jobs Edgar Hoover
Director

sent nott a, a
mg

DAT!

sr-J232ZZT

• I-

Chairman Stokes. It would also be appropriate to enter into the
record the following additional materials, having to do with the
Bureau’s COI NTELPRO news media efforts, at this time. 1 They
will be designated MLK exhibits F-515, F-516, F-517, F-518, F-519,
F-520, F-521, and F-522.

1 These and other materials bearing on the FBFs use of the news media to- further COINTEL
PRO efforts are found in the section of the committee’s final report which discusses the
Bure?’’’'" ~-eafw*oRination investigation of Dr. King.

fill

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MLK Exhibit F-515

MLK Exhibit F-515 — Continued

MLK Exhibit F-516

7 m**w»Um)hmu I I

"1 ^ UNITED STATES GCT^ |!MENT

Memorandum

3 : "**" ( DIRECTOR, FBI

date: 6/28/68

SAC, -ST

^ 9 1

4ms. ./lOQ-^1213) P

At'*/ Lit T

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY *
^DISRUPTI ON OF THE NET LEFT

ReBulet to Albany, 5/10/68*

r y>

New Left activity In the St. Louis Division is
concentrated in the headquarters city, principal organizations
involved in this movement are as follows:

(ACTION;

Action Committee to Increase Opportunities for Negroes

Students for Democratic Society <SDS) ;

St. Louis Draft Resistance (SLDR);

The Committee to Support Draft Resistance (CSDR) . {

- A CTION is basically a racial typeorgan ization. It

consists of a small group of r^fviduaXs'vho split from the
St. Louis Chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE)
several years ago in belief that CORE was not sufficiently
Militant. Its activities*^ re Irregular, depending almost
entirely on its dhainaaa fe^^^Sj^^^ Communist Party efforts
to cultivate him have so iSr appear ea unsuccessful; however,
some Influence Is exerted through O RVI L LE LEACH , veteran Communist
Party member, who is chairman of the. Community Relations Committee
of ACTION.

An immediate Counterintelligence Program concerning
the latter three organizations would be restricted because these \j
organizations are all campus-type organizations and Washington
University and St. Louis University will close for summer
vac^ions in the first week of June. JThese organizations will
be virtually out of existance untii^the schools reopen in September.

U*- Bureau (#ri) ®EC- U . y V 1 ’ I

!•- st. Louis • r- 7 • — ■ ivJJs

Bureau (A/7J
1*— St. Louis
BCJ :ajb

Rtf 31'

: JUL 5

V.S. Ssvin£i Bends Kept Istty** jif Ysjroll Savings Fl>

SL: “100-2i2l3 /

** St. Louis has 'pending investigations on these four

organizations and their leadership and will be,^).ert to an y
circumstances or conditions .Which might be utilized to good
advantage tor Counterintelligence purposes.

In the past this office has used to good advantage
anonymous sailings in connection with communist Party Counter-
intelligence. However, at this time the off ice- has no specific
publications in mind which might be suggested^for Bureau approval.

- The f eeding_pf_jell . chosen jLn,fpraatiQn._to _the J3t . Louis

Globe Democrat^ a~local newspaper, whose edit nr and ass ocilpLi
editor , are- extremely fr iendly tn the Bureau and the fit. Trouts
QfULcg, tras also been utilized in the past and it is contemplated
that this technique might be^ used to good advantage in connection
with this program.

With specific regard to the St. Louis Draft Besist ance.
which is a one-man organization headed bj
, Washington University graduate student, the iol lowing
circumstances occurred:

t urned In his Selective Service draft card at a
public meeting' on Investigation at his local board

determined that a tew days later he wrote to the board requesting
a duplicate card. If this type of information could ha ve been
publicized. It might have pointed out the insincerity of
Nothing, however, was done at the tine because of the confidential
nature of draft board records and the fact that public ity may
have jeopardized prosecution presently pending against

J St. Louis will carefully analyze these organizations

/under this program in an effort to affect the disruption of the
I Hew Left and specific suggestions of Counterintelligence action
f will be submitted to the Bureau for approval by separate letter.

MLK Exhibit F-517

%■

MLK Ex F-517

' SAC, St. Louis (100-3X213)

) . 7 -■ —

10/18/68

" Dlraetor.

/ '

1BI (100-449698)

f COINTELPBO SET IXTT

B«uralrt«l 10/4/68 eaptlosad •'Stud.ntV for a SeaocratLc .
Eoclsty, IS - BBS."

Authority la granted to contact *r

in the event information la received that a specific high
school is being targeted for organising by the SDS. This say
be done only in the event that such a contact *111 not Jeopardise
your investigation of SDS or your sources therein

Enclosed herewith are one copy of a pamphlet entitled
dents for a Democratic Society, Front Bunner of the Few
ft" and ten coplea of a leaflet entitled ^Campus or Battle-
ground? Columbia is a Faming to All Amer i can gnlyerglti ea."
As these publications say be of value to
providing him *iih background on the SDS, you nay furnish
copies of this material to bin at that tine.

-■K

.*-! EE j

t — Rl
o

During your contact vltb «

you Bbould

Impress upon bin that the Bureau's interest In this natter Is

** ** ln " trlct * 9t conf “ enc# * y - - 7

nelosureo - 11 X

HH: jes

;»! a

HDCT21B63

100

Luster to SAC, St. Louis * Cj :, '•

1- S3: COINTELFHO r* SET LSFT .. .* „ -!• *

^00-449698. .-.V.- >■/ ’ if.

A* * • ♦ . * *

HOTS CONTINUED;

witbtbe Bureau In the past. Its publisher Ur. WBSSp ^mm

i* on the Special Correspondents List - The inioraatlon
* contained In onclosure^egrtiiiin bacJtground on SDS which can ‘ ir 71
''be ot valne to contains public ..source -*';*-^**y

:¥« i y» i *e pref lonely -cua subadttod these docuneote to outside .£

agencies.

- 2 ^

102

In - H-7& f^ 5

this conversation are not known* £HB5Sf* aB transferred ~-\ 7 .
to Detroit ahort l v aft er hi s return from the National 1 ‘

Convention nnd^S^^^^^^^pears to have dropped from the
local Party

•"• w _

( Possi ble additional counterintelligence action )

against has been considered carefully and discussed /

among speSflBTagents conversant with local Party activities* (
Consideration is being given to requesting Bureau authority
for a published feature article in the ”St. Louis Globe- \

Democrat” , St. Louis dally newspaper. Appropriate background \
information and suggested questions would be furnished to an )
SAC contact who has cooperated previously in this program. ^

The Bureau will be advised when it is felt the time
is propitious for such action. In the meantime, inner Party
activities will be scrutinized carefully and continually
for possible other type counterintelligence action.

- 2

103

MLK Exhibit F-519

UNITED SfATES c' {ERNMENT EX ' F" 5 1 1 ClQl ^^ ^-^TlAj-

> Memorandum ^ ^

• *

: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-104-42) Datx: 7/14/66 ^^;

SAC, ST. LOUIS (100-16708)

^^OMMUNIST PARTY, USA

COUNTED IKTELLToMl^ PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Be St. Louis letters to Bureau 4/14/66 and 6/15/66,
St. Louis alrtel to Bureau 7/12/66, Bulet to St. Louis 4/26/66
and Burad to St. Louis 6/21/66. # /

POTENTIAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTION

E3SSBI described in St. Louis letter 4/14/66 as a
recent refeasftoi the Missouri State penitentiary where he
reportedly served tlaeg gran arcotlc violation, has now been
iden tified as He has been using the nxse

CE?£QaDgea blv . The Kansas City Division
was released from the Missouri State Penitentiary
11/26/65 where he^was

robbery . Ho dispositions
are abound

I lt appears therefore that information which was
irculatlng among Communist Party (CP) members that he served
ime for a narcotics violation is not true. Other Information

ha* been ,daYft?qnf?d ,no^-casts *Qm& doubt on. statements hr

£ £ jjl received his Initial indoctrination in Marxism at a class

^^S-Hej^rin the Missouri State penitentiary. It may be n oted th at*"
o I 7 £M he Kansas City Division in its letter 6/16/66 states gjgs s a ^

9 c I served part of his robbery sentence at reformatories ana away
H t. plrf 013 the Missouri State penitentiary. ^

S % li ? activities in the CP will be followed closely

for possible counterintelligence action based on his past
criminal record. ^ awViP / .

• e &San*,\

E^ecp, i,^rut

^JL ~ Bureau
1 - St. Louis

U AB/XC

(3J

f l<^>
n K. iQRfi

r.nr:n

rA-:.:.r.'=is? njraygg 8 06

j^&^siz^zzjiT.'i^rso ••

WI23S SHS'JH 1 1 ■■ <—

- /C -raS

We will continue to watch tha C P*» involvement
In The St. Louis Citizens tor Peace in Yletnaa. A caalnfU
investiga tion is bei ng conducted regarding this organization
s been very active in this group and has
otKSr members to be similarly active.

m 1 1 u i £i<**adllia£Si

i.vnKLLidcfcJ Am a*

containing a photograph of RONALD LAND BERG , DCA Coordinator and
C? aenber, with the headline "DuBois Van’ Attends Red Convention
Ronald Landberg Observer at Party Meeting in § k .Y. n The article

105

J 6* -

states LANDBXRG adulated representing 8t . Louis at a Kational
DCA Convention in Chicago and then traveled to the CP Con*
vent ion In Hew York as an "unofficial" observer. The article
contains an insert "See Editorial Page 2F”.

An editorial In this issue of the newspaper Is
titled "The Communist Line” and states the Implications of
the LANDBEHG story are clear; that they forecast the CP
line for the next few months in DCA "and other organisations".

Zt appears possible that adverse publicity of thle
nature may well stifle efforts of DCA to launch units in the
St. tails area, particularly at the local colleges and universities.

In a recent press Interview following LAJpBERG’s^
return to St. Louis, he announced that he has beftg transferred
.ta-Dg-trPit. by j£4« He in effect conceded failure in the St.

Louis area, complaining of an excessive number of right-wing '
organizations and local conservatism

Zt Is not known to what extent, if any, our counter-
intelligence action may have been instrumental in his decision
to leave St. Louis. .

ST. IMS GLDBE-DEMXRAT

MARCH 30-31, 1368

MLK Exhibit F-521

- Ctm. • ta M. tr

% l-NlTtfj STATES ((jERNMENT

Memorandum

\ 1

; Mr. Sullivan

:K«»\t G. C. Moor<

DATE: 3/28/68

rd'y&Ei

m SANITATION WORKERS S TRIKE

MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE _
racial’matters

A sanitation workers strike has been going on in
Memphis for some time. Martin Luther King, Jr., today led a
march composed of 5,000 to 6,000 people through the streets
of Memphis* King was in an automobile preceding the marchers.

As the march developed, acts of violence and vandalism broke
out including the breaking of windows in stores and some

looting. 71

This clearly demonstrates that acts of so-called
nonviolence advocated by King cannot be controlled. The same
thing could happen in his planned massive civil disobedience^ .■*
for Washington in April. „ ~ — ~ ~ ^ j k 6 f~

APT OT: EX-105 J AP^l^W^

Attached is a blind memorandum pointing^ut- the
above, which if you approve, should be made available by
Crime Records Division to cooperative news media sources* (j^

'Enclosure , / ft /

TDR:fhd '(S) M/L( *]/[!&■ ^ -

TDRtfhd (<5)

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. .Bishop
1' - Mr* G. C. Moore
1 - Mr* Deakin

/i f:

ddf

a fk

v hi <mis 7 aw-ffliwMk#-"* 1

109

Martin Luther King, Jr., President of the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference, injected himself into the
sanitation workers' strike in Memphis, Tennessee, and the
result of King’s famous espousal of nonviolence was vandalism,
looting, and riot.

Previously, King involved himself in this strike,
called for a general strike, and called for a mass march.

Today he led the mass march in an automobile at the head of
the line. Negroes began shouting "black power" and trouble
began. King, apparently unable or unwilling to control the
marchers, absented himself from the scene; window breaking and
looting broke out.

Police officers were forced to use gas to break up
the march and to control the crowd. It was necessary to
activate the National Guard. Martin Luther King claims his
much-heralded march on Washington, scheduled for April 22,
1968, will also be "nonviolent." He says he has persuaded
militant black nationalists to abandon violent extremism in
Washington, D. C., during the march. Memphis^raay only be the
prelude to civil strife in our Nation’s Capitol.

XER OX.

4 V368

.^CLOSURE

39-935 0 - 79 -8

110

MLK Exhibit F-522

An Editorial

FOR HANOI?
OR FOR AMERICA?

The St. Louis Globe-Democrat and the
St. Louis Post-Dispatch are unmistaka-
bly opposed philosophically; i.e. on mat-
ters of government, especially fiscal
responsibility; on matters of welfare,
particularly where immorality is in-
volved, and on other notable issues.
Many fine newspapers throughout the
nation share the views of The Globe-
Democrat.

The Globe-Democrat accepts the Inev-
itability that reasonable persons, and
thus, reasonable media organizations,
will differ. Difference of opinion Is
Indigenous to a rational world.

Thus, The Globe-Democrat has re-
frained, as a matter of policy, from
commenting — favorably or unfavorably
—on the conduct or opinions of other
members of the media.

In Wednesday's issue, the St. Louis
Post-Dispatch publlshed.a cheap shot, a
biased and slanted item about The St.
Louis Globfe- Democrat. In its normally
hypocritical manner, the Post-Dispatch
presented material about The Globe-
Democrat as a news story, when in fact
it was an editorial in a bogeyman's
costume. Had the Post-Dispatch had the
Journalistic character and professional-
ism to publish its Federal Bureau of
Investigation story as an editorial. The
Globe-Democrat would have respected
tbe afternoon paper’s prerogative to
express its opinion, and we would not
have commented about it.

The Post-Dispatch editorialized story
said The Globe-Democrat in recent years
had published news material about stu-
dent dissidents, especially In St. Louis
County at Lindbergh High School; The
Post-Dispatch story said the student
dissident stories were ''planted'* by the
FBI and implied they were the result of
"conspiratorial" ties between The Globe-
Democrat and the FBI. The story bla-
tantly implied a nefarious alliance be-
tween The Globe-Democrat and the . FBI
for unworthy purposes.

It is most certainly true that The
Globe-Democrat has published news sto-
ries in the past about dissident student
activities; In the St. Louis area. In the
Midwest and throughout the United
States and the world. To the best of my
knowledge and recollection, these stories
originated in the normal manner incident
to any news story: from an interested
reader who notified the city editor, a
parent, a student, a witness or scores of
other sources.

For the Post-Dispatch news story to
state that the FBI arranged stories In
The Globe-Democrat through contacts
with the publisher of The Globe- Demo-
crat Is a villainous lie typical of the
depraved thinking of a Communist “Big
Ue" technique — designed to undermine
the fabric of a country. It Is true that I
personally knew J. Edgar Hoover, the
long- time, respected director of the FBI,
and enjoyed an hour or more visit with
him In Washington only a few days
before bis death In May of It7?. It Is a
privilege to Identify Clarence M. Kelley,
pi jsent FBI director and former chief of
p’ice of Kor'.ps City, as a Mend.
Neither Mr. Hoover nor Mr. Kelley at
any time provided me any hdormatioa
relative to any news stones, past or
present Hr. Hoover and Mr. Kelley have
never at any time communicated news
material to. or made any request of
Martin L. Dfiggan, editor of the editorial
page of The Globe-Dec rat, or George
A. Kfflenberg, mnnagtng editor of The
Gtobe-DemocraL

We are at a loss to account for the FBI
memoranda, unless the explanation is
that some overzealous agent sought to
advance himself by taking credit for
what Tbe Globe-Democrat produced in
its normal pursuits.

In the normal course of community,
social and business activities and news
work, we have known a succession of
FBI agents in charge in the St. Louis
office. At no time has any of these men

Ill

of impeccable character and ability ever
"planted" a story In The Globe-Demo-
crat by way of my office or that of Mr.
Duggan's or Mr. Killenberg's. Quite the
contrary, the St. Louis office of the FBI
has consistently maintained a frequently
frustrating reluctance to release news
material to The Globe-Democrat.

The Post-Dispatch story, to the con-
trary, emits a barnyard stench which is
a measure of a good deal of that paper's
pretense at news coverage: Rot.

This is an appropriate occasion to offer
a statement expanding on The Globe-
Democrat’s news and editorial policy,
expressed daily in our masthead. The
Globe-Democrat’s purpose is to serve the
interests of our community, state and
nation. The Globe-Democrat’s intention
is to be supportive, generally, of commu-
nity institutions. It is not, as it appears
to be with the other daily in St. Louis,
nitpicklngly destructive, denigrating and
demeaning by repeated irresponsibility
and uninformed criticism. We believe in
the United States of America.

We believe in the integrity and the
future of the United States, including the
integrity and objectives of the FBI.
During the late 1960s and early 1970s

when universities were being bombed
and burned, and in some cases innocent
citizens murdered; when banks were
being bombed and burned; when a hall
in Congress was bombed; when peaceful,
personal access to national political
conventions was being denied to orderly
Americans, The Globe-Democrat be-
lieved and still believes that it was the -
do fy of the FBI to apprehend those
threatening the internal security o'f the
nation.

If The Globe-Democrat played a con-
structive role during this period, this
newspaper Is proud of Its participation
and coalrtbutlca.

Tbe Globe-Democrat cherishes its rale
as a supporter of the American system.
The Globe-Democrat suggests that the
frequently slanted news coverage la tbe
Post-Dispatch, most especially its recent
lPfart, Page One Dw£;aaa series paying
tribute to North Vietnam's oppressive
and dehumanising leadership out of
Hanoi, la a. shameful disservice to St.
Louis and America.

Wa prefer pro-Americantsm.

G. DUNCAN BAUMAN
Publisher

SL Loub Glebe-Democrat

Chairman Stokes. Mr. DeLoach, at the conclusion of a witness’
testimony before our committee, the witness is entitled to 5 min-
utes. During the 5-minute period either the witness or his counsel
may address the committee and in any way amplify or further
expand upon your testimony before the committee. I would extend
to either you or your counsel at this time 5 minutes for that
purpose, if you so desire.

Mr. DeLoach. Mr. Chairman, I simply would like to state I
appreciate the respect shown me by this committee, and I hope I
have been able to be of some service to the committee and to the
Congress, and that is all I have to say, sir.

Chairman Stokes. We certainly thank you very much, Mr. De-
Loach, for your appearance here and for the testimony you have
given us.

There being nothing further at this time, you are excused, sir.

Mr. DeLoach. Thank you, sir.

Chairman Stokes. The Chair at this time desires to make a
statement.

During the Kennedy assassination hearings, when we turned to
evidence of association and its implications for conspiracy, it oc-
curred to me that it might be appropriate to discuss certain gener-
al principles that seem applicable. “Conspiracy is founded in associ-
ation,” I said then, “but more than association is required to estab-
lish conspiracy.” I hoped at that time to assist those who followed

112

our hearings or read our record to understand the significance of
what we were doing.

It seems to me now that it would be appropriate to discuss for
the record the moral or legal standards the committee might want
to use in evaluating the evidence on the ultimate question, as it
has been put to us, did the FBI kill Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.?

Our earliest legal traditions, those rooted in English common
law, reflect an abhorrence of the unjustifiable taking of a human
life. Lord Coke, a 17th century textbook writer, formulated the
classic definition of murder:

When a man of sound memory and of an age of discretion unlawfully kills any
reasonable creature in being and under the king’s peace with malice aforethought,
either expressed or implied by the law * * *

Much of our legal learning on homicide has been based on the
concept of malice aforethought. The distinction between murder
and manslaughter turned on it: unjustified killing with malice
aforethought constituted murder; unjustified killing without malice
aforethought constituted manslaughter. Behind all of this legal
thought has been our traditional Judeo-Christian teachings; they
are the bedrock on which our law ultimately rests. Men act freely,
and they are responsible for the results of their actions. They
ought not harm one another, and the ultimate harm that you do to
another is deprive him of his life.

Modern legal thinking treats homicide accordingly. The model
penal code of the American Law Institute embodies generally ac-
cepted definitions of the elements of criminal homicide — state of
mind, conduct, causation and result. These same elements are re-
flected in mature moral thought.

Homicide is not a simple concept. Questions of degree are in-
volved. Degrees of legal homicide are based, to begin with, on state
of mind. A death that is consciously brought about — a murder, in
the traditional sense — is termed intentional homicide. Reckless
homicide, that is, a death not intended but consciously risked,
when it does occur, is what has traditionally been called man-
slaughter. And there is a third classification in modern law: Unjus-
tifiable conduct, under circumstances where death might occur,
should have been foreseen, and does occur; it is called negligent
homicide.

On this last point, additional comment is necessary. There are
sound reasons in morality and law not to permit the imposition of
personal or criminal liability based on a standard of negligence. I
recognize, of course, negligence is a familiar standard for the impo-
sition of civil liability — money damages assessed for harm done,
even wrongful death.

But civil liability is a thoroughly different matter from criminal
liability. It often embraces little more than a shifting of the burden
of risk of injury, a risk that can best be met by insurance. Some-
one, usually the person with the deepest pocket, may pay damages,
but no one goes to jail. Yet personal or criminal liability, it is
argued, ought to rest on subjective factors, that is, intent or con-
scious risk taking, and not be assessed on an objective standard,
that is, a standard that speaks in terms of what a person should
have known.

113

It is not necessary to belabor the argument. Suffice it to say that
these considerations have not carried the day in our society, so the
concept of criminal negligence is part of our legal framework. It is
widely employed, particularly where deaths occur in the operation
of motor vehicles.

Getting to the subject at hand — the role of the FBI in the King
assassination — the facts that have been developed before the com-
mittee are literally unprecedented. Never before has an agency of
our Government, least of all a police agency, apparently set out to
destroy a prominent citizen, perhaps not directly to kill him, but to
destroy his moral standing nevertheless. Heretofore, our law in the
area of reckless or negligent homicide has dealt with the conduct of
private citizens, usually engaging in ordinary occupations, such as
operating an auto on the highway, hunting with a dangerous
weapon, providing medical treatment, and so on.

Unusual cases have, of course, been brought before the courts
that have involved operating a night club where numerous patrons
die in a fire; playing Russian roulette, where players are held
responsible for the death of another; participating in a drag race in
which a death occurs.

Analogies between these usual or exceptional cases and the evi-
dence in these hearings are strange and uncomfortable, but com-
pelling.

Can it legitimately be said that the FBI, like the night club
owner, consciously risked or should have foreseen, not a fire in a
firetrap, but that others might be inflamed by its unlawful propa-
ganda and do what the Bureau itself did not do: Fire a deadly shot
into Dr. King?

Can it legitimately be said that the FBI, like the player of
Russian roulette, consciously risked or should have foreseen not
that one chamber of the revolver would be loaded but that others
might be encouraged by its unlawful participation in another kind
of roulette in which the stakes included Dr. King’s life?

Can it legitimately be said that the FBI, like the participants in
a drag race, consciously risked or should have foreseen, not that
high speed racing can culminate in a fiery accident, but that others
might be encouraged by its unlawful participation in a dangerous
political contest to take Dr. King’s life by violence?

I do not know how far these general principles should be ex-
tended here, but I do feel that they are applicable. We face an
unprecedented challenge. We have no clear-cut guides available.
Yet we must decide.

Other factors, too, must be considered. Apart from state of mind,
the nature of one’s conduct in the commission of a homicide can
also affect how responsibility is assessed. The law has always taken
very seriously the consequences of conduct that is unlawful, and it
has easily, perhaps too easily, found responsibility for ensuing
deaths.

If the conduct is otherwise felonious — as in the case, for example,
of an armed holdup — and it results in a death, it is termed a
felony-murder. If, on the other hand, the conduct is only a misde-
meanor, a resulting death is termed a misdemeanor-manslaughter.

How do we apply these principles here? Do we place special
emphasis on the illegal character of the FBI conduct?

114

The basic meaning of causation is not difficult to comprehend. A
human being must always be held responsible for the consequences
of his conduct, even when his conduct is not the sole factor in
bringing about a result for which he can be held legally responsi-
ble.

The possibility of joint responsibility has always been recognized,
although difficult questions are raised when more than one individ-
ual’s conduct contributes to the result, say a death. Should it be
held that the death was jointly caused? Or should the conduct of
the actual perpetrator be held to be the intervening and, therefore,
the sole cause?

Responsibility for a death is always assessed based on the inter-
play between state of mind, conduct, cause, and result. These ele-
ments have been applied consistently to all persons in that they
stand equal before the law. Given a certain age and a degree of
mental and physical capacity, every person has to be held to the
same minimum standard of responsibility.

This being said, however, certain classifications of people have
been held to a higher degree of responsibility: Parents with respect
to their children; guardians with respect to their wards; trustees
with respect to their beneficiaries; Government officials with re-
spect to citizens. This is merely another way of saying that larger
responsibility goes with higher authority.

What I have outlined here are some of the moral and legal ideas
upon which our moral and legal concepts of responsibility are
based. They are raised here with the thought that they may be
appropriate as a framework for questions we ought to try to
answer as the committee analyzes the evidence presented in these
hearings: Did responsible officials of the FBI intend by their con-
duct to bring about Dr. King’s death?

Did FBI officials recklessly engage in provocative conduct, con-
sciously risking Dr. King’s death, even though they did not intend
to bring it about?

Can we say that these FBI officials should have known that their
conduct was unjustifiably risking Dr. King’s death?

Should the committee take special note that the conduct of the
FBI in this conspiracy of harassment of Dr. King was not only
unjustified as policy, it was also illegal and unconstitutional?

Did the conduct of the FBI contribute in any significant degree
to the sequence of events that occurred in Memphis and led to Dr.
King’s death, that is, did they help create the moral climate in
which such an act was not only thinkable, but could be thought of
as a justifiable course of conduct?

If so, to what degree did the conduct of the FBI so contribute?

Should the actions of those persons who may have actually plot-
ted Dr. King’s assassination and carried it out be considered inter-
vening causes in the chain of events that could be tracked, even in
part, back to the FBI itself?

Would they have acted as they did without regard for the con-
duct of the FBI?

I realize, of course, that I have posed questions that are easier to
ask than to answer. I know, too, that we have no precedents here
to give us firm guidance and the answers that we give will be
debated for years to come.

115

Yet we have no choice but to do the best we can with what we
have available to us. I hope that these standards and questions
may serve as an acceptable moral or legal framework for our
analysis when the committee comes to grips in its final delibera-
tion with the ultimate question which might well be rephrased:
Should the FBI bear some responsibility for the death of Dr. King?

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine.

Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have no prepared remarks, yet I would like to point out that I
think this select committee has operated with great harmony
during your chairmanship. I would hope that we could continue in
that category.

I don’t necessarily take exception to the statement of the chair-
man. However, I did want to point out that this does not necessar-
ily represent the conclusions nor necessarily the views of all mem-
bers of the select committee.

I would hope that the media in handling this and that the
American people listening to these hearings recognize that the
chairman in making this statement was primarily posing questions
that must be resolved ultimately by the whole committee.

Now, in listening to this, and the chairman did afford me the
courtesy of showing me this statement prior to making it, I would
describe the statement as a scholarly dissertation replete with
professional theories of law, morality and rationalization.

I would hope that no one would come to any thought that this
select committee may have arrived at conclusions and are now
seeking through testimony and theories to justify any such a con-
clusion.

There are, however, what I would consider provocative wordings
in these rhetorical questions such as “responsibility for a death is
always assessed based on the interplay between state of mind,
conduct, cause, and result,” et cetera, of mature moral thought.

A question was asked, but it almost was in the terms of a
conclusion which I am sure the chairman did not mean to convey
that any conclusions have been reached, but it does mention the
fact that conduct of the FBI in this conspiracy of harassment was
not only unjustified as policy, it was also illegal and unconstitu-
tional.

I would like to have the record quite clear, Mr. Chairman, that
this was put in the form of a question that we must resolve rather
than a conclusion of the Chair or of the select committee.

Chairman Stokes. I would certainly concur with the gentleman’s
statement and underscore the fact that the Chair nor members of
this committee have yet had an opportunity to deliberate on these
questions.

What the Chair hoped to do was to put into some perspective the
scope of the discussion and dialog which I feel that the committee
must ultimately come to grips with in terms of its firm conclusions.

If there is nothing further at this time, the Chair would like to
announce that the committee would like to meet for a very brief
open session in room 304 immediately, it will be open session but it
will be immediately after we recess here, in room 304. It should not
take us very long at all.

If there is nothing further before the committee at this time, the
Chair will adjourn until 9 a.m. tomorrow morning.

[Whereupon, at 1:14 p.m. the committee adjourned, to recon T ~
at 9 a.m., Tuesday, November 28, 1978.]

INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1978

House of Representatives,

Select Committee on Assassinations,

Washington, D.C.

The select committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 9:11 a.m.,
in room 345, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Louis Stokes
(chairman of the select committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Stokes, Devine, Preyer, McKinney,
Fauntroy, Sawyer, Ford, Fithian, and Edgar.

Also present: G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director;
Peter Beeson, staff counsel and Elizabeth L. Berning, chief clerk.

Chairman Stokes. The committee will come to order.

The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey.

NARRATION BY PROF. G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL
AND STAFF DIRECTOR

Mr. Blakey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Over the past 4 days of hearings, the committee has heard evi-
dence relating to the performance of the FBI. The committee,
however, must go beyond the FBI and examine the conduct of the
Department of Justice, for the Bureau is ift law, if not always in
fact, a subsidiary agency of the Department.

The committee has taken a hard look at how the Department —
more specifically the Attorney General — exercised supervision over
the FBI in the surveillance of Dr. King and the investigation of his
assassination.

By way of background, the position of Attorney General was
created by law in 1789; its incumbent was to be the chief legal
officer of the U.S. Government. Not until after the Civil War,
however, did the role of the Attorney General begin to acquire its
modern institutional forms. Since the post was (and is) appointive,
the Department of Justice was established in 1870, to insure con-
tinuity from one administration to another. Over time, the Depart-
ment has increasingly taken the lead in major Federal prosecu-
tions and other Federal legal matters.

Yesterday the committee heard a summary of a staff report on
the FBI investigation of the King assassination, one that identified
a variety of possible deficiencies in that investigation. The purpose
of today’s hearing is to consider the extent to which the Depart-
ment itself must share the blame for investigative failures, if such
are found to be the case by the committee, lack of concern for

( 117 )

118

individual rights and organizational problems. Copies of the report
have been made available to today’s witnesses.

The report raised a number of questions, although, obviously,
how they are settled is up to the committee.

For example, the investigation was apparently hampered from
the beginning by a strained relationship between the FBI and
Justice. No formal mechanism was established for the transfer of
information, and unilateral decisions were made by Bureau person-
nel, to name but two particulars. Cooperation is, of course, a two-
way street, but the responsibility for it, or its lack, must fall
heavily on the agency of higher authority.

Some other problems that might not have occurred, had the
Department and the Bureau established a better working relation-
ship, and had proper leadership been exercised, are:

One, little regard was apparently shown for the constitutional
rights of the defendant or his family. Ray’s relatives were the
target of proposed illegal electronic surveillance during the man-
hunt, though it was apparently never instituted.

After James Earl Ray was arrested, his communications with his
lawyer were intercepted, apparently by local authorities and passed
on to the FBI. Subsequent to his conviction, Ray was interrogated
without being informed of his Miranda rights.

Two, following Ray’s arrest, the investigation came to a virtual
standstill, although questions of conspiracy at least remained open
and some leads were followed out. But evidence that might have
led to the discovery of a plot was in fact largely ignored by the FBI,
or not imaginatively sought.

Three, not used were those investigative resources peculiarly
available through the Justice Department, including interrogation
under oath in Federal grand juries, immunity grants, and lawful,
court-ordered electronic surveillance.

At the time of the assassination of Dr. King, the Attorney Gener-
al of the United States was Ramsey Clark, who, when word first
was flashed from Memphis, declared an intention to be directly
involved on a daily basis, given the importance of the case.

He assigned responsibility for the investigation to the FBI, and
he ordered that responsibility within the Department be shared by
two Assistant Attorneys General, Stephen Poliak of the Civil
Rights Division and Fred Vinson of the Criminal Division.

It would be appropriate at this point, Mr. Chairman, to enter
into the record MLK F-514, and appropriately display a depart-
mental organization chart, and appropriately display MLK exhibit
F-515.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection it will be entered into the
record at this point.

[The information follows:]

120

Mr. Blakey. Until Ray was arrested in London on June 8, 1968,
departmental attorneys were little involved in the case, even
though the department had within it a tradition of successful col-
laboration in conspiracy investigations in the antitrust and orga-
nized crime fields. When it was necessary to extradite Ray from
England, Mr. Vinson went to London to oversee the proceedings,
although it is somewhat unusual for the Department to handle
extradition in a State murder case. It did so because there was an
allegation of conspiracy to violate civil rights, a Federal crime (18
U.S.C. Sec. 241) and because two States — Tennessee and Missouri —
were active in the case.

From Ray’s apprehension forward, the role of the Department of
Justice was most conspicuous for its absence.

In January 1969, the Nixon administration came to power. While
stated policy was to pursue conspiracy leads, Attorney General
John Mitchell, in fact, apparently did not participate actively in
the case. Mitchell apparently did not argue with the FBI’s lone
assassin conclusion, and Ray was, after all, in prison.

Assistant Attorney General Jerris Leonard of the Civil Rights
Division did propose that Ray be interviewed in connection with a
conspiracy investigation. But no representative of his office was
present for FBI interviews, and a suggestion by Leonard that Ray
appear before a grand jury on the conspiracy charge was never
followed through.

Ramsey Clark is a key official whose exercise of responsibility as
Attorney General must be carefully examined.

Mr. Clark was appointed in 1961 Assistant Attorney General in
the Land and Resources Division of the Justice Department. Even
in this capacity, he worked extensively in the Kennedy administra-
tion’s high-priority civil rights program in the South.

Mr. Clark was named Deputy Attorney General in 1965 and
Acting Attorney General in 1966. He held the top position in the
Department from 1967 to the change in administration in January
1969. He is now in private practice in New York City.

It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to calls Mr.
Clark.

Chairman Stokes. The committee calls Mr. Clark.

Will you stand, raise your right hand, and be sworn?

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before this
committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
so help you God?

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM RAMSEY CLARK, FORMER ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. Clark. I do.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. You may be seated.

The Chair recognizes staff counsel, Mr. Peter Beeson.

Mr. Beeson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Clark, will you state your full name for the record, please?

Mr. Clark. My full name is William Ramsey Clark.

Mr. Beeson. Would you give the committee a brief rundown on
your professional background up until the time when you left the
Department of Justice in January of 1969?

121

Mr. Clark. Well, I finished law school at the University of
Chicago, December 1950; returned to Texas, took the bar and began
practicing in 1951; remained in general practice in Texas until
1961 when I joined the Kennedy administration as Assistant Attor-
ney General. I remained Assistant Attorney General until Febru-
ary of 1965 when I became Deputy Attorney General. I remained
Deputy Attorney General until September, roughly, of 1966. I
became Acting Attorney General. I was nominated to be Attorney
General in February of 1967.

Mr. Beeson. From that time until the change of administrations
in January of 1969 you were Attorney General of the United
States, right? As Deputy Attorney General from February of 1965
until September of 1966, who was the Attorney General at that
time?

Mr. Clark. Nicholas Katzenbach.

Mr. Beeson. Mr. Clark, I would like to direct your attention to
the time of the assassination of Dr. King in April of 1968. I wonder
if you would give the committee a brief description of your initial
official reaction as Attorney General of the United States on hear-
ing the news of Dr. King’s assassination in Memphis?

Mr. Clark. Well, it is hard to have an official reaction to such a
tragedy. My recollection is that we were having a staff meeting in
my office discussing the usual miscellany. A phone call came in
which is fairly rare. You know, when I have all these people in
there they don’t interrupt these meetings all the time.

I was told that Dr. King had been shot and seriously wounded. I
think that call was from Jim Lowry who was a young man working
in the Community Relations Service.

We stayed in the office for what seemed an awfully long time
and received numerous calls, including a number of calls from the
hospital in Memphis, if not directly or indirectly they were being
communicated to us contemporaneously and we finally were told
that Dr. King had died.

Mr. Beeson. What action, if any, did you take to investigate the
matter, Mr. Clark?

Mr. Clark. I authorized an immediate Federal investigation
under the then Section 241, Title XVIII, which was we believed a
rather inadequate statutory provision. We had congressional rec-
ommendations to enlarge it at the time.

We sent a formal letter that evening, I believe, to the Director of
the FBI to make an exhaustive investigation and during the course
of the evening which I spent in my office at the Department I
decided to go to Memphis personally. I flew down early the next
morning.

Mr. Beeson. You mentioned that the statutory provision, 18
U.S.C. 241, you described it as somewhat inadequate. Do you recall
any significant concern on your part or the FBI’s part that there
was not a clear statutory jurisdictional basis for Federal investiga-
tion?

Mr. Clark. We had an obligation to proceed by law. I think
throughout the investigation the lawyers particularly were con-
cerned about the factual adequacy of our investigation under the
laws that existed; 241 required evidence of conspiracy among other
things, but it seemed so inherently a civil rights matter in a

122

nonlegal sense at least, this great leader of our civil rights move-
ment assassinated, that I don’t believe any legal concerns that we
had impeded our pursuit of the facts.

Mr. Beeson. You mentioned that the next morning you went to
Memphis. What was the purpose of that trip and who did you go
with?

Mr. Clark. The purpose was to be sure that everything possible
was being done in a fairly difficult context and to be sure that
people understood we cared. The people that went with me were
Roger Wilkins who was the Director of the Community Relations
Service; Clifford Alexander who is the Chairman of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission; Deke DeLoach who was an
Associate Director of the FBI.

I called Mr. Hoover early that morning, maybe two or three, to
tell him I wanted to take a high official of the FBI with me.

That is all I can remember right now.

Mr. Beeson. For purposes of the record, Mr. Clark, I believe Mr.
DeLoach’s title was Assistant to the Director and not Associate
Director. Mr. Tolson was Associate Director at that time.

Mr. Clark. They use a little different terminology. I never both-
ered to get it straight.

Mr. Beeson. Do you recall a news conference at the airport in
Memphis after arriving there, Mr. Clark?

Mr. Clark. I recall a sea of press and being involved in the
middle of it. I don’t recall a stated press conference in the sense
that it was preplanned. I think it was unavoidable, the focus of the
country’s attention was on that place and matter.

Mr. Beeson. You were reported to have stated during the meet-
ing with the press at the airport that: “All of our evidence at this
time indicates that it was a single person who committed this
criminal act.” This was a statement that you were making on the
5th of April, the day following the assassination of Dr. King.

Do you recall making that statement or one similar to that?

Mr. Clark. There were several meetings with the press on that
day. I think during the course of that day probably more than once
I stated that from the evidence presented to me there was nothing
indicating more than a single actor. That remained my evaluation
of the evidence through various encounters with the press over the
next several days.

Mr. Beeson. What was the purpose of making a comment on the
state of the evidence at such an early stage? As I imagine you
know, that comment and similar comments have been referred to
by some as an initial official effort by the Government to hide
involvement of others.

Did you consider comments of that type possibly backfiring in
that way when you made it?

Mr. Clark. The considerations were quite different at the time. I
believe in the importance of the integrity of the investigation. I
also believe in the public’s right to know something that concerns
it desperately and the public’s desperate concern about the murder
of Martin Luther King which was one of the finer reflections on
our national character in my time impelled me to tell them what I
knew. I believed it was important then. Hindsight does not change
my view.

Mr. Beeson. Mr. Clark, I would like to read to you from a copy of
an article in the Washington Star that appeared on April 28,
between 3 and 4 months following the assassination. This article is
found in MLK exhibit F-512 if the committee clerk will give Mr.
Clark a copy of it.

[The information follows:]

. Qr$i)

Token

124

Mr. Beeson. I misspoke myself. It was 3 or 4 weeks after the
assassination.

If you could read with me, the article is headlined “King’s Mur-
derer Is Viewed as Loner,” dateline, Atlanta.lt reads:

Attorney General Ramsey Clark said yesterday there is no significnt evidence
that the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. “goes beyond the single actor”
who fired the fatal shot.

Clark made the statement in reply to a question concerning reports of a possible
conspiracy of southern businessmen who might have been involved in the King
slaying.

Do you consider this article an accurate reflection of your views
of the evidence as the case developed and in this case approximate-
ly a month after the assassination itself?

Mr. Clark. Yes.

Mr. Beeson. At any time during the assassination investigation,
did your views change on the status of the evidence concerning the
conspiracy issue?

Mr. Clark. I don’t recall any presentation of evidence, as distin-
guished from circumstances, that ever implied direct involvement
of another person, and simultaneously I believe I saw an enormous
amount of evidence of the direct participation of a single person
whose identity was fairly consistently established because I felt I
should go on the facts available rather than the circumstances.

Mr. Beeson. Let me ask you this, Mr. Clark: You stated before
the day of the assassination an official authorization was transmit-
ted to the FBI to investigate this matter under 18 U.S.C. 241,
conspiracy to violate Dr. King’s civil rights.

Approximately 2 weeks later, on the 17th of April, Eric Starvo
Galt, an alias for Mr. Ray, was formerly charged in Alabama under
the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 241. The complaint read essentially
charging Mr. Ray and a person alleged to have been his brother
with a possible violation of — the conspiracy to violate Dr. King’s
rights.

In view of your agreement with the April 28 article that the
evidence demonstrated no significant signs of conspiracy, and your
feelings throughout the investigation that that was the status of
the evidence, could you explain the factual basis and the purpose
for filing the Federal complaint on the 18th of April charging a
possible conspiracy to violate Dr. King’s rights?

Mr. Clark. I can tell you why I did it. To me it was of great
importance that there be the most thorough possible investigation
and the apprehension of the murderers. And I did not have a great
deal of confidence in that happening without Federal investigation.

We had one statement, hearsay, that was the basis for the Feder-
al complaint that was filed insofar as I can recall, and that was a
statement attributed to the person who bought the rifle in the
hardware store in Birmingham, by the personnel in the store from
whom he purchased it, that he and his brother were going hunting
in Wyoming, or that his brother did not like the gun sight, or
something like that.

Now that was the factual basis on which I was able to sign that
complaint or authorize its signature. I do believe that I was person-
ally directly responsible for its being filed whether I signed it or
not. Without that allegation, I don’t know what I would have done.

125

That was the basis on which I invoked Federal jurisdiction and the
authority to continue the FBI in the investigation.

Mr. Beeson. Would it be fair to conclude that you did not credit
the factual basis underlying the complaint?

Mr. Clark. I thought it was at the very least suspicious, but I
didn’t think I had to be the judge and jury and executioner on that
issue. I believe then and now, always, in a healthy skepticism and
try to avoid being misled by assumptions.

Mr. Beeson. Again, to clarify the record, the statement of the
Aeromarine clerk attributed to Mr. Ray was, as it was reported
initially to the FBI, that Mr. Ray stated when he exchanged the
rifle and bought a more powerful rifle that was ultimately found
outside of the rooming house, that he exchanged the rifle after a
conversation with his brother, hence the reference to the brother,
reflected in an FBI interview of Mr. Wood, the clerk at the Aero-
marine.

Do you recall any additional evidence of references by Mr. Ray to
a brother surrounding his trip East to Atlanta, Ga. approximately
weeks before the assassination of Dr. King, or at any other time
during the pre-assassination period which might have — which were
consistent with — this reference to a brother by Mr. Ray in the
Aeromarine Supply Co.?

Mr. Clark. I have a broader recollection than you state for the
record of what was said about a brother in the hardware store.
Whether it has just grown or turned in my mind or whether it is
an accurate recollection I can’t say, but it was a fairly elaborate
story as I recall being told to me that he was going hunting in
Wyoming or Montana, but I think Wyoming was mentioned, with
his brother.

Mr. Beeson. To be fair, there are several versions, in interviews,
of that brother story.

Mr. Clark. Beyond that, I recall, apparently being told, because I
recall thinking that I knew that he had brothers. That they — like
he had some history of maybe petty crime, that they were a part of
his awareness, that he referred to his brothers, talked with his
brothers from time to time.

Specifically, I don’t think I can recall being told or knowing that
he had said he was going to Atlanta to be with his brother. I
probably knew it, that that had been alleged. But the only aware-
ness I retain is that he had brothers that he referred to from time
to time and that we were not able to find any proximity between
them and him before the time of or after the assassination in terms
of days or weeks.

Mr. Beeson. Do I characterize your testimony fairly in saying
that the possibility of family involvement in the assassination
never appeared to be significant to you during the course of the
investigation?

Mr. Clark. I think you do. I think that is right. The feeling that
I have now is that it was one of those sad and troubled families
that had members that got caught up in things like that.

Mr. Beeson. Mr. Clark, do you recall any dissent within the FBI
on the conspiracy issue or is your recollection that their view of the
evidence was essentially consistent with yours?

39-935 0 - 79 -9

126

Mr. Clark. I don’t recall anyone from the FBI suggesting evi-
dence or even a strong view that there was a conspiracy.

Mr. Beeson. Would you characterize the FBI’s willingness to
investigate conspiracy possibilities in this investigation? Were they
open to pursue conspiracy leads in the investigation?

Mr. Clark. The thing that I recall — and these things do get
embellished in your mind — is suggestions very early on of every
conceivable type of conspiracy. I remember the suggestion that a
Soviet freighter had landed in Mobile and somebody slipped off the
side to come up and kill Dr. King. 1 remember suggestions that his
close associates had done it, the Ku Klux Klan had done it, the FBI
had done it, pick your favorite target.

The nature of the events and the emotions involved conjures all
that up. I would be sure that the major purpose of the FBI was to
try to catch the person who pulled the trigger.

I think simultaneously, however, it was concerned and investi-
gated the possibility of economic support and even direct participa-
tion, although the evidence of any direct participation was so no-
ticeable by its absence. I think that particularly Steve Poliak of the
Civil Rights Division expressed a continuing concern that there be
a full conspiracy investigation and I assume that until this day
from time to time, the FBI goes out and tracks down some allega-
tion of conspiracy.

Mr. Beeson. Let me shift the focus of the questioning somewhat.

As we have established, this was investigated as a possible civil
rights violation. You referred to Mr. Poliak as head of the Civil
Rights Division within the Department of Justice. I believe that
Mr. Fred Vinson, who was the Assistant Attorney General of the
Criminal Division, was also brought into the case at an early stage
to review reports along with you and Mr. Poliak.

Do you recall any other Department of Justice attorneys who
carried significant responsibilities within the assassination investi-
gation?

Mr. Clark. Well, I think there were a number who spent a great
deal of time on it. I am sure the Deputy Attorney General, Warren
Christopher, was fully and contemporaneously apprised, as were
the three of us, myself, Mr. Vinson, and Mr. Poliak. I think their
principal assistants, Bob Owen, perhaps Telly Kozsak, in the Crimi-
nal Division were constantly involved and concerned.

Mr. Beeson. What did you consider to be an appropriate role for
the Department of Justice attorneys to play in the ongoing investi-
gation of the FBI?

Mr. Clark. This seemed at the time to be the largest, most
urgent, and perhaps difficult investigation within my experience.
Unlike President Kennedy’s assassination, there was not an imme-
diate apprehension of the person accused. The country was in a
turmoil. We spoke of 100 cities where pain from the murder had
caused rioting. The manpower of the FBI was enormous, and in my
judgment, as far as I can tell, certainly my desire was unsparingly
employed.

My opinion as to both the proper and most effective way to
pursue such an investigation as this was to spur the FBI on as
effectively as we could and review what they did as quickly as
possible. The capacity to suggest is fairly limited realistically —

127

alternatives, different courses of investigation. But it seemed to me
to fall in the general area of a criminal investigation, in which the
FBI would ordinarily pursue and complete an investigation before
it refers it to the legal staff, so to speak, for prosecutorial determi-
nation.

Here I thought it was important that we have a more contempo-
raneous opportunity to evaluate its progress and try to establish
that.

Mr. Beeson. The investigative files reviewed which were devel-
oped during the investigation indicate that, can be taken to indi-
cate that, on a day-to-day basis the FBI’s field investigation was
directed and focused out of FBI headquarters in Washington. The
Department of Justice attorneys and yourself received a substan-
tial amount of paperwork in the form of monthly reports from field
offices, formal letterhead memorandums, which would sum up the
resolution of certain investigative leads.

The paperwork which appears to have passed on a daily basis is
far more superficial than that which came periodically on a month-
ly basis or after the resolution of some specific lead.

Would you agree with the assessment of the investigation which
I have given to you, the fact that day-to-day conduct was exclusive-
ly or primarily in the province of the FBI with the Justice Depart-
ment and yourself remaining in the background to be informed but
not taking an active part within the investigation?

Mr. Clark. I think that is certainly correct. I don’t think the
memos necessarily reflect the true nature of the flow of communi-
cation. I doubt if on a working day — and they tended to run six or
seven a week — went by from the April 4 to the June 9 in which I
did not have some direct oral communication about the progress of
the investigation. I have not seen government by memorandum
working too well.

Mr. Beeson. Did you ever consider the possibility of having a
departmental representative review the incoming AIRTEL’s,
memorandums, along with the FBI in order to maintain a more
contemporaneous idea of the investigation?

Mr. Clark. No.

Mr. Beeson. In retrospect, would you consider that an advisable
thing to do? Do you think that would be a wasted effort?

Mr. Clark. Knowing what I know tells me it would have been
helpful and it would have probably been costly in terms of already
strained relations.

Mr. Beeson. In terms of appearing to attempt to supervise too
closely the ongoing FBI investigation?

Mr. Clark. In terms of directly injecting or more directly inject-
ing lawyers into the progression of FBI investigation.

Mr. Beeson. On the same general line, Mr. Clark, let me ask you
a few background questions and then get into specific questions on
the use of the grand jury in this investigation.

How extensively was the grand jury used during your term as
Deputy Attorney General and Attorney General in the criminal
investigations generally? By this I mean as a means of investigat-
ing the case, as opposed to a receptable for the presentation of
evidence?

128

Mr. Clark. It is hard to know how to characterize it. It would
vary with the type of crime. I would say in an antitrust violation
they might use a grand jury fairly extensively. In a bank robbery
not at all. We had investigative usage of grand juries, but over-
whelmingly they screened evidence, developed and even packaged
long before a lawyer at the Department of Justice ever heard of
the alleged crime.

If you went through the 90-odd Federal judicial districts, I would
assume that the vast majority of the grand juries in their daily
operations did no real investigative function. They reviewed evi-
dence that was developed by investigators and presented to them
through witnesses.

Mr. Beeson. What do you consider the ideal characteristics of a
case which would merit grand jury investigation?

Mr. Clark. Well, I think it is rather hard to determine facts
sitting around in a room talking. It is certainly hard to find fugi-
tives that way. So what the grand jury has really come down to is
the use of coercion to testify. The grand jury has one advantage
over the investigator and it may have some psychological advan-
tage, but one — and a disadvantage to others is quite possible.

But the one clear advantage is that it can cause punishment to
be inflicted for refusing to answer like granting immunity where
the fifth amendment is invoked or by simply referring for con-
tempt where that does not become an issue.

So its utility is where you have recalcitrant witnesses, sometimes
where you have great difficulty getting documentary evidence, ana-
lyzing documentary evidence because of its completeness, where
you believe people are concealing things and documents and the
intimidating quality of the questions before the grand jury might
elicit that.

Overwhelmingly, I believe the purpose of the grand jury is the
protection of the innocent from the overzealous prosecutor.

Mr. Beeson. If evidence of a crime were in the hands of people
with criminal backgrounds not prone to cooperate in a field inter-
view with the FBI, would this be one situation where a grand jury
might be effectively utilized?

Mr. Clark. Yes; where you have a recalcitrant witness. Some-
times it helps. Sometimes they will do as Sam Giancanna did and
just sit in jail for 18 months.

Mr. Beeson. Specifically in a case such as the murder of Dr.
King, if there had been indications of involvement of hate groups,
or hate-type organizations, again you are dealing there with indi-
viduals who will probably not cooperate in a field interview; is that
correct?

Mr. Clark. Well, assuming your hypothesis, yes.

Mr. Beeson. So, again, assuming the hypothesis, that would be
an appropriate area for a grand jury investigation?

Mr. Clark. Yes; if those were the facts, if you had people who
were not talking because of some affiliation or association. The fact
here, as I recall, is that there was never any suggestion that the
grand jury would have any utility, that someone was not talking. I
recall no requests that a grand jury be utilized. We were running
all around the country trying to find somebody and we were not
going to find them in a grand jury room.

129

Mr. Beeson. Do you consider evidence reliable which is taken
under the grant of immunity?

Mr. Clark. I think it is very difficult evidence. It has a potential
for distortion. It is involuntary. An individual under those circum-
stances may not, either unintentionally or intentionally, give you
the full truth as they see it.

Mr. Beeson. Mr. Clark, I believe that during your administration
as Attorney General you developed what was known as the strike
force approach to the investigation of organized crime cases; is that
correct?

Mr. Clark. That is right.

Mr. Beeson. Is it not one of the components of the strike force
approach to achieve early involvement of attorneys along with
investigators, in the evaluation of evidence, the formulation of
strategic decisions, the targeting of individuals in the investigative
process?

Mr. Clark. Yes; the theory of the strike force is that there has
been some corruption or infiltration of some agency’s criminal
justice and therefore you need a coordinated team approach to
liberate, so to speak, the captured elements. That involves the
selected use of Federal, State and local police and investigative
agencies and quite frequently a high and early use of a grand jury.

Mr. Beeson. Would this be an investigative grand jury?

Mr. Clark. Preponderantly, yes.

Mr. Beeson. Did you ever consider implementing the strike force
concept within the Civil Rights Division of the Department of
Justice for the purpose of investigating conspiracy cases?

Mr. Clark. I think it was February 8, 1968, at Orangeburg, S.C.,
3 students of the South Carolina State College were shot and killed
and 27 were seriously wounded that we know of because they were
hospitalized.

We discovered it and several hundred law enforcement personnel
were involved, including the presence of the FBI, National Guard,
State police, county sheriffs, local police.

After considerable difficulty and finally learning of the involve-
ment of the FBI, we took that particular investigation essentially
away from the FBI and investigated it with young lawyers and
others from the Civil Rights Division. So we had direct experience
in that sort of thing.

I would not recommend it in many cases. It is a very, very
difficult thing to do. The capacity of the entire Civil Rights Divi-
sion did nothing else. It is very limited. Its experience in investiga-
tion was hardly extensive. But in Orangeburg it was essential
because the failure of the FBI to reveal candidly its early presence
and the horror of the scene.

In an investigation as sweeping as the murder of Dr. King, the
decision that you could not use the FBI would have left you in
extreme difficulty.

Mr. Beeson. If I understand the Orangeburg situation that you
are describing, that was not a classic example of a strike force
approach so much as a step that you took to remedy a specific
problem in that case.

Mr. Clark. That is the reason that we did it. The strike force
approach, as far as I know, is as such limited to organized crime.

130

Mr. Beeson. But the strike force approach would assume cooper-
ation between the FBI and Department of Justice attorneys in the
organized crime investigation and not a replacement of the FBI?

Mr. Clark. Sadly, the history of the FBI’s role in strike forces
tended to be nonparticipation. It is a fairly well known history. Mr.
Hoover gave many reasons, but those that seemed to have the
greatest strength were unwillingness to risk his manpower with
other personnel, particularly where corruption was involved, and
the sharing of the fame, success.

Mr. Beeson. Then would it be fair to conclude that one reason
that the strike force concept did not spread was because of a
perceived reluctance on the part of the investigative arm of the
FBI to participate in that type of approach?

Mr. Clark. Well, it may have spread further even with that. I
think as time went on the FBI tended to get onboard because at
least in the early years it seemed to be a winner. Indictments were
returned and successful prosecutions completed. Still, it was very
difficult for the FBI to engage in that sort of sharing arrangement.

Mr. Beeson. Was the heavy involvement of the Department of
Justice attorney successful in the Orangeburg case?

Mr. Clark. No. I say that with the greatest respect for all that
were involved, but the prejudice — my interpretation — the prejudice
was so powerful we had great difficulty persuading the Federal
judge to convene a grand jury. Two successive grand juries did not
obtain an indictment, although we had testimony of officers empty-
ing six-shot service revolvers at helpless students yards away.

I signed an information, a painful comedown from the dimension
of the crime, and some very able young lawyers in the Civil Rights
Division went down to try the case but were unable to secure
convictions.

Mr. Beeson. Mr. Clark, let me shift to one other possible investi-
gative technique available in 1968, that of electronic surveillance.
Will you start off by giving your views in general on the use of
electronic surveillance in criminal investigations to the committee?

Mr. Clark. Well, I opposed, as Attorney General, the use of
electronic surveillance as un-American, if you will, as inconsistent
with the idea of individual freedom, as an improper way for the
Government to proceed against its people, against the meaning of
human dignity.

President Johnson sent up a Right to Privacy Act which we
struggled to secure passage for that failed that would have prohib-
ited wiretapping. As Attorney General I had little knowledge of the
actual practice until I became Acting Attorney General.

I think as far as I can tell, I essentially succeeded in eliminating
the use of wiretapping in what you might call domestic affairs and
in greatly curtailing its use in international or foreign national
security affairs.

Mr. Beeson. Did you perceive of any investigative losses involved
in that decision?

Mr. Clark. Well, we try to tell ourselves we are right so I
perceived just the opposite, substantial gains across the board.

My view was and is that in addition to being unacceptable as
contrary to the spirit of the American Bill of Rights, it was terribly
wasteful, inefficient, and finally corrupting investigative tech-

131

niques, the idea of having grown people sit around listening days
on end to what other people may or may not be talking about,
hoping they will say something they should not, is not the way to
prevent or control crime, that in fact it is wasteful of resources.
They could be out protecting the people.

Mr. Beeson. Isn’t it a fact, though, Mr. Clark, that the nature of
certain criminal offenses, and specifically conspiracy which is often
based really on conversations, requires the use of electronic surveil-
lance, or to state it otherwise, isn’t it at least far more difficult to
prove an offense which is based solely on conversations together
with an overt act, of course, without the ability surreptitiously to
overhear these conversations?

Mr. Clark. Well, the crime is the overt act, not the conversation,
because we have a first amendment. I would prefer to see us
investigate the overt acts and proceed on acts. Conspiracy may be
hard to prove anyway.

It is my judgment a testament to the intelligence of the Ameri-
can jury that most of the major conspiracy prosecutions of the
Nixon years failed on the conspiracy counts. They could not get
convictions in Chicago; they couldn’t get convictions in Harrisburg,
Gainesville, or any of those places. There is something insidious
about that use of conspiracy law and wiretap tends to compound it.

I have looked at the logs of more wiretaps than a person who
cares about freedom ought to have to, both in office and since. I am
constantly amazed at the religious fervor of those who favor wire-
tapping because I don’t see the evidence that it is effective if you
are willing to engage in worse than a dirty business.

Mr. Beeson. In your experience as a prosecutor, you have no
recollection of cases where the evidence was based substantially on
the interception of conversations through wiretapping, and in fact
cases that could not have been brought without the use of wiretap-
ping?

Mr. Clark. I don’t know of any such cases. No one has pointed
any out to me. It is interesting to observe, and this can be read
several different ways, that of the literally dozens of cases in 1966
and 1967 in which lawyers in the Department of Justice went
before courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States,
and said to our great embarrassment, we have discovered the pres-
ence of illegal electronic surveillance or wiretapping — and there
were at least 35 such cases on remand to consider whether the
wiretap produced evidence or leads that tainted the trial — we did
not find a single case.

Maybe we should have, but I prefer to believe that the FBI was
fair about it and that there was in fact no utility. All it did was
jeopardize good prosecutions.

We ought to believe we can find facts and move on them and not
have to sit around and listen to people’s conversations to enforce
the law.

Mr. Beeson. Approximately 2 months after the assassination of
Dr. King, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act was
passed, which provided a statutory basis for legal or authorized
electronic surveillance — electronic surveillance which would have
been conducted under the scrutiny of a Federal magistrate or
district judge and with the authorization of the Attorney General.

132

Following the passage of title III, were your views on the utility
or the propriety of electronic surveillance in any way affected, or
did they remain the same?

Mr. Clark. Well, my views remain the same. My conduct may be
questionable. I refused to use title III, did not authorize its use,
during my remaining time as Attorney General. I justified it legal-
ly by saying it was discretionary. I was not mandated to use
wiretapping, that I would either follow the law or resign if I were,
but that in the exercise of my discretion I declined to use it.

Perhaps there really wasn’t an exercise of discretion, in the
sense that I looked at the case to decide because of a predisposition
against the use of wiretapping.

Mr. Beeson. Had the FBI considered the use of the provisions of
the new statute in this investigation or any other criminal investi-
gation, you would have prevented that use, is that correct?

Mr. Clark. I think so. If we wanted to conjure up all the horri-
bles we can think of, you might come up with one where I would
authorize it, but I doubt it. But the FBI hadn’t waited for title III.
There were a number of occasions in which it asked me to approve
wiretapping or electronic surveillance of Dr. King before his assas-
sination, including, I believe, as close to the assassination as April
2, 1968. I declined in those cases.

Mr. Beeson. We perhaps will get into that area a bit later.

Let me ask you to refer to Martin Luther King exhibit F-507, if I
could. This is a copy — I believe you have seen this document before,
Mr. Clark — it is a copy of an FBI memorandum to you, Attorney
General, on May 13, 1968, approximately 5 weeks into the assassi-
nation investigation, in which they request your authorization for
the use of electronic surveillance during the investigation of the
assassination, essentially in order to ascertain the location of the
fugitive, James Earl Ray.

When I asked about it previously, you didn’t have any specific
recollection of receiving this request. Is that still the case now?

Mr. Clark. That’s a hard question. I mean, you are talking about
mental processes. You know, I have no doubt that I had this sitting
in my desk drawer for some time.

Mr. Beeson. Was it ever your practice to solicit the views of the
FBI on the legality of proposed electronic surveillance that they
submitted to you, to ask them to analyze the legality of electronic
surveillance before transmitting a request to you?

Mr. Clark. There were several things that I did: I told them to
always consider the relative importance of prosecution and discov-
ery. This is in the national security field, obviously, because that
was the only place that I was really considering wiretapping, be-
cause an authorization could well destroy the possibility of a legal
prosecution, and sometimes I would override them on that ground,
that I didn’t think it was important, as we know — that we know
certain information that we preserve a right to prosecute, why,
there was some indication that there might be a serious Federal
crime committed.

As far as just asking them for their view of the legality of a
wiretap, I guess I felt as competent as they to evaluate that.

Mr. Beeson. Did you ever feel it would be useful to have them,
by some sort of internal regulation, go through the process at least

133

of analyzing the legality of specific proposals before submitting it
to you, to acquaint them with the laws, to force them to face the
possible prejudice caused by a specifed wiretap proposal?

Mr. Clark. We did that in a number of areas. I can recall, I
think, John Doar working at great length on the law of arrest,
which is such a critical and difficult area, and a number of others.
Particularly in the urban riot situation, the use of deadly force, we
spent a great deal of time with them, trying to narrow and disci-
pline the circumstances under which enforcement officers were
authorized to use “deadly force,” as it is called, which means shoot
somebody or hit them hard and in a way it might kill them.

As to wiretapping, before the Omnibus Crime Control Act, June
1968, the legality was so very ambiguous, anyway, that the utility
of an effort to train or discipline on the law would be rather
meaningless. As Attorney General, I had a hard time explaining
how you could justify under the Constitution of the United States a
wiretap on a foreign embasssy — as an illustration — except by prece-
dents. They have done it since Robert H. Jackson. So I don’t know
where that would have gotten us.

I rather think there was considerable legal work in the Criminal
Division, and with the FBI, on legal procedures under title III of
the Omnibus Crime Control Act after it became law.

Mr. Beeson. This specific proposal came before title III was
enacted. A review of FBI files indicates that they did perform an
internal analysis of the legality of the proposal, the constitutional-
ity of it, and possible prejudice that it might do to the case, and
came to the conclusion in the memos — I believe it is a fair sum-
mary of Mr. DeLoach’s testimony yesterday — that in fact, at least
according to the FBI’s internal analysis, that proposal would, if
implemented, have been unconstitutional and illegal as to the tar-
gets of the electronic surveillance.

Do I take it from your testimony that there were at least no
internal procedures in effect in the Department of Justice in May
of 1968 which were violated by their submission of that proposal to
you, notwithstanding their own analysis of its illegality, or in sub-
mitting the proposal to you and withholding their analysis on its
legality?

Mr. Clark. I assume at all times, for all people knowingly recom-
mending the violation of constitutional rights is unacceptable, and
I don’t know what kind of Ten Commandments you put out to
prevent that.

The cause was probably this: The FBI’s reputation was on the
line because of its failure to apprehend someone more quickly, and
that was the source of enormous agitation; and it may well be that
this memo reflects greater interest in apprehending someone so the
FBI has done its job than in a successful prosecution, because I
think by May 13 the press was beginning to react unfavorably
about the failure of the investigation to find the person that at
least I had said earlier we had on the run.

Mr. Beeson. Just one final line of questioning, Mr. Clark.

You have referred previously to strained relations which existed
between the FBI and the Department of Justice at the time of the
assassination investigation, something which at least would have
been a consideration, had you ever considered inserting a depart-

134

mental representative into the FBI to review incoming communica-
tions from the field. What was the cause of the strained relations,
and how did it manifest itself?

Mr. Clark. That’s kind of a big question.

I guess I believe that there was always considerable tension
between the FBI and the lawyers in the Department of Justice.
“Time dissipates to shining ether the solid angularity of fact,” and
it became popular in later years to say that the relationship be-
tween Mr. Hoover and my father was always a bed of roses. But
not only do I remember otherwise, from teenage experience, I have
heard otherwise, both from my father and from Mr. Hoover. It’s
not all unhealthy and I would say here, as I have said other places
many times, that more often than not Mr. Hoover was right about
it, because he was dealing in highly sensitive information about
people that had to be used with absolute integrity if we were to
have a system of law, freedom under law.

I came to the office of Attorney General after Robert Kennedy
and Nicholas Katzenbach, and those were fairly turbulent times
between — in the relationship between the FBI and the Department
of Justice. I came in particularly at a time when we were going
through the very painful process of disclosing illegal FBI electronic
surveillance in scores of cases — I referred to it earlier — and nobody
enjoyed that, but least of all the FBI.

I came in with a Director who was Director of the FBI before I
was born, and I think he rather wondered who this new kid was,
saying you can’t wiretap here and you can’t blackbag here. I had
never heard the phrase “blackbag” at the time; but they wanted to
enter some places without a warrant. I said you can’t do that
because there is a fourth amendment to the Constitution, and I
think there was some resentment about that.

But then, at least as I sense the epoch now, for all the turbulence
of the early sixties, it had a glorious quality about it. I mean, the
civil rights movement was in the ascendency and there was a belief
that we would overcome, and in the years when I was Attorney
General, riots and violence and the fear of crime were high; and I
think those things combined to make for a very difficult relation-
ship between the FBI and the Department of Justice.

I think it can be overstated. I think at many levels there was a
fine working relationship. I think at many levels there was a
respect and, efficiency with Mr. Hoover, my relationship was
always cordial, although we both understood profound differences.
I think he understood my belief that whatever his contributions
earlier, he had stayed on the job too long.

Mr. Beeson. In reviewing the history of the investigation, there
is an absence of at least some investigative approaches which
would have required close cooperation and collaboration among the
Department of Justice attorneys and the FBI. For example, grand
jury immunity, perhaps participation of the Department of Justice
attorneys in significant interviews, such as the interview of Mr.
Ray after his guilty plea, no evidence of an attempt to implement
the type of strike force concept of earlier involvement, and closer
involvement, of attorneys.

Is that situation understandable in terms of the strained rela-
tions that you are describing now, or is it simply a fact that to the

135

best of your recollection this investigation just did not warrant
those investigative approaches?

Mr. Clark. Well, you lumped a whole lot together there.

As I said earlier, I do not recall any suggestion that a grand jury
would have utility, any proposal that a certain person be put
before a grand jury. The impression I had was that we had hun-
dreds, maybe even thousands, of FBI agents trying to act like
hippies — which they couldn’t do, because they came from a differ-
ent background — to see whether they could pick up a trace of a guy
who led us to believe he might be in hippie areas of different
towns, of hundreds of agents looking through millions of passport
applications, and things like that.

I didn’t see a grand jury utility. It never — nothing I ever heard
or saw or have seen indicates it would have had any utility.

On your other questions, I don’t — I don’t know what we could
have contributed by having lawyers closer in than we did. The
average FBI investigation is turned over to the Department of
Justice lawyers as a fait accompli. You walk into the attorney’s
office with the file and say, “Here’s the file. This kid stole a car”
whatever it is. This is not an analogy, merely to show a practice.

Now, here you had the need to have the most highly motivated
investigation that you could have, and to create any disruptive
quality by trying to inject people in, like you lack confidence in
what they are doing and/or you are trying to overdo, my sense was
our need was to motivate them to show our great concern, to
review what they did, if we had ideas or suggestions to let them
have them, but above all to have them out on the streets looking
hard.

Mr. Beeson. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions of the
witness.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, counsel.

At this time the full committee will suspend for about 5 minutes,
for the purpose of permitting the King subcommittee to conduct a
meeting in the same room here, which will be a public meeting.

So we will ask at this time if the witness will just remove himself
from the witness table for a few moments, until we can transact
this other business.

The full committee is in suspension.

[Whereupon, at 10:35 a.m., the proceedings were suspended.]

Chairman Stokes. The full committee will now come to order.

The Chair would request the witness to resume his place at the
witness table.

[Whereupon, Ramsey Clark, former Attorney General of the
United States, having been duly sworn previously, resumed the
stand and testified further as follows:]

Chairman Stokes. The procedure at this point will be that the
Chair will yield himself such time as I may consume, after which
the committee will resort to the 5-minute rule.

TESTIMONY OF RAMSEY CLARK— Resumed

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Clark, let me first establish your period of
service within the Justice Department. My understanding is that
during most of 1965 and 1966 you were Deputy Attorney General
under Attorney General Katzenbach. In the latter part of 1966 you

136

became Acting Attorney General, and in early 1967 you were con-
firmed as Attorney General, and you held that position until Janu-
ary of 1969; is that correct?

Mr. Clark. That’s correct.

Chairman Stokes. Now I would like to focus questions on the
activities of the Department’s major investigative agency, the FBI,
during that period.

You were, of course, aware that the FBI had a Domestic Intelli-
gence Division, that the responsibilities of that Division included
investigation of individuals and organizations posing threats to
national security within the United States; is that correct?

Mr. Clark. That sounds correct. I am just puzzled about whether
another division had some jurisdiction over threats to national
security within the United States but that is essentially right.

Chairman Stokes. Would you tell the committee what steps, if
any, you took in order to remain informed of the day-to-day activi-
ties of the Domestic Intelligence Division, if you took such action?

Mr. Clark. You mean generally?

Chairman Stokes. Yes, sir. I guess, essentially what I am re-
questing of you is whether you set up some procedure whereby
they were to keep you informed of their activities, whether or not
this would have been on a daily basis of some kind.

Mr. Clark. Well, they informed me of their activities essentially
through the Director, I would assume, that what they chose to tell
me came through memos that were at least processed through the
Director’s office.

I don’t recall any distinct method of communication for any
division of the FBI, except with reference to particular cases where
there would be necessary communication between, say, the Crimi-
nal Division and the Internal Security Division and agents working
on the case.

I think all the divisions reported as to their general activities
through the Director.

Chairman Stokes. Did you know Mr. Sullivan who was head of
that division?

Mr. Clark. I came to know him at some time. I certainly knew
the name. Whether I would recognize him if I saw him is question-
able.

I endeavored early as Attorney General to establish a system of
regular meetings with assistant directors, and Mr. Hoover ex-
pressed his desire that that not be done. My hope was that the
assistant attorneys general and the assistant directors would have
regular lunches in my office, with Mr. Hoover and Mr. Tolson, so
we would get to know each other better.

Mr. Hoover said that he thought that would be difficult for him
and a bad policy, and I dropped the idea.

Chairman Stokes. Did you read into that anything other than
what he said?

Mr. Clark. No. I thought it was his view of administration and
the relationship that he thought most effective between the FBI
and the Department of Justice. I disagreed, but I didn’t believe that
while he was Director I could meaningfully establish a relationship
over his opposition.

137

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Clark, were you confident during your
years as Deputy Attorney General and Attorney General that you
had a thorough knowledge of the operations of the Domestic Intelli-
gence Division?

Mr. Clark. I never thought about it that way certainly, but if
any Attorney General was ever confident that he had a thorough
knowledge of what the FBI was doing, I would question his intelli-
gence. I knew the six preceding Attorneys General and for reasons
of affinity and consanguinity had great respect for them, and had
occasion to ask them from time to time how much of their atten-
tion they were able to devote to the FBI; and none of them ever
suggested more than 5 percent.

The FBI was running 700,000 or 800,000 investigations a year
when I was Attorney General, to 7,500, 7,700 agents, and it would
have been impossible, if you did nothing else, to know what the
divisions were doing. It’s a rare Attorney General, literally, who
could sit down and name the divisions of the FBI.

Chairman Stokes. And that would be a situation you would
think that nothing could be done about?

Mr. Clark. I think something could be done about it probably. I
shouldn’t distinguish the Federal Bureau of Prisons from the FBI
or the Immigration and Naturalization. I would say our ignorance
of the Immigration and Naturalization substantially exceeded our
ignorance of the FBI. It has to do with the nature of the Office of
Attorney General and the capacity of an individual in a short and
hectic period of time to master a huge bureaucracy, that there was
not enough knowledge, was and is, in my judgment.

We tried to correct that in a number of ways. I think the major
effort was an effort to institute what we called then the PPBS,
Planning, Programing, and Budgeting, something that came out of
Mr. Hitch’s activities over at the Department of Defense, and was
urged generally on executive agencies by the then-called Bureau of
the Budget; and while Planning, Programing, and Budgeting didn’t
really fit precisely into law operations, it had high utility in help-
ing you find out what you were doing, and why, where your re-
sources were allocated.

We tried to initiate PPBS and we believed — I say “we”; I certain-
ly believed, and, I think, the handful of people that were involved
with me — that it would help us learn more about the FBI and
indeed help the FBI learn more about the FBI; and we started
down that road, but not a great deal of progress was made.

Chairman Stokes. Well then, if I understand your testimony,
essentially you are saying that it pretty much leaves the FBI and
some of these other agencies to operate under their own autonomy
and without real supervision or jurisdiction of the Attorney Gener-
al’s Office; would that be correct?

Mr. Clark. In the daily activities, that’s correct.

Chairman Stokes. Then, again speaking in general terms, were
you aware, during your years as Attorney General and Deputy
Attorney General, of the counterintelligence programs, of CO-
INTELPRO conducted by the FBI?

Mr. Clark. The COINTELPRO came into my vocabulary in the
early or midseventies. The idea that the FBI ever engaged in
disruptive activities never occurred to me, and had it, I think I

138

would have acted. It is something I feel pretty strongly about; it is
no proper function of Government.

Chairman Stokes. Let me ask, how did the COINTELPRO pro-
gram come to your attention?

Mr. Clark. Through the press, I believe. People started talking.
There were documents leaked, both selectively and unselectively,
and it became a part of the vocabulary.

Then through a number of lawsuits and investigations, publica-
tion of a little paperback called “COINTELPRO," as I recall, I
came to know more and more about it, or at least have more
information, accurate or not, about it.

Chairman Stokes. Now, Mr. DeLoach, who was assistant to the
Director in the FBI, was your primary source of contact with the
FBI, was he not?

Mr. Clark. For daily activities he was.

Chairman Stokes. And in the course of this liaison between the
Bureau and yourself, in his capacity as the liaison person, then are
we to assume that Mr. DeLoach never briefed you about the CO-
INTELPRO program?

Mr. Clark. I have no recollection, and every confidence that my
recollection is adequate, that there was ever the mention of the
word “COINTELPRO" or any description of any of the disruptive
or illegal activities of COINTELPRO made to me by Mr. DeLoach
or anybody else while I was in the Department of Justice, from
1961 to 1969.

Chairman Stokes. I would like now to direct your attention to
the FBI’s investigation of Dr. King and his organization, the South-
ern Christian Leadership Conference.

When did the FBI’s use of electronic surveillance against Dr.
King and the SCLC headquarters first come to your attention?

Mr. Clark. I have not been able to establish the date clearly.
The occasion I remember vividly. I was Deputy Attorney General
and it was late in the evening, and I was sitting up in my office,
and John Doar came up, handed me an FBI memo and said, “What
do you make of that?" And I looked at it and said, “Well, I guess
you’re saying it looks like this must have been picked up by elec-
tronic surveillance?"

He said, “That’s what it looks like to me.” And I said, “I’ll go up
and talk to the Attorney General about it."

I had been around for a long time, even before 1961, in a sense,
but I must say the idea that the FBI would have wiretapped Dr.
King was unbelievable. I worked for 4 years with Bob Kennedy,
loved the man, had the highest respect for him, but this just was so
inconsistent with my perception of how he saw Dr. King, how the
FBI functioned, that I couldn’t believe it.

I went up, however, and talked to Mr. Katzenbach, showed him
the memo, and he said, roughly, “Well, there has been a problem.
It’s cleared up now and you don’t need to worry about it.” My
guess is that that was August or September of 1965, and having
plenty of problems and being told that this one was over, and that
apparently being the fact, I didn’t worry about it anymore until the
disclosures came out.

When I became Acting Attorney General, I found some of the
files in rather chaotic condition, and particularly those relating to

139

how the Attorney General retained information about authorized
electronic surveillance.

My impression, roughly, was that Bob Kennedy must have been
sitting there in the Attorney General’s Office and the secretary
would come by and Bob would sign something, put it in his pocket
or stick it in his desk. We would find them all over the place.

The problem I have is, how do you know what has been approved
and what is going on?

We began to organize them, even though it was my belief — I had
been told by the President I wouldn’t be Attorney General, but it
seemed like I could do something while I was sitting around; and
one of the things we tried to do was organize those files, and
discovered the authorization of wiretap on Dr. King, as I recall, in
October of 1963, and some others.

Chairman Stokes. Did it ever, Mr. Clark, come to your attention
that the FBI was briefing Members of Congress, the White House,
members of the press, private citizens, on the activities of Dr. King,
based upon wiretaps?

Mr. Clark. Mr. Chairman, from early youth I had witnessed how
the FBI would operate on the Hill and with the White House — I
remember the Harry Dexter White case well — and knew its rela-
tionship with the chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittees
of the House of Representatives, the chairman of the Appropri-
ations Subcommittees of the Senate, others.

Apparently many people knew — for whom I had and have the
greatest confidence and respect — Bob Kennedy, Burke Marshall
and others, became aware in 1964-65 that there had been prepara-
tion of memorandums and dissemination of them, perhaps playing
of tape recordings. I don’t know why. I guess I was just down
working on something else. I don’t think I was aware of it until I
read about it in the papers later on.

Chairman Stokes. In 1966, after becoming Attorney General, I
believe that you systematically reviewed all wiretapping done by
the FBI in the recent years and found additional evidence of elec-
tronic surveillance on Dr. King. Would that be correct?

Mr. Clark. That’s correct. As best I recall, I found three one-
page memos that appeared to have been authorized, that is, signed,
by the Attorney General, in 1965, bugs, as I recall, as distinguished
from wiretap, and on hotel rooms.

Chairman Stokes. In uncovering this evidence, were you made
aware of the stated purpose for which these bugs were being
placed?

Mr. Clark. The memos themselves said very little, I’m sure. I
had come to believe — and I am sure it was from conversations with
some of the principals — that it related primarily to a belief in the
FBI that the Communist conspiracy, so to speak, was infiltrating
the civil rights movement, and particularly the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference, and influencing Dr. King, and that for a
variety of reasons that involved protecting the civil rights move-
ment, protecting Dr. King, and perhaps placating the Bureau, and
perhaps avoiding a controversy before an election year, 1964, that
the original wiretapping was done.

My view has always been that when Bob signed that — Bob Ken-
nedy — that he must have intended to take it off soon. Within a

140

month, his brother was murdered, and he just didn’t think about
things like that for a while; so it stayed on for quite a long period —
1965, when I assumed, and I think 1 had the impression from
conversations and all relating to the same sort of thing, although
the nature of them had an inherent improbability about it, very
unattractive.

Chairman Stokes. How about after you had become Attorney
General, did the FBI come to you with requests that they be permit-
ted to put electronic surveillance on Dr. King in his Tiome at
Atlanta, on the SCLC in Atlanta?

Mr. Clark. They sent memos out. Mr. Hoover didn’t like to be
told no, directly, which is understandable, and when he thought he
was going to get a “no,” he would send them over; and rarely
would he go to battle.

I can only remember one time when he asked me to reconsider
breaking and entering. I don’t believe he ever asked me to recon-
sider a wiretap directly and personally; but I got, I would say, at
least four requests from the fall of 1966 through April 2, 1968 to
authorize electronic surveillance of Dr. King.

I imagine it was on his quarters, his home, or his church; but I
cannot tell you at this moment that I specifically recall that.

Chairman Stokes. The last request would have been 2 days prior
to his assassination?

Mr. Clark. If that’s the date — and I think it is — that is available
to the committee, I’m sure.

Chairman Stokes. What was your reaction to these requests?
What action did you take relative to the requests?

Mr. Clark. I guess I didn’t like it at all. There were many
requests that I turned down, and the range — I can only go on
memory; somebody could look — was quite wide and in various in-
vestigations.

I have learned that apparently I turned down a request on Fred
Hampton, for instance. At the time, and until his murder, I think
probably the name meant nothing to me. I turned down in the low
scores altogether, and some it would be very difficult to explain,
like Abba Eban, and things like that; but the King one was special,
both because of the shock that I had when I had learned that he
had been earlier wiretapped, my disbelief that there could possibly
be any justification for it, and it was not anything I was willing to
consider.

Chairman Stokes. With reference to these four requests you
have spoken of, and the last of which you believe was on April 2,
which would have been a couple of days prior to the assassination,
was the FBI still at that time basing the purpose upon communism
and infiltration of Communists in the civil rights movement, et
cetera? What is your best recollection?

Mr. Clark. My best recollection is that at least the last several,
or at least the last one, had to do with the Poor People’s Campaign,
and an incredible fear of, a paranoia, literally — that wasn’t pecu-
liar to the FBI by any means — about the possibility for violence.

We had had tragic urban riots in 1967, Newark and Detroit, in
the late summer. We had had major magazine articles. I remember
Life magazine with a picture of snipers on top of buildings, saying
this was all planned; and Spiro Agnew holding a press conference

141

as Governor of Maryland saying the same people that provoked the
riot in Newark provoked the riot in Detroit, fantasizing like that.

I think we had hearings that Senator McClellan conducted that
were credible in terms of the fear that they reflected and provoked
irrationally about the potential for violence from these poor people
coming to the Nation’s Capital.

I think that the last request — I would be surprised if they didn’t
have “Poor People’s Campaign” written up at the top, and didn’t
state that there was concern that there was going to be deliberate
provocation of violence, and there would be preventive measures.

My view about the importance of preventing riots is pretty well
known, and that would have been a natural appeal.

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Clark, are you familiar with the press
conference in which Mr. Hoover described Dr. King as being the
most notorious liar in the world?

Mr. Clark. Well, I’m certainly familiar with that incident, yes.

Chairman Stokes. And did you ever have occasions to talk with
Mr. Hoover, during which discussions he would describe to you his
feelings toward Dr. King?

Mr. Clark. I had a number of occasions to listen. I didn’t do a lot
of talking, simply because there was some — I just had some sense
that there was a preoccupation here by an older person, and that
maybe you could let him let a little steam off by just expressing his
views; but that he had a personal dislike for Dr. King was well
known to me.

Chairman Stokes. In terms of the dislike you describe, would you
describe it as being intense dislike bearing on hatred? How would
you describe it?

Mr. Clark. Trying to analyze it, it had to me qualities of racism.
I know that’s a hard word, but Mr. Hoover came from an older
generation; he was raised in a southern city, if you will, segregated
city, it came from his views of the clergy, which I would call strict,
roughly, I guess, came from his — it’s hard to talk about a person
like this. He was a very able man, but he had some preoccupations
with sex, and I saw these coming together It caused him — then the
prominence of Dr. King, the international recognition. I have often
thought perhaps the nonviolence — he didn’t like that, really, be-
cause in his value system power was right; but, anyway, these
things caused him in a very uninhibited way to express a personal
belief that Dr. Martin Luther King was not a good person; and he
knew that I disagreed with that, but that didn’t inhibit him from
saying his thing.

Chairman Stokes. From expressing himself.

Mr. Clark, we have received, during the past week or so, testi-
mony relating to the attitude of the FBI toward civil rights viola-
tions. We have had some testimony that in terms of investigating
civil rights violations that they engaged in foot dragging. On the
other hand, we have had some testimony that agents did a good job
and that they were consciencious about investigating civil rights
violations, et cetera.

It seems to me you would be in a unique position to be able to
assess the attitude and the performance of the Bureau with refer-
ence to investigating civil rights violations. You have already made
some reference to the Orangeburg, S.C., situation.

39-935 0 - 79 - 10

142

I would ask you at this time if you would elaborate a little more
for us in terms of your own assessment of their performance?

Mr. Clark. Well, first, I think that all those characterizations
that you gave are true. You just have to realize how many investi-
gations and how many people were involved; and, first, how the
FBI as an institution adapted to change, to new laws, new national
moods, and institutionally how it was structured.

I believed at the time, and still do, that the resident agent policy
of the FBI was a very serious handicap to its effective investigation
of many civil rights violations. In a very rough way, the resident
agent policy permitted some agents to opt to remain in a location,
rather than adventure to higher opportunities. This would mean
agents would work for 20 years in the same town, same area.

It had some very efficient aspects. You get to know the sheriff
pretty well and the chief of police, the judges, and all the rest; but
it had some great handicaps, too: One, if there are prejudices in the
community, that makes it likely that rights of some citizens would
be violated. You will tend to identify with those prejudices.

Second, it is hard to attack the person that has helped you in
picking up all those Dwyer Act convictions. So the resident agent
policy which Mr;. Hoover changed in the early sixties, particularly
in the South, was a great handicap. You can’t change attitudes
overnight. Many of these attitudes were deeply ingrained.

I think the FBI came to civil rights investigation with great
concern. To a considerable degree they were in the numbers game.
They justified their existence by running up high statistics on easy
marks like stolen automobiles. If they had to put a lot of manpow-
er into a single investigation, such as whether a couple of deputy
sheriffs beat up a Black prisoner in a county prison somewhere, it
didn’t help them that much; it didn’t show that much; it made it
difficult for them to appear well in the other statistics.

Still, I believe that Mr. Hoover sensed the need to get on top of
civil rights investigation and did some rather remarkable things. I
always thought one of the great persuasive feats of contemporary
American history was President Johnson’s persuading Mr. Hoover
to go to Jackson, Miss., to open an FBI office. The meaning and
impact of that was very important to FBI agents, and Black folks,
and to American citizens generally.

The investigation of the Klan — the infiltration, I guess you would
have to say today, of the Klan — I don’t know enough about it to
have final judgments, but rather remarkable from what I have
seen in terms of expeditions and effectiveness.

If I had to judge their coming to investigate, of comparing their
investigation of civil rights cases with their investigation of orga-
nized crime, I come to a surprising conclusion, and that is that
they came with a little greater speed and effectiveness to the
investigation of civil rights violations than they did to organized
crime. It took a long time to get into — Mr. Hoover at one time
saying there is no organized crime. Still, there would be many
illustrations where an agent simply wouldn’t do a good job investi-
gating a public accommodations title II allegation, and many
others.

143

It was necessary, I think, for us to keep pressure on to expand
and extend and make more effective commitments of resources to
civil rights investigation, but I guess I think it moved fairly well.

Steve Poliak can probably tell you a lot more about that.

Chairman Stokes. Let me ask you this: We have heard over the
past several days the testimony of a prolonged and intense effort
by the FBI, not only in the early part of the sixties but also in 1967
and 1968 — which is during your own tenure as Attorney General —
of their efforts to destroy Dr. King as the leader of the civil rights
movement in this country.

The methods that they used were immoral and often illegal,
certainly went far beyond any legitimate investigative mandate.

As Attorney General and head of the Justice Department, the
FBI, at least on paper, was under your control. Additionally, you
were personally aware of Mr. Hoover’s deep dislike for Dr. King.
You had first-hand knowledge of their past use of electronic sur-
veillance against Dr. King. You had received several additional
requests yourself involving the wiretap of Dr. King throughout the
years, your years as Attorney General, and I would ask you: In
light of this, would this not have caused you to try and delve
further into this kind of activity on the part of the FBI in order to
put a stop to something that was going on in a situation where you
were the ultimate authority, at least programmatically?

Mr. Clark. Well, first there seems to be an assumption there
that I was aware of unlawful conduct regarding Dr. King. That is
an incorrect assumption. I wasn’t.

I believed, and I am not yet fully persuaded otherwise, that the
FBI didn’t disobey instructions.

You know, you would often wonder, when you turned down a
wiretap, whether that would mean some agent in the field would
go to some local police counterpart and get them to install the
surveillance.

As of this time, I haven’t found that occurring on any of the
matters that I turned down. I believe that Mr. Hoover would be
extremely cautious about risking the reputation of the FBI in
unlawful activity.

I think one thing we tend to miss is how many shared his
prejudice, Mr. Chairman. We like to wonder why the Attorney
General of the United States didn’t know what was going on. Why
didn’t those Members of the Congress to whom you have alluded
say something about it.

Did they enjoy what they heard? Did they appreciate the confi-
dence? What about the editors and others? The fact is that he
was — Mr. Hoover was working in an environment of pervasive
prejudice, and he wouldn’t have risked the thing that he loved the
most otherwise.

I think facts that have been revealed about conduct of the FBI
toward Mr. King, Dr. King, show how very fragile freedom and the
rule of law are in the United States of America.

I hope this committee, beyond its specific assignments, will help
enact a law to control the FBI because if investigative agencies
don’t function in accordance with law, there is no law.

The ability of the Presidential appointees and sometime bureau-
crats to control all that enormous machinery is nonexistent where

144

the law isn’t clear and specific, and the operations open, and the
citizenry supportive.

It is imperative that we recognize that.

Chairman Stokes. I think I have just one further question I
would like to get your views on, something I think that disturbs a
lot of people.

We received testimony a few days ago from a former FBI agent
assigned to the Atlanta field office. He told us of how the news first
came across the radio, that station, that Dr. King had been shot.

Another agent in this same office — and this office, of course, had
the primary responsibility of investigating Dr. King, they were
involved in the surveillance on him — that the agent, upon hearing
the news, exclaimed, they got Zorro, they got the SOB.

A few moments later, when the news came across that he was
dead, he said this man literally jumped with joy, exclaimed his
satisfaction over the fact that King was dead.

There is some concern over the fact that, considering this, consid-
ering the attitude of Mr. Hoover, which was well-known through-
out the Bureau, all the agents knew of this dislike that he had for
Dr. King — and I guess my question goes to the efficacy of letting an
agency which had targeted Dr. King in the way that it had, an
agency which had him under the kind of investigation they had
him under, then be assigned the task of investigating his death.

Does it seem to you that under such circumstances, that such an
agency would in fact perform a top-notch job on a man who they
demonstrated such dislike for during his lifetime?

Mr. Clark. Let me qualify the first by repeating that at the time
I was unaware of the extent of the targeting that we now know
about.

It is a hypothesis contrary to fact to ask what would I have done
had I known about it because I believe hopefully I would have done
something long before. Perhaps resign had I known about it.

My judgment under the circumstances was that the FBI would
be motivated to try harder to solve this case than probably any in
its career because in an unusual set of ways both its effectiveness
and its credibility were on the line.

The public knew that the Director had called, as I did, Dr. King
the most notorious liar in the world. Many leaders knew rather
directly of his great personal distaste for Dr. King. A failure to
perform here would have had profound impact on the public confi-
dence in the FBI.

We ought to look at alternatives, too. There was an important
investigation that required an enormous amount of personnel. It
consumed a great amount of time, energy, and money.

What could you put together and what would the losses be in
trying to substitute alternatives. Would you put the Secret Service
on it? Put the Border Patrol on it? GSA’s custodian employees?
What would you really suggest out of the 20-odd Federal investiga-
tive agencies?

You know, I read in the paper that your committee had faulted
the FBI’s investigation here. I think it made an extraordinary
effort. Nothing that I have seen has changed that view.

145

It arrested a man finally, as to whom there is very substantial
direct evidence that he was at least in the environs and had done a
lot of things that seemed to be related to the possibility.

I enjoy admitting mistakes. I can’t tell you that I am able to say
that this was one. I believe that the judgment was right, that the
FBI pursued this with keenest desire and made a prodigious effort,
and without a lot of breaks that you often get, finally apprehended
someone who pled guilty.

I regretted at the time, I regret still, that there was a plea of
guilty. I thought history was entitled to more. Although I think an
individual has a right to plead guilty if he chooses that the public
can’t deny to satisfy its concern for history.

I would like to see that trial happen. I would like for history to
be more assured. But history is rarely assured about assassinations.
There is something in us that finds some so horrible and unaccep-
table.

I think the FBI was probably the only available agency. To sit
here now and think of the appearance of conflict of interest is to
ignore some overwhelming facts: That it had the confidence of the
vast majority of the people of the United States — that is my judg-
ment — to a higher degree than it had mine; that it had the confi-
dence of the President of the United States; that it had some 7,700
agents that were pretty darned good investigators.

We needed them in an emergency. We used them.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you very much.

I have no further questions.

At this time the Chair recognizes the gentleman from North
Carolina, Mr. Preyer.

Mr. Preyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is good to have you here today, Mr. Clark.

I wanted to clear up one point for the record which I may not
have understood correctly in the first place.

You mentioned that when Robert Kennedy was Attorney Gener-
al he had a habit of signing papers and you would find the papers
stuffed in his pockets, or in drawers, in his desk. Is that right?

Mr. Clark. Let me restate that and say that it iis probably an
unfair characterization. He was a bundle of energy and impatient
with details. Filing wasn’t one of his personal strengths.

My impression coming in later — and it was augmented by what I
had seen — I had seen him walking around with paper sticking out
of his pockets, you know, and they looked kind of crumpled.

But the characterization that I made was based upon coming in
more than 2 years after he left office, and trying to reconstruct his
methodology in approving wiretaps and bugs.

That became a fairly significant and essentially, I think, unrelat-
ed reason, that there was a controversy at the time between Mr.
Hoover and Robert Kennedy as to who authorized all these bugs
that had been placed on people that were allegedly involved in
organized crime.

I felt an obligation to the Department and the former Attorney
General and the Director to find out what I could about it.

We found copies of these things scattered hither and yon. I
mean, as I recall, we found some in a desk that he had used. We
found some in files where they would never have been found

146

except by careful review. There was no systematic treatment of
them.

The reason in part I think was, you see, unlike all the other flow
of material that would come through the Attorney General’s office,
where all the secretaries and everybody would have some obliga-
tion to stamp them and initial them and everything else, approval
of wiretapping and bugs would come directly from the Director of
the FBI to the Attorney General.

Usually in his day I think they were carried over by Courtney
Evans probably. So, it was just the two of them there. Mr. Evans
was going to return back to his office in a few minutes, and Bob
signed the thing without anybody present except himself often —
himself and Mr. Evans.

Then he would leave hurriedly to go to the White House or
someplace and he would stick it in a drawer. There was no system-
atic filing or recordkeeping. He kept no ledger, for instance, that
we ever found that said I authorize this such and such a date this,
such and such a date.

So, I don't know how he could tell what he had done except by
memory.

Mr. Preyer. Well, the only question I wanted to clear up was to
make sure there was no implication that some of these orders
which he may have signed he was reserving final judgment on,
that he put them in his pocket, say, or in his desk drawer in order
to give them more attention or more consideration.

You are not raising any question that these orders were effective
when you found them or you were not specifically raising any
question that he did not intend to authorize the wiretap on Martin
Luther King?

Mr. Clark. No. His signature is on that. I am sure that I saw
that.

Mr. Preyer. I think most of your testimony is clear on that,
but

Mr. Clark. I think I can help. The papers that I am referring to
were nearly all carbons. We still used carbon in those days. The
original would be returned to the FBI.

It is a request — I think this is one right here, exhibit F-507.
Usually they had a place for your signature. Maybe this is not
really one, but they would send an original and a carbon.

What we found in the files was the carbons. Sometimes they
would indicate by initials that they had been signed, and some-
times you couldn’t tell. So, I don’t, you know — as to many I really
don’t know whether they were signed. I know they were apparently
received, and presumably signed.

Mr. Preyer. Thank you.

I have just one other question, Mr. Chairman.

This is a law school question, a hypothetical question. I put it to
you because of your reputation as a lawyer and as a former Attor-
ney General. You may want to think about it further before re-
sponding to it.

There has been evidence presented to the committee here that
the FBI, in an unprecedented way, one agency in this country, set
out to destroy the moral standing of a respected citizen in this
country, Dr. Martin Luther King.

147

You were not involved in that in any way, as it has been made
clear here today.

The question I would like to put to you, assuming this evidence is
true, that the agency set out to destroy a prominent citizen by
destroying his moral standing in the community, and assuming,
further, that the person or persons involved in the assassination of
Dr. Martin Luther King were influenced by this FBI propaganda,
do you think the agency, the FBI, should bear some responsibility
for the death of Dr. Martin Luther King on the grounds of criminal
negligence; that is, by analogy to the case of Russian roulette,
where the players are guilty of murder, even though they do not
fire the actual shot?

Mr. Clark. Responsibility is a difficult word. Criminal negligence
seems the wrong analogy because there was conduct, there was
malfeasance, but it is primarily not a legal question.

I see it this way. There are moods in the life of a nation that
create higher probabilities of good and bad conduct. In the intensi-
ty of the sixties, with all the potential for violence, a deliberate
effort to destroy the moral standing of an individual could be a
causative factor, weighted with many others in enabling an individ-
ual to assassinate that person.

If I had a particular hatred, if that hatred was reinforced by
public expression and private conduct of a highly respected person
or agency, my self-justification in committing such an act could be
enhanced.

But it seems to me that the most important thing is not trying to
weigh that responsibility, because I don’t think we have the capac-
ity to sort out all the elements and attribute weight to them.

The important thing to me is that in a society that seeks freedom
for its people under the rule of law such conduct by a government
agency is absolutely intolerable.

Those who care about government of the sort that we preach of
should work now to see that we practice as we preach, that public
funds never again be expended to investigate and destroy the char-
acter or seek to destroy the character, because I believe more than
ever now the American public understands and respects Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr. for the enormous moral force that he was.

He told us that social change was essential to justice, that non-
violence was the only acceptable and humane way of achieving it.
Those seem to me to be the two great lessons we need to learn.

But for government to be involved in an effort of that sort is
totalitarian and impermissible.

I queried as long ago as 1950 in a book called “Crime in Amer-
ica” that I wrote whether — and this was just based on the belief
that there had been private communications to the President — the
history of the civil rights movement, which to my lights is the
noblest quest of the American people in my time, more so than the
peace movement, it was a quest for equality, motivated by princi-
pal — whether the history of the civil rights movement was altered
and its purpose severely damaged by conduct of the FBI in inform-
ing, misinforming the President about Martin Luther King, Jr.

Mr. Preyer. Thank you, Mr. Clark.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine.

148

Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Clark, you have made some very interesting answers here
today. I want to make sure that I understood you correctly.

I believe in response to a question by our chairman, Mr. Stokes,
relative to whether or not the FBI was reluctant to investigate civil
rights matters, was your response generally to the effect that as
times changed, and the Bureau found it necessary to change its
posture, that they moved more rapidly in investigating civil rights
matters than they did, for instance, in organized crime?

Is that an accurate assessment of your remarks?

Mr. Clark. Very nearly. What I was really trying to say was not
with reference to specific investigations but the totality of the
commitment of the Bureau.

I believe we could demonstrate with a study which I have not
made that the FBI moved with greater speed and effectiveness into
a new field, investigation of civil rights violations, than it did into
another new field, investigation of organized crime activities.

Mr. Devine. Thank you.

Now the other thing that I made a note about — and I want to
make sure was accurate — you said that the FBI was motivated
harder to solve this case than any other case, due to its reputation.

Is that an accurate assessment of what you said?

Mr. Clark. Yes.

Mr. Devine. Mr. Clark, do you feel that you were intimidated by
J. Edgar Hoover?

Mr. Clark. I never thought so.

Mr. Devine. Do you think any Attorney General, any of the
Attorney Generals were? I am quite sure your father wasn’t.

Mr. Clark. No, I don’t think my father was.

Mr. Devine. The reason I ask this question is when you look at
the chart over there, the FBI was an arm, simply an arm of the
Justice Department. You also had jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Prisons, Immigration and Naturalization, U.S. attorneys, U.S. mar-
shals — LEAA now.

Isn’t it a fact that the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation serves at the pleasure of the Attorney General, whoever he
or she may be?

Mr. Clark. The fact, no.

Mr. Devine. Pardon.

Mr. Clark. It is not a fact, no. It may be the law.

Mr. Devine. Well, let’s get back to intimidation. What do you
mean by that?

Mr. Clark. I mean I think some Attorneys General weren’t at all
pleased. But they had the technical legal power. I suggested — and
it has been recorded before — to President Johnson — I felt that Mr.
Hoover had been in office too long. I came to believe that in the
early, midsixties.

Later on I suggested that the need to coordinate and standardize
the various Federal investigative agencies was such that it might
be helpful to have Mr. Hoover end his service by reviewing all of
the agencies, as to jurisdiction, performance, and the rest, and
move him up and out of the FBI.

Mr. Devine. Well, maybe

149

Mr. Clark. That wasn’t at all acceptable to the President. I don’t
believe he really seriously considered it.

Mr. Devine. There are a number of people who feel that Mr.
Hoover served too long, perhaps beyond the time that he should
have.

But if memory serves me correctly, he was appointed as Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation by Harlan F. Stone, who at
that time was Attorney General of the United States, and that
each succeeding Attorney General renewed that appointment.

With the inherent right to appoint is the inherent right to
remove. I was just wondering why, if these Attorneys General prior
to and succeeding you did not move in that direction, were you not
intimidated in some way?

Mr. Clark. First, I don’t think that they were in any technical
sense reappointments. I recall no reappointment. The only question
that I recall is that when Mr. Hoover became 70 there was a
requirement for him to remain in office, that the President waive
some Civil Service rule, that he had done I think with General
Hershey, and perhaps some others — did not do with James B.
Bennett, I remember — and that was done.

Mr. Hoover had become an institutional force. The power of an
Attorney General in political terms to remove him was very limit-
ed, if it existed.

Finally, in performing your duty under the law, you have an
obligation to recognize the power of the President, too. If the Presi-
dent in fact wanted Mr. Hoover as Director of the FBI, he had the
power to effectuate that.

Mr. Devine. I think we all recognize that Mr. Hoover had a
powerful influence on the Congress, on the President, and on the
American people. Any move by an Attorney General to have him
dismissed would have probably created quite a problem across the
Nation.

I was wondering if in your knowledge whether you or any of
your predecessors or any of your successors ever made a recom-
mendation to the President that he be removed or step aside.

Mr. Clark. I am not aware of any. There was a widespread belief
that after the 1964 election President Kennedy might have re-
■moved him, or not renewed his — I think that is the same — about
the same year that he reached 70 — not waive the requirement of
the Civil Service law.

But I am not aware of any recommendation of any sort about his
removal except the one that I mentioned, about creating a new
position and putting him in it for his final year.

Mr. Devine. Again, in another vein, my final period of inquiry
has to do with your aversion to electronic surveillance or wiretaps.

Is your objection to that, in addition to the waste of manpower,
the fact that although there may be a legitimate national security
reason or an effort to solve a serious organized crime problem that
an electronic surveillance picks up extraneous material that is
unrelated to the offense and, therefore, is an invasion of the priva-
cy of the American citizen?

Mr. Clark. That is only part of it. Basically it is the practice of
Big Brother. I don’t believe that that is the American way.

150

I think we can solve crime and prevent crime without engaging
in such methods, and that the very acceptance of the methods will
undermine our commitment to freedom finally.

Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from the District of Columbia, Mr. Fauntroy.

Mr. Fauntroy. Yes.

Mr. Clark, as one who was deeply involved in the movement of
the sixties, you know that I know that you enjoyed the reputation
for integrity and sensitivity to the goals of the movement.

Certainly your statement about Dr. King’s relevance to this cen-
tury before this committee is indicative of your feeling now and
then that he was perhaps the most important man with the most
important message for this, the most violent century in the history
of mankind.

You have stated that while you were not aware of the COINTEL-
PRO program, as you have since come to learn of it, you were
aware of what you call — some of the intolerable practices of the
FBI with respect to Dr. King in April of 1968; were you not?

Mr. Clark. Well, I think you would have to tell me what you
meant by some of the intolerable practices.

Mr. Fauntroy. You were aware that electronic surveillance and
coverage of Dr. King had been effected by the FBI, that they had
produced documents and tapes and were attempting to persuade
public officials and the press to utilize them.

Were you not aware of that in April of 1968?

Mr. Clark. I was aware that there had been authorized wiretap-
ping and bugging. As I stated earlier, I do not believe I was aware
of the use of tapes, the playing of tapes, although I think others
were and had endeavored to put an end to it — Burke Marshall, Bob
Kennedy — at an earlier period.

Now, why

Mr. Fauntroy. You were not aware of efforts to approach Mem-
bers of the Congress, White House personnel, members of the
press, to suggest things that would destroy Dr. King’s effectiveness
as a civil rights leader by FBI people?

Mr. Clark. I was aware that the FBI was in various ways ap-
proaching for various purposes many Members of the Congress and
that it was always vitally interested in the press and what the
press said about it.

I was not aware of any organized effort, any repetitious effort. I
think I would have assumed that they appealed to the prejudices of
some. But I had no notion that there was a campaign systematical-
ly conducted to destroy his reputation.

In fact, I rather believed that after the confrontation with Bob
Kennedy that that had pretty much dissipated.

Mr. Fauntroy. You were aware of Mr. Hoover’s practices with
respect to Members of the Congress on other matters. You were
aware of what I think history will record as the pathological con-
tempt and hostility that Mr. Hoover had for Dr. King.

Did you have any indication of that in 1968?

Mr. Clark. I was very much aware of Mr. Hoover’s very low
opinion of Dr. King. I was aware of his personal inability to stop
talking about it.

151

Mr. Fauntroy. I take it it was for that reason that you felt that
an FBI investigation of the assassination would be rather thorough,
for the reason that you felt the FBI would feel obligated to do it to
protect its reputation.

Mr. Clark. I think that was an augmenting motivation.

Mr. Fauntroy. Well, then, how do you explain the failure of the
FBI to pursue the conspiracy aspects of the assassination, if be-
cause of their past reputation with respect to Dr. King they had
something to prove about their innocence in this question.

We have a chart there which shows the amount of money and
amount of mileage committed by the FBI to the investigation of
the death of Dr. King. It shows enormous amounts of money and
time spent up until James Earl Ray was apprehended, and then a
dramatic dropoff.

Our investigation indicates that the FBI did a thorough job in
terms of identifying the suspect and bringing him — and arresting
him and bringing him to the country.

If the motivation which led you not to feel that you had to take a
hand as Attorney General in this was that you felt the FBI would
do a thorough job to protect its own reputation, how do you explain
that they did such a poor job in the conspiracy aspects of the
investigation?

Mr. Clark. First, I hope that nothing I have said has implied to
you that I decided not to take a hand.

I believe that I had said, although it might have been in the
executive session, that I spent more time and commitment on this
investigation than any other by far and established essentially
unique procedures for it, in which there were daily oral reports
unprecedented in the history of the Department of Justice.

So, I did not not take a hand. I took a very direct hand and
personal interest. But I didn’t think I was Sherlock Holmes, and I
wasn’t going to take over the investigation and try to run it myself.

Now, second, you state as a conclusion that they did such a poor
job on investigating conspiracy. You know all that you have heard.
I don’t know. I don’t know what you base that conclusion on.

The charts mean nothing to me except that they spent a lot of
money until they caught James Earl Ray. Perhaps they thought
they had the case essentially solved then. That is a possibility.

Psychologically, I would say that once they had him arrested, at
least, they felt that their reputation was secure. I think there were
some very anxious moments — I know there were some very anxious
moments for the Bureau in April and May, when they were con-
cerned about delays.

I think that is really what is behind Mr. Hoover’s agitation about
the talk about hot pursuit, because it highlighted the fact that they
hadn’t caught the person they had been telling me they were going
to catch right away.

But the followup on conspiracy is something I can’t evaluate
because I don’t know what you know about what was done.

I can say this, that after the apprehension of James Earl Ray —
and I think this is essentially unique, too — I sent a written memo
to the Director asking him to pursue the conspiracy possibilities.

He expressed to me orally his intention to do that. I asked and
assigned valuable resources and personnel, including Steve Poliak,

152

to followup on conspiracy because you can’t afford to leave a stone
unturned in a situation like this, whatever the probability.

If history has taught us anything about assassinations it is that
at least one generation goes to its rest in disbelief. Ours won’t be
an exception.

Mr. Fauntroy. You indicated that obviously, therefore, that it
wasn’t a mistake on your part in your view not to work more
closely with the FBI in this investigation. You had no alternative,
as you indicated. You couldn’t realistically turn to the Secret Serv-
ice to do the investigtion.

But I wonder why the theory of the strike force, which you
pointed out to us earlier in your testimony, did not occur to you;
namely, that at least in criminal investigations, where corruption
may have been a real factor, that certain agencies may be neutral-
ized and, therefore, you form a strike force.

I wonder why you didn’t think of that avenue for more direct
involvement, particularly in light of what you knew about Mr.
Hoover and about the tactics that the agency had been employing
with respect to Dr. King at that time.

Mr. Clark. Let me say two things.

None of the people that I worked closely with and respected so
much in the civil rights movement ever suggested disability on the
part of the FBI, that we ought to have somebody else.

The idea of the strike force is very similar to the idea that we
should have used a grand jury, and in my opinion they are both
absolutely irrelevant to this investigation.

I ought to understand what the strike force is about. I have led
myself to believe I created the idea. It was for very special needs.

I have to tell you right now that had I had the full support of the
FBI in organized crime investigations, the strike force would have
been investigated by the FBI because it had the capacity, it had the
manpower, the skill and the training.

The reasons for a strike force are totally absent here. I mean, it
is a very weak analogy to say that, well, a strike force was involved
in corruption in Government. What we are talking about there is
payoffs for narcotics, or prostitution, or gambling, or something
like that — the police or the jailers or whoever it may be.

The idea that in an emergency, with a need right now, because
someone is barreling down the road at 70 miles an hour, that you
try to put all these people together who haven’t worked before,
when you don’t have a leisurely chance to convene a grand jury
and come about the thing in a slow and deliberate fashion, that
you are going to solve this case by bringing in postal inspection or
something, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, is just a wrong
idea.

It is an idea of someone that was at one time enchanted with the
strike force. But I don’t believe it has any application here.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Fauntroy. May I request unanimous consent for 2 addition-
al minutes, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, the gentleman is recog-
nized for 2 additional minutes.

153

Mr. Fauntroy. My final question has to do with a comment you
made about how the FBI operated on Capitol Hill. You indicated
that many people understand that, or understood it.

You mentioned specifically how the FBI operated with respect to
the Appropriations Committee chairmen of the House and the
Senate.

With proper discretion, but with an effort to at least inform this
member and the American people about what tactics — no — what
steps were taken by the FBI, I wonder if you would care to elabo-
rate on that.

Mr. Clark. You know, I am sorry I got to barreling down the
highway at 70 miles an hour again. I didn’t get the question. You
want me to say what

Mr. Fauntroy. I want you to elaborate. You said, “I knew how
the FBI operated on Capitol Hill.” What do you mean by that,
because I am anxious to know in general terms what you meant by
that.

Mr. Clark. Well, nothing particularly ominous. I really believe
in free communication, in trusting Government employees. But you
watch how agriculture moves around the Agriculture Committees,
you watch how the Pentagon moves around the Defense Commit-
tees.

The FBI would move in a slightly broader spectrum. It would be
deeply involved in some areas — supplying even agents to help com-
mittee staff with some of its work.

Mr. Fauntroy. What would the agents do — help them do what?

Mr. Clark. I don’t really know. This is something that I have
been informed of. But I think that the Appropriations Subcommit-
tee in the House at one time had a number of agents working on
their analysis of budget — you know, they have accountants, the
agents aren’t people with spyglasses as far as I know — just working
on the accounting and analysis of budget items.

Mr. Fauntroy. They would go to the General Accounting Office
for that, would they?

Mr. Clark. There is a General Accounting Office; yes. Perhaps
the chairman preferred the FBI. Anyway, he was using them for
some reason. I think that is a fact.

Most Attorneys General have commented on the FBI going di-
rectly to the White House with information. A notable exception to
the practice was Robert Kennedy. Many Attorneys General have,
you know, expressed grief, agitation about it.

It involves some serious problems because you can mix politics
and criminal investigations if you are not real careful. But still I
was generally aware that Mr. DeLoach and other members of the
White House — other members of the FBI would talk with people at
the White House.

I didn’t tell the President he couldn’t have lunch with J. Edgar
Hoover.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian.

Mr. Fithian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Mr. Clark. I always enjoy hearing your responses to
the questions, as we did in executive session.

154

I will limit my questions, Mr. Chairman, to two.

I am still interested in your elaborating somewhat more on your
belief that the Bureau did all that it could be reasonably expected
to do in the area of conspiracy.

This is, of course, one of the main problems that this committee
is wrestling with. An awful lot of people have a great deal of
difficulty accepting the fact that a fugitive from Missouri State
Penitentiary could finance himself and do all these things, and go
to several continents, and get passports and operate as long as he
did, including the assassination of Dr. King, without some kind of
assistance from somewhere.

Now, just as a general proposition, and then more specifically, if
you were directing an investigation of this nature, what kinds of
steps would you have personally directed be taken with regard to
assessing the conspiracy angle; and second, then, do you believe
that those steps or alternative steps that could be looked upon now
as thorough were actually undertaken by the FBI.

Mr. Clark. Let me say first that I did not intend to convey the
impression that I believe that the FBI did all it could reasonably
have done in investigating conspiracy. I don’t know. You see, I
don’t really know how extensive its investigation of conspiracy was.

What I do think I know is that it threw an enormous amount of
resources at solving the case, and that it was instructed and reflect-
ed a willingness and from time to time presented matters that
indicated it examined a conspiracy.

But I don’t — I can’t tell you how far they went. I think they were
enormously relieved when they got James Earl Ray. I can remem-
ber a couple of nights not sleeping well because one night they had
found — somebody had found a body buried in a bush at Puerto
Villarte, and they had to take it to Mexico City to pump the
fingers up so you could get a print, because we were sure it was
James Earl Ray.

Another time there was some digging over in Camden, N.J., and
they thought maybe we lost him there. They were greatly relieved,
and it may be there was a letdown. It may be that I sensed that
possibility, or that others did, Steve Poliak, or Fred Vincent, be-
cause we did send a memo over that they should continue it.

I can’t tell you whether they did all — your investigation makes
you privy to far more information I think on that subject than I
have.

Your question, what would I have done to investigate conspiracy
is really very difficult. Naturally I feel modestly — I think I was a
splendid Attorney General. But I can’t tell you that I have had
vast experience in criminal investigation. I haven’t. I have had
probably more than most who served as Attorney General, but I
would have to begin as pretty much a beginner.

Mr. Fithian. Well, may I interrupt to just say, did I understand
you earlier this morning to say in response to counsel’s question
that you didn’t think very much of using the immunity process in
questioning witnesses in order to elicit information, which some
believe is a fairly valid tool in dealing with conspiracy, and maybe
one of the only ones that you can actually elicit information that
would lead to the apprehension of the conspirators?

155

Mr. Clark. Well, something like immunity is much closer to my
experience than direct criminal investigation because when you
start talking about immunity you start talking about the fifth
amendment and statutes and grand juries and legal proceedings.

I question coerced testimony. I think it is undesirable. I think it
is wise to seek independent evidence. The use of immunity, the last
10 years out of Government I have watched what immunity does to
Harrisburg, or during the Attica trials — you read the corruption
that is involved there, people dumping on each other, you know.
You think you have got somebody going now because you have to
make a case.

I also believe that it is incompatible with the purpose of the fifth
amendment, which is to compel the State to prove its case, not to
empower it to coerce the individual to make the case.

So, I am not keen on immunity. I suggested a study to abolish
immunity when I was in office. We found more than 33 immunity
statutes, and some of them were just wildly out of control.

As I recall at that time the FTC could grant immunity in a case
involving the assassination of the President of the United States,
for instance. That is lawless.

Mr. Fithian. One last question, Mr. Clark.

Given all the information we have, and what you discussed this
morning about the role of the FBI in discrediting Dr. King, would
you care to summarize suggestions.

You came on pretty strong at one point, I believe, and said that
this committee had a distinct responsibility to recommend changes
in the law, so that we could not have this situation develop again.

More specifically, perhaps briefly, what are those firm recom-
mendations that many of us would like to pursue?

Mr. Clark. They are before the Congress in the form of a draft
bill that is called a bill to control the FBI, that I came down as
national chairman of the Advisory Council for the American Civil
Liberties Union to announce.

I will ask John Shaddock, who is the Washington representative
of the ACLU, to provide you with it. But it is not dissimilar to — it
contains in fact things that I had seen and worked on over many
years earlier.

First, investigative techniques should arise from authorization in
law. Every form of acceptable investigation should be determined
by the lawmakers. We have evaded our responsibility and made
the cop on the street, the agent out there, make the tough decision.
That is wrong.

In a way title III was an effort to begin to regulate that. Until
1968 we had just failed to encourage, to say whether you can
wiretap or not. We knew there was flagrant wiretapping, private,
Federal, State, and local.

There were books written about it all over the place, an absolute-
ly lawless invasion of constitutional rights. We didn’t have the
courage to come to grips with it.

We need that desperately about all kinds of technical devices.
We need it about the use of informers. We need it throughout
areas of conduct in investigation.

Every act authorized by police and investigators should be estab-
lished in law. There should be clear areas of prohibition and strict

156

punishment for prohibition. There should be openness in govern-
ment because without that openness, without the opportunity to
review, you can’t find the misconduct.

There should, in my judgment, be sometime a Federal investiga-
tive agency review board that has the power to determine miscon-
duct by subpena and compulsion of testimony and to take disciplin-
ary action.

And it should be comprised of people, including people whose
rights are less valued in our society than the rights of others.
There is a pretty good inventory. Some of the things are fairly easy
and we have tended to get done.

One of the provisions I liked best in the Omnibus Crime Control
Act of 1968 was the final requirement that the Director of the FBI
be approved by the Senate, because I had lived as a young lawyer
through the McCarthy period and saw the possibility of someone
coming in as Director there, requiring no Senate approval, no
check or balance, and terrible consequences.

I think the U.S. Attorney’s office should be removed from Senate
confirmation because that vests political decisionmaking in the
selection of the executive branch prosecutor in the area where the
member that has that power is most interested, among his political
contributors, and the rest.

Those are some of them. There were 20 or 30 different elements,
but those are the key ones.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. Sawyer. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Anything further?

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could ask just one
question?

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Blakey.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Clark, this is a philosophical question that you
and I had discussed shortly before the hearings. There were going
to be two, and Judge Preyer did such an eloquent job of asking one
of them, and you did such an eloquent job of answering it, I am
really hesitant to ask you the other question lest I have to follow
such a performance.

Let me ask it, anyway:

I am sure you recall in 1965 and 1967 when the President’s
Crime Commission wrestled with some of the problems about how
to investigate organized crime cases, and the organized crime task
force, which you may recall that I worked for, recommended to the
full commission that the sophisticated use of such things as grand
jury, immunity, and wiretapping was very useful in breaking con-
spiracy cases. I think I recall your eloquent statement against
wiretapping in the commission.

Nevertheless, the commission, at least the majority of them, did
recommend to President Johnson that legislation in this area be
adopted.

I think you can recall, too, a long conversation you and I had in
the Wiretap Commission when the Congress, in a joint Congression-
al-Presidential commission had the opportunity to study the 1968
act. We discussed again your philosophy.

157

In that connection, Mr. Chairman, I wonder if it would be appro-
priate to include in the record at this point as Martin Luther King
exhibit F-537, a four- or five-paragraph review of the evidence
taken by the Wiretap Commission of the usefulness of wiretap in
homicide cases?

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the
record.

[The information follows:]

MLK Exhibit F-537

Electronic Surveillance

158

(8) History crimes: As a rule, court-ordered
electronic surveillance has proven useful in the in-
vestigation of offenses which are being or are about
to be committed. Where the offense has already been
completed, surveillance is rarely used. As one Com-
mission witness testified, eavesdropping “can only be
used most effectively where there is an ongoing con-
spiracy. Investigating old crimes and old events is
really not what [it] is all about.” 454 Thus, crimes
such as robbery, rape, and murder are generally not
investigated by court-ordered surveillance.

The primary problem with using court-ordered
surveillance to investigate history crimes is that once
the crime is completed, there is usually no further
discussion of it by the participants. 445 Probable cause
to believe such discussions will occur is difficult to
establish, 456 as is the use of particular telephones for
such conversations. 447 If the investigators have
probable cause to support a surveillance order, they
may be close to an arrest and eavesdropping may not
be needed. 444

On the other hand, there is some indication that
courts will find probable cause in a homicide case
somewhat more quickly than with other offenses. 4 *’
Where a history offense is part of an ongoing con-
spiracy, probable cause about the occurrence and
location of conversations may be less difficult to
show. 440 This may be true, for example, of an
Organized Crime contract killing. 441 Thus homicide
is the history crime in which electronic surveillance is
most frequently used. 442

Some use has also been reported with reference tc
locating fugitives, 443 although these situations could
more properly be considered ongoing offenses. In
most fugitive cases, the surveillance was deemed un-
productive. 464 Where evidence of past events is
developed, it usually comes “fortuitously,” 465 as a
“serendipitous” result 444 of surveillance directed at
a presently continuing offense. On occasion, a sur-
veillance order may be obtained for a present offense
with the hope that the eavesdropping will discover
./evidence of a past crime. 447 .

Despite the difficulties involved, surveillance or-
ders have occasionally been used effectively to in-
vestigate history offenses. In Nebraska 464 and
Wisconsin, 469 surveillance orders produced crucial
evidence in homicide investigations. In both in-
stances the prosecutor “tickled” the suspects into
talking about the crimes on the tapped telephones or
in the bugged premises by questioning and then,
releasing them. Part of the probable cause statement
in the Nebraska case included a psychiatrist's opinion
that the defendant would react to the stimulus of in-
terrogation in precisely that fashion. 470 Such
“tickling” was also used in a theft investigation in
Queens, New York. Company employees were told
of the thefts, taps were put on the phones, and people
started talking. 471

159

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, I would like, if I could, just to read
part of the paragraph of that summary. It said:

Despite the difficulties involved, surveillance orders have occasionally been used
effectively to investigate history— or the— what the commission meant at this time,
homicide offenses. In Nebraska and Wisconsin surveillance orders produced critical
evidence in homicide investigations. In both instances prosecutors “tickled” the
suspects into talking about the crimes on the tapped telephones or in the bugged
premises by questioning and then releasing them.

These techniques, that is, a grand jury, immunity, wiretapping,
were not employed in the King investigation. You indicated that
you thought it was inappropriate, either to use them as a matter of
policy, in the case of wiretapping, or that you thought there was no
occasion for the grand jury or immunity.

This is a long preface for what I hope is an important philosophi-
cal question. You have suggested here today — and indeed you sug-
gested in your “Crime in America”, that measures such as this
could be fairly characterized as repressive, and that a free society
ought not adopt repressive measures like this in an effort to inves-
tigate crime, that in the long run there is no conflict between
liberty and security, and an effort to adopt repressive measures
like this out of fear leads to more problems than it solves, and that
we need not pay a price in liberty or important values, that price
being the adoption of these kinds of measures.

That’s the preface. Let me ask you the question: If I were to tell
you that the utilization of an executive session like a grand jury,
and a congressional subpena, like a grand jury subpena, and the
immunity orders authorized by the Organized Crime Control Act in
1970 by this committee, had developed at least the outlines of what
may well have been a conspiracy in the King case — it may well
have been, and I am certainly making no final judgment; that is up
to the committee — may well have identified people who could have
been associated with James Earl Ray in Dr. King’s death and
would argue from that that the failure on the part of the FBI and
the Department of Justice under your leadership to utilize those
techniques in 1968 may have led to the failure to solve the conspir-
acy dimensions of this case, would — and this is the question — would
not our society have paid a very dear price in paranoia, distrust of
government, concern among Black people at the fairness of justice,
concern among Black people that our society cared enough to
investigate Dr. King’s death?

The question I am asking you is, Don’t we pay a price to use
these investigative techniques? Don’t we also pay a price to not use
them if not using them leads to failure to solve a case of impor-
tance to so many people as the death of Dr. Martin Luther King?

Mr. Clark. Let me say, first, Mr. Blakey, you and I have been on
opposite sides of this subject. In the President’s Crime Commission
you were an insider there, and I was an outsider. In the Wiretap
Commission you again were in the position of power and I was
outside, just saying what I thought; and here again, I don’t — I put
this by — question the wisdom of injecting these differences of view
into the Martin Luther King assassination investigation. I think
they are important public questions, but unrelated here.

First, the “if’ that you propound is a big “if.” It is like if you
were beating your mother. In other words, if we solved the case —

160

and God knows it is important to solve the case and know the
truth always, and here more so than always— but the FBI wasn’t
terribly reticent about asking for things and it never suggested,
except in the case of the family and for the purposes of pursuit and
at the cost of the prosecution, possibly, the use of wiretap.

But, finally, what a very sad justification for wiretap, the life of
Martin Luther King, whom wiretapping and surveillance so nearly
destroyed. To say that it would solve his murder and therefore we
should authorize it, and we can control it because his life, above
all, exemplifies the capacity for misuse— I well remember Whitney
Young, who served on the President’s Crime Commission, who
briefly, believed that wiretapping was desirable because he saw
organized crime preying on his people in the ghetto by selling them
heroin, and he hated it — he was a compassionate man — finally
saying, after some of the revelations before Whitney died about Dr.
King, how wrong he thought it was because, of course, such instru-
mentalities of power will be used against the wrong people.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Clark, let me kind of ask the question and
make a comment. You and I indeed have had this discussion on a
number of occasions, and maybe it would be appropriate to say for
the record, nothing that I have ever advocated in the use of wire-
tapping would ever justify what happened to Martin Luther King,
would it, as far as you know?

Mr. Clark. A question between justification and cause, I guess. I
assume you wouldn’t

Mr. Blakey. I mean the kind of wiretapping that was authorized
in title III would never have been permitted as against Dr. Martin
Luther King?

Mr. Clark. When was the last time a judge denied a request for
an order?

Mr. Blakey. The question is: When was the last time that they
did give one where the probable cause was not adequately estab-
lished?

Mr. Clark. It’s amazing how effective we have gotten. We’re
never wrong. The judges always approve them.

Mr. Blakey. You are quite right, that we shouldn’t inject the
broader philosophical argument in it.

What I would comment though is that among the motivations
that led the House of Representatives, not the Senate, to adopt title
III was the death of Martin Luther King and Bobby Kennedy. It
was repeatedly said on the floor— and I would have to add that
how ironic it would be if one of the legislative motivations for
enactment of title III was the death of Dr. Martin Luther King,
and then it was not employed to solve his assassination, and a
reasonable case could be made had it been employed in 1968 and it
might well have contributed to its solution.

Thank you, Mr. Clark.

Chairman. Stokes I just have one further question, Mr. Clark,
and I want to take advantage of your legal mind. This question was
posed by Judge Preyer, and my question, really, is a further exten-
sion of his question:

It seems to me that ultimately one of the questions that this
committee must grapple with in its ultimate determination is
whether the FBI must bear some responsibility for Dr. King’s

161

death. In that vein, let me further extend the hypothetical question
put to you by Judge Preyer. He mentioned the FBI being engaged
in a program to destroy Dr. King. We know now from the evidence
that that program of destruction started out firstly as an unofficial
program and then became an official program of a law enforce-
ment agency of the U.S. Government, but it went even further
than that, because we have in the record memorandum and data
that say after he has been destroyed — they talk of the condition
that will reign in this country as relates to Negro people; it talks of
the utter confusion, et cetera, et cetera.

So this law enforcement agency then arrogates unto itself the
power to choose Dr. King’s successor, the next man to lead the
Negro people of this country. That then, to me, seems to go even
further than destruction, when such an agency arrogates unto
itself such unconstitutional power.

Then add to this equation that we now have in the record memo-
randums and data by this law enforcement agency of the United
States in which Dr. King is described as being a traitor to the
country, a traitor to his race, thereby attempting to set the mood of
a person who has been a traitor to this country and therefore does
not deserve any kind of consideration.

Add to this that there is in the record now evidence that he was
described as being the most dangerous Negro in this country. Then
I would want you to place it in the framework of the legal responsi-
bility that we know, that a parent has to a child, a guardian has to
a ward, that a government has to its citizens. I think it goes
without saying that we are talking about a higher degree of respon-
sibility when we talk of those trust positions.

So when we take it in the sense that what we are talking about
is something that gets to the very root and fabric of a democracy,
when an agency of a government that is charged with the protec-
tion of the citizens utilizes all the powers of that agency to destroy
a human being, and having set that type of mood and climate, I
would ask you to assume one further fact in the equation: Assume
that this attitude, this destructive targeting, is known to right-wing
hate groups in this country, particularly those in which monetary
consideration has been offered for the death of Dr. King, would it
be difficult for you to legally assess some responsibility for the
death of Dr. King on the FBI, assuming all of those hypotheticals?

Mr. Clark. Legally, yes.

Let me add to that a little bit: First, it became very clear to me
that such an organization should never have the power to wiretap
or bug. An agency with those qualities simply cannot be empow-
ered with such potential invasion of individual dignity.

Let me answer rather than legally, because, see, legally to estab-
lish responsibility you would have to show that, well, perhaps as
Judge Preyer was suggesting, that some level of negligence would
essentially be involved in a murder, that a person intentionally
acted in a way calculated to cause another to commit a murder.

Now, if you had evidence of that, legally, yes, I haven’t read
about that in the newspapers and I don’t know of that. Morally, let
me look at it for a moment with you: In a sense it is unfair to all to
take the FBI out of context and examine it in some isolation, as if
that were possible. We have had pervasive racism in this society

162

and we have to recognize that, and there were those who knew and
enjoyed what seemed to be the support of the FBI for their own
racism.

And I think it’s true of human nature that — as I tried to say
earlier— that if I have a particular prejudice and something that
my social contacts have caused me to respect — the church, the
Government, patriotism— the FBI shares that, reinforces that prej-
udice, then that compounds my commitment and my capacity to
act on that prejudice; and I think in a sense the values of the
Nation created the FBI and it reflected those values; and it ap-
pealed to prejudices in us, and it in that sense certainly increased
the probability of violence of this sort.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you.

Any further questions from members of the committee?

Mr. Clark, at the conclusion of a witness’ testimony before this
committee, under our rules, the witness is entitled to 5 minutes for
the purpose of explaining or amplifying or making any further
statement he so chooses relative to his testimony before our com-
mittee.

I would extend to you at this time 5 minutes for that purpose, if
you so desire.

Mr. Clark. Well, I appreciate the opportunity and commend the
practice, but I have already burdened you with enough of my views
for one morning.

Thank you.

Chairman Stokes. I certainly want to thank you for your appear-
ance here this morning. You’ve been very helpful to the committee.
It is nice to have had you here. Thank you very much.

The committee will recess until 2 p.m. this afternoon.

[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, the com-
mittee to reconvene at 2 p.m.]

Afternoon Session

Chairman Stokes. The committee will come to order.

The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey.

Mr. Blakey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Our next witness, Mr. Chairman, is Stephen Poliak. Mr. Poliak
joined the Office of the Solicitor General in the Justice Department
in 1961. In 1965, he became Deputy to Assistant Attorney General
John Doar of the Civil Rights Division, and he took over that
division in 1967.

Mr. Poliak remained with the Justice Department until January
1969. Mr. Poliak is at present in private practice of law in Wash-
ington.

It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Mr.
Poliak.

Chairman Stokes. The Chair calls Mr. Poliak.

I would ask you to please stand and raise your right hand and be
sworn.

You solemnly swear the testimony you will give before this com-
mittee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so
help you God?

Mr. Pollak. I do.

163

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. You may be seated.

The Chair recognizes staff counsel, Peter Beeson.

TESTIMONY OF STEPHEN J. POLLAK

Mr. Beeson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Poliak, would you state your full name for the record, please.

Mr. Pollak. Stephen John Poliak.

Mr. Beeson. I wonder if I could ask you to give a brief rundown
of your professional background prior to and during your associ-
ation with the Justice Department, until you left in a change of
administrations in 1969.

Mr. Pollak. Yes. I began the practice of law here in Washington
in 1956 with the law firm of Covington and Burling. I was with
that firm until November of 1961, when I joined Archibald Cox in
the Office of the Solicitor General of the United States Department
of Justice.

I served in that office for two and a half or so years and then left
the department to serve the Task Force on the War Against Pover-
ty, and then briefly as the Deputy General Counsel of the new
Office of Economic Opportunity.

In March, late March of 1965, Mr. Doar and Mr. Katzenbach
invited me to return to the Department of Justice as Mr. Doar’s
deputy, and I did so and served as what is now called Deputy
Assistant Attorney General through February of 1967, when Presi-
dent Johnson asked me to serve as his Advisor on the National
Capital Area.

I served in that post through October of that year, following
approval by the Congress of a plan to reorganize the District gov-
ernment.

In October I returned to the Department of Justice and served as
the Special Assistant to the Attorney General, and then was sworn
in as Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Rights
Division in January of 1968, January 3, 1 believe.

I served through the end of the administration. I believe I left
office at noon on January 20, 1969.

Mr. Beeson. So that you had been deputy — excuse me — Assistant
Attorney General in charge of the Civil Rights Division for ap-
proximately 3 months at the time of Dr. King’s assassination?

Mr. Pollak. Something over 3 months, that is correct. I had
actually as special assistant carried some responsibilities with re-
spect to the division because Mr. Doar was trying the so-called
Neshoba case in Mississippi before the U.S. District Court and was
not in the city.

So, I had a role supervising the division in his absence.

Mr. Beeson. All right.

Mr. Pollak, there has been some testimony before the committee
already concerning a strained relationship between the Depart-
ment of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation at around
the time of Dr. King’s assassination.

I wonder if you could give the committee your conception of the
relationship that existed between the Civil Rights Division and the
FBI in 1968.

164

Mr. Pollak. My perception of the relationship between the Civil
Rights Division and the FBI in 1968 was a product of the experi-
ence I had serving in the division in the previous 3 or so years.

That was that — for a number of reasons — that the civil rights
investigations which we requested in large, large number often
placed the Bureau in some positions of conflict with local police
agencies, when the Bureau was called upon to investigate possible
charges of police brutality.

I had the feeling at that time that the number and type of
assignments which our requests called for led some in the Bureau
to be less enthusiastic about those requests than they were about
other undertakings.

On the other hand, I had had extensive experience with their
response to our requests, and it was my belief and conclusion that
they carried out our requests well and that what we were called on
to do to perform our responsibility was to draw requests that set in
motion the proper investigation which we wanted.

Mr. Beeson. Speaking specifically about the assassination inves-
tigation which was predicated on a possible conspiracy to violate
Dr. King’s civil rights, do you recall any reluctance at all on the
part of the Bureau to investigate that case?

Mr. Pollak. I don’t recall any reluctance to engage in that
investigation. I might say that we understood in the Civil Rights
Division— and I am sure throughout the department— what the
meaning of a full investigation was.

What Mr. Clark requested orally, and what I confirmed with my
written request to the Director of the FBI on the evening of April
4, 1968 was a request for a full investigation.

That, in the terminology between the Department and the
Bureau, meant that every lead was to be pursued, that all effort to
carry forward the investigation was to be made, that nothing was
to be spared.

So that in requesting a full investigation we understood that all
of the bells would be clanging, and the fire engine would be moving
out there to meet the responsibilities in every possible way.

My observation in the period of time after that request was
made, both in oral communications and then upon receipt of writ-
ten communications, was that the response was a full one.

Mr. Beeson. I believe in 1968 that a situation had developed
whereby local U.S. attorneys did not become involved in local civil
rights investigations under Federal statutes, that responsibility for
civil rights investigations throughout the country under Federal
civil rights statutes fell, with few exceptions, on Department of
Justice attorneys in Washington.

Is that in fact correct?

Mr. Pollak. That was our practice, Mr. Beeson.

We have the prosecutorial and law enforcement responsibility
under the Federal statutes, and in many of the situations I guess
the complexity of the investigation which had to be mounted was
such that we carried it directly in Washington.

The only difference that I recall in that practice was stemmed
from the southern district of New York, where I believe it was a
succession of U.S. attorneys — and Mr. Morgenthau stands in my

165

recollection — wanted to pursue the direction of the investigations
in that jurisdiction.

There was a man or two elsewhere in the United States and my
memory is in Chicago and possibly one other jurisdiction, where
occasionally the direction was in the hands of the local office of the
U.S. attorney. But primarily and almost exclusively the Civil
Rights Division carried that responsibility.

Mr. Beeson. Was this solely because of the complexity of the
cases or was it also because of the reluctance of local U.S. attor-
neys to become involved in local civil rights prosecutions?

Mr. Pollak. I think that my perception is that it was also the
latter. A major portion of our effort in the period of time that I
served in the Department, but not exclusively so by any means —
the major portion of the effort was in the States of the Deep South.

While we had good cooperation from the U.S. attorneys and their
staffs in assisting us when we pursued a case, and in joining us in
the courtroom with a case, we felt that the — I think we felt those
U.S. attorneys and their staffs were desirous of concerning them-
selves with other Federal law enforcement, and we considered it a
matter which we could best handle directly.

Mr. Beeson. The investigative files in the assassination investiga-
tion reflect no involvement whatsoever by local U.S. attorneys’
offices, with the exception of the Birmingham office, which did
receive reports because that was the jurisdiction in which the
Federal complaint was filed.

But outside of the fact that they were also included in the
distribution of the paperwork of the investigation, there is no other
evidence of active involvement by local U.S. attorneys overseeing
in this investigation.

Is that consistent with your recollection and do you consider that
a defect in the investigation oi not?

Mr. Pollak. It is consistent with my recollection, and I don’t
consider it a defect in the investigation.

We did not consider that the investigation of the laws committed
to enforcement by the Civil Rights Division had been or should be
pursued through direction of the local U.S. attorneys or with par-
ticular participations of their staff up to the time that we had a
case.

I might say, just to be sure that the record reflects the picture as
we saw it, that U.S. attorneys in pursuit of the law cases that we
brought often played significant roles.

U.S. attorney Floyd Buford of Georgia prosecuted the case
against the persons charged with responsibility for the slaying of
Lemual Penn on the highway in Georgia.

So that U.S. attorneys stepped forward at our request and played
important roles in law cases once they were lodged. But they had
not done so at the stage of investigation.

Mr. Beeson. Would you describe, please, the role which you
yourself adopted in the investigation in Washington, the assassina-
tion investigation, and the role which you considered appropriate
for other attorneys within the Civil Rights Division, in terms of
supervising or actually participating in the day-to-day investigation
of the assassination.

Mr. Pollak. Yes.

166

I saw my role as the law enforcement official within the depart-
ment with prosecutorial responsibility for the statute under which
the investigation and then the complaint in Birmingham was
lodged; that is, 18 U.S.C. 241.

I considered that as part of that prosecutorial responsibility, I
had the responsibility for supervising the investigation being car-
ried out by the FBI for the vigor, completeness, and activity of that
investigation.

I considered that D. Robert Owen, and I, my first assistant, and
the staff within the division that from time to time worked on the
King assassination matter, were responsible for carrying forward
the supervision of the investigation so that we would be confident
in the event we came to prosecute, or in the event a prosecution
was to be mounted by another jurisdiction, then our fact-finding
was to be made available, we would have a fact-finding record
which would be full and complete and responsible.

Mr. Beeson. Would you give us, as specific as possible an idea of
how you carried out your responsibilities in supervising the FBI’s
conspiracy investigation in this case?

Mr. Pollak. Yes.

Of course, the investigation commenced on the 4th of April with
the request for the full investigation. The conspiracy investigation
was commenced at that time, since the statute that the investiga-
tion was mounted under was a conspiracy statute.

We saw the investigation commence. I myself made a trip to
Memphis on the 8th of April, and met with the special agent in
charge of the Memphis office, Mr. Jensen.

I might say that that trip was also related in a significant
manner to the staging on that day, which my recollection is was
the day before Dr. King’s funeral in Atlanta — there was a march
and considerable concern as to the situation in Memphis on the 8th
of April, and I was there also in that connection.

But in supervising the investigation we received the reports of
the Bureau orally and in significant respects in writing. We re-
viewed those reports.

We, as Mr. Clark said this morning, were not the directors of the
investigation. It was not either by training or by experience an
undertaking which we made during the investigative stage, to
direct the particular steps to be taken to solve a crime.

We set it in motion. We received the reports. We made further
followup requests as we thought those requests were appropriate.
Indeed, as I did and Mr. Clark mentioned in this instance he did, at
times subsequent to April 4.

Mr. Beeson. In terms of actually targeting specific possible con-
spirators in the case, identifying and then following out specific
conspiratorial leads, would it be fair to state that that was at least
initially solely the province of the FBI, and that your function was
merely to review the leads that they had considered significant
enough to follow out?

Mr. Pollak. Certainly initially, at the earlier point, the FBI,
through its investigation, came upon the leads and as the draft
report, the staff report indicates, the FBI set down a 24-hour dead-
line for following out leads.

167

Until those particular leads came to be reported to us, those
leads were not known to us.

Subsequently, as the leads came to our attention through written
reports and contemporaneous oral reports, we did review those
reports and ascertained on the time frame forward into 1968 that
various leads were followed down.

As you know, I made additional followup requests that leads
should be pursued and as the year wore on, made particular re-
quests on three occasions with specific categories of leads or inci-
dents or questions which we thought warranted further investiga-
tion, particularly then, since Mr. Ray had been arrested, with
respect to the possibility of a conspiracy.

Mr. Beeson. Do you recall any specific conspiratorial leads that
you yourself asked the FBI to pursue, independent of what the FBI
was doing themselves?

Mr. Pollak. I would not recall them at this point, as far away
from 1968, and indeed I do not want to suggest that I have a full
recall because I do not.

But in preparing to come before the committee, and to meet with
you and Mr. Sacco earlier this year, I sought to refresh myself by
reviewing some of the papers.

My recollection is as to specific requests, refreshed as I have just
described, includes a request of some detail stemming from an
interview of one of the attorneys in our division, Mr. J. Harold
Flannery, with a man named Sartor in the Memphis area, who had
been said by a man named Epps, with whom I had met in Wash-
ington at the Vice President’s request, to have some leads.

Mr. Flannery interviewed Mr. Sartor, a memorandum was pre-
pared raising a number of different questions of possible conspira-
torial background to the assassination, and I forwarded that to the
Director, I believe, in the month of September 1968, with a request
that those leads be pursued.

Of course, in the month of June and again in July I had commu-
nicated with the Director, requesting that all leads indicating the
possibility of a conspiracy be immediately run down and reported.

So, Mr. Sartor request was really supplemental to what they
were currently doing.

Additionally, I made two followup requests on November 7, 1968
and another one on November 15, 1968 requesting that specific
matters reported in the articles in the Look magazine by Mr. Huie
be pursued, particularly some of those that I recall to mind include
reports of Mr. Ray’s statements about the discussions with and
actions with Mr. Raoul, or a Raoul, questions concerning the source
of various funds, a question concerning the red automobile which
had been purchased in 1967, and a number of detailed requests
that were in those two requests to Mr. Hoover.

Those are the matters which I recall having raised in specific
with the Director on the conspiracy

Mr. Beeson. Let me ask you this, Mr. Pollak. You have had a
chance to review a draft of, the staff report of the investigation,
which at this point has tentative indications from our reviews.

The report does indicate that while numerous conspiracy leads
were pursued, there was a significant failure to pursue the possibil-
ity of family involvement, despite the possession by the FBI and

168

the Department of Justice, relatively early in the investigation, of
a substantial amount of evidence indicating the possibility of
family involvement.

Would you care to comment on that aspect of the report? Do you
recall, for example, specific consideration with the FBI or within
the Department of Justice of this possibility, and do you recall
focusing any attention on the possibility of family involvement?

Mr. Pollak. My recollection is that there was an enormous flow
of facts or possible facts coming to us on paper and in oral reports
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The situation was such that we had one person in our division
assigned to make a name index on multiply cards so that we could
keep track of the individuals identified in the Bureau reports, and
the dates in which those individuals were alleged to have taken
particular actions.

My recollection includes reference to the family. I was certainly
aware of Mr. Ray’s family. I do not have a recollection that there
was any indication that ever came to my attention in the time
until I left the Department, that the family members were objects
of unresolved indications that they had been a member of a con-
spiratorial plan to assassinate Dr. King.

I am clear that it was my perception at the time, during the
period commencing on the 4th of April and running through the
time that I left the division, that the FBI was responding to the
requests that were made and conducting a broad-scale and a deep
investigation.

I would say that my recollection includes a level of intensity of
the investigation which was highest in the period until Mr. Ray’s
arrest on the 8th of June. I consider that something over 2-month
period to have been an investigation, both into the persons respon-
sible for the slaying, being an individual or more than one individ-
ual, and also, then, upon the identification of a single person
involved, an investigation to find that single person.

I am also aware that once the arrest occurred that the — this
intensity seemed somewhat to be reduced. I may draw that conclu-
sion or recollect my drawing the conclusion 10 years ago from
several facts.

One: The Bureau inquired of me in the month of July whether
the complaint filed April 17 in Atlanta, the conspiracy complaint,
could be dismissed.

Two: In the period immediately following Mr. Ray’s arrest I
prepared, and the Attorney General signed, a request to the
Bureau to continue to pursue all leads with respect to the possibil-
ity of conspiracy.

At least in looking back on it I would conclude that I must have
felt some need to make clear to the Bureau that it was the Divi-
sion’s perception that the conspiracy possibility had not been run
to the ground, and that further investigation with all alacrity
under the heading full investigation should continue to be pursued.

Mr. Beeson. Ultimately you were satisfied that a full conspiracy
complaint — full conspiracy investigation was pursued?

Mr. Pollak. 1 was satisfied that the Bureau was responding to
the request for a full investigation and I considered that that
investigation was ongoing at the time I left the Department.

169

If I considered it had not been concluded, I would not have been
prepared to dismiss the conspiracy complaint, as indeed in July of
1968 I was not prepared to agree to its dismissal.

So, I considered that the matter had not been brought to a point
where it was incumbent on any of the men and women working
with me to suggest to me that the time had come to close the
investigation.

Indeed, I believe it is my perception that some of the particular
inquiries that I had made in my requests had not finally been
responded to by the time I left office.

But, I would hasten to say that the amount of paper coming in
on a city-by-city or special agent in charge office basis — in other
words, those monthly reports — were from each city where the con-
spiracy investigation was mounted — the amount of paper was so
great that it was not easy to identify that each of the leads had
been finally run down without very close checking.

Mr. Beeson. I understand.

One final question, Mr. Poliak.

We met once before in an interview. I believe at that time you
stated that you were aware during your period as head of the Civil
Rights Division of Mr. Hoover’s extreme dislike for Dr. King and of
the security investigation of Dr. King and SCLC for possible Com-
munist infiltration.

My question is, did you ever consider the possibility that the FBI
would be unable to pursue an objective investigation given that
background of an adversary relationship against Dr. King?

Mr. Pollak. My recollection of my awareness is this: I received
during the period as first assistant, and then as Assistant Attorney
General, reports of a classified nature from the FBI with respect to
it, which appeared to me — and I believe they were so denominat-
ed — to concern themselves with the possibility of a Communist
influence on Dr. King and his organization.

It was my perception that those reports must be flowing from a
request made by some other division in Justice, and that they were
being forwarded to me for information.

I was aware of that. I believe that I would say that my aware-
ness was that those reports were reflective of an investigation in
pursuit of one of the statutes of the United States.

I was not aware of any wiretapping or bugging of Dr. King. My
knowledge in that respect was less than Mr. Clark has testified to
this morning.

I did not know, for example, that there had been previously
outstanding requests for wiretapping and the incident he spoke of
respecting Mr. Doar bringing the matter up with Mr. Clark, and
Mr. Clark in turn bringing it up to Attorney General Katzenbach.

The extent of my awareness was that Mr. Hoover had made
critical remarks, extremely critical remarks, about Dr. King, and I
was aware of that.

Now, on that background, I did not feel that the full investiga-
tion which we asked for would be carried out in less than a com-
plete and devoted manner.

I think that I would say to some extent I had been aware that in
the past there had been investigative requests which were not

170

pleasing to the Bureau, and they had carried those out in what I
thought was a dedicated manner.

I observed that — I mean, I had observed hundreds if not thou-
sands of Bureau requests. I had observed the response to those
requests. I had prepared lawsuits from the material they had devel-
oped, and I had found it to be of a high quality.

I did not consider that the Bureau’s response to the King request
would be interfered with by an attitude of the Director. Maybe I
should have, but I did not consider the possibility.

Mr. Beeson. I have no further questions, Mr. Poliak.

Thank you.

Chairman Stokes. At this time the committee will operate under
the 5-minute rule.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr.
Preyer.

Mr. Preyer. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions at this time of
Mr. Poliak. We appreciate your testimony.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from the District of Columbia,
Mr. Fauntroy.

Mr. Fauntroy. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions of Mr. Poliak
either, but I do want to welcome him to the committee and to say
to him, as I said to Mr. Clark, that during the decade of the sixties
he was among the most trusted and sensitive of those in Govern-
ment to our efforts to improve the quality of life for all Americans
and particularly for Black Americans.

Mr. Pollak. Might I say thank you, Congressman, very much.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine.

Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Poliak, I want to compliment you on your recall during those
trying times when you were in the Department of Justice.

Let me try to summarize what I think were the most persuasive
parts, or dramatic statements that you made in response to Mr.
Beeson’s inquiry. I believe you said that you had a feeling that the
Bureau was less enthusiastic in investigating civil rights matters
than others, however, that they did carry out their requests well.

I think you said you recall no reluctance to engage in those
investigations and when you requested a full investigation, that
your observation was that there was a full response, and, finally,
that you were satisfied that the Bureau responded to the requests
for full investigation.

Does that about summarize your testimony?

Mr. Pollak. Yes; I think those points were made by me this
afternoon, Mr. Devine, yes.

I might say, because it has been a background to my testimony
here today, that in the Civil Rights Division we had expended a
great deal of time on the so-called Neshoba case. That was the
slaying of three young men in the summer of 1964 in Mississippi,
three civil rights workers. That was a matter which the Bureau
investigated at the Division’s request, using techniques which I
observed the Bureau to use in investigating the slaying of Dr.
King — interview techniques — and it was an extremely difficult case
to crack, according to my observation.

171

The Klan or Klan-influenced people were involved, and the
Bureau carried that request for investigation out. It produced evi-
dence to the Division, the Division followed up on the evidence
with attorney interviews, and presented the case to the — my recol-
lection is — the grand jury; but I am not clear on that recollection.
In any event, it was tried and a guilty verdict rendered by the
Mississippi jury.

That was only one of the cases, Mr. Devine, that we had investi-
gated through the techniques we requested the Bureau or antici-
pated the Bureau would use in the King matter; but we had seen
those techniques work, and that was our experience.

Mr. Devine. Some question was raised, again by staff counsel,
Mr. Beeson, relative to the participation or lack thereof by the U.S.
attorney’s office. Isn’t it an accurate statement, Mr. Poliak, to state
that the U.S. attorney’s office is the prosecuting arm of the Justice
Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation is the investi-
gative arm, and that it is the duty and responsibility of the Bureau
to investigate and present the facts to the U.S. attorney, who, in
turn, may or may not authorize prosecution based on whether or
not he feels the facts warrant prosecution?

Mr. Pollak. That is my perception from afar of the typical
criminal case which comes across the docket of the U.S. attorney.
In the civil rights investigations that we used the Bureau, those
were several different kinds, Mr. Devine. We had a range of laws
which gave us civil causes of action, enacted by the Congress,
public accommodations, equal employment, public facilities, voting.
We used the Bureau extensively in those investigations and they
would customarily be asked to make a preliminary investigation;
and after we had a few facts that were elicited, we would make a
determination whether there was a warrant to proceed further,
and then we would make additional requests.

That was primarily the way we proceeded in criminal investiga-
tions, too, and I think our role was a more involved role than the
customary U.S. attorney role, where the file is presented to the
attorney at the time he is ready to prosecute.

Mr. Devine. But the Civil Rights Division would request an
investigation by the Bureau, which would be conducted, and rarely
did the U.S. attorney’s office initiate an investigation by its own
motion; is that correct?

Mr. Pollak. That’s correct. There were some, Congressman, that
were initiated in the field, rarely, but some, over police brutality,
alleged police brutality, so-called 242 investigations, 18 U.S.C. 242.

Mr. Devine. Thank you very much.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford.

Mr. Ford. Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief.

Mr. Pollak, I would just like to follow up on a question from my
colleague there: On April 8, what was the purpose of your visit to
Memphis?

Mr. Pollak. The primary purpose was to be the President’s
representative in connection with the matters that were scheduled
to take place on that particular day. There was a significant poten-
tial that the State guard would be federalized because of the
unrest, and in that situation that we had seen in 1967 and 1968,

172

the President sent — in actuality the Attorney General sent — a rep-
resentative of the President to be the direct liaison in the event
there was a federalizing of the guard, and I went for that purpose.

Mr. Ford. As head of the Civil Rights Division, assigned out of
the Justice Department, were you there working with the U.S.
attorney’s office, or working with the FBI at this time?

Mr. Pollak. I flew from Washington, arriving in the early morn-
ing, either — I think it would be, I think I arrived probably at 10
o’clock on the night before and worked through most of the night,
meeting the various miltiary officials and others who were involved
with maintenance of law and order in that city, during this day in
which Mrs. King and leaders of the civil rights movement were
coming for a massive march in respect to both the sanitation men’s
situation and in respect to the slaying of Dr. King; and there was
considerable concern over the possibility of some sort of violence,
and I worked with the National Guard leaders, and had an office,
temporary office, located in Mr. Robinson’s office. He was the U.S.
attorney.

I recall, Mr. Ford, calling on Mr. Robert Jensen, who was the
special agent in charge of the Memphis office, and discussing with
him the status of the King assassination investigation, but that
was not the primary purpose of my trip.

Mr. Ford. Was that a request for the District Office in Memphis
to get involved in the investigation of the assassination of Dr.
King?

Mr. Pollak. No; it was not, Mr. Ford. They had been requested
immediately upon our request for a full investigation, and they
were the case office in charge in the field.

Mr. Ford. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the
balance of my time.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. Sawyer. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Any member of the committee seeking further
recognition?

Mr. Pollak, at the conclusion of a witness’ testimony before our
committee, the witness is entitled to a period of 5 minutes, during
which time he may explain, amplify or in any way comment fur-
ther upon his testimony before our committee.

I would extend to you at this time 5 minutes, if you so desire.

Mr. Pollak. No; I have nothing further to add. I’m available to
the committee. I commend the practice of affording the witness
time and I believe I have said as much as you people have asked
me. That’s enough.

Chairman Stokes. I certainly, on behalf of the committee, thank
you for your appearance here. You have certainly been of great
assistance to the committee by your testimony, and we appreciate
your presence. Thank you.

The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey.

Mr. Blakey. Nothing.

Chairman Stokes. There being no further witnesses to come
before the committee this afternoon, the committee will adjourn
until 9 a.m. tomorrow morning.

[Whereupon, at 2:55 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, the com-
mittee to reconvene on Wednesday, November 29, 1978, at 9 a.m.]

INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1978

House of Representatives,

Select Committee on Assassinations,

Washington, D.C.

The select committee met, pursuant to adjournment, in room
345, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Louis Stokes (chairman of
the select committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Stokes, Devine, Preyer, McKinney,
Fauntroy, Sawyer, Ford, Fithian, and Edgar.

Also present: G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director;
Gene Johnson, deputy chief counsel; Ron Adrine, staff counsel; I.
Charles Mathews, special counsel; Edward Evans, chief investiga-
tor; and Elizabeth L. Berning, chief clerk.

Chairman Stokes. The committee will come to order.

The Chair recognizes counsel for the committee, Mr. Gene John-
son.

NARRATION BY GENE JOHNSON, DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL

Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., was one of the most prominent
leaders of the civil rights movement in the 20th century. For this,
he was hated by his enemies almost as much as he was admired by
those who associated themselves with his vision of America.

As we have seen, he was personally opposed by powerful Govern-
ment officials, notably J. Edgar Hoover, and he was ideologically
opposed by factions of Black militants for his commitment to non-
violence.

The most extreme hostility toward Dr. King apparently lay in
groups of white supremists and conservative businessmen who
were convinced he was attempting to establish a new social and
economic order in this country and that in his international stance
he was playing into the hands of the Communists.

It was bad enough from the standpoint of racist resistance to Dr.
King that he would win battle after battle in his campaign for
equality for Black Americans. It was intolerable that he would
broaden his objective to include international peace and an end to
economic injustice.

Threats to Dr. King were commonplace. He narrowly escaped
death in a stabbing incident in New York in 1958, and in the 1960’s
FBI intelligence reveals he was the target of violence by the Ku
Klux Klan and other hate groups.

( 173 )

39-935 0 - 79 - 12

174

By the time of his assassination, no less than 50 threats on his
life had been recorded by the FBI.

It is not surprising that literally dozens of conspiracy allegations
have come to the attention of the committee and have been consid-
ered in its investigation. Some of these allegations were checked by
the FBI in 1968. Others have come to light more recently.

In deciding which of them to pursue, the committee evaluated
the various allegations in terms of inherent credibility and their
temporal relationship to the assassination.

In the case of those that seemed based on misrepresentations, or
stemmed from the imaginations of the mentally ill, or that sub-
stantially predated the murder of Dr. King, a followup investiga-
tion was not made or was strictly limited.

Conspiracy leads to which significant resources were allocated
included the following:

One, a report of a price being placed on Dr. King’s head in
Atlanta in 1967.

Two, information that a businessman with organized crime con-
nections was involved in a conspiracy.

Three, evidence that a narcotics trafficker might have come in
contact with Ray from time to time in his period leading up to the
assassination.

Four, an allegation that policemen in Louisville, Ky., may have
made an offer to kill Dr. King.

Five, reports that a standing money offer for killing Dr. King
had been circulated at the Missouri State Penitentiary.

But the conspiratorial allegation that has received the most at-
tention from the committee originated in St. Louis earlier this
year, when the FBI advised it of a memorandum containing infor-
mation on a concrete offer to pay money to kill Dr. King.

Mr. Chairman, the next witness has asked under rule 6.3(2) that
there be no media coverage; that is, no TV, radio, pictures, or
recordings.

It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to enter an
order to that effect.

Chairman Stokes. The witness, having invoked his rights under
rule 6 of this committee, the pertinent part of which reads as
follows:

No witness served with a subpena by the committee shall be required against his
or her will to be photographed in any hearing or to give evidence or testimony while
the broadcasting of that hearing, by radio or television, is being conducted. At the
request of any witness who does not wish to be subjected to radio, television, or still
photography coverage, all lenses shall be covered and all microphones used for
coverage turned off.

In addition, the witness has further requested that the same
provision apply to the hallway which is immediately adjacent to
the hearing room.

The Chair at this time requests a complete compliance with the
request of this witness, both in the hearing room and in the adja-
cent hallways.

The Chair would like to also announce that the witness now
entering the room will be under U.S. marshal security. Therefore,
all persons in the room are requested anytime the witness is either
entering the room or leaving the room to remain seated, in order

175

that marshals may be able to execute the kind of security that has
been requested by this w itness.

The Chair at this time would call Mr. Byers.

Mr. Johnson. It would be appropriate, Mr. Chairman, that Rus-
sell George Byers be sworn.

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Byers, would you please stand, raise your
right hand and be sworn.

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before
this committee is the trvith, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you God?

Mr. Byers. I do.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. You may be seated.

Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Chairman, before we proceed, I would like to
make a motion on behalf of Mr. Byers.

Chairman Stokes. Would the gentleman please identify himself
for the record, please.

Mr. Hamilton. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. My name is James
Hamilton. I am representing Mr. Byers in this hearing.

I would like to make a motion on behalf of Mr. Byers that this
session be adjourned to executive session. The basis for this motion
is the committee’s rules, rule 3.3(5), which says that if the commit-
tee determines that evidence or testimony at any investigative
hearing may tend to defame, degrade, or incriminate any persons,
it shall receive such evidence or testimony in executive session.

I think that it is apparent that the testimony that Mr. Byers
gives this morning will tend to defame or degrade both himself and
others.

Now, I realize that the practice has been to have an open session
after an executive session has been held first where testimony that
might have this effect will be given.

But I suggest to the committee that the language of the rule is
such that it indicates that, even if there has been a prior executive
session, whenever evidence shall have this tendency the committee
should continue to take such testimony in executive session.

I am sure the committee knows that there are prominent Su-
preme Court cases — Yellin v. United States, Cojak v. United States,
to give only two — which indicate that a congressional committee
must follow its own rules.

I would request that the committee follow what appears to be the
clear language of this particular rule and adjourn this particular
session to executive session.

Chairman Stokes. Does counsel for the committee, Professor
Blakey, desire to be heard on the motion?

Mr. Blakey. Yes.

Mr. Chairman, as I am sure counsel for Mr. Byers will recall the
statement of Mr. Justice Frankfurter that very often a page of
history is worth more than a page from a dictionary in interpreting
legal documents.

The provision to which Mr. Hamilton refers was placed in the
House rules and, of course, they appear in our rules as a derivative
of the House rules, as part of a code of fair procedure.

In House Resolution 151, placed in the House rules on March 23,
1955, the rules were explained at that time in the Congressional

176

Record, and I am referring now to the Congressional Record of the
84th Congress, first session.

I would like to quote a comment made by Congressman Hardy
and Congressman Brown of Ohio. Congressman Hardy first noted —
and I am quoting now from page 3572 and 3573 — that “* * * the
rule was only designed to protect an individual other than the
witness.’'

So, to the degree that Mr. Hamilton’s motion relies on the self-
incrimination of the. witness, it is inapposite.

Mr. Brown of Ohio explained the operation of the rule in essence
saying that the contemplated procedure was when evidence was
taken in a public session that apparently would defame or incrimi-
nate that the committee should go into executive session to evalu-
ate it.

Then he said, and I quote:

Then if they determine that there is some ground for a charge against you, they
can have all the open sessions they want to have.

Later on he says, and I quote:

What does it say here. They consider that in executive session. Then they come
back into open session. After they have got their information and they decide that
there is substance to the charge, or my charge against you, then they go— they can
go ahead and have all the open hearings they want.

I would argue, Mr. Chairman, that in light of this legislative
history to the House rule, which would obviously also be legislative
history to this committee’s rule, that the fact that this committee
has heard from Mr. Byers in executive session in May 1978 and has
had an opportunity since that time to evaluate his testimony, that
an executive session at this time would be not required under the
rule and would be inappropriate.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you.

Does counsel have anything further?

Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Chairman, may I make two brief points.

First of all, Mr. Byers’ testimony this morning will have a ten-
dency to defame and degrade others besides himself. The second
point I would make is that I think that the legislative history that
Mr. Blakey is quoting from is at best ambiguous.

There is also a statement in the same history, the same colloquy
before the House, by Mr. Miller of Maryland, where he indicates —
and I am abbreviating the quotation — that:

Certainly the language here does not indicate how it would be possible to bring
out evidence that you knew was going to degrade somebody except in executive
session. I do not see any language here that permits that.

So, I think at best the legislative history is ambiguous and I
would suggest that in any event the clear language of the rule
should be followed and, consequently, that this session be held in
executive session.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Does counsel for the committee have any-
thing further?

Mr. Blakey. No; Mr. Chairman. I think the previous remarks are
adequate for the Chair’s rule.

177

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Hamilton, I believe that you have been
provided with a copy of the legislative history as prepared by the
Library of Congress on this subject.

Mr. Hamilton. That is correct.

Chairman Stokes. All right.

The Chair has listened carefully to both your motion and argu-
ments in support of the same. The Chair would have to rely upon
the legislative history as the Chair understands it, and as has been
referred to here by counsel for the committee.

I would again underscore the statement of Mr. Brown of Ohio on
the floor during the colloquy which occurred on this legislation at
the time it was considered in the House, which I would refer to
once again, where Mr. Brown of Ohio says:

What does it say here. They consider that in executive session. Then they come
back into open session after they have got the information. If they decide there is
some substance to your charge or my charge against you, then they can go ahead
and have all the open hearings they want.

This, it seems to me, would be determinative of the situation
here. The committee having entertained testimony of the witness
in prior executive session, therefore it would seem to me at this
time that the committee can, in compliance with the statements
made by Mr. Brown of Ohio, hold all the open hearings the com-
mittee desires. The Chair would therefore overrule your motion.

Does counsel have any further objections?

Mr. Hamilton. No, Mr. Chairman, we are prepared to proceed.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you.

Prior to proceeding the Chair would like to make a statement for
the record. The Chair would like to express its deep appreciation
and gratitude to Mr. Hamilton for representing Mr. Byers here at
this hearing today.

Mr. Hamilton is representing Mr. Byers pursuant to a request of
the D.C. Bar Association that Mr. Byers made in accordance with
our committee rules.

He was obtained by the D.C. Bar Association on very short
notice, and we deeply appreciate Mr. Hamilton’s appearance here
today. His appearance, in this committee’s opinion, reflects the
highest spirit and character of the members of the District of
Columbia Bar Association and its public interest section.

At this time the Chair recognizes counsel for the committee,
Professor Blakey.

Mr. Blakey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Byers, would you state for the record your name, please.

TESTIMONY OF RUSSELL GEORGE BYERS

Mr. Byers. Russell Byers.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Byers, have you and your counsel been supplied
a copy of the committee’s rules?

Mr. Byers. Yes, sir.

Mr. Blakey. Have you read them?

Mr. Byers. Yes, sir.

Mr. Blakey. Do you understand them?

Mr. Byers. As well as I can.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Byers, you are appearing here today pursuant
to subpena, are you not?

178

Mr. Byers. That is correct.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Byers, do you know John Kauffmann?

Mr. Byers. I am going to refuse to answer on the grounds it may
tend to incriminate me.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Byers, would you intend to claim your privilege
against self-incrimination to all other questions in this hearing?

Mr. Byers. That is correct.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, in light of the representation of the
witness I would ask that the order of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia conferring immunity on Mr. Byers dated No-
vember 8, 1978, be marked as Martin Luther King exhibit F-570,
be inserted in the record at this point, and made available to the
witness.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it is so ordered. It may be
made a part of the record and provided to the witness and his
counsel.

[The information follows:]

179

MLK Exhibit F-570

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

In the Matter of the Application of )

)

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES )

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS )

)

Misc. No. 78—6 3 3 7

ORDER . .

CONFERRING IMMUNITY UPON AND *'*' """ *'

COMPELLING TESTIMONY FROM RUSSELL GEORGE BEYERS

States House of Representatives Select Committee
on ..dLions having made written application, pursuant to Title 18 ,

United States Code, Sections 6002 and 6005, for an order conferring
immunity upon Russell George Beyers and compelling him

to testify and provide other information before the Subcommittee on
the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. of the Select

Committee on Assassinations or the full Select Committee, and the
court finding that all procedures specified by S 6005 have been duly
followed, it is hereby, this 5^*^ day of 1978,.

ORDERED, that Russell George Beyers in accordance

with the provisions of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 6002
and 6005, shall not be excused from testifying or providing other
information before the Subcommittee on the Assassination of
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. of the Select Committee on Assassinations
or the full Select Committee on the grounds that the testimony or other
information sought may tend to incriminate him.

- > Tetri'

■ S' 5 o,? C-
. COPY

180

ORDERED FURTfftlR, that Russell George Beyers appear

when subpoenaed by said Subcommittee or Committee and testify and
provide such other information that is sought with respect to matters
under inquiry by said Subcommittee or Committee.

AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no testimony or other information
compelled under this order (or any information directly or indirectly
derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against
Russell George Beyers in any criminal case, except a

prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement or otherwise failing
to comply with this ORDER.

S? wg . /z

United States District Jipfge

Dated: NOV 6 - 1978

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, I would note for the record that Mr.
Byers and Mr. Hamilton are now reading the order of the court.

Chairman Stokes. It may be so noted.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Byers, have you and your counsel had an oppor-
tunity to examine this order?

Mr. Byers. Yes, sir.

Mr. Blakey. Has your counsel instructed you on its legal mean-
ing?

Mr. Byers. Yes, sir.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that the court’s order be
communicated to the witness and the witness be directed to answer
the previous question.

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Byers, in light of the order which you
have just read, by which immunity has been conferred upon you,
the Chair would at this time direct you to answer the questions put
to you by counsel.

Mr. Blakey. Let me state for the record, Mr. Byers, once again
what the question was.

Do you know John Kauffmann?

Mr. Byers. I did.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that Martin Luther
King exhibit F-571 be inserted in the record at this point and be
appropriately displayed on the easel.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the
record at this point.

[The information follows:]

MLK Exhibit F-571

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Byers, can you see Martin Luther King exhibit
F-571 from your seat?

Mr. Byers. You are talking about the photograph to my right?

Mr. Blakey. Yes, sir.

Mr. Byers. Yes, sir.

Mr. Blakey. Can you identify that individual?

Mr. Byers. It is John Kauffmann.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Byers, let me direct your attention to approxi-
mately the spring of 1967. Did you have a conversation with John
Kauffmann at that time in which he inquired of you whether or
not you wanted to earn $50,000?

Mr. Byers. That is correct.

Mr. Blakey. As a result of that conversation, what did you do?

Mr. Byers. I went with him to meet another man.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, at this point I would ask that
Martin Luther King exhibit F-572 be inserted in the record and
appropriately displayed on the easel.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered in the
record at this point.

[The information follows:]

182

MLK Exhibit F-572

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Byers, can you see what has been marked as
Martin Luther King exhibit F-572 from your seat?

Mr. Byers. Yes, sir.

Mr. Blakey. Can you identify that individual?

Mr. Byers. It looks like a picture of Jack Sutherland. But I have
only seen Jack Sutherland twice in my life.

Mr. Blakey. Did you have a conversation with Mr. Sutherland?

Mr. Byers. I did.

Mr. Blakey. What did he say?

Mr. Byers. He offered me $50,000 to arrange to murder Martin
Luther King.

Mr. Blakey. In 1967, did you know who Dr. Martin Luther King
was?

Mr. Byers. No.

Mr. Blakey. Did Mr. Sutherland tell you who he was?

183

Mr. Byers. He told me he was a civil rights leader.

Mr. Blakey. Did you ask Mr. Sutherland where he was going to
get the money, come up with the $50,000?

Mr. Byers. Yes. It struck me rather strange. He told me it
belonged to a secret southern organization that could raise the
money.

Mr. Blakey. What did you do then?

Mr. Byers. I declined the offer.

Mr. Blakey. Where were you when this offer took place?

Mr. Byers. Mr. Sutherland’s home.

Mr. Blakey. Was Mr. Kauffmann also present?

Mr. Byers. That is correct. He was.

Mr. Blakey. Did you and he then leave together?

Mr. Byers. That is correct.

Mr. Blakey. Did you have any conversation with Mr. Kauff-
mann?

Mr. Byers. I told him I wouldn’t be interested and we dropped it
from there.

Mr. Blakey. Did you ever see Mr. Sutherland again?

Mr. Byers. I seen him one time later at a water company meet-
ing at House Springs, Mo. It was either House Springs or High
Ridge. It is two little towns that is close together.

Mr. Blakey. Did you have any conversation with him at that
time?

Mr. Byers. No; I did not.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Byers, how long after the Sutherland meeting
did you remain associated in any way with Mr. Kauffmann?

Mr. Byers. I can’t place a date, but it wasn’t too long.

Mr. Blakey. You subsequently broke off whatever relationship
you had with him?

Mr. Byers. That is right.

Mr. Blakey. Following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther
King on April 4, 1968, did you tell anyone about your meeting with
Mr. Sutherland?

Mr. Byers. Yes, I told a gentleman about it.

Mr. Blakey. And who was that

Mr. Byers. You say after the meeting or after the assassination?

Mr. Blakey. No, this is after the assassination. I will back up.
After the meeting with Mr. Sutherland, did you tell anyone about
that meeting?

Mr. Byers. No.

Mr. Blakey. OK. After the assassination — which was my original
question — did you have any conversation with anyone about the
Sutherland offer?

Mr. Byers. Yes, I did.

Mr. Blakey. Who was that?

Mr. Byers. It was Murray Randall.

Mr. Blakey. And what was your relationship to him at the time?

Mr. Byers. He was my attorney.

Mr. Blakey. What did you tell him?

Mr. Byers. I told him I had had a proposition to arrange to
murder Mr. King for $50,000.

Mr. Blakey. Why did you tell him?

184

Mr. Byers. He was my lawyer. You had to tell somebody. You
know, it just struck me rather strange. The man got killed, and I
had the offer.

Mr. Blakey. Did you ask him whether you were in any way
involved in the assassination?

Mr. Byers. Well, I ran it by him one reason for that. He told me
at the time the man had confessed to the killing or had been
apprehended and he told me evidently there was no substance to it,
just to forget about it.

Mr. Blakey. His advice to you then was that you were not
involved in the assassination that occurred in Memphis?

Mr. Byers. That is correct.

Mr. Blakey. Did you have any other reason for discussing the
Sutherland offer with Mr. Randall?

Mr. Byers. None that I can think of.

Mr. Blakey. Have you ever told anyone else about the Suther-
land offer?

Mr. Byers. Yes; I told another gentleman about it.

Mr. Blakey. And who was that?

Mr. Byers. Mr. Weenick.

Mr. Blakey. And what was his relationship to you?

Mr. Byers. He was my lawyer after Mr. Randall became judge,
and I was a friend of Mr. Weenick’s before that time.

Mr. Blakey. What was the context within which you had a
conversation with Mr. Weenick?

Mr. Byers. Please repeat the question.

Mr. Blakey. What was the context in which you had a conversa-
tion with Mr. Weenick?

Mr. Byers. I told him the same basic story that I told to Mr.
Randall.

Mr. Blakey. Did you ask him for legal advice?

Mr. Byers. The same way; yes.

Mr. Blakey. And what was his legal advice to you?

Mr. Byers. Basically the same answer, because it was much later
when I told him of the offer. I told Mr. Randall first and then some
years later I told Mr. Weenick.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Byers, have you furnished this committee with
attorney-client waivers for Mr. Randall and Mr. Weenick?

Mr. Byers. Yes, sir.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Byers, do you know John Paul Spica?

Mr. Byers. Yes, sir.

Mr. Blakey. Who is he?

Mr. Byers. He is my brother-in-law.

Mr. Blakey. Did you ever tell Mr. Spica of the Sutherland offer?

Mr. Byers. No; not until the time I got the subpena to come up
here. When I got — the time I got the subpena, I mentioned it to
him at that time.

Mr. Blakey. You did not tell him anytime from 1967 until April
4, 1968?

Mr. Byers. To the best of my knowledge, no, because he was
incarcerated at the time.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Byers, do you know Robert Regazzi?

Mr. Byers. Yes, sir.

Mr. Blakey. Who is he?

185

Mr. Byers. Well, who he is I don’t know. He is just

Mr. Blakey. What relationship, if any, does he have to you?

Mr. Byers. You mean as far as being a relative?

Mr. Blakey. Friend, business associate.

Mr. Byers. I installed a cigarette machine in Mr. Regazzi’s sea-
food store about 2 years ago, and that had been the first time I had
seen him in maybe 10 years.

Mr. Blakey. Did you know him in the period between 1967, when
you had the Sutherland offer made to you, and April 4, 1968?

Mr. Byers. I did, but I can’t remember, recall running into him
at that time. I met Mr. Regazzi in about 1963, 1962, roughly.

Mr. Blakey. Did you ever tell Mr. Regazzi of the Sutherland
offer in the period of time between 1967 and 1968?

Mr. Byers. Not that I could remember.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Byers, do you know Dr. Hugh W. Maxey?

Mr. Byers. I know who he is, but I do not know him.

Mr. Blakey. Who is he?

Mr. Byers. He was a prison doctor.

Mr. Blakey. Do you know if Dr. Maxey had any relationship to
Mr. Kauffmann?

Mr. Byers. Supposedly very close friends.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Byers, why didn’t you tell the police, the FBI or
other law enforcement officials of the Sutherland offer in 1968
after the assassination of Dr. King?

Mr. Byers. Because I thought the man was crazy that made me
the offer, and after it happened I didn’t want to be involved.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Byers, did you volunteer this information to
this committee?

Mr. Byers. Volunteer what information?

Mr. Blakey. About the Sutherland offer. Did you come to us or
did we come to you?

Mr. Byers. Oh, you come to me with the subpena.

Mr. Blakey. In fact, did you cooperate with this committee when
its investigators first contacted you?

Mr. Byers. I don’t know what you mean by cooperating.

Mr. Blakey. Did you tell

Mr. Byers. I let them enter the home.

Mr. Blakey. Did you tell them the story the first time they
talked to you?

Mr. Byers. No, no.

Mr. Blakey. In point of fact, you were subpenaed before this
committee to appear in executive session on May 9, 1978, weren’t
you?

Mr. Byers. That is correct.

Mr. Blakey. Did you decline in that executive session to testify
unless you were granted immunity?

Mr. Byers. Absolutely.

Mr. Blakey. Was your testimony compelled under a grant of
immunity at that time?

Mr. Byers. That is correct.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Byers, did you tell the same story to this
committee in May — on May 9 — that you are telling this morning?

Mr. Byers. To the best of my knowledge, yes.

Mr. Blakey. Was it the truth, then?

186

Mr. Byers. That is right.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

Chairman Stokes. The Chair at this time recognizes the gentle-
man from the District of Columbia, Mr. Fauntroy, for such time as
he may consume, after which the committee will operate under the
5-minute rule.

Mr. Fauntroy.

Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Byers, for appearing again before the committee,
this time in public session.

Mr. Byers, Professor Blakey has developed from you the broad
outlines of your story. Nevertheless, I would like to ask some more
detailed questions.

Mr. Byers. OK.

Mr. Fauntroy. The first is when did you first meet John Kauff-
mann?

Mr. Byers. When did I first meet him? That is going back a long
ways, so I am going to give you a rough idea. I would say maybe
1957, 1956, 1955, somewhere in that area.

Mr. Fauntroy. And under what circumstances do you recall
having met him?

Mr. Byers. I was a friend of his brother's, his brother Nigel. He
would come to his brother’s house, and that is how I met him.

Mr. Fauntroy. Where did he live at that time?

Mr. Byers. You mean Mr. Kauffmann?

Mr. Fauntroy. Mr. Kauffmann.

Mr. Byers. John Kauffmann?

Mr. Fauntroy. John Kauffmann.

Mr. Byers. The same place he lived until he died, Jefferson
County, Imperial, Mo.

Mr. Fauntroy. I see. And where did he work?

Mr. Byers. He told me he was a stockbroker when I first met
him. I never bought no stock from him, so I wouldn’t know.

Mr. Fauntroy. And what other kinds of business enterprise did
you come to know him through?

Mr. Byers. He dabbled in real estate, just various different
things.

Mr. Fauntroy. Where did he live actually?

Mr. Byers. He lived at that motel, in Jefferson County, Imperial,
Mo.

Mr. Fauntroy. Do you recall the name of the motel?

Mr. Byers. Oh, I think they called it Bluff Acres or — he had an
office there with a string of names on it as long as your arm.
Probably all phony. I don’t know.

Mr. Fauntroy. Bluff Acres Motel in Barnard, Mo.?

Mr. Byers. That is right, Barnard, Imperial.

Mr. Fauntroy. You say he dabbled in real estate and represent-
ed himself to you as a stockbroker?

Mr. Byers. That is correct.

Mr. Fauntroy. What was your relationship with him?

Mr. Byers. You are talking about in 1955 or 1967?

Mr. Fauntroy. Throughout the period, what was your relation-
ship with him?

187

Mr. Byers. Well, sometimes I would drive him to where he would
have to go. He had sort of a bad leg. He would ask me to run
different errands on real estate transactions. Just generally a little
bit of everything.

Mr. Fauntroy. Did you engage in any criminal activity with
him?

Mr. Byers. Not with him. I left some possessions there that may
not have just been so-so.

Mr. Fauntroy. Well, you know, you can be rather candid with
us. Just sort of tell us.

Mr. Byers. Stolen cars. I used his motel. And other stolen ob-
jects.

Mr. Fauntroy. So that you would steal cars and leave them —
and other things, and leave them at the motel?

Mr. Byers. Absolutely.

Mr. Fauntroy. With his acquiescence or with his acceptance?

Mr. Byers. As long as I paid the rent.

Mr. Fauntroy. I see.

Do you know of any other criminal activity that Mr. Kauffmann
was engaged in?

Mr. Byers. I didn’t hear the last part of that question. Any other
criminal activity he was what?

Mr. Fauntroy. Engaged in.

Mr. Byers. Well, I come to find out he dealt in drugs, and when I
found out he dealt in drugs, that is when we split.

Mr. Fauntroy. Tell me how you found that out and why you
split.

Mr. Byers. Well, he owned a company called Fix-A-Co.

Mr. Fauntroy. Fix-A-Co?

Mr. Byers. F-I-X dash A dash C-O. And he told me one day all
the money he was making in drugs, which come as a shock to me.
He told me that he discovered Fix-A-Co company had a drug li-
cense and he could then buy drugs legitimately and sell them the
other way.

So, when he informed me of that, we had a little falling out. I
says I will see you later. I didn’t go round anymore.

Mr. Fauntroy. You say it was Fix-A-Co?

Mr. Byers. That is right.

Mr. Fauntroy. You bought a fix there?

Mr. Byers. You get a fix with Fix-A-Co.

Mr. Fauntroy. I see. Why did you split?

Mr. Byers. Well, I am scared of the drug penalty. I am not a
drug dealer. There is two ways out in that. Either you get killed or
you go to the penitentiary.

Mr. Fauntroy. I see. Well, do you know of any other criminal
activity in which Mr. Kauffmann was engaged?

Mr. Byers. Not that I can think of at the time.

Mr. Fauntroy. Did any other people hang around his motel or
avail themselves of the services that he provided you, for example?

Mr. Byers. Well, he always engaged a lot of exconvicts which he
had brought in from the Missouri State Prison. So, what their
transactions was I don’t know.

Mr. Fauntroy. Under what circumstances did you understand a
motel owner would be engaging exconvicts?

188

Mr. Byers. He had them work at the motel. You know, they
would clean up, they would rent the rooms at nighttime. He had
other pieces of real estate where they would go and do some work.

Like I say, we never really got into that. You know, I mean
people like that, you don’t ask their business, they don’t ask your
business.

Mr. Fauntroy. I see. How did you understand those exconvicts
came to work for him?

Mr. Byers. He had an arrangement with Dr. Maxey at the
Missouri State Prison the way he told me. I don’t know this to be
true, but he had an arrangement and Dr. Maxey would always give
him one or two released at a time to him, to come to him.

Mr. Fauntroy. And Dr. Maxey was his friend within the Missou-
ri State Penitentiary?

Mr. Byers. That is what he told me. That is what he led me to
believe.

Mr. Fauntroy. Did you and the people who hung around the
motel ever discuss criminal activities?

Mr. Byers. I don’t believe so. I didn’t have that much to do with
them. I would come and stay pretty well to myself.

Mr. Fauntroy. Did you have the idea that you were the only one
who was engaging in some criminal activities which he covered
with his motel?

Mr. Byers. At one time I thought so, until I found out he dealt in
dope, and then I didn’t have a doubt.

Mr. Fauntroy. When you met Kauffmann, and he raised the
$50,000 with you, what time of day was it?

Mr. Byers. It was in the evening.

Mr. Fauntroy. And where were you?

Mr. Byers. At Mr. Sutherland’s home.

Mr. Fauntroy. That was the first time he raised it with you, at
Sutherland’s home?

Mr. Byers. No. He talked about $50,000?

Mr. Fauntroy. Yes.

Mr. Byers. It was earlier in that day. We were someplace and he
said to me, he said, “How would you like to make $50,000.” I says,
“What do I have to do?” He says, “Meet me tonight, and I will take
you somewhere.”

So about 6:30 that night I met him and we proceeded to drive in
my car to Mr. Sutherland’s house.

Mr. Fauntroy. And was anyone else present at Mr. Sutherland’s
house?

Mr. Byers. Mrs. Sutherland — she was introduced to me as Mrs.
Sutherland — was there at the time. But we were just introduced.
She had no conversation, no nothing, and she went to another part
of the house.

Mr. Fauntroy. I wonder if you could describe the house. You say
you drove there in a car with Mr. Kauffmann.

Mr. Byers. That is correct.

Mr. Fauntroy. After earlier in the afternoon he had apprised
you of an opportunity to make $50,000?

Mr. Byers. That is correct.

Mr. Fauntroy. Tell us a little bit about the house.

Mr. Byers. You mean about the contents?

189

Mr. Fauntroy. Mr. Sutherland’s house.

Mr. Byers. OK. Mr. Sutherland met us at the door with a pair of
like overalls and a hat. Looked like a Confederate hat, with crossed
swords. He took us to a den with a Confederate carpet, Confederate
flag, bugles, swords, and all the paraphernalia hanging on the wall.

Mr. Fauntroy. I see. You say that the only other person you saw
in the house was his wife, who then left and went to another part
of the house.

Mr. Byers. That is correct.

Mr. Fauntroy. So you are now in the den.

Mr. Byers. With Mr. Kauffman, Mr. Sutherland, and myself.

Mr. Fauntroy. The three of you. Now, did Mr. — and it is at this
point that the offer was made?

Mr. Byers. After a slight conversation, exchanging of a joke of
some kind, you know, and an offer of a drink, we got down to
business.

Mr. Fauntroy. Well, who stated the purpose for which you
would receive $50,000?

Mr. Byers. Mr. Sutherland.

Mr. Fauntroy. Mr. Sutherland. Can you just recall roughly what
he said to you?

Mr. Byers. Well, we got into it. We got down to business. I said,
“What do I have to do to make this $50,000?” He says, “Either
arrange or kill Martin Luther King.” At that point I said, “Who is
Martin Luther King?” I didn’t know who he was.

Mr. Fauntroy. Well, did he appear serious when he made the
offer.

Mr. Byers. Dead serious.

Mr. Fauntroy. To your knowledge, was either Mr. Kauffmann or
Mr. Sutherland given to playing practical jokes?

Mr. Byers. Not for $50,000. They didn’t joke like that.

Mr. Fauntroy. So you took them as being dead serious.

Mr. Byers. Absolutely. Why would they waste my time and take
me at 6:30 in the evening to play a joke on me?

Mr. Fauntroy. Are you aware of any social or political views
that Mr. Kauffmann had?

Mr. Byers. Any social what?

Mr. Fauntroy. Social or political views. Or racial views.

Mr. Byers. No. We never really got into those. I understand after
I quit associating with the man he was a Wallace supporter. They
had a Wallace campaign or something.

Mr. Fauntroy. What about Mr. Sutherland?

Mr. Byers. He was a Wallace man, too.

Mr. Fauntroy. Well, do you know why Mr. Kauffmann would
have taken you to Mr. Sutherland?

Mr. Byers. Well, there was probably something in it for Mr.
Kauffman if I would have agreed.

Mr. Fauntroy. To your knowledge, did Mr. Kauffmann have any
reason to believe that you might accept such a contract?

Mr. Byers. Not that I would know of. The only reason they may
have to believe is if they were looking for someone to set up in this
position. Maybe — I don’t know. I don’t understand the whole thing.

Mr. Fauntroy. You mentioned that you knew John Paul Spica,
who is your brother-in-law. Do you have any reason to know or to

39-935 0 - 79 - 13

190

believe that Mr. Kauffmann knew of your relationship with Mr.
Spica?

Mr. Byers. I imagine he did. It was quite well covered by our
friends the press at the time Mr. Spica was in trouble.

Mr. Fauntroy. And what was the trouble in which Mr. Spica
found himself?

Mr. Byers. Accused of murder.

Mr. Fauntroy. And what was the result of the court proceedings
in that case?

Mr. Byers. Life imprisonment.

Mr. Fauntroy. Where?

Mr. Byers. Missouri State Penitentiary.

Mr. Fauntroy. Were you working at that time?

Mr. Byers. At which time?

Mr. Fauntroy. At the time of the offer.

Mr. Byers. No, just with Mr. Kauffmann.

Mr. Fauntroy. Did you have any legitimate income at that time?

Mr. Byers. No; I was under Federal indictment for conspiracy to
violate the Dyer Act, and I was just sort of hanging to see what
was going to happen for myself.

Mr. Fauntroy. I guess — and that had to do with auto theft, I
guess?

Mr. Byers. That is correct.

Mr. Fauntroy. And nothing more. Did you have any information
which would lead you to believe that there was any connection
between the offer Mr. Sutherland made to you and Dr. King's
assassination in Memphis a few months later?

Mr. Byers. Did I believe there was any connection between the
offer and the assassination, is that the question?

Mr. Fauntroy. Yes.

Mr. Byers. I didn’t know what to believe. It struck me awfully
funny that I get the offer and the man turns up dead. Either it was
connected, coincidental, or everybody was out to kill him. One of
the three.

Mr. Fauntroy. Did you make any connection between the al-
leged assassin, James Earl Ray, and his presence at Missouri State
Penitentiary at a time when your brother-in-law was there?

Mr. Byers. I don’t understand the question. Did I know

Mr. Fauntroy. When you learned that James Earl Ray — or
when did you first learn that James Earl Ray was accused of being
the assassin?

Mr. Byers. When he was apprehended.

Mr. Fauntroy. In June, did you know — in your learning that,
did you also learn that he had been at the Missouri State Peniten-
tiary?

Mr. Byers. I can’t answer that. I paid no attention to it. Of
course I read in the paper where he had escaped from the Missouri
State Penitentiary, like everybody else, but I did not know James
Earl Ray.

Mr. Fauntroy. So that you didn’t make that connection in your
own mind?

Mr. Byers. No.

Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back almost
all the balance of my time.

191

Chairman Stokes. I sensed some reservation. Mr. Byers, if I
understand you correctly, Mr. Kauffmann took you to Mr. Suther-
land and Mr. Sutherland made the offer of the $50,000 to you; is
that correct?

Mr. Byers. He made the purpose of the offer to me.

Chairman Stokes. What do you mean by that?

Mr. Byers. Mr. Kauffmann asked me how I would like to make
$50,000; then he proceeded to take me to Mr. Sutherland.

Mr. Sutherland told me how I was going to make the $50,000,
what I had to do to make the $50,000.

Chairman Stokes. That was to kill Dr. King?

Mr. Byers. That’s correct.

Chairman Stokes. And on the spot there, did you tell them you
would not do it?

Mr. Byers. I sort of crawfished a little; I seen too many late
night movies, where they make you an offer you can’t refuse, and
you jump up and shout out, “absolutely no,” and you maybe never
leave the place.

So I told him I didn’t think I would be interested, and when I got
outside, I definitely wasn’t interested.

Chairman Stokes. But after you said to them, “I don’t think I
would be interested,” did they say anything more to you about it?

Mr. Byers. No.

Chairman Stokes. The whole conversation terminated at that
point?

Mr. Byers. That evening, yes.

Chairman Stokes. Did they ever after that — either one of them —
discuss the offer with you?

Mr. Byers. No.

Chairman Stokes. That means before the assassination and after
the assassination?

Mr. Byers. I never saw them after the assassination.

Chairman Stokes. So other than what you have said here, when
he told you how you could make the $50,000, and you said you
didn’t think you would be interested, there has never been any
further discussion whatsoever between you and them about this?

Mr. Byers. That’s correct.

Chairman Stokes. I have no further questions.

The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine.

Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Byers, did you see any money?

Mr. Byers. No.

Mr. Devine. They didn’t proffer any cash of any kind?

Mr. Byers. No.

Mr. Devine. Did they make any suggestion to you that you
shouldn’t say anything to anybody about this offer when you decid-
ed to decline it?

Mr. Byers. Well, naturally, when you talk to somebody — I didn’t
decline it right on the spot; I told them I didn’t think so. You
know, we certainly left it drop like that; and then when I got
outside I told Mr. Kauffmann I wasn’t interested in it.

Mr. Devine. But you were not contacted, either telephonically or
any other way, not to mention that?

Mr. Byers. Not to mention the assassination of Mr. King.

192

Mr. Devine. Not to mention the offer.

Mr. Byers. No.

Mr. Devine. Mr. Byers, do you have any record of accusation,
charge or conviction of any crime of violence?

[Witness confers with counsel.]

Mr. Devine. While you are consulting with counsel, may I amend
the question to say: prior to the assassination of Dr. King.

Mr. Byers. Prior to the assassination of Dr. King, I have never
been accused of any crime of violence that I know of.

Mr. Devine. You had never been accused, charged or convicted of
any crime of violence prior to that date in 1968; is that it?

Mr. Byers. To the best of my knowledge, no.

Mr. Devine. Then you don’t have any history of being a hit man
or one that might be involved in a crime of this nature prior to
that time?

Mr. Byers. As far as I know, I don’t.

Mr. Devine. Was part of this offer, as you recall, a suggestion
that either you kill Dr. King or that you obtain someone to do it?

Mr. Byers. Like I said, it was either arrange for the death of Dr.
King, or kill Dr. King, as long as Dr. King was dead.

Mr. Devine. One more question in the same line then: although
you had not been charged or convicted for any crime of violence
prior to April 4, 1968, were you known to have associates that
would be engaged in crimes of violence?

Mr. Byers. I don't know. That’s a pretty broad question.

Mr. Devine. What I am trying to

Mr. Byers. One person may think he is violent; the next person
may not think he is violent. So who is going to make the decision
on that question?

Mr. Devine. What I am trying to find out, Mr. Byers, is just why
were you, Russell Byers, singled out as the person that these people
were willing to offer $50,000? What in your background caused you
to be the No. 1 man to be selected for this particular purpose?

Mr. Byers. I can’t answer that question for you.

Mr. Fauntroy. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Devine. I have one more question. I will.

Did you at any time know James Earl Ray?

Mr. Byers. No.

Mr. Devine. Yes; I will yield to my colleague.

Mr. Fauntroy. Was your brother-in-law convicted of a contract
killing?

Mr. Byers. That’s correct.

Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you.

Mr. Devine. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer.

Mr. Preyer. Mr. Byers, after you declined the offer of Mr. Kauff-
mann, how long did you continue in your working relationship
with him, that is, continue to use his motel?

Mr. Byers. Not very long. We sort of broke off relationships
because the dope transaction started. You know, I became aware of
his narcotics transactions.

193

Mr. Preyer. Had you become aware of this narcotics transaction
before he made the offer to you — Mr. Sutherland made the offer to
you?

Mr. Byers. No; it was after he made the offer to me I became
aware of his narcotics business, because he wanted me to partici-
pate, and I would not.

Mr. Preyer. Was it a matter of weeks or months that you contin-
ued to work with him after the offer?

Mr. Byers. Maybe it was weeks, something like that; it wasn’t
too long.

Mr. Preyer. No further mention was made of the offer to kill Dr.
King during that time?

Mr. Byers. No, sir; you know, I figured it’s time for me to leave.
When he is wanting me to kill somebody, then he is dealing in
drugs, it’s time to go.

Mr. Preyer. Your final decision on the offer to kill Dr. King was
made to Mr. Kauffman outside of Mr. Sutherland’s home, and you
had no further discussion on it?

Mr. Byers. That’s right.

Mr. Preyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford.

Mr. Ford. Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman yields back his time.

The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. McKinney.

Mr. McKinney. Mr. Byers, do you think that Mr. Kauffman was
aware of the fact, or did he have knowledge at the time, that your
brother-in-law was in Missouri State Prison for committing
murder?

Mr. Byers. I imagine he did. Like I say, the press covered it
pretty thoroughly; it was a pretty well-known fact.

Mr. McKinney. Did you at any time ever discuss this offer with
your brother-in-law or with your sister?

Mr. Byers. No. You don’t go home and tell your wife stuff like
this.

Mr. McKinney. What was the reaction when you turned down
this offer?

Mr. Byers. No big deal.

Mr. McKinney. You drove from the Sutherland’s household with
Mr. Kauffmann?

Mr. Byers. Took him home, and I returned him back to his place.

Mr. McKinney. You were in the same car, and you didn’t discuss
it any further, after you initially refused the offer?

Mr. Byers. No.

Mr. McKinney. Did you feel at any time after turning down this
offer that you were in danger because of your knowledge of the
conspiracy to kill Dr. King? Obviously if you are offered $50,000 for
a contract to kill someone or to arrange a contract by several
people, that is a conspiracy; were you afraid that you might be in
some personal danger, knowing of this?

Mr. Byers. Not attempt to; I wasn’t afraid. I didn’t think at the
time they made me the offer there was anything to it. You know, I
just thought this is a guy — he has hung out his flags on the wall,

194

and he put all his rugs on the floor, and he is having himself a
good time.

I just let it pass. Now that Dr. King got assassinated, then it
made me sit up and think.

Mr. McKinney. When Dr. King was assassinated in 1968 and you
became aware of it why didn’t you contact the FBI?

Mr. Byers. What would I tell them? What kind of spot would I
put myself in?

Mr. McKinney. Well, that’s what I am asking you.

Mr. Byers. In other words, I don’t want to get involved, but I
wound up very much involved.

Mr. McKinney. Did you feel at the time that you would endan-
ger yourself because of other activities you were involved in, or
because of the King case?

Mr. Byers. Absolutely; absolutely. I don’t think the FBI was too
concerned that Mr. King got killed.

Mr. McKinney. That puts it in the light. You said you knew Dr.
Maxey?

Mr. Byers. Please repeat the question.

Mr. McKinney. Did you know Dr. Maxey?

Mr. Byers. No; I did not know Dr. Maxey. I heard Dr. Maxey’s
name on a lot of occasions, from Mr. Kauffmann, but as far as
personally knowing him, never.

Mr. McKinney. Did you at any time after becoming aware of Dr.
King’s assassination discuss with Kauffmann the strange fact that
Dr. Maxey, a doctor at Missouri State Prison, was supplying ex-
convicts to Mr. Kauffmann and that your brother-in-law and James
Earl Ray were confined in Missouri State Prison at the same time?

Mr. Byers. You say this is after the assassination?

Mr. McKinney. Yes.

Mr. Byers. I never talked to Mr. Kauffmann after the assassina-
tion. I quit talking to him before the assassination and never
talked to him since.

Mr. McKinney. I’ll reserve some time, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman reserves the balance of his
time.

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian.

Mr. Fithian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Byers, did you know Mr. Kauffmann well enough to know
what his attitudes were on racial matters?

Mr. Byers. Not really. You know, I mean, we never really sit
down and talked about it, talked it out and say, “Do you like this
guy because he is Black, or do you like this guy because he is
green?” We never did.

Mr. Fithian. Did you have any indication of Mr. Sutherland’s
attitude toward race, racial matters?

Mr. Byers. When I see all those things hanging on the wall and
carpet on the floor, I had a pretty good idea. Then when he told me
that he wanted to kill a colored gentleman, I imagine he didn’t like
him.

Mr. Fithian. Would you describe for the committee what your
own feelings were at that time toward questions of integration?

Mr. Byers. At the time of the offer?

Mr. Fithian. Yes.

195

Mr. Byers. Of the assassination?

Mr. Fithian. Before the assassination.

Mr. Byers. I didn’t even know who Mr. King was.

Mr. Fithian. That wasn’t the question. The question was: What
were your personal attitudes, let’s say, toward integrating the
schools?

Mr. Byers. I had none.

Mr. Fithian. Sorry

Mr. Byers. I had no feelings either which way.

Mr. Fithian. Where did you grow up, Mr. Byers?

Mr. Byers. St. Louis.

Mr. Fithian. Did you have any Black friends?

Mr. Byers. When I was in school?

Mr. Fithian. Yes.

Mr. Byers. No. None went to my school.

Mr. Fithian. Could you describe a little more fully your attitude
toward race questions?

Mr. Byers. I have no — I’m not prejudiced.

Mr. Fithian. And you have no reason to believe that Mr. Kauff-
mann is prejudiced either?

Mr. Byers. Like I say, we just didn’t discuss it.

Mr. Fithian. Let me ask you one thing more: just a moment ago
you said — I think I can quote you accurately: “I didn’t think there
was anything to it — to the offer.” Was that your testimony?

Mr. Byers. That’s along those lines; yes.

Mr. Fithian. Fifteen minutes before that, in answer to a ques-
tion, you said, “And I thought they were serious. Why else would
they have me drive out to Sutherland’s home at 6:30 in the after-
noon?”

Mr. Byers. They may be serious, but I didn’t figure them as the
serious kind, especially when they start talking $50,000. That’s
what I meant by that.

Mr. Fithian. My question is: Which of these statements would
you have the committee believe? It doesn’t seem to me we can
believe both.

Mr. Byers. I would have them believe that Mr. Kauffmann and
Mr. Sutherland were very serious, but me, in my mind, I just

Mr. Fithian. Then what did you mean when you said, “I didn’t
think there was anything to it”?

Mr. Byers. Because I thought they were just a couple of people
talking, is what I thought. See, my personal views and your person-
al views may be two different things, like you have one now.

Mr. Fithian. My question is whether or not you thought they
were serious, and at one point you said, “I didn’t think there was
anything to it” and at another point you said you thought they
were serious.

Mr. Byers. OK.

Mr. Fithian. Let’s sort this out.

Mr. Byers. Let’s correct it. I would say they were very serious.

Mr. Fithian. So then you do think that there was something to
it?

Mr. Byers. That’s right.

Mr. Fithian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

196

The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. Sawyer. You said that your brother-in-law, Mr. Spica, was
charged and convicted on a so-called contract or hit-type killing.
Did I understand you correctly?

Mr. Byers. That’s correct.

Mr. Sawyer. What were the circumstances of that, do you recall?

Mr. Byers. No, I don’t, really. It was a murder where he was
offered money, and I don’t believe that they ever really proved that
he actually committed the murder. I believe that he arranged it or
something along those lines. I’m really not too familiar with the
thing, except I know he got life in the penitentiary.

Mr. Sawyer. Who — or in what category was the person that
killed or had him killed?

Mr. Byers. The — what do you mean by “what category”?

Mr. Sawyer. I mean, what kind of business or occupation?

Mr. Byers. He was a real estate man.

Mr. Sawyer. And he was, or allegedly at least, convicted of
having been hired by somebody else to arrange for the killing of
that person?

Mr. Byers. By the man’s wife.

Mr. Sawyer. Had he had any criminal record before that?

Mr. Byers. You mean, convictions or arrests?

Mr. Sawyer. Let’s start with arrests.

Mr. Byers. Oh, he had a lot of arrests, I imagine.

Mr. Sawyer. Any other convictions?

Mr. Byers. I can’t tell you all those questions. A lot of times a
person is convicted of something and they kept that a secret to
their self, and as far as I know, I would say no.

Mr. Sawyer. Is he still in the Missouri State Penitentiary?

Mr. Byers. No, he is not.

Mr. Sawyer. When did he get out?

Mr. Byers. I would say 5 years ago.

Mr. Sawyer. Do you happen to know what the practical impact
in the State of Missouri is of a life sentence when eligibility for
parole occurs?

Mr. Byers. No, I don’t.

Mr. Sawyer. Do you know about how long he was in?

Mr. Byers. Ten years, 11 years, 12 years.

Mr. Sawyer. Did you have any contact with him while he was in
the Missouri State Penitentiary?

Mr. Byers. Yes; when he first went in, I went on a regular basis
to visit, and then — you know how it is — time was — a great number
of years — I didn’t go at all.

Mr. Sawyer. When did he first go there, do you recall?

Mr. Byers. I can only give you approximate dates.

Mr. Sawyer. Give me that.

Mr. Byers. Maybe 1963.

Mr. Sawyer. And about what time, what year, was this offer
made to you by Sutherland?

Mr. Byers. Like I told you, the fall of 1966 or the spring of 1967.

Mr. Sawyer. So he was in about 3 or 4 years at that point?

Mr. Byers. I imagine, somewhere close to that.

Mr. Sawyer. And was that still during the time you did see him
in prison, before time had passed, so you slacked off?

197

Mr. Byers. I think about the time of the offer I had to quit going
to see him, because I got convicted myself, and convicted felons are
not allowed to visit in a penitentiary.

Mr. Sawyer. That would have been after the Sutherland episode,
right?

Mr. Byers. I would say yes, about that same time.

Mr. Sawyer. But after?

Mr. Byers. Yes.

Mr. Sawyer. About how long after?

Mr. Byers. I don’t know. I got convicted December 27 in 1967, so
that would be the winter of 1967. It would all depend if the offer
was made to me in the fall of 1966 or the spring of 1967, when you
asked me how long, so you can see for yourself how long of a span
there is in there.

Mr. Sawyer. So then you were seeing him for a number of
months, anyway; you were seeing Spica for a number of months,
between the time the Sutherland offer was made to you and you
got convicted?

Mr. Byers. That’s correct, yes.

Mr. Sawyer. And about how often would you see him during
that period?

Mr. Byers. I can’t remember that. I would imagine pretty regu-
lar, maybe once a month, once every 2 weeks, once every 2 months,
no set schedule.

Mr. Sawyer. You obviously would have mentioned this offer to
Spica, then, when you saw him, seeing as how that was the kind of
thing he was convicted of?

Mr. Byers. I don’t think the offer would have did him any good,
doing life, and I did not, and I will repeat again, I did not tell him
of the offer.

Mr. Sawyer. But aside from whether it would do him any good
or not, the very thing, the very setup on which he has been
convicted, it would seem to me to be naturally conversational that
you had been offered the same kind of deal. Wouldn’t that be a
natural thing to talk about?

Mr. Byers. It may be natural, but it wasn’t.

Mr. Sawyer. You are quite sure you didn’t?

Mr. Byers. I’m positive.

Mr. Sawyer. And then if I put your timing right, the offer to you
that Sutherland made was, oh, give or take a number of months,
up to a year before King was killed?

Mr. Byers. Fall of 1966 or spring of 1967, which ever one

Mr. Sawyer. So it could have been, anyway, something short of a
year elapsed, maybe just a few months, or maybe 6 or 7?

Mr. Byers. Could be.

Mr. Sawyer. Well, could be; is that clear?

Mr. Byers. Yes, it depends on that time element. Like, remem-
ber, I testified to, the fall of 1966 or the spring of 1967; that would
put a few months either which way.

Mr. Sawyer. I have no further questions.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman yields back the balance of his
time.

198

Mr. Byers, in reply to a question by Mr. McKinney of Connecti-
cut, you made the statement — I think I quote you correctly — “I
don’t think the FBI was too concerned that Dr. King got killed.” Do
you remember making that statement?

Mr. Byers. Yes.

Chairman Stokes. What is your basis for that statement?

Mr. Byers. What I read in the paper.

Chairman Stokes. Meaning what, “what you read in the paper”?

Mr. Byers. Well, in an article where a man said — let’s see, how
did he put this? — the ones who harassed this man were the same
ones to investigate his murder. That’s the story I am going along. I
shouldn’t have said that.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you.

The gentleman from the District of Columbia, Mr. Fauntroy.

Mr. Fauntroy. Mr. Byers, at the time that you were visiting
your brother-in-law, were you aware of the relationship between
Dr. Maxey and Mr. Kauffmann?

Mr. Byers. Yes.

Mr. Fauntroy. Do you have any reason to believe that Dr.
Maxey was close enough to Mr. Kauffmann to know of the avail-
ability of money to kill Dr. King?

Mr. Byers. If Dr. Maxey was close enough to Mr. Kauffmann to
know?

Mr. Fauntroy. Yes.

Mr. Byers. That would be hard to tell without me — like, I never
ever knew Dr. Maxey; I just heard Mr. Kauffmann talk, how they
were friends and how Dr. Maxey would come maybe once a month
and visit with him.

Mr. Fauntroy. I see.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no further questions.

Chairman Stokes. Any other member? Mr. McKinney?

Mr. McKinney. Mr. Byers, I just want to get myself straight on
your relationship with Mr. Kauffmann. How long did you know
him?

Mr. Byers. Well, go back to the beginning of the question you
asked me, 1955, 1956, 1957 — I can’t nail the year down.

Mr. McKinney. But you were

Mr. Byers. But I never associated with him until after his broth-
er died, that I was friends with, and his brother died, like in 1962.
You know, I never had no close association with him, because his
brother was my friend. His brother was a real nice man.

Mr. McKinney. The two of you became fairly close?

Mr. Byers. His brother?

Mr. McKinney. No; Mr. Kauffmann himself.

Mr. Byers. You mean, Mr. John Kauffmann?

Mr. McKinney. Yes.

Mr. Byers. Not as close as I was to his brother, Gil.

Mr. McKinney. How soon after this offer did you break off your
relationship with Mr. Kauffmann?

Mr. Byers. Within a short period of time, maybe like weeks or
something like that, when I found out about the narcotics transac-
tions.

Mr. McKinney. Did Mr. Kauffmann ever contact you and ques-
tion why he didn’t see you, any longer?

199

Mr. Byers. No; I made it very clear why I was going to leave the
scene.

Mr. McKinney. At the time that you said you were going to
leave the scene, did he make any mention of the fact that he had
taken you out and gotten you a “hit” offer?

Mr. Byers. No.

Mr. McKinney. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Byers, one other question. I want to put
something in perspective. Are you aware of how the FBI became
aware that this offer had been made to you?

Mr. Byers. Only what I read in the paper.

Chairman Stokes. Can you tell us what that is?

Mr. Byers. That I unconsciously had told someone of this offer,
an informant at the time to the FBI, and the FBI wrote it down
and misfiled it for 5 years. That’s all I am aware of.

Chairman Stokes. This would have been in 1973 that you were
talking with a person who was an FBI informant; isn’t that cor-
rect?

Mr. Byers. That’s correct.

Chairman Stokes. And you mentioned this incident to that
individual, not knowing the individual was an FBI informant; is
that right?

Mr. Byers. That’s correct.

Chairman Stokes. And then, as a consequence of your having
stated it to him, the FBI informant did inform the FBI of it, but
they then misfiled the memorandum in which they had put it; is
that your understanding?

Mr. Byers. That’s the way I read it in the paper.

Chairman Stokes. Now, in 1973, after you had talked with this
individual who you now know to be an FBI informant -

Mr. Byers. No, I do not know him to be an FBI informant,
because I don’t know who it was.

Chairman Stokes. I see; but you do recall you talked to someone
about this?

Mr. Byers. Evidently I did.

Chairman Stokes. Has the FBI ever been to you, to interrogate
you about the story?

Mr. Byers. Been to me to interrrogate me about the story? You
mean, when the man give it to him in 1973?

Chairman Stokes. My question really is, has the FBI ever been
to you to find out from you about this incident?

Mr. Byers. About the offer being made to me?

Chairman Stokes. Right.

Mr. Byers. No.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you.

One further question: As I understand you, you don’t know who
it was you talked to in 1973, who was the informant; is that
correct?

Mr. Byers. That’s correct.

Chairman Stokes. Well, were you in the habit of talking to a lot
of people about this incident?

Mr. Byers. No, but maybe when I was drinking, you know, could
have been any one of a thousand people I might have told it to, you

200

know; like when you drink, you talk, and you don’t know what you
are saying, or what you’re doing. Who knows?

Chairman Stokes. Well, if you say you don’t know what you are
saying, what you are talking about, what you are doing

Mr. Byers. Evidently I told this story to someone whom I cannot
recall telling this story to, is what I am trying to say; and I am
trying to give you a reason for why I may do this.

Chairman Stokes. That’s what I am trying to get at.

Mr. Byers. Yes.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you.

I have no further questions.

Any other members seeking further recognition? Mr. Fauntroy?

Mr. Fauntroy. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Does counsel, Mr. Blakey, have anything
further?

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, there is one matter I would like to
follow up on.

Mr. Byers, apart from your knowing who the informant is, have
you ever been told who the informant might be?

Mr. Byers. No. Who would tell me?

Mr. Blakey. That was my question to you. Have you ever had
any discussions with anybody as to who that informant might have
been?

Mr. Byers. Oh, naturally, it has my curiosity aroused. I would be
a fool if it didn’t; but I just — I don’t know who it would have been.

Mr. Blakey. Have you ever had any discussion with any counsel
as to who that informant might have been?

Mr. Byers. You mean, such as legal counsel, like

Mr. Blakey. I am not referring to Mr. Hamilton. Any other
lawyer, anyplace, anytime?

Mr. Byers. Talking about legal counsel?

Mr. Blakey. Right; a lawyer.

Mr. Byers. Oh, I’m sure that I may have run into it by asking
them who this may be, or who could have told such a story on me.

Mr. Blakey. Did you have any conversations with Mr. Randall
about the informant?

Mr. Byers. Probably so, but I don’t remember just what the basis
of the conversation was.

Mr. Blakey. Did you ever speculate to Mr. Randall who the
informant might have been?

Mr. Byers. I can’t remember that.

Mr. Blakey. Did he ever speculate to you who the informant
might have been?

Mr. Byers. I can’t remember that. Whenever me and Mr. Ran-
dall talked, we just talked a lot and didn’t really say anything.

Mr. Blakey. Did you ever have any conversations with Mr. Ran-
dall in 1973 about the offer?

Mr. Byers. About the offer?

Mr. Blakey. And the fact that

Mr. Byers. I had conversations with Mr. Randall a long time
before 1973 about the offer.

Mr. Blakey. Right, but my question is directed to 1973.

Mr. Byers. Well, I can’t remember specifically in 1973. I may
have had — I would say yes, but I could not swear to it.

201

Mr. Blakey. Did you ever have any conversations with Mr.
Weenick in 1973 or thereafter about the offer?

Mr. Byers. Yes.

Mr. Blakey. Did you have any discussions with him in which
either you or he speculated about who the informant might be?

Mr. Byers. Oh, possibly so.

Mr. Blakey. When did it come to your attention that the inform-
ant had given this information to the FBI?

Mr. Byers. When a reporter from the New York Times came and
told me.

Mr. Blakey. When did that occur?

Mr. Byers. After I was here at the committee last time.

Mr. Blakey. I’m somewhat confused, Mr. Byers. Perhaps the way
I am asking the question has confused you.

Is it that you did not know that the informant had, until the
New York Times reporter talked to you, and that did not occur
until after your appearance on May 9, 1978? You couldn’t have
speculated about an informant with either Mr. Weenick or Mr.
Randall in 1973.

Mr. Byers. I misunderstood your question a while ago. I didn’t
even know an informant existed until — like I say — 1978. I wasn’t
following your questioning a while ago. Did you ask me a while ago
if we discussed an informant in 1973?

Mr. Blakey. That’s correct.

Mr. Byers. No. How could we discuss it when we didn’t even
know there was one?

Mr. Blakey. So your testimony is — and you would have us be-
lieve, and it is true — that you had no discussions about an inform-
ant until after the New York Times article?

Mr. Byers. Oh, yes, I didn’t even know — when Mr. Conrad Baetz
and Mr. Waxman came to my home — this is the first I knew that
you knew anything about it. That’s the first I knew.

Mr. Blakey. Fine.

Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

Chairman Stokes. Is any member of the committee seeking fur-
ther recognition?

Mr. Byers. It may be necessary for the committee to call you
back later today. For that reason, we would ask that you remain
available this morning and a portion of the afternoon.

For the time being, this does conclude your testimony before the
committee, and at the conclusion of a witness’ testimony, either the
witness or his counsel may make a statement to this committee
during a 5-minute period. During that period you may amplify or
explain your testimony in any way or make any further comment
you so desire on your testimony before this committee.

I would extend to you — to either you or Mr. Hamilton — at this
time 5 minutes for that purpose, if you so desire.

Mr. Byers. I can’t think of anything I would like to add.

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Hamilton?

Mr. Hamilton. No comments.

Chairman Stokes. Then at this time the Chair would once again
admonish all persons in the room to please remain seated until
such time as the witness has left the hearing room.

Thank you very much and you are excused, Mr. Byers.

202

The committee will take a 2- or 3-minute recess.

[Brief recess.]

Chairman Stokes. The committee will come to order.

In light of the testimony that has just been received before the
committee, which tends to relate to a conspiracy, the Chair thinks
it is appropriate at this time that I make certain comments rela-
tive to the testimony of this witness and subsequent witnesses over
the next 3 days.

When we got to this point in the Kennedy hearings, I thought it
appropriate to make certain general remarks. Here, too, certain
things should be made more explicit.

The committee will be hearing testimony over these 3 days deal-
ing with what the committee has found. In presenting this evidence
to the committee, the staff will not be trying to prove or disprove
any particular theory. The purpose of these hearings is not to try
to establish or refute particular theories but to consider the evi-
dence available on the various points. That evidence may either
prove it, disprove it, or be insufficient to make a judgment either
way. Nevertheless, because these hearings are legislative in charac-
ter and not a judicial trial, the committee has a duty to make what
it has learned public, even if it falls short of what everyone might
wish to know on the crucial question: Was there a conspiracy
involved in the assassination of Dr. King?

Let me make another important point: It may be helpful for
those following our hearings if something is also said here about
the quality and the quantity of evidence available to the committee
as it has moved through each of the phases of its deliberations and
the need to recognize how to use each kind of evidence.

In certain aspects of our work the committee has had available
to it the hard stuff of science. The quality of the evidence available
to the committee was, therefore, unusually high, even if it did not
materially assist us, as it did in the Kennedy investigation.

As the committee turned to assessing the performance of the
agencies, principally the FBI, less scientific evidence was available
to the committee and it was necessary to rely more on documents
and human memories, principally those of public officials.

Now as the committee’s attention turns directly to the question
of conspiracy, it will be necessary to move away from the hard
evidence of science and documents and consider more oral testi-
mony. The shifting nature of the balance ought to be explicitly
noted and commented on.

Those who follow our hearings must recognize the difference in
the quality and the quantity of the evidence available to resolve
issues in this most difficult area. Human perception and memory,
to say nothing of bias or motive to lie, sharply qualify human
testimony, making it less reliable than scientific analysis or docu-
ments written not for litigation but as an accurate record of actual
events.

That oral testimony, moreover, will be about events that oc-
curred over 10 years ago. It will in some instances also concern
people who are now dead and who cannot either be examined to
determine the truth or to defend themselves against posthumous
accusations.

203

As I observed in the Kennedy hearings, those who follow our
hearings should also keep in mind some principles about the law of
conspiracy and the special difficulties associated with its proof.

Mr. Justice Holmes once succinctly defined a conspiracy as “a
partnership in criminal purposes/’ That definition serves well
enough here. Unless evidence is adduced from which “a partner-
ship in criminal purposes” can be inferred, a conspiracy cannot be
said to exist. A suspicion suspected must always be distinguished
from a fact found.

Let me say concretely what I mean. Basically, the Justice De-
partment task force and others have concluded that James Earl
Ray was the lone assassin of Dr. King, because they have conclud-
ed that he was a loner and he was a racist — in short, because he
had no significant associations other than his family and he appar-
ently had an intensely personal motive, it was inappropriate — the
task force found — to conclude that there was a possibility of a
conspiracy involved in the assassination.

What the task force and various writers have rightly recognized,
if not always made explicit, is twofold: First, conspiracy is rooted in
association — no association, no conspiracy; and, second, motive can
be a key to the interpretation of conduct.

We took up the question of motive in previous hearings. Let me
now turn my attention to association and conspiracy.

Because the previous investigations concluded there was no evi-
dence of association, they were not forced to deal with the difficult
questions posed by evidence of association as it gives rise to evi-
dence of conspiracy. It is a fundamental principle of American law
that guilt cannot be inferred from association alone and it is one
that must be honored in congressional hearings, also.

To be sure, conspirators seldom shout their intentions from the
rooftops or publish their thoughts in the newspapers. Conspiracy
must, therefore, usually be inferred from circumstantial evidence —
associations, plus. As I noted in the Kennedy hearings, herein lies
the difficulty in all conspiracy investigations, whether they are
trials or legislative hearings dealing with conspiracy questions.

Mr. Justice Jackson once observed of conspiracy trials, and I
quote him:

A defendant in a conspiracy trial occupies an uneasy seat. There generally will be
evidence of wrongdoing by somebody. It is difficult for the individual to make his
own case stand on its own merits in the minds of jurors who are willing to believe
that birds of a feather flock together. If he is silent, he is taken to admitting and if,
as it often happens, co-defendants can be proded into * * * contradicting each other,
they convict each other.

What Mr. Justice Jackson said about a conspiracy trial applies
even more strongly in the context of a congressional hearing.

As I have repeatedly said in these hearings, these proceedings
are not a criminal trial. There is no indictment and there is no
defendant; there is no prosecutor and there is no defense counsel.
The normal rules of evidence do not apply. Because none of the
elements are here present, a special burden is imposed on this
committee as evidence is introduced before it, and on those who
follow our proceedings, not to take the evidence so introduced
beyond what it fairly establishes or to sensationalize it.

204

This caution is particularly apt when evidence of association is
introduced. I repeat, conspiracy is founded in association, but more
than association is required to establish conspiracy. Reasoning that
guilt goes hand in hand with association — the principle of guilt by
association — is to be abhorred in a free society.

I would caution, therefore, those who follow our hearings or read
our record to evaluate the evidence that we will hear these next 3
days as carefully as the committee itself will, reserve judgment
until all the evidence is in and do not reach conclusions beyond
what the evidence itself fully justifies. Anything else — it seems to
me — would be bad logic. It would also be unfair to all who are
concerned.

Thank you.

At this time the Chair recognizes special counsel, I. Charles
Mathews.

Mr. Mathews. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, Murray Randall was one of two attorneys in-
formed by Mr. Byers of the offer to murder Dr. King. He is present-
ly a judge in the court of criminal corrections in the city of St.
Louis.

Further, Mr. Chairman, counsel has been advised that Judge
Randall will be invoking rule 6, so it may be appropriate at this
time to so order.

Chairman Stokes. The next witness has invoked the provisions
of rule 6, the pertinent part of which reads that:

No witness served with a subpena by the committee shall be required against his
or her will to be photographed in any hearing or to give evidence or testimony while
the broadcasting of that hearing by radio or television is being conducted. At the
request of any witness who does not wish to be subjected to radio, television or still
photography coverage, all lenses shall be covered and all microphones used for
coverage turned off.

In addition, the Chair understands that this witness has also
requested that the hallway area adjacent to the hearing room also
be covered under the provisions of rule 6.

Therefore, at this time the Chair requests complete compliance
with the request of the witness not to be photographed in any
respect.

Mr. Mathews. Mr. Chairman, it would be appropriate at this
time to call Judge Randall.

Chairman Stokes. The Chair calls the judge.

Judge Randall, will you please stand and be sworn in?

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before the
committee is the truth, nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Judge Randall. I do.

Good morning. I would like to introduce Mr. Hilton Reed, Jr., a
member of the bar in the city of St. Louis.

Chairman Stokes. We are pleased to have you this morning.

The Chair recognizes counsel for the committee, Professor
Blakey.

Mr. Blakey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

TESTIMONY OF MURRAY L. RANDALL, SPECIAL JUDGE, ST.
LOUIS CIRCUIT COURT FOR CRIMINAL CAUSES, ST. LOUIS, MO.

Mr. Blakey. For the record, would you state your name, please.

205

Judge Randall. Murray L. Randall.

Mr. Blakey. I would like to express the appreciation of the
committee and the staff, including myself, for your appearance
here today. I know that you have taken time from a very busy trial
docket.

It has been a professional inconvenience to you. Nevertheless, I
am sure you realize the important public purpose your testimony
may serve this morning.

Judge Randall. Could I say you ought to express that for the
State of Missouri. It cost the State of Missouri $25,000 for me to
come, closed down my division all week.

Mr. Blakey. The committee obviously regrets that.

Judge Randall. The work I do, I get assigned cases each week. I
was assigned a murder case, and I had to send it back because I
was afraid to interrupt it and I didn’t know when to return. I am
glad to be here. They are the ones who got inconvenienced.

Mr. Blakey. The committee appreciates your cooperation today,
as it does of any other State judges who disrupt their schedule to
come to Washington.

Judge Randall, have you been supplied a copy of the committee
rules?

Judge Randall. Yes.

Mr. Blakey. Have you read them?

Judge Randall. Yes.

Mr. Blakey. Do you understand them?

Judge Randall. Yes, I think I do. I think I am a pretty good
lawyer.

Mr. Blakey. Let me ask you this question. Do you know Russell
George Byers?

Judge Randall. Yes, I do.

Mr. Blakey. When did you first meet him?

Judge Randall. Well, I first met him on the day that he pled
guilty in Peoria, 111. I represented a co-defendant whose name was
Arthur Strawbridge. He was known as the “hawk.” Mr. Byers
appeared on the same day I did and pled guilty.

So, I met him that day. I did not become acquainted with him,
though, until mid-1968. I changed arrangements on May 1, 1968. I
entered my private practice and left a big firm. It was subsequent
to that that he came to me and asked me to incorporate a business
for him.

Mr. Blakey. You first met him in December 1967?

Judge Randall. Whatever date that was, sir, I don’t remember.

Mr. Blakey. He indicated to us and, of course, the record would
speak for itself on that. Then he subsequently came to you in 1968?

Judge Randall. Yes. Was that what he indicated?

Well, I thought you said he indicated, but the facts are he came
subsequent to the time I opened my own office, which was May 1,
1968, sir. I am guessing about mid-1968, 2 or 3 months, because
when I opened my office I didn’t even have a secretary for a while,
only had an answering service.

I didn’t know what was going to happen when I went out on my
own. It worked out fine, but I had left a good income and I started
off very frugally. My total expenses for that year were $2,000

39-935 0 - 79 - 14

206

operating the firm. So, it was sometime after that because the
secretary had to type the papers.

I will tell you the filing date of the corporation papers would give
you the date.

Mr. Blakey. In any event, he consulted you then in a profession-
al capacity, is that correct?

Judge Randall. Well, only with respect to the services of draw-
ing up the necessary forms to incorporate a business. I would say I
saw him twice, once at the beginning and once at the end.

Mr. Blakey. Judge Randall, I would like to ask you some ques-
tions about your conversation with him. But before I do that, Mr.
Chairman, I would ask that the witness be shown Martin Luther
King exhibit F-573 and it be inserted in the record. It is a waiver of
the attorney-client privilege between Mr. Byers and Mr. Randall.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the
record at this point and shown to the witness.

[The information follows:]

207

WAIVER OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

I, RUSSELL BYERS, hereby waive my attorney-client privilege
with respect to any and all communications or documents
between Murray Randall and myself concerning an offer,
solicitation, or plan to assassinate or harm the person of
Martin Luther King, Jr.

Dated this

*7 11

day of June, 1978.

MLK Exhibit F-573

Judge Randall. I have a copy of that, sir.

Mr. Blakey. Obviously, Judge Randall, you know, of course, that
this waiver authorizes you in this congressional committee to dis-
cuss what would otherwise be privileged communications between
yourself and Mr. Byers.

Judge Randall. That is what I think, yes, sir.

Mr. Reed. If I may, Professor Blakey, I would like to indicate at
this time that it is my opinion that the waiver of the attorney-
client privilege is not an absolute matter and deals only with those
matters which are clearly related to the matters under discussion
here.

208

So, I would not like at this time for the Judge to feel free to
discuss any matters that might have arisen during the course of
his representation of Mr. Byers.

Thank you.

Mr. Blakey. Judge, let me direct your attention back to that
period of time after sometime in mid-1968 when you had conversa-
tions with Mr. Byers and ask you this question:

During the course of your conversations with him then or later,
did he ever tell you of an offer that had been made to him of
$50,000 to kill Dr. Martin Luther King?

Judge Randall. Well, there was a consultation and my best
recollection is that this happened near the end of my law practice.
I terminated my law practice November 4, 1974.

In conjunction with something else I did for him, could I tell you
about that?

Mr. Blakey. Let’s see if we can’t get the basic details of it down
first. You say you did have a conversation with him sometime
in

Judge Randall. Well, that gets

Mr. Blakey. Excuse me, Judge, sometime in 1974 is when your
memory is, the first time you had a conversation with him about
the offer?

Judge Randall. The only one.

Mr. Blakey. So you did not have conversations with him prior to
that time?

% Judge Randall. Not that I recall.

Mr. Blakey. And you fixed the date of 1974 because of an event
you were then going to tell the committee about?

Judge Randall. Well, I am trying to tell you, sir, that the court
records would designate the date, you know, but my best recollec-
tion was that it was near the end of my law practice.

If I could tell you what that was and what occurred, then I think
we could immediately get into it.

The $50,000 figure, I don’t recall the amount.

Mr. Blakey. Was the litigation having to do with his UMC
Industries versus Russell Byers Consolidated Vending Co.?

Judge Randall. That is probably it. Do you have the court date?

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that the docket be
appropriately marked as Martin Luther King exhibit 582 and
shown to the witness.

Judge Randall. I would love to see that.

Chairman Stokes. Counsel asks also to make it part of the
record?

Mr. Blakey. Yes, would you incorporate it in the record at this
point.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection.

[The information follows:]

209

MLK Exhibit F-582

CIVIL DOCKET

NITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CLOSED

4 0 4 £
(

Jury demand date:

Form No. 10S TUv.

73C

~ALK FA. lir

■1 «’*&&&<

210

?3C 4 - 4 51

:.C IHDUSTBIES, INC, vs RUSSEL BYERS, d/b/a CPUS PUPATED VENDIHO CO.

aTE

PROCEEDINGS

D»« Ordar c
Judgment Net

r,-73

-22-73

Marshal's, ret.. to service of summons. etc. on deft on 6-20-73 fid,

12-.73

■■■

iMMWBM

13 -Hi

Answer rec'd & lodged.

-3-73“

and costs, returnable Oct 3. 1973. filed, and so ordered.

Execution issued.

:o-73

Marshal's ret. on summons to garnishee Raiffie Vending Co filed

(executed 9-14-731. • . ,

’ . .

“ _Q_7

-13-7

to niff's interrogatories propounded to garnishee filed.

. .

974

3-74

Plff's motion for examination of judgment debtor filed. &

1974. at 10 a.ra. re ability to pay .judgment herein. Delivered to

U S Marshal for service by atty for plff.

)-74

Marshal's ret. on Execution, unsatisfied, filed (garnishment

...

;r^7T

Marshal’s return on Citation to appear executed i-ib-Y-4 on

Russel Byers filed, (.served Donna Byers .wife) .

S^74“

Parties appear by counsel, and plff isdirected - by the ct to

propound questions in writing, and cause is passed to Feb 15, 1974

i'9-74

Plff's interrogatories to judgment debtor, Russel Byers, fid.

Deft's answers to interred fid.

Judge Randall. While we are doing that, let me explain to the
committee that for that service I made no charge. The best I can
recall, it was an encounter at the courthouse and I appeared with
him.

He was going to appear alone, and I thought he had a problem,
and I appeared with him and I made no charge for that. It was
immediately following that that he consulted me about this matter
you are interested in.

I have with me my client card on Mr. Byers, which I would be
happy to present to the committee, that shows the services I per-
formed for him and the charge.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that that client card be
made Martin Luther King exhibit

Judge Randall. I have not made a copy of this, and I would
appreciate your returning me a copy.

Mr. Blakey [continuing]. Be appropriately marked as “MLK ex-
hibit F-583” and inserted in the record at this point.

211

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the
record as an exhibit at this point and a copy of it made as per the
Judge’s request.

[The information follows:]

Byfirs, Russell, G.

3696 Washington Ave.

St. Louis, Mo. 63108 ^ £3

WO 2-671f» '

Fee : 0

Paid:

Expenses: $53.00

Hry ] Jt.f

MLK Exhibit F-583

Mr. Blakey. Let me then direct your attention

Judge Randall. Could I look at this first, please?

Mr. Blakey. Certainly.

Judge Randall. According to this, the occasion was August — do
you have a copy of this, counsel?

Mr. Blakey. You have my copy, Judge. I am sure I see your
problem. The Xeroxing at the edge

Judge Randall. It says 8-74. Do you know if that is the eighth
month or eighth day?

Mr. Blakey. The Xeroxing leaves something to be desired. Nev-
ertheless, it does indicate — correct me if I am wrong — that the
representation began sometime in 1973 and ended sometime in
1974.

Judge Randall. That is not correct. I don’t know when my name
got on it, but I would have to tell you what occurred. You can see it
here from this. A default judgment was taken. I made no represen-
tation because the client took a default judgment.

My first and only appearance was on this date where it says
parties appear by counsel. It says 8-74 down near the end:

Parties appear by counsel and plaintiff was directed by the court to propound
questions in writing and cause this to pass to February 15.

Mr. Blakey. In any case, Judge, the litigation begins sometime
in 1973 and ends in 1974.

Judge Randall. But I was not involved in it.

Mr. Blakey. Your testimony is that sometime after it began you
became involved.

Judge Randall. I was involved on 1 day, the day he appeared in
court.

Mr. Blakey. That would be sometime between 1973 and 1974.

Judge Randall. It appears it was 1974 sometime, sir, from this
document, because you see he took a default judgment because
there was no defense and then the plaintiff filed a motion to
interrogate him in open court in aid of execution and partu ’v
they were trying to find out where the vending machines v

That is the day I appeared with him in court and that is the
time and you will notice I made no charge for it.

212

Mr. Blakey. Fine. In any case, Judge, sometime around that
appearance or shortly thereafter I take it you had a conversation
with him.

Judge Randall. On that day.

Mr. Blakey. On that day, yes. Will you tell the committee what
that conversation was?

Judge Randall. Before I undertake to do that I would like to say
something about my memory on this thing.

This event was a wholly insignificant event to me. I never once
thought about it again until Mr. Byers called me upon returning
from Washington when he was questioned out here and told me
that he had supplied my name.

I gave it very little thought thereafter until a few months ago
when Carter Stith, a reporter for the Post Dispatch, visited me and
told me she had a copy of the FBI report, which was news to me,
and she had my name.

From that time forward I have wracked my memory on this. I
have read all the newspaper articles. I have read the FBI report.
All I can say to you today is that some of this new information has
fused in my mind with what Mr. Byers told me, plus the fact I
have wracked my memory, so I will give you my best present
recollection. I cannot guarantee it will hold 100 percent. Do you
understand that?

Mr. Blakey. I am sure the committee would indicate to you,
Judge Randall, that it would not want anything other than your
best memory.

Judge Randall. But do you understand it is blended with some
other things.

Mr. Blakey. With that preface, would you tell us as best you can
what he said to you and what you said to him?

Judge Randall. Very well. As a result of the problem he got into
over the collection thing where he was going to appear alone and I
appeared with him and he took the fifth amendment because of
some problems connected with it, he then, we went into the corri-
dor and we First talked to the attorneys on the other side and they
offered to settle a $50,000 judgment for $1,000, the attorney’s fee.

He never came up with that money before I left the law practice,
and that is the reason I know it was near the end. As a result of
that, he said to me, he had me cornered and it was all free, he said
I have something else I would like to consult you about.

He said, I have this story that I think is out and I may be
questioned by the Federal Government about it. I would like to
know the ^procedure for claiming immunity. He didn’t think it
incriminated him, but he was concerned about claiming immunity
because I told him that was a public hearing.

You know, in order to get immunity you go before the grand
jury, go before open court and get immunity and you go back. He
was concerned about the publicity. Frankly, what he was trying to
do is decide in his mind, if I am questioned about this, shall I talk
or shall I claim immunity.

Then he related what happened. To the best of my recollection
the year was about 1964, about 10 years previous. I could be wrong,
but I have a recollection it was 10 years past.

213

He said that at that time he had an arrangement with the
sheriff of Jefferson County. I do not think the privilege extends to
my explaining the details of that arrangement.

Suffice it to say that he said through his connections with the
sheriff of Jefferson County he met this man named Kauffmann.

Is that his name? My memory is it was Kauffmann, the crippled
man.

Mr. Blakey. There is testimony in the record about Mr. Kauff-
mann.

Judge Randall. He was described to me as an old, little, crippled
man who had once been a stockbroker and who had lost his license
due to obtaining a conviction for securities fraud.

He said how he met him was this: That the sheriff was engaged
also in the business of peddling narcotic drugs, and in fact he told
me that the sheriff was later indicted and convicted for it.

He said that he was obtaining his supply of narcotic drugs from
Kauffmann and Kauffmann was obtaining them in this fashion.

Mr. Blakey. Excuse me, Judge. The sheriff was obtaining them
from Kauffman?

Judge Randall. From Kauffmann; yes. Mr. Byers denied he had
any connection with narcotic drugs. Mr. Byers denied there was
two crimes he never engaged in. One was murder and the other
was narcotic drugs.

So, he said at this time the sheriff was getting a supply of
narcotic drugs from Kauffmann and Kauffmann was obtaining
them in this fashion. Kauffmann had a medical manufacturing
business located in Jefferson County in an old motel over on old
Highway 67, just north of the Kohler City Shopping Center.

Now, the Kohler City Shopping Center is not an incorporation, a
municipality. It is a shopping center which has been there since I
was a boy. I think it is in or near the town of Imperial, the
municipality of Imperial.

He said he was manufacturing these medicines in this motel and
he had a narcotics license and so he was able to obtain narcotics.
He said that he thought that it was a front for the narcotics
business.

He said that he had associated with him in this business a doctor
who was employed by the Missouri prison system. He either did
not remember his name or he never knew the doctor’s name. At
least he did not give me his name.

He said that both Kauffmann and the doctor were dead, to his
knowledge, at the time he was telling me. He said that he spent
some time, in his spare time, hanging around this motel.

He worked mostly at night in his business, Mr. Byers did, so he
had the daytimes to hang around there. I do not recall whether he
ever met the doctor or not, sir, or whether he told me whether he
met the doctor. The doctor, he thought, was dead.

He said that in addition to that there was a farm that adjoined
the motel. The motel was along the highway. I could picture this
area a little bit.

Highway 67 was no longer a traveled route. Highway 1-55 had
replaced it. So, motels were of no use. So, they had this motel and
he was manufacturing this medicine.

214

He said there was a farm immediately adjoining it and to the
rear of it and there was a farmhouse off away from the highway.
He said there was a man who lived up there who ran around the
country dressed in bib overalls and a straw hat. He said everybody
knew him by sight. He knew him by sight, but he had not met him.
He said he was a retired patent lawyer and that he had come to
the Metropolitan St. Louis area from Memphis, Tenn.

He did not know whether he practiced law in Memphis or St.
Louis.

He said that one day — and I think it was at the motel but I can’t
be sure; as I said, this was an insignificant event to me and I am
only giving you my best recollection— he said that one day he was
with Kauffmann, I think at the motel, and Kauffmann said to him,
“Would you like to earn $20,000.” Now, it may have been $50,000,
and I may be influenced in that figure by the FBI report. I think it
says $20,000 in the FBI report. But it was some sum of money.

He said that he flippantly replied, “Who do I have to kill?” He
said he had no intention of killing anybody. He never killed any-
body in his life and he never would kill anybody, but he thought
Kauffmann was pulling his leg and he had nothing to lose, so he
went along with the leg-pulling contest.

He said the man then replied, “We have to go see the old man”
or the top man. I can’t be sure whether he said the old man or the
top man.

They then proceeded — I don’t know whether it was immediately
or later — they then proceeded to the farmhouse.

I can remember only two things he told me about the farmhouse.
One, it was a stone house, and second, the parlor was carpeted with
carpet that contained impressions of the Confederate flag. I don’t
know how he knew this, but he told me that this carpet had been
removed from some public place, a cocktail lounge or a club that
had a Confederate motif, and placed in the farmhouse.

He said that he was introduced to the old farmer or whatever
you want to call him, and the man still had on his bib overalls, but
he did not have on the straw hat. He had a Confederate Army cap
on.

He said they then went into the den and that he engaged this old
man in conversation designed to needle him or find out how he
could come up with the fee, whatever it was, $20,000 or something.
He said the man said that he was a member of a national organiza-
tion from which he could get the fee. I do not recall whether he
said the organization was allegedly in on the matter or it was only
the source of his fee.

But he then questioned him in extreme detail about this organi-
zation. In fact, he said this questioning constituted 90 percent of
his conversation.

He said the man told him by either description or name many
alleged prominent people who were a member of this organization.
If he related any of them to me by description or name, I do not
recall them. I don’t think he even told me any of them.

Then at the conclusion of this conversation he said he finally
asked the man, “Well, if you can get the money, who do I have to
kill?” And he said he said, “Dr. Martin Luther King.” He said that
he laughed and said, “I pass.”

215

He said a further comment in departing such as nobody can get
by with it, or it can’t be done, or it is too dangerous, or something
to the effect that, you know, he was leaving this because it was not
an appropriation operation.

He said, however, that he had no intention at any time to par-
ticipate in any such conduct, that he regarded these people as
being, you know, pulling his leg, taking him on a snipe hunt, very
light. He said that he forgot about it.

Sometime later Dr. King was killed. I don’t recall the time. If I
am right on 1964 — you know, it was a long period of time, but I
could be wrong on that date. He said that the only thing he had
seen — no, there were two things — that caused him to think that
they might be associated with Ray was that he had read that
before Ray escaped from prison that he was transferred to the
medical department and he escaped from the medical department.

He said that he had also read that Ray was seen in Canada with
a little old crippled man.

Those are the only things that I can remember that caused him
to wonder about whether or not, you know, there might be some
connection.

He was not upset about it. He was not disturbed. He did not feel
that anything was imminent. He just thought he had me cornered
and I was free and that he might as well find out something from a
free lawyer and, you know, there I was.

I made no charge for that, as you can see from client’s card on
Mr. Byers. The only charge I made was $250 for the incorporation,
and I am not sure he paid that. That card is not a financial card.
My receipts ledger would show it and it is possible that I did not
enter payment on the card.

That is all I know about the thing. That is the whole extent of
any representation I ever had with Mr. Byers.

Mr. Blakey. Is that the whole extent of his conversation with
you?

Judge Randall. As far as I can recollect, sir. Specific questions,
you know, might remind me of something.

Mr. Blakey. Did he say anything to you about an informant and
make an effort to

Judge Randall. Not at that time.

Mr. Blakey. This is in May of 1974. You were having the conver-
sation in May of 1974.

Judge Randall. Sir, can you tell what this date is on this sheet?
I can’t tell the date. Would you take it up there?

Mr. Blakey. What I am trying to do with you, Judge, is get an
approximate time. The record obviously will speak for itself as to
exactly what the date was. The Xerox is not that clear as to
exactly the month.

Judge Randall. Let me tell you. Here is the entry — no, that is
not the entry. The interrogatories came first, but he didn’t answer
those. Well, I can’t tell you the date. It was the day he appeared in
court and testified, took the fifth amendment. Obviously, it was
sometime in 1974, sir.

Chairman Stokes. If counsel for the committee can fix the date
some other way, I think the Judge has given his best recollection
on it.

216

Judge Randall. That is the best I can do, sir.

Mr. Blakey. In any event, Judge, let me clarify if I might for the
record. You indicated that when you talked to him in 1964

Judge Randall. 1974.

Mr. Blakey. I’m sorry. 1974. It is your best recollection now that
he indicated that he had been dealing or was aware of Mr. Kauff-
mann’s dealing in drugs some 10 years earlier?

Judge Randall. Yes.

Mr. Blakey. Is your memory fixed or firm on that 10-year
period?

Judge Randall. No, sir.

Mr. Blakey. It could be a shorter period of time?

Judge Randall. Yes.

Mr. Blakey. It could have been a longer period of time?

Judge Randall. Well, it had to be before Dr. King was killed.

Mr. Blakey. So your memory is that it is sometime prior to Dr.
King being killed?

Judge Randall. Very definitely.

Mr. Blakey. He had a drug association or he knew of a drug
association of Mr. Kauffmann?

Judge Randall. Yes, sir.

Mr. Blakey. Let me follow up on an answer that you gave. Did
you have a subsequent conversation with Mr. Byers, that is follow-
ing this conversation in 1974, in which you also discussed the
Sutherland offer?

Judge Randall. When Mr. Byers returned from out here he
called me up, told me what he had done, told me he had given you
people my name, and undertook to refresh my recollection, sir. I
cannot remember what was said in that conversation. I have met
with him once in which we talked about the informant. Those are
the only conversations.

Mr. Blakey. Let me see if I can’t approximate the date when you
might have talked to Mr. Byers after his appearance here. Mr.
Byers appeared before this committee on May 9, 1978. So it would
be some point in time following that.

Judge Randall. And before the investigators came to see me,
because I told them when they came to see me that Mr. Byers had
called me.

Mr. Blakey. Now, would you repeat for us, if you can, to the best
of your ability, what Mr. Byers said to you at that time.

Judge Randall. He told me he had come out here and reported
this, you know, told you about it, given you my name, and told me
that he hoped I remembered the conversation, and undertook to
refresh my recollection. And that is all I can remember, sir.

Mr. Blakey. Subsequent to that time, did you have another
conversation about the Sutherland offer?

Judge Randall. The only thing is the informant, sir.

Mr. Blakey. Can you tell us when you had a conversation with
him about the informant.

Judge Randall. Yes, sir, as best I can recall. When Carter Stith
came to see me she told me she had information, she had the FBI
report. She had information that I was one of two people to whom
Mr. Byers had told this. The other one was Mr. Weenick. She asked
me if I was the informant. So I felt a little disturbed about that.

217

Mr. Blakey. Judge, could you pinpoint the time when this would
have been?

Judge Randall. When the FBI report was first released to the
press, when a New York Times reporter came to St. Louis.

Mr. Blakey. This would be sometime in July?

Judge Randall. Sir, you know that date better than I would. I
think the first story in the St. Louis papers, it might have been
immediately subsequent to the first story. You can pinpoint that; I
can’t.

Mr. Blakey. Was it prior to or subsequent to the interview of
you by our investigators?

Judge Randall. Subsequent, very subsequent. So I decided I
ought to try to see Mr. Byers and see if he thought I was the
informant or if he knew who was the informant.

I have to tell you something else. Miss Carter Stith, who was the
reporter who visited me, told me when he examined the FBI
report — I don’t know if she was present or if it was related to her
by the New York Times reporter — that he studied it and restudied
it with great care, and they were convinced he knew who the
informant was but he would not talk.

But, anyway, sometime after this, let’s say 3 weeks, that is a
guess, I got home early one night and I called Mr. Byers at home
and asked him to meet me. I met him at Gianino’s Restaurant,
which is about 5 blocks from my home. I waited until Mr. Byers
could get there.

When I arrived he was parked in front, standing outside. I think
he reserved the next parking space for me. I went into that park-
ing space and I asked him to sit in the car. He said he was afraid
to talk in either car for fear the FBI had the cars wired.

We then went into the restaurant and we sat in a booth on the
south wall. I was on the east side, he was on the west. He ordered a
small salad. I ordered a martini. He was frightened. He wanted to
get home before dark. He was afraid somebody was trying to kill
him. He did not remain very long.

I will not tell any other things; I don’t think they are pertinent.

But, anyway, I asked him if he thought I was the informant, and
he said no. I asked him if he could tell from the report who the
informant was and he said yes. And I already had some informa-
tion concerning Richard O’Hara that I need not go back into, that I
knew he knew. He told me it was Richard O’Hara, said he could
tell from the context.

He had a conflict in his mind. He wanted to go to the press with
Richard O’Hara’s name as an FBI informant, but he was afraid if
he did that, that the FBI would have to drop him as an informant,
and then he would become a witness against him.

He was not concerned, especially about this report but other
things that Mr. O’Hara could have reported on him, you see. So he
did not know what to do.

But I think he went to the press, because Carter Stith came to
see me and asked me if O’Hara was the informant, and it had to
come from Mr. Byers later.

He asked me about the Journey case. You see, I had another case
where there was a suspicion.

So that is the whole story on that, gentlemen.

218

Mr. Blakey. I wonder if Martin Luther King exhibit F-574 could
be inserted into the record at this point and made available to the
witness?

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the
record at this point and shown to the witness.

[The information follows:]

MLK Exhibit F-574

*DATE INTERVIEWED: , TIME INTERVIEWED:

PLACE INTERVIEWED: __ St. Louis City Municipal Courthouse, 12th Stree t

\ME: MURRAY RANDALL

— y— : ~ -

DATE OF BIRTH: ‘ SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

HOME ADDRESS:

BUSINESS ADDRESS:

: MLK INVESTIGATION

CONNECTION: Randall is a former attorney of Russell Byers

and was familiar with John Paul Spica.

" TERVIEW STATEMENT : ,

Murray Randall was interviewed by Investigators Mel Waxraan and Conrad

Baetz at the St. Louis City Courthouse, 12th Strett, St. Louis, Missouri.

Mr. Randall is now a Circuit Judge in the City of St. Louis, and as such
he was interviewed in his chambers.

Mr. Randall advised that in the 1960’s he was an attorney for Russell .
Byers in certain cases which Byers had in both criminal and civil court
actions.

Judge Randall initially indicated that he would be unable to speak about

any conversations he had with Russell Byers since it was his belief that

uch conversations would come within the preview of the attorney-client

' — — ■■ "a ;

relationship and therefore it would be/violation of professional ethics

for him to divulge the same.

219

^ INTER VIEW SHEET CONTINUATION . PAGi!» 2 of 3

Judge Randall was then supplied with a waiver of attorney-client

privilege signed by Russell Byer s. Upon receipt of the waiver, Judge
Randall indicated that he would be more than willing to cooperate and
assist HSCA in anyway possible. . ' *•-'**

Judge Randall was specifically asked about any conversations that . .

Russell Byers had with him concerning solicitation to. assassinate

Martin Luther King, Jr.. Judge Randall ’stated that following the fass-

T-aSSination of Dr. Martin Luther King, and he is unsure .of the exact

‘"'dciLe oi year# Russell Byers advised "him during the course of a conver- .

s e c tion - Llia L ' By erg had Been approached by Mr. John Southerland and Mr.

: • J ohn - Ifrauff maim bume L ii t le ' ' pri or ~ r t < 0~~Dr . king's assassination and oti erect-

" 50,000 - to aooaop - iiiuLe Dr. King; — Byers advised Judg ~e~~ Rand g‘ Xl that hd ;

d erlSwfl d the - of for, butyhad— abked - - By er s whether lie knew who “was behind

it->. —Byers repT -ied -^ fo "Randall that he though L perhaps it would ‘ be '

* ‘ . .. - . r

K uKImtKlan since South erland _ h^d . al l ud ftd to a " - group of • S o uthern

•b usinessmen. ** It was therefore Ra n dall*^ op-fninh. t - y.r=ic prnhahl y ,

♦ K lan related. However since it came within the p review of a^ orney- ‘ .

. c lient privilege he could not and would- not discuss _i.t_ with,, anyone else.

Randall also advised that he understood from Byers that a friend of one

.of the individuals, John Kauffmann specifically, was. a doctor from

- Missouri State Penitentiary, later identified as Dr. Hugh Maxey. Judge —

Randall stated that it was merely speculation on his part, however he * -*

was always under the impression that there was some relation between

he fact that John Kauffmann had offered Byers, or rather had participated
* - • T.nf ftor I

in a solicitation made to Byers, to kill Dr. Martin/King and the fact
that Dr. Maxey was employed at the same penitentiary that James Earl Ray

220

TM'nr-mrrr-ra SHEET CONTINUATION ; PAGK — 3 of 3

Ray was in- Hpwpypr P^n^al/Lyi-M -hagfnn hn. nria— f-U^-h 1-hi r- rnr mnrol y

s peculation on his part and that had no .^nbafantUI -^nrlpnrp T^hi.r’ - h

would link the two. . ' , —

Judge Randall also ind icated that he knew Russell Byers* brother-in-law',
John Paul Spica, and indicated t hat in‘the early 1960*s he had defended^*
a woman accused of homicide sucessfully and that John- Paul Spica had
been charged as another accomplice in the homicide and convicted! Judge ;
Randall stated that apparently the Spica family thought that- had * they -

221

Mr. Blakey. Judge Randall, this is an interview report prepared
by Mr. Conrad “Pete” Baetz of the staff. It is his report of Mr.
Baetz and Mr. Waxman’s July interview of you.

I would ask that you read it over if you like and let your counsel
take a look at it as well.

Judge Randall. Let me add this.

Mr. Blakey. Excuse me, Judge. I don’t mean to interrupt. If you
would read the whole report, then I would like to ask you one or
two questions about it.

Judge Randall. I wanted to add something I forgot.

He could not remember the attorney’s name at the time he
talked to me. Of course, I told the investigator that he could not
remember. This name was supplied by them.

Mr. Blakey. Have you had a chance to read the report?

Judge Randall. No.

Mr. Reed. I have not had a chance and I would appreciate your
forebearance for a few moments, please.

Judge Randall. Again, they supplied the name of the doctor.

Mr. Reed. I think we are prepared to reply.

Judge Randall. I have now read it, counsel.

Mr. Blakey. Would you characterize Mr. Baetz’ report as a fair
and accurate representation of their interview with you?

Judge Randall. I would characterize it as substantially correct.
There are certain things that he supplied that I did not know.

For example, names, I didn’t know names. There is one thing in
here that is a little incorrect. I am sure he did not mean to do so. I
did not know John Paul Spica. I knew of John Paul Spica. John
Paul Spica and a woman named — well, I think I might as well
explain it. There is no problem with this. Do you want me to
explain that?

Mr. Blakey. Certainly. Is there anything you want to add to that
report or your memory of it?

Judge Randall. Well, counsel doesn’t want me to get on to it,
but this is no problem.

Mr. Reed. I am going to object at this point. I am not quite sure I
understand how this particular sentence ties into the subject at
issue here.

I may be wrong, but I am concerned, again, that Judge Randall’s
position is such that he must be careful in terms of the kinds of
conversations that he divulges, particularly when they have no
relevance at all to the matter at issue here. I am merely trying to
protect him against any unwarranted intrusion into other clients’
rights and all.

Judge Randall. I appreciate the advice by counsel. He is very
capable, but I think the problem I have is that this is an error and
I think I ought to correct it and this has nothing to do with any
conversations with Mr. Byers. So I don’t have the problem.

Mr. Reed. May I consult with my client for a moment, please?

Judge Randall. I know I have a counsel who is much more able
than I am, but you know I have represented a bunch of lawyers in
my day. I tried a lot of prominent cases all over America and the
worst client you can have is a lawyer.

Mr. Reed. I will second that.

39-935 0 - 79 - 15

222

Judge Randall. I told my lawyer when he came here, I said, you
have the worst client in the world.

What I was going to tell you was John Paul Spica was charged
with conspiracy to murder a man named Myzak. Mrs. Myzak was
also charged with conspiracy to murder. The police thought some-
body else actually killed them. In Missouri we have no joint trials.
They are tried separately.

Norman London represented Mr. Spica. He was convicted and
got life. I represented Mrs. Myzak. She was found not guilty. So I
am kind of proud to say that.

Now I did not know John Paul Spica. This was back before I met
Mr. Byers. I tried the Myzak murder case in January of 1964. Paul
was tried in 1963.

The only thing I indicated here was that John Paul Spica’s
father was a fine man, a court official, a constable in one of our
courts. Everybody knows him. I was trying to say that people like
Byers and Paul’s father felt that if I had defended him, I would
have had the same success. The facts are I would not have because
the evidence was different, you know.

Mr. Blakey. If I understand your testimony correctly, Judge,
what you are indicating is that Mr. Baetz said you know Mr. Spica
when in fact you knew of him, but other than that, the report is
substantially accurate.

Judge Randall. Could I run through it if you don’t mind?

Let me say, first of all, I was ready to go out on the bench. I had
a jury waiting and this was a brief, hurried thing. We were all
under pressure. Russell Byers was familiar with John Paul Spica. I
did two legal things for Russell Byers. I was familiar with John
Paul Spica only by reputation. “He was interviewed by these two
investigators” and that is true. “He is now Circuit Judge in the
City of St. Louis and was interviewed in his chambers.”

“Mr. Randall advised that in 1960 he was attorney for Russell
Byers in certain cases which Byers had in criminal and civil
courts.”

The criminal is wrong. I never represented Mr. Byers in any
criminal matter. As a matter of fact, during the time I knew Mr.
Byers he was never arrested and you have to know why. He was on
probation and he never got in any trouble when he was on proba-
tion. That is the reason he incorporated the vending machine busi-
ness. He operated that. So I never represented him in any criminal
matter.

The “sixties” is inaccurate. You know, I started in 1968 and it
was 1968 and 1974. I don’t think these people deliberately did this
wrong. Don’t misunderstand me. This is normal. They took no
notes but wrote it up later.

Mr. Blakey. My only objective here is to make sure the record is
accurate.

Judge Randall. That is the reason I want to go through it all so
it will be accurate.

Judge Randall indicated he would be unable to speak about any conversation he
had with Russell Byers. It was his position that it would be a violation of profession-
al ethics.

223

That is not accurate. They immediately handed me the waiver of
attorney-client privilege and they told me they didn’t want to hear
about anything other than that.

Judge Randall was then supplied with a waiver of attorney-client privilege signed
by Mr. Byers.

That was the first thing that happened.

Upon seeing the waiver. Judge Randall indicated he would be more than willing
to cooperate. He said he would try to do anything possible.

I think I probably did that.

Judge Randall was specifically asked about any conversation that Russell Byers
had with him concerning solicitation to assassinate Dr. Martin Luther King.

I don’t think it was very specific. The time was short.

Mr. Blakey. If I might interrupt, in the interest of time perhaps
if you read it silently to yourself and then if you found a substan-
tial error you would just simply bring that to the committee’s
attention.

Judge Randall. I can read aloud about as fast as I can silent. I
probably was unsure of the date. I probably didn’t say very much
because 1 had not given it a lot of thought at that time.

He said that Byers was approached by John Sutherland.

That is wrong. He approached Sutherland and I didn’t know
Sutherland’s name. Sutherland is a patent lawyer, isn’t he?

Mr. Blakey. There is evidence in the rec 3 rd to that effect.

Chairman Stokes. Judge, would you suspend for a moment,
please.

Counsel, in light of the fact that we have the witness’ testimony
before the committee and there appear to be some inconsistencies
in the statement by staff counsel taken from him, it would seem to
me that we might dispense with having the Judge have to go
through here and pick out all the inconsistencies.

Judge Randall. Mr. Chairman, I am sure this man did not
deliberately do it. These are the kind of things that occur. There
were no notes taken, you understand; they are not significant.

Chairman Stokes. I understand that, but it seems to me that
unless counsel has some specific purpose for introducing Mr. Baetz’
documents, that we might avoid this time-consuming exercise.

Mr. Blakey. My purpose was to see if the Judge’s recollection of
that interview was roughly what the investigators had indicated to
us.

Judge Randall. Eighty percent correct.

Mr. Reed. Under those circumstances I would have no objection
to proceeding as the chairman suggested. I think the difficulty has
been that neither the Judge nor I was aware of the extent to which
the verbatim language of this statement might be used in terms of
directing your examination of him, if you understand what I am
saying.

It may be that these discrepancies are not material. But if that is
the case, then I think Professor Blakey can assure us of that and
we can proceed.

Mr. Blakey. The only question I would want to direct your
attention to in the interview is the next to the last paragraph, the
full paragraph beginning on page 3 which indicates, “Judge Ran-

224

dall indicated that he had no other information relative to either
Byers or Spica regarding the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. which would be of assistance to the committee.”

Is that substantially correct?

Judge Randall. That is correct. Of course, Spica never had any
connection with it as far as I know, gentlemen.

Chairman Stokes. In fairness to the Judge here since we have
interrupted his going through and getting all the inconsistencies
out of here, I would think that we ought to consider only that
portion of it which he has had a chance to correct before we
withdrew the document. Except for that portion you asked about.

Mr. Reed. I was going to ask that, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. Blakey. I have no objection to that.

If I could shift our attention a bit, Judge Randall, let me turn to
a different matter. We can come back to the interview later.

I ask that Martin Luther King exhibit F-575 be inserted in the
record at this time and given to the witness. It is an undated letter
to you postmarked November 3, 1978.

[The information follows:]

225

MLK Exhibit F-575

ST. LOUIS CIRCUIT COURT FOR CRIMINAL CAUSES

DIVISION NO. 22
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ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI 63103

MURRY L. RANDALL. SPECIAL JUDGE

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ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI 63103

MURRY L. RANDALL. SPECIAL JUDGE

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Judge Randall. To me?

Mr. Blakey. No, to the chairman. I wonder if you and your
counsel would have an opportunity to read it?

Judge Randall. I am familiar with this letter. I wrote it.

Mr. Blakey. Judge, let me direct your attention to page 3 and 4
and ask that you read for the record the second full paragraph on
page 3, beginning, “Yet my testimony” and continued through the
second paragraph on page 5 ending in “questioned by the FBI.”

Judge Randall. To all of them except the last paragraph, start-
ing at that point and read all except the last paragraph?

Mr. Blakey. Turn to pages 3 and 4.

Judge Randall. Yes, and read all of it until the last paragraph.
Is that what you are asking me, sir?

Mr. Blakey. Yes, sir.

The second paragraph on page 5 ending with “questioned by the
FBI.”

Judge Randall. All right.

Incidentally, I was trying to avoid a public hearing, you know
that.

Yet my testimony is of no real value to your investigation.

The remarks Mr. Byers made to me while representing him in a civil case (I never
represented him in any criminal case) occurred several months after similar re-
marks by Mr. Byers had been reported to the FBI.

Mr. Byers has told me that this report was made by one Richard O’Hara, a then
criminal partner of Mr. Byers. As with most stories fabricated by criminals, the
remarks only involved dead persons.

At about the time the remarks were reported to the FBI, Mr. Byers expressed
serious concern to me as to whether Mr. —

that was corrected to Mr. O’Hara in a subsequent letter, I made a
mistake —

whether Mr. O’Hara was an FBI informant.

I believe those remarks by Mr. O’Hara were fabricated and purposely planted
with Mr. O’Hara for the purpose of trying to learn whether Mr. O’Hara was an FBI
informant since the only person the FBI could possibly check with was Mr. Byers
himself.

The FBI apparently recognized them as such and did not interview Mr. Byers as
to do so would have endangered the life of its informant.

Mr. Byers then, I believe, told the story to me for the purpose of preparing me for
possible representation of him in the event he was questioned by the FBI.

That I wrote.

Mr. Blakey. I wonder if you would elaborate for the committee
and explain to the committee why you feel the story Mr. Byers told
you was a fabrication?

Judge Randall. Well, at the time, you understand, I did not
believe that. I didn’t give it serious concern, but I was representing
a man named Norm —

Mr. Reed. Just a moment, please. I would like to have an oppor-
tunity to consult with Judge Randall.

Judge Randall. Yes, I am ignoring my lawyer. I was represent-
ing a man who was charged with transporting stolen jewelry from
the city of St. Louis to Little Rock, Ark. I got that representation
right after New Year’s 1973. I tried the case, I think, about August.
It was presided over by Bill Webster. The crime had occurred, the
robbery. It was a robbery of an antique jewelry store in the Mary-
land Plaza Center.

232

It had occurred about August. Norman Journey was not arrested
until January. Shortly after the arrest, the two people who perpe-
trated the robbery — one named Petty, one named Emory — were
arrested and identified. They had tied the people in the chairs.

Shortly after that, Petty tried to kill Norm Journey. Let me
finish. This is all public information, Mr. Reed.

Then after that Petty killed Emory, near Little Rock, Ark. They
had taken this jewelry and sold half of it to a man whose name I
believe was McMillan, who owned the Hilton Hotel in there, in
Little Rock. He was the son of the chairman of Central Soya Corp.

After they sold part of it to McMillan, they chartered a plane
from police officers who ran a chartering company and flew to
Shreveport, La. where they are alleged to have sold the remainder
to the top Mafia man.

Shortly after that, the Little Rock police assassinated Petty.
They shot him 12 times with a shotgun, as he came out of the
store. All right.

Then Norman Journey was not arrested with him for several
months. Petty and Emory were living with two girls.

Mr. Reed. Pardon me.

Judge Randall. Well, this ties in — O’Hara — and I can’t tell it
without it. We are getting right down to the end of it to tell.

So these two girls, according to the reports, had been taken by
Petty and Emory to case the place about a month before, on their
way they visited Richard O’Hara. So, when they told their story,
Richard O’Hara was charged in a State charge with accessory to
the robbery along with the two girls.

It was later nolle prossed. The suspicions were that Richard
O’Hara was the informant. So Russell Byers came to me

Mr. Blakey. Judge, this is the informant in the jewelry robbery
case?

Judge Randall. Right. Russell Byers came to me, and this was
public information, and asked me is Richard O’Hara the informant
in this case. I said I don’t know. I said why do you want to know.
He said well, I have been questioned by an FBI agent about some-
thing and I think only Richard O’Hara knows.

Mr. Blakey. Just a second, Judge. Could we pinpoint when this
conversation between Mr. Byers and you was?

Judge Randall. The best I can tell you it was during my repre-
sentation. My best recollection is that proceeded from January of
1973 until about August of 1973, sir. That is the best. You know, I
can’t pinpoint these things.

Mr. Blakey. Just your best recollection.

Judge Randall. So when we met at the Gianinos, he immediate-
ly started in with Richard O’Hara.

Now, you see, I gave this no thought, but there is certain things
about the story, and I may be wrong, you know. It is only my
opinion. You gentlemen have got to reach your own. I am not
trying to influence yours.

But here he comes to me sometime in 1974 and says the story is
somewhere, and he wants legal advice. I think that it is a good
possibility that he told that story to O’Hara thinking if I am
questioned about it, I will know he is the informant because he was

233

dealing with this man, you understand. He wasn’t worried about
these other things.

Now, you asked the basis of my opinion. I gave it to you. I am
not trying to sell it to you.

Mr. Blakey. You have no specific information that would sup-
port that speculation as to why Byers told you the Sutherland offer
back in May of 1974?

Judge Randall. I have no information except what I have relat-
ed to you. I don’t know whether you call that specific or general.

Mr. Blakey. Did Mr. Byers ever indicate to you anything specifi-
cally that would lead you to conclude that he was trying to identify
O’Hara as the informant?

Judge Randall. Oh, he told me he did identify him. Oh, yes.

Mr. Blakey. He was trying to identify it by telling O’Hara the
story about Dr. King.

Judge Randall. Sir, what he was trying to find out if he could,
whether O’Hara was an informant because he wanted to quit work-
ing with him if he was an informant. He wanted to quit dealing
with him.

Mr. Blakey. Let me see, Judge, if I can clarify somewhat what
the record is on this story.

It is your belief that Mr. Byers was trying to identify Mr. O’Hara
as an informant for the FBI by planting with Mr. O’Hara the Dr.
King offer story, hoping that the FBI would check the O’Hara story
with Mr. Byers himself, and if Mr. O’Hara and the Bureau fell for
the ploy, Mr. Byers could then identify Mr. O’Hara as an FBI
informant. Is that the essence of it?

Judge Randall. Yes. That is all in my belief. It has nothing to
do with this committee.

Mr. Reed. It should be clearly identified as such, I think, Mr.
Blakey, that it is only an opinion. I think it is an accurate para-
phrase of what he said. But it must be characterized as an opinion
of Judge Randall’s.

Judge Randall. I think that is what Mr. Blakey says, my belief
and opinion.

Mr. Blakey. Perhaps, Judge, the committee might find it useful
if you and I discuss that opinion. Would you mind?

Judge Randall. I have discussed all I know about it.

Mr. Blakey. OK.

You had known Mr. Byers for some years, hadn’t you?

Judge Randall. No.

Mr. Blakey. Well, I mean you had some contact with him peri-
odically?

Judge Randall. I didn’t know him very well.

Mr. Blakey. Did you have an opportunity while you did have
contact with him to make a judgment about his basic intelligence
or maybe native shrewdness?

Mr. Reed. At this point, Professor Blakey, I am going to have to
object. I think that the questioning has now ranged far afield from
the area from which substantive evidence with respect to this
matter could be expected to derive.

As a result, I think that the further questioning with respect to
this collateral matter is inappropriate. I don’t think the judge has
prepared, and I am certainly not prepared to advise him as to the

234

area in which you are presently questioning him. I don’t see the
relevance.

Mr. Blakey. I will withdraw the question.

Mr. Reed. Thank you.

Mr. Blakey. OK. Let me see if I can clarify one other thing,
Judge Randall.

You did not give to the committee investigators your speculation
when you were interviewed in July of

Mr. Reed. I will object to that.

Judge Randall. I will answer it.

Mr. Blakey. If I may finish the question, it might not be objec-
tionable.

At least if I understand your testimony correctly to the degree
that the interview report did not include it, and you indicated to
the committee that the interview report was substantially accu-
rate, do I understand your testimony today as being that you did
not give it to the committee investigators in July because you had
not had a — you had a subsequent conversation with Mr. Byers in
which the informant issue arose?

Judge Randall. Sir

Mr. Reed. Hold it.

Judge Randall. No, let me answer. First, I didn’t even know
there was an FBI report. The committee investigators didn’t tell
me about that. I learned that later.

Mr. Blakey. That is the point that I am trying to develop.

Judge Randall. So I didn’t have the speculation then.

Mr. Blakey. That is right. And therefore omitting it from — not
mentioning it to the investigators is really of no evidentiary signifi-
cance.

Judge Randall. Absolutely none, sir.

Mr. Blakey. Your testimony here today, then, is consistent with
the testimony to investigators every time?

Judge Randall. I hope so.

Mr. Blakey. You see the point I was trying to develop, both in
bringing out the interview report that did not include speculation
and the speculation today.

I wouldn’t want this record to indicate Judge Randall came up
with speculation subsequent and could have given it to the commit-
tee investigators at an earlier point in time.

Judge Randall. I appreciate that.

Mr. Reed. I don’t

Judge Randall. All right.

Mr. Blakey. I wonder, Judge Randall, if you would read now for
the record the rest of your letter, beginning in the beginning.

Judge Randall. Well, of course the purpose of this letter is I
had requested the staff to let me testify in executive session. That
had been rejected.

Your committee has subpenaed me to testify publicly in a matter concerning one
Russell Byers, who is known here to be one of the most dangerous criminals in this
city. He has received a lot of publicity here in recent months.

Just a few months ago in the course of an ongoing investigation. . .

This is all newspaper stuff, as you know —

235

. . . here of him by the FBI and police with respect to assaults on one Finer and
related matters, it was reported in the public press that his principal associate in
crime was murdered almost immediately after the associate visited an FBI office.

I believe that this man’s murder was arranged by the person to whom he and Mr.
Byers —

This was all newspaper stuff—

. . . had sold the statues stolen from the museum, and Mr. Byers is now fearful
that this publicity is classing him as an informant and this same fate will occur to
him.

I had evidence of that as I met with him. He was scared. He told
me this publicity had him on the spot. He was angry. He said he
wasn’t going to testify before television. He was angry that the
committee seemed to indicate he was in on the plot, which he
claimed he wasn’t.

I believe my public testimony and that of Mr. Byers will endanger lives, including
my own.

That is the rest of my letter.

Mr. Blakey. Thank you, Judge Randall. I have no further ques-
tions at this time.

Judge Randall. And let me tell you something else. No, I got to
add something. I also was fearful that the FBI, if that name came
out here, would accuse me of not reporting it to them.

I had been negligent. I knew that for 2 months. I should have
reported it sooner. So, I sent a copy of this to Bill Webster, FBI
Director, because I didn’t want to appear here in public testimony
and blow the name of an informant and then be accused of, you
know, failing to report it.

But then I got scared; the informant would be in danger, if you
want to know the truth about it. OK?

Mr. Blakey. Thank you, Judge.

Chairman Stokes. At this time the Chair will recognize the
gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford, for such time as he may
consume, after which the committee will resort to the 5-minute
rule.

Mr. Reed. If you please, Mr. Chairman, at this point I would
respectfully ask the committee if a brief recess is in order. Judge
Randall I think would like to refresh himself. I know I certainly
would, and I think we would be in much better position to continue
after 2 or 3 minutes.

Judge Randall. If this isn’t going to take long, I am going to
overrule you again.

Mr. Reed. Your Honor, I won’t be overruled in this case. If you
wouldn’t mind. Two or three minutes I think would be sufficient.

Chairman Stokes. How much time would counsel desire, then?

Mr. Reed. Two or three minutes would be sufficient, I think.

Chairman Stokes. The committee will now suspend for 5 min-
utes.

Mr. Reed. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. We will be in recess for 5 minutes.

[Brief recess.]

Chairman Stokes. The committee will come to order.

The Chair at this time recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee,
Mr. Ford.

Mr. Ford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

236

Judge Randall, I again would like to welcome you.

Judge Randall. How are you, Congressman?

Mr. Ford. Fine, thank you very much.

Judge Randall, when Mr. Byers discussed with you the conversa-
tion he had with Kauffmann to kill Dr. King, did you give him any
legal advice as to his possible involvement in the assassination?

Judge Randall. No, sir. The thing he wanted to know from
me

Mr. Reed. Judge, you have answered that question.

Judge Randall. He wants me to stop. You will have to ask
another question.

Mr. Ford. Well, why not?

Judge Randall. Well, he didn’t ask me what to do. His only
question was if I get questioned, he was trying to determine should
I talk or should I insist on immunity. He asked me the procedure
for immunity.

You see, this is not something he thought was imminent. You
know, he just wanted to be a little prepared. I told him the proce-
dure was you appear before the grand jury, take the fifth amend-
ment, go in open court, and get immunity, and went back.

He was trying to decide in his mind if I am questioned about
this, shall I talk or shall I insist on immunity. He didn’t like the
immunity because he didn’t want the publicity. But there was no
thought about reporting it.

Hell, this was 10 years after the event, and everybody is dead.
You know, you don’t think about reporting it if everybody is dead
and it is 10 years old.

Mr. Ford. Judge Randall, did you personally take any action
upon the information Mr. Byers had shared with you?

Judge Randall. Took the action of advising him what he should
do if he is questioned about it, yes.

Mr. Ford. Turning now to page 1 of this confidential letter
addressed to Chairman Stokes, I have here I think it is your first
paragraph, maybe your second paragraph. You talk about Russell
Byers, who is known here to be one of the most dangerous crimi-
nals in the city.

Could you explain that to the committee, please?

Judge Randall. Well, you know, I don’t want to go into all the
stuff that is reported out in St. Louis in the press. You can read
the press.

Mr. Ford. But you said it in your letter. Could you tell us what
you meant by that particular statement in your letter?

Judge Randall. What is in the press out there, gentlemen.

Mr. Ford. You had read it in the press.

Judge Randall. Yes, sir.

Mr. Ford. And you included that in this letter?

Judge Randall. Yes, sir.

Mr. Ford. Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield back the balance
of my time.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman yields back the balance of his
time.

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer.

Mr. Preyer. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine.

237

Mr. Devine. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from the District of Columbia,
Mr. Fauntroy.

Mr. Fauntroy. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian.

Mr. Fithian. No questions.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer.

Judge, obviously this is a sign that you have done a very thor-
ough job here. There are no questions from the committee. I have
none.

Does counsel have anything further?

Mr. Blakey. I don't have any questions. I would once again,
Judge, like to express the appreciation of the committee, the staff,
for your taking time to come here. You have been of great help to
us.

I am sorry if my questioning sometimes seemed dense. I have
had it said among my students in class that they didn t always
understand what I was getting at, either.

Judge Randall. Well, Professor, they weren’t dense to me. They
were dense to my counsel.

Mr. Reed. May I object in the record.

Judge Randall. He can object to that.

Chairman Stokes. Judge, prior to extending to you the 5 minutes
which you are entitled to as a witness before this committee, let
me say on behalf of our committee how very pleased we are to
have had your appearance here today.

We certainly regret any inconvenience caused the State of Mis-
souri or your courtroom by having asked you to come here. But it
was imperative that we have your testimony in this matter.

I think it is a matter that is important to the Nation and you
certainly made an outstanding contribution to the work of this
committee by appearing here today.

Judge Randall. I only have one thing to say. I take back all the
things I said to the staff. I feel different now. If you want to know
what they are, ask them.

Chairman Stokes. I must officially also extend to you under the
rules of our committee, either you or your counsel, at the conclu-
sion of your testimony you are entitled to 5 minutes for the pur-
pose of any statement you care to make.

Judge Randall. I have none.

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Reed?

Mr. Reed. I have none on his behalf. Thank you again.

Chairman Stokes. All right. We thank you both for your appear-
ance here. You are excused at this time.

Judge Randall. You want these copies back that you loaned us,
is that right?

Chairman Stokes. At this time the committee will recess until 2
p.m. this afternoon.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the select committee recessed, to re-
convene at 2 p.m.]

39-935 0 - 79 - 16

238

Afternoon Session

Chairman Stokes. The committee will come to order.

The Chair recognizes counsel, Mr. Mathews.

Mr. Mathews. Mr. Chairman, Lawrence Weenick is the other
attorney told by Mr. Byers of the offer to murder Dr. King. Mr.
Weenick is presently in private law practice in Clayton, Mo.

It would be appropriate, Mr. Chairman, to call Mr. Weenick.

Chairman Stokes. The committee calls Mr. Weenick.

Please raise your right hand and be sworn.

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you shall give before
this committee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but
the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Weenick. I do.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. You may be seated.

The Chair recognizes staff counsel, Ron Adrine.

Mr. Adrine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

TESTIMONY OF LAWRENCE WEENICK, ATTORNEY, CLAYTON,

MO.

Mr. Adrine. Mr. Weenick, would you state your full name for
the record, please, and spell your last name?

Mr. Weenick. Lawrence Weenick, W-e-e-n-i-c-k.

Mr. Adrine. And, Mr. Weenick, are you currently employed?

Mr. Weenick. I’m in the private practice of law in Clayton, Mo.

Mr. Adrine. Now were you engaged in the practice of law in the
early 1970’s?

Mr. Weenick. Yes, I was.

Mr. Adrine. And where was your practice located at that time?

Mr. Weenick. In Clayton.

Mr. Adrine. Mr. Weenick, have you been supplied with a copy of
the committee’s rules?

Mr. Weenick. Yes, I have.

Mr. Adrine. And have you had an opportunity to read those
rules over?

Mr. Weenick. I read them over, yes.

Mr. Adrine. And do you understand those rules?

Mr. Weenick. I understand them.

Mr. Adrine. Sir, you are here under subpena today?

Mr. Weenick. Yes, I am.

Mr. Adrine. Have you ever represented an individual named
Russell G. Byers?

Mr. Weenick. Yes.

Mr. Adrine. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to request
that the witness be shown Martin Luther King exhibit No. F-576.

Chairman Stokes. You are asking that it be made a part of the
record also?

Mr. Adrine. Yes.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the
record at this point and shown to the witness.

[The information follows:]

239

2WUUY8

' ' t • . . .

i :

WAIVER OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

/":■;/ \

: \.V. \ ^ '■

I* RUSSELL BYERS* hereby waive my attorney-client privilege with
respect to any and all communications or documents between
Lawrence N„ Weenlck and myself concerning an offer, solicitation,
or plan to assassinate or harm the person of Martin Luther King, Jr.

MLK Exhibit F-576

240

Mr. Adrine. Thank you.

Mr. Weenick. The document you have in front of you I think you
have seen before, and it is a waiver of the attorney-client privilege
between yourself and Mr. Byers; is that correct?

Mr. Weenick. Yes. I have seen it and I have a copy of it.

Mr. Adrine. Is it a fact, sir, when you were first approached by
committee investigators that you requested to see this document
before you would talk to them about anything that occurred be-
tween you and Mr. Byers during this time frame?

Mr. Weenick. Well, when Mr. Baetz and Mr. Waxman first came
to see me, I wasn’t at liberty to tell them anything; and subse-
quently they brought this document over to me, at which time I
discussed what they wanted to know.

Mr. Adrine. But it is correct to characterize your reluctance as a
concern for the attorney-client privilege; is that correct?

Mr. Weenick. That’s correct.

Mr. Adrine. Therefore, having seen this document, you realize
that you are now free to discuss those matters that relate to the
incidents that we are investigating before the committee; is that
correct?

Mr. Weenick. That’s right.

Mr. Adrine. Mr. Weenick, what type of matters did you repre-
sent Mr. Byers on?

Mr. Weenick. Oh, they were all civil matters. He had been sued
several times, had a problem with the IRS.

Mr. Adrine. Do you recall when your representation of Mr.
Byers began?

Mr. Weenick. Well, I knew Mr. Byers before I started represent-
ing him, and I don’t know when it was. It was sometime after
Judge Randall went into law practice, because it was my under-
standing that Judge Randall represented Mr. Byers prior to the
time he became a judge.

Mr. Adrine. Did you hear Judge Randall indicate that he en-
tered into the judgeship or gave up his private practice sometime
in 1973 or 1974?

Mr. Weenick. Yes.

Mr. Adrine. Does that comport with your recollection?

Mr. Weenick. Probably close to it.

Mr. Adrine. Did there ever come a time when Mr. Byers spoke
to you about the existence of a plot to kill Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr.?

Mr. Weenick. He spoke to me about an offer made to him;
whether it was a plot or not, I don’t know.

Mr. Adrine. And do you recall when he spoke to you about the
offer?

Mr. Weenick. No. It was sometime after he spoke to Judge
Randall. I think Judge Randall testified this morning that it was
sometime in 1974, and it was after that, because I remember Mr.
Byers told me that he had told Judge Randall about this. So it had
to be after that time, and I don’t know when.

Mr. Adrine. So as a result he would have had to have told you
about this offer sometime subsequent to the time that Dr. King had
been killed?

Mr. Weenick. Oh, yes, quite a bit after that.

241

Mr. Adrine. Several years, as a matter of fact?

Mr. Weenick. Oh, yes.

Mr. Adrine. Now, did Mr. Byers reveal any of the details of that
offer to you?

Mr. Weenick. Well, he told me what had transpired. If that’s
what you mean by “details.”

Mr. Adrine. That’s correct.

Would you relate what you can recall from that conversation?

Mr. Weenick. Well, it was a very brief conversation, and I really
don’t know how it came up, but he told me that he had been
approached one day by John Kauffmann, and Mr. Kauffmann had
asked Mr. Byers if he — if Mr. Byers — wanted to make some money.

I think the figure was $50,000, and I guess Mr. Byers said,
“Sure,” he’d be interested in it; and Mr. Kauffmann then took Mr.
Byers to a man’s house down in Imperial or Barnhart, Mo., a man
by the name of John Sutherland, at which time Mr. Sutherland
repeated the offer to Mr. Byers, to pay him the sum of $50,000 to
either kill or procure the killing of Dr. Martin Luther King.

Mr. Adrine. Were you told any of the details or the descriptions
of the places where the meeting was held?

Mr. Weenick. Yes. It was at Mr. Sutherland’s house, and Mr.
Byers briefly described the house to me, at least some of the
interior furnishings, which consisted primarily of a large carpet,
either in the den or in the entry hall — I don’t recall which — which
was made to resemble a Confederate battle flag; and the walls of
the study or the den was hung with another Confederate flag and
various other military-type paraphernalia.

Mr. Adrine. Did Mr. Byers give you a personal description of the
individual with whom he met?

Mr. Weenick. Mr. Sutherland?

Mr. Adrine. That’s correct.

Mr. Weenick. No.

Mr. Adrine. Did Mr. Byers indicate to you where the money —
the $50,000 — was to come from?

Mr. Weenick. No, he did not.

Mr. Adrine. Did he give you any indication as to why he — that
is, Mr. Byers — had been selected to have this offer made to him?

Mr. Weenick. No, he didn’t.

Mr. Adrine. Did Mr. Byers indicate to you whether or not he
had agreed to the undertaking?

Mr. Weenick. He told me no, that he refused their offer and,
really, he didn’t really consider it very seriously.

Mr. Adrine. Sir, did you know John Sutherland?

Mr. Weenick. No, I never met John Sutherland.

Mr. Adrine. Did you know of him?

Mr. Weenick. I had heard about him. He was a patent lawyer in
the city of St. Louis. I don’t believe I ever met him.

Mr. Adrine. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

Chairman Stokes. The Chair at this time will recognize the
gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford, for such time as he may
consume.

Mr. Ford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Weenick, I want to pick up where counsel left off.

242

Did you ever turn over this information to the authorities prior
to the time you were contacted by this committee?

Mr. Weenick. No, I did not.

Mr. Ford. Do you mind telling the committee why not?

Mr. Weenick. I was not at liberty to turn it over to them.

Mr. Ford. Sir, isn’t it a fact that your client, Mr. Byers, denied
accepting the offer to kill Dr. King?

Mr. Weenick. Yes, that’s correct.

Mr. Ford. Then what was the purpose of keeping this informa-
tion privileged?

Mr. Weenick. Well, it was not up to me, Mr. Ford, to tell
anybody about this thing. If Mr. Byers wanted it to be known, then
it was his duty to tell them, not mine.

Mr. Ford. The fact that you represented Mr. Kauffmann, did it
in any way influence the advice that you gave Mr. Byers concern-
ing this information?

Mr. Weenick. I think Mr. Kauffmann was already dead when
Mr. Byers told me this, so it would not have made any difference.

Mr. Ford. Did you ever consider going to the authorities with
what you knew?

Mr. Weenick. Did I ever?

Mr. Ford. Yes.

Mr. Weenick. No.

Mr. Ford. Were you specifically instructed not to tell anyone
about the plot?

Mr. Weenick. By Mr. Byers, do you mean?

Mr. Ford. Yes.

Mr. Weenick. Well, Mr. Ford, any time a lawyer is told some-
thing in his capacity as an attorney, when the client-attorney
relationship has been established, we are not allowed or authorized
to tell anybody what has been communicated to us, unless, of
course, the client authorizes us to do so.

Mr. Ford. But what about your client, Mr. Byers, did you ever
advise him as to what he should do with the information?

Mr. Weenick. He didn’t ask me.

Mr. Ford. So you never advised him of what to do?

Mr. Weenick. Well, you have to understand this was some, oh, I
guess, 6 or 7 years after Dr. King had been killed. Mr. Ray had
been apprehended. The thing was ended. There was no talk of a
conspiracy, nothing of any kind or description; so there really
wasn’t any sense to it as far as I could see.

Mr. Ford. What type of relationship did you enjoy with Mr.
Kauffmann when you represented him?

Mr. Weenick. Well, I was his attorney.

Mr. Ford. Just his attorney?

Mr. Weenick. Right.

Mr. Ford. You represented Mr. Kauffmann, who Mr. Byers says
was the person that set up the meeting where he was offered the
money to kill Dr. King. Were you familiar with that?

Mr. Weenick. I heard him testify to that, yes.

Mr. Ford. You heard it where?

Mr. Weenick. Right here, this morning, I heard Mr. Byers say
that.

243

Mr. Ford. So you are saying Mr. Kauffmann was dead when you
learned of this?

Mr. Weenick. I believe he was, yes, because it was sometime that
I heard about this in late 1974 or 1975, and Mr. Kauffmann died in
1974.

Mr. Ford. But you never heard Mr. Kauffmann talking about
this; is that correct?

Mr. Weenick. No. I had no more dealings with Mr. Kauffmann
after about December of 1968; and I had not talked to him since
that time.

Mr. Ford. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman yields back the balance of his
time.

Mr. Weenick, let me ask you this: The testimony we received
from Mr. Byers is, of course, very important testimony, because, if
believed, it gives an outline to the possibility of conspiracy to kill
Dr. Martin Luther King. In support of his testimony, we have now
heard the supporting testimony of a sitting judge and yours as a
practicing attorney, which gives credence to the testimony of this
witness, and, of course, the committee ultimately will have to
determine the credibility of this witness based upon whatever testi-
mony comes before this committee.

I would ask you this question: Knowing what you know of Mr.
Byers, are you in a position to be able to tell the committee
whether you would believe him under oath?

Mr. Weenick. Well, let me say this to you, Mr. Stokes: Mr. Byers
had absolutely no reason to tell me this at the time he told it to
me, or any other time. Whether he made it up or not, I don’t know.
There was — there seems to be no credible reason why he would
have made it up and told it to me and to Mr. Randall, and evident-
ly to this other person who was an FBI informant.

I don’t know what his motive would have been.

Certainly I can’t say for certain that he is not lying, but I
certainly don’t know what his motive would be for doing so.

Chairman Stokes. And that’s the precise question I was really
addressing, is whether the witness would have any motivation to
lie, and if so, what that motivation would be.

Mr. Weenick. I can’t think of a reason why.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you very much.

I have no further questions.

The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine.

Mr. Devine. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr.
Preyer.

Mr. Preyer. Thank you.

Following up on what the Chairman’s questions to you were,
when Mr. Byers told you this, was he seeking legal advice relating
to this incident?

Mr. Weenick. As far as I can recall, he just told it to me. I recall
it was in my office, and we had been discussing another matter,
and it may have been around the time Mr. Kauffmann died — I’m
not real sure — and that may have been what prompted him to tell
me. I really can’t recall.

Mr. Preyer. It was in your office?

244

Mr. Weenick. Yes.

Mr. Preyer. Not at a neighborhood bar or something like that?

Mr. Weenick. No.

Mr. Preyer. And you were discussing legal matters at the time
when he was visiting you in your office?

Mr. Weenick. Yes, to the best of my recollection. I don’t know
why he would have been there otherwise.

Mr. Preyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian.

Mr. Fithian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have one question: I wasn’t sure, and I want you to clarify it for
me. You said that he, meaning Byers, “told me he never took it
very seriously.”

Would you clarify for me what you meant by that?

Mr. Weenick. Well, what I mean by that is that I don’t think he
ever seriously considered accepting the offer.

Mr. Fithian. But you were not alluding to a question of the
seriousness of the offer on the part of those who were proffering it?

Mr. Weenick. I would think that if they had made the offer they
were probably serious. I don’t know.

Mr. Fithian. Was there anything about Mr. Byers’ demeanor or
comment, or your own observation that would shed any light on it
for the committee as to whether you felt that when he told you this
that he was telling you about a serious offer by these folks?

Mr. Weenick. I think he thought they were serious at the time.
That was the impression he left with me.

Mr. Fithian. Thank you.

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. Any
further members of the committee seeking further recognition?

Mr. Weenick, under the rules of our committee, when a witness
has completed his testimony before this committee, the witness is
entitled under our rules to 5 minutes during which time he can
explain or amplify his testimony in any way he so desires. I would
extend to you 5 minutes for that purpose, if you so desire.

Mr. Weenick. I have nothing further, Mr. Stokes.

Chairman Stokes. I certainly, on behalf of the committee, want
to thank you for your appearance here and for your cooperation
with the staff and with this committee, and we are indebted to you
for your testimony here today. Thank you very much.

Mr. Weenick. Thank you.

Chairman Stokes. The Chair recognizes Mr. Mathews.

Mr. Mathews. Mr. Chairman, before we call our last witness, it
is necessary, in order to clarify the record, to recall Mr. Byers for
one additional question.

I might note, too, Mr. Chairman, he still will continue to invoke
rule 6. Therefore, an order may be appropriate to indicate to the
media that the cameras, radios, tapes, et cetera, should be shut
down.

Chairman Stokes. At this time then, the witness having request-
ed the invocation of rule 6, the media are asked to comply with
that rule of the committee, which provides that no photography or
other recording of the witness be made; and the Chair would also

245

extend the application of Rule 6 to the hallway area which is
immediately adjacent to the hearing room, as per the request of
the witness.

Mr. Mathews. It might be appropriate now, Mr. Chairman, to
recall Mr. Byers.

Chairman Stokes. The committee recalls Mr. Byers.

The Chair would say further, this witness being under U.S. Mar-
shal security, all persons are requested to remain in their seats
anytime the witness is either entering or departing from the hear-
ing room.

The record will reflect that the witness, Mr. Byers, has returned
to the hearing room and is accompanied by counsel, Mr. Jim Ham-
ilton of the District of Columbia Bar.

Mr. Byers, the Chair would admonish you that you are still
under the oath which I administered to you this morning. Do you
understand that?

Mr. Byers. I understand it.

Chairman Stokes. All right. The Chair recognizes Professor
Blakey.

TESTIMONY OF RUSSELL GEORGE BYERS, ATTORNEY, CLAY-
TON, MO., ACCOMPANIED BY COUNSEL, JAMES HAMILTON—

Resumed

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Byers, after you testified this morning, Judge
Randall appeared and testified, and he indicated that he had
racked his memory and done the best he could to recall as many
details about his conversation with you as he could, and he gave
the committee his best recollection of what you said to him, and
what he said to you.

After comparing and contrasting his memory against your testi-
mony, there were several items that I thought it might be appro-
priate to clarify in the record. Nevertheless, based on conversation
with your counsel and his representations, I would only ask you
one question at this time.

Judge Randall indicated that his memory was — and the record
will, of course, correct me if I am wrong for misstating — that in the
conversation with Mr. Sutherland you questioned him, that is, Mr.
Sutherland, in detail, and learned — Judge Randall remembered —
names of other members of the organization that were apparently
going to be the source of the financing of Dr. King’s killing.

My question to you, therefore, is: Is it your best recollection that
you did, in fact, learn the names of other members of that southern
organization?

Mr. Byers. No names at all, to the best of my recollection,
nobody. If he recollects something, it’s beyond me.

Mr. Blakey. Do you recall any aspect of the conversation in
which Mr. Sutherland indicated that there were other members of
the organization?

Mr. Byers. No. When he said “secret southern society,” he men-
tioned no names, and I pressed for no names.

Mr. Blakey. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Any other member of the committee seeking
recognition?

Mr. Fithian. Just one clarification, if I may, Mr. Chairman.

246

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian.

Mr. Fithian. Did Mr. Sutherland refer to the southern organiza-
tion by title?

Mr. Byers. By what?

Mr. Fithian. By title, by name of organization, as distinct

Mr. Byers. No; just a secret southern society or organization that
he belonged to; that was all.

Mr. Fithian. But he did say he was a member of it?

Mr. Byers. The best I remember, to phrase him, he says, “We” —
it’s been a long time; I’m trying to remember — “We belong to a
secret southern organization” — or “society”. He could have said “I”
or “We.” I cannot be sure.

Mr. Fithian. But you have the impression that he did belong to
this organization?

Mr. Byers. That’s just my impression, that he did, yes.

Mr. Fithian. I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Do you recall him saying anything about
there being prominent people?

Mr. Byers. No; I recall nothing of that nature.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you.

I would again at this time, concluding your testimony before this
committee— we will now release you from further testimony— I
would extend to you, either you or your counsel, 5 minutes under
the rules of this committee, if there is any further statement you
or your counsel care to make to the committee.

Mr. Byers. We can’t think of another thing to say.

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Byers, I want to thank you, on behalf of
the committee, for your cooperation with both the committee and
our staff, and for the testimony you have given this committee
here today. Thank you very much. You are excused.

Also, persons are requested to remain in their seats while the
witness departs the room.

Rule 6 of the committee is now hereby lifted and you can resume
coverage of the hearings.

The Chair recognizes counsel, Mr. Mathews.

Mr. Mathews. Mr. Chairman, following Mr. Byers’ appearance
in executive session before the King subcommittee on May 9, 1978,
the committee took Mr. Byers’ testimony seriously and it concen-
trated a major share of its investigative resources and time on
exploring the possible relation between the conspiracy manifested
in the offer to Mr. Byers and the events in Memphis.

Here this afternoon to present the results to date of that effort is
Edward Evans, the chief investigator of the King task force.

It would be appropriate now, Mr. Chairman, to call Mr. Edward
Evans.

Chairman Stokes. The Chair calls Mr. Evans.

Mr. Evans, the Chair would admonish you that you have been
previously sworn in these hearings and the application of that oath
would apply at this time. Do you understand that?

Mr. Evans. Yes, sir.

Chairman Stokes. You may proceed.

247

TESTIMONY OF EDWARD EVANS, CHIEF INVESTIGATOR,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS— Resumed

Mr. Evans. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, the FBI
memorandum that first brought to the attention of the committee
the allegation of a conspiracy in Missouri to assassinate Dr. King is
dated March 13, 1978. It relates that an FBI informant sometime in
March 1974, reported that the informant had been party to a
conversation late in 1973 in which, according to the informant, a
Mr. Byers claimed to have been made an offer for $10,000 to
$20,000 to murder Dr. King.

It would be appropriate now, Mr. Chairman, to introduce that
memorandum as MLK exhibit F-577.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the
record.

[The information follows:]

MLK Exhibit F-577

200001 Ba. f- 5VS

S' f

h 20 . 1973

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE C;T ASS AS3I2IATIG- IS
UY S. HOUSE OF EEPRESEHTATF/ES (ESC A)

In connection with the HSCA’s Investigation Into
the assassination of* Martin Luther Ming, Jr., the St. Louis
Office of the F3I surfaced information during a file review
in an unrelated matter which it is believed is of interest
to the Committee. This information concerning a St. Louis
informant discussing with (first name not furnished) Beyers
several individuals who may have information germane to the
HSCA T s investigation was furnished to FBI Headquarters, in the
attached memorandum dated March 13, 1973.

In order to facilitate the Committee’s evaluation
of the information contained in above-mentioned memorandum,
the St . Louis Office was asked to furnish background' data
on Beyers. On Ilarch 17, 1978, the St. Louis Office
telephonically furnished the following;

HAKE: Russell George Beyers

DOB: August 19, 1931 . • ■

- FBI NUMBER: 101-3113

The information contained in the memorandum of
March M3 , 1978, was discovered as a result of a file review
conducted for- background data on Beyers who was recently
arrested by the St. Louis Police Department for his alleged
, participation in the burglary of aEt.-Lbuis museum.'- '

M Where - information" is not provided, it -is because

. not retrievable or is not being furnished 'pursuant to ■

. the Memorandum, . o f Understahding . t

248

L.NiTLD sTATKS 0 LlW.iTsl KNT i'>F j'l .*

;‘tUKUAi i ; l i: r a i: or iM‘E- i Tu;.\Ti'*N
j tsiiiMirov. im:.-

March 13 j 1978

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE OH ASSASS IHATIOHS
O’. S. HOUSE 0? REPRESENTATIVES (ESCA)

20060 i

In the course of a file review conducted at the
St. Louis FBI Office in an unrelated matter, a St. Louis
informant file was reviewed. This file contained a contact
memorandum dated Ilarch 19 , 197^ , which set forth information
relating to several criminal natters and also contained the
following paragraph:

-During the Fall of 1973, five or sir months ago,
date not recalled. Beyers came to the shop inquiring as
to whether they could get together to talk, and they later
did so at Pizza and Cream, Clayton, Missouri, in the area
of a Broad -Dugan Paint Store, where informant had traveled
on business. Beyers talked freely about himself and his
business, and they later went to informants house where
Beyers told a story about visiting a lawyer in St. Louis
County, now deceased, not further identified, who had
offered to give him a contract to kill Z-Iartin Luther £ing.

He said that also present was a short, stocky man. who
walked with a limp. (Later, with regard to the la.tter
individual, Beyers commented that this man was actually
the individual who made the payoff of James Earl Ray after
the killing. ) Beyers said he had declined to accept this
contract. He did remark that this lawyer had confederate*
flags and other' items about the house that might indicate
that he was r a real rebel T . Beyers also commented that
he had .been offered either $10, 00Q or $20,000 to .kill King.-

... '.wv .3 Extensive, further ^research in the St. -Louis indices •
and files failed to reveal this "information was in. any ~ Way ?

"... disseminated and the .information simply reposes in the informant .

249

Mr. Evans. As we now know from Mr. Byers’ testimony before
this committee, the alleged offer by John Sutherland was set up by
John Kauffmann and it was made in late 1966 or early 1967, and it
was for $50,000. Mr. Byers said in 1974, as he said today, that he
did not accept the offer.

What follows is a report of the select committee’s investigation of
the Byers allegation:

Byers was located at his home in Rock Hill, Mo., a suburb of St.
Louis. He initially denied any knowledge of the offer, but after
consultation with his attorney he indicated that he might have
information relevant to the committee’s inquiry but that he would
only reveal it under subpena and with a guarantee of immunity.

Following issuance of a subpena, Mr. Byers appeared before the
King subcommittee on May 9 and he was granted immunity under
title II of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 pursuant to an
order issued by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.

Mr. Byers’ executive session testimony may be outlined as fol-
lows:

In late 1966 or early 1967 — he wasn’t sure which— Mr. Byers was
approached by John Kauffmann, a friend and business associate,
and asked if he would like to earn $50,000. When Mr. Byers asked,
“What do I have to do?” Mr. Kauffmann told him to meet him that
evening.

Mr. Byers met with Mr. Kauffmann at 6:30 that evening and
together they went to the home of John Sutherland, a St. Louis
patent attorney. Mr. Sutherland’s home was in a rural area near
Imperial, Mo., outside of St. Louis.

The three men met in an office or den that had a rug replica of a
Confederate flag. Mr. Sutherland, who appeared to be in his fifties
or sixties, was wearing what looked to Mr. Byers to be a Confeder-
ate colonel’s hat.

After a short period of social conversation, Mr. Sutherland asked
Mr. Byers if he would like to make some money. Mr. Byers said he
was interested, and Mr. Sutherland offered $50,000 to kill Martin
Luther King.

In response to Mr. Byers’ question as to the source of that
money, Mr. Sutherland said he belonged to a secret southern orga-
nization, and they had a lot of money.

Mr. Byers said he neither accepted nor declined the offer but
indicated he would think about it. He further stated that he never
seriously considered accepting it, that he never saw Mr. Sutherland
again, and that Mr. Kauffmann never mentioned it again.

Committee investigators then were sent out to investigate wheth-
er such an offer had, in fact, been made.

In his testimony Mr. Byers said he had told two attorneys —
Lawrence Weenick, of Clayton, Mo.; and Murray Randall, of St.
Louis, about the offer.

After being shown attorney-client privilege waivers from Mr.
Byers, both Mr. Weenick and Mr. Randall were interviewed and
confirmed that Mr. Byers had told them of the offer, and the
details they gave were substantially similar to those provided by
Mr. Byers. Both attorneys said Mr. Byers had related the incident
to them after the assassination of Dr. King.

250

Committee investigators contacted the informant who had sup-
plied information about the offer to the FBI. He confirmed the
report of the conversation with Mr. Byers in 1973.

Background checks on Mr. Kauffmann and Mr. Sutherland were
initiated in June. Mr. Kauffmann was born April 7, 1904, and died
April 1, 1974. He was a lifelong St. Louis resident, involved in a
variety of business activities, including the manufacture of gliders
and real estate development. From the early 1960’s to his death he
owned and resided at the Buff Acres Motel in Barnhart, Mo., and
his widow, Beulah, still lives there.

Mr. Kauffmann’s criminal record discloses he was arrested and
convicted for the manufacture and sale of amphetamines in 1967.

Committee investigators reviewed the files of the Federal drug
case that led to Mr. Kauffmann’s arrest and conviction. They
reveal he had been operating a legitimate drug company that
marketed a cough mixture called Fix-A-Co. Through the company
he was ordering amphetamine sulfate powder in bulk and making
amphetamine pills from this powder. During 1967 and 1968, the
report shows, Mr. Kauffmann sold over 1 million pills illegally to
undercover Federal agents.

A Federal informant testified at Mr. Kauffmann’s trial that
some of the illegal pills were delivered to the Missouri State Peni-
tentiary in Jefferson City, Mo. This is the prison where James Earl
Ray was incarcerated until his escape in April 1967.

Mr. Kauffmann’s file was also checked for indications of a pro-
pensity for violence. Although it was negative, it was noted that a
Federal narcotics agent was ambushed and shot just after talking
to an informant about Kauffmann. This incident occurred shortly
after Kauffmann’s arrest but following disclosure that the victim
was a Federal agent who had worked undercover on the Kauff-
mann case.

There were two other details disclosed in the check of Mr. Kauff-
mann’s criminal record: (1) He told an undercover agent he had
threatened a person who owed him money in order to scare him;
and (2) he had been solicited to assist in obtaining parole, on work
release, for the convicted murderer of a police informant.

While there is no indication that Mr. Kauffmann himself en-
gaged in acts of violence, he associated with persons who were
capable of violent behavior and he may have played the role of a
broker for criminal activity for these and other people.

In addition, while the committee was unable to obtain informa-
tion that would provide details on Mr. Kauffmann’s political atti-
tudes, it did establish that he was associated with John Sutherland
in efforts to establish an American Party in the St. Louis area in
1967-1968. Examination of American Party petitions filed with the
Missouri secretary of state for the 1968 Presidential election shows
Mr. Kauffmann’s signature as either the circulating officer or as a
notary public. The American Party supported the candidacy of
Gov. George Wallace of Alabama.

John Sutherland, a descendent of early colonists, was born in
Charlottesville, Va., October 19, 1905; he died in 1970. He was a
1926 graduate of Virginia Military Institute with a degree in elec-
trical engineering; he received a bachelor of law degree from City
College of Law and Finance, St. Louis, in 1931, and a master of law

251

degree from Benton College of Law. He held a commission in the
U.S. Army Reserve from 1926 to 1936, though he apparently never
served on active duty. He was married in 1930 to Anna Lee of
Atlanta, who survives him.

Mr. Sutherland practiced patent law in St. Louis throughout his
career. The firm of Polster & Sutherland was dissolved at the time
of his death. He was a lifelong resident of the St. Louis area.

Mr. Sutherland belonged to a number of social, fraternal and
professional organizations and he was active politically throughout
his adult life. In view of the statement attributed to him by Mr.
Byers that referred to a “secret southern organization” as a source
of funding for the proposed assassination, the committee searched
for any affiliations with an organization that could be considered
secret, southern or both. Three were examined.

The first was a St. Louis social order with confidential member-
ship, traditionally white; it was also once the target of civil rights
demonstrations. No evidence was obtained, however, that would
indicate it was other than purely social in nature.

The second was a white citizens group, formed by Mr. Sutherland
in the early 1960s. It had ties to a Deep South parent organization
and its stated purpose was to promote States rights and racial
integrity. Mr. Sutherland served as the first chairman of the steer-
ing committee. While Mr. Sutherland withdrew from an active
leadership role after the council’s first year of existence, he re-
mained interested in it until his death, although there were indica-
tions that the organization was not sufficiently activist to suit him.
No evidence was obtained, however, that any member of this orga-
nization was involved with Sutherland in a plot against Dr. King.

The third was the Southern States Industrial Council of Nash-
ville, whose president in 1968 was Thurman Sensing; he was also
an associate and frequent correspondent of Mr. Sutherland.

The committee’s examination of the Southern States Industrial
Council developed that Mr. Sensing addressed the Daughters of the
American Revolution in Washington on April 15, 1968, less than 2
weeks after the King assassination. While Mr. Sensing called it a
“* * * senseless, tragic crime,” and recommended that the killer—
“* * * be apprehended if possible, and brought to trial for his
crime,”— he also used the occasion to criticize Dr. King and those
associated with him. He stated at one point, “It is not too much to
say, in fact, that Martin Luther King, Jr., brought this crime upon
himself.” Holding Dr. King to account for his attitude toward civil
disobedience, Mr. Sensing speculated that the assassin “* * * may
well have said to himself, ‘I think Martin Luther King should be
killed. I realize there is a law against murder, but in this case, I
think the law is unjust.’”

The Washington Field Office of the Bureau, favorably impressed
by Mr. Sensing’s speech, brought it to the attention of Director
Hoover.

It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to insert in
the record a copy of Mr. Sensing’s speech, and the accompanying
FBI memorandum, as MLK exhibit F-578.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the
record.

[The information follows:]

252

MLK Exhibit F-578

UNITED STATES COVE ( 4 ENT

Memorandum

date: 7/1/68

to : DIRECTOR, FBI

A )/„

”T,y\\ /SAC,WFO (62-0)

subject:' THURMAN SENSING
\J ' EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT

C SOUTHERN STATES INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL
1103-111 STAHLMAN BUILDING
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE

.*L MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Enclosed' to Bureau two copies of speech entitled
"A Call To Law and Order" reportedly delivered by caption
on 4/15/68, to the National Defense Luncheon of the National
Society Daughters of the American Revolution at the Mayflower
Hotel, Washington, D.C.

In his speech, Mr^. SENSING condemns Communism,
false compassions, civil disobedience, court decisions that
have disarmed law enforcement and man's criminal Instincts
as the roots of riots in America. Mr. SENSING calls for
a return to law and order.

Enclosure furnished WFO by __

, an SAC contact. ~ j ^

Enclosure furnished Bureau in order that the
Bureau have the benefit of Mr. THRUMAN SENSING's thinking
on one of our major national problems.

Re WFO alrtel to Director, dated 2/20/58, entitled
DEFENDERS 0E„ STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES,

IS-X (WFO# 100-32567-10) noting THURMAN SENSING spoke at the
sf\-

( 2 ) - Bureau (Enel 2)„*- ,; ''

2 - WFO "

(1 - 80-114, SAC CONTACT) /.

WLL: f j c ^ ^

l(\u. t6 JUL 2 1968

54JUU 1 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on tie Payroll Savings Plan

BMRECOftClvO COPY

253

WFO 62-0

Second Annual Convention of above group held at Richmond,
Virginia, 2/18-19/53. Mr. SENSING spoke mainly on SLtate
Sovereignty and the need to keep the Federal Government
from operating the states.

ReWFOlet to Director, dated 10/16/56, entitled
MARYLAND PETITION COMMITTEE, IS-X (Buflle 100-415566 and
WFO 100-32942-7) enclosing a copy of a pamphlet entitled
"THE REAL QUESTION ABOUT INTEGRATION" by THURMAN SENSING,
published by the Southern States Industrial Council,

MARTIN J. CONDON, III, President, at Nashville, Tennessee.

Submitted for Information.

39-935 0 - 79 - 17

254

% A CALL TO LAW AND CRUell '

. X

- Thurraatfe^asi^. E xeoutlTa Vic o I'vnzid&nt
Southern Suites Industrial Council'

'1103-lixx S£alilinan SuiU-ug
Nashville, Tennessee 372C1

About three months ago, I gave Mrs. Griswold the choice of two subjects for my
. talk to you. here today. One of these subjects was ”A Call to Law ard Order, " and that is
the one she chose. *

It is rather ironic now that this subject should have been chosen for this setting
three months ago because if any city in our whole nation has needed law and order, it has

* been Washington, D. C. , the capital of the nation, during the past several days. During
those days smolie caused by fires set by arsonists curled around the Washington Monument,
the dome of the nation's Capitol, and settled like a pall over the While House. People have
been shot to death and stores have been looted right here in our Capital City - a shame and
a disgrace for a people who call themselves law-abiding citizens.

Naturally, this speech has been prepared for soma time because I only returned
from a five -weeks' trip over the continent of South America a week ago, and knew that I
wouldn't have time to prepare a tall: after I got back. Therefore, I am really going to make
tho speech In two parts - first, as I had it prepared for delivery before my trip to South
America — everything I wrote then still applies - and second, In view of the happenings
during the past ten days.

This is not a racial speech; this is not a political speech — it is a lav/ ar.d order

• speech. It is a forthright speech and I will not pull any punches. However, the people named
and quoted are named and quo tad not because they are black or while, not because they are

Republican cr Democrat, but because they said v.kat they eaid and did what they die.

We made a survey of a« the Southern Spates Industrial Council members ML

gitirg them a list of 22 r.u».io;u*T issues, and asked them to rate the issues *ki ov-.'er of cjr.«oru
Crime - and lawlessness was named as the Issue cf paramount concern by a vide marrin.

* r >e 1 ivei ; od to the \X r )c^’e:> <; ? r * I-nnchecn of the I 1 ". « kj*>vs of ‘.l\>

American Revolution at Ira Mayflower iioiel, Wy&hicgion, D. C. / April 15, it-jS.

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2 .

People of great political influence in this country have permitted the concept of
''freedom of speech" to be expanded to include subversion, Intimidation, sedition, and
Incitement to riot. They have condoned the distortion of "academic freedom" to encompass
the adulteration of young minds with Communist doctrine and the disintegration of a well
disciplined educational system. They have allowed "freedom of assembly" to mushroom
into disruption of peaceful activity, mob ride, riot and insurrection.

Unless those in authority in the United States can be influenced to abandon this
course — or unless they can be replaced by men who will — we cannot hope to restore in
our nation the kind of domestic peace and order that have made our many generations proud
to be Americans — living in a land of freedom, security, opportunity, and justice under law*
The crisis we now face is the most serious, the most dangerous, In the history of
our country.

4 . Remember, this was written three months ago. .

- "We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union,
establish justice, insure domes tic tranquility, provide for the common defense,
promote toe general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to- ourselves *

• and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for toe United States
of America." ...

This passage comes, as you will recognize, from the Preamble to toe Constitution.
The phrase I want to emphasize and dwell on for a while is "insure domestic tranquility."

As you know, in many cities and towns in this country in the last few years we have had
anything but "domestic tranquility"; in fact, we have had anarchy of toe rankest sort. This
.was especially true during the past summer — toe "long, hot summer" we had been warned
about.

Actually it was a rather cool summer weather wise, but it was certainly hot so far
, as domestic tranquility is concerned. The riot?, arson, looting and murder that have
. occurred in many of our cities are a shame and a disgrace for a nation that c alls Itself
civilized.

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Kow then, I want to suggest how v/c could put an end to arson ar.d looting, both of
which are despicable crimes. The solution is this: Issue orders to the police or the guardsmen
as the case might be, to shoot arsonists, looters and snipers on sight — and investigate later.
\va have mollycoddled, we have pampered, we have excused law breakers entirely too much
in this land of ours to maintain a law and ordor nation.

This would not only stop the arson and looting — it would prevent it from happening
in the first place. To give orders not to shoot under any circumstances for a period of timo,
as was done in some of our cities this past summer, not ouly encourages lav/ -breaking, it
also betrays the trust of the mayor or the governor, as the case might be.

Moreover, this is not a racial solution — 7 it is a law and order solution, because
law and order must be observed by everyone alike, both black and white, if we are to live
in a civilized country.

The present disregard for law and order has been abuilding for quite a number of
years. Five causes have worked hand in hand to wreak havoc upon the fabric of America.

The riot roots may be found, I thin!; (1) in Communism' (2) in false compassion (3) in civil
disobedience (4) in court decisions and (5) in the criminal instinct that lies repressed in
the heart of man. “

Communism, I believe, is the catalyst which has precipitated the present situation
in this country. Anyone who has studied the details of the various riots that have taken
place in the country must agree that they did not happen spontaneously — they were planned.
Communism thrives on agitation ar4 revolution of all sorts, upon overthrow of the existing
order* The Communists arc calling the riots in our streets a "war of national liberation.”
Communists are definitely involved in the various civil rights organizations in five country
at the present time. It is no coincidence that Stokcly Carmichael, the despicable self-
proclaimed apostle of guerrilla warfare In die United States, turned up in Communist Havana
at a meeting of the organization created by. the Soviets and the Communist bloc countries to
organize revolution in both the Americas.

If people like Carmichael and Kao Brown, the present head of the Student Non-
Violent Coordinating Committee, better laiov.n as SNCC, arc very soon not tried for treason

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then we arc going to he well on our way to forfeiting our right to call our country a
law-abiding, patriotic nation.

By^ the way, SNCC is certainly a badly named organization. Instead of being called
the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, it should bs called the Non-Student
Violent Coordinating Committee, . .

The second cause of riots is the false compassion that has been spewed out by our
leaders in government, by some of the clergy, and other s in positions of responsibility dur-
ing the past few years. ' • * . ' •

It was no less than President Johnson who used the civil rights marchers' phrase,
,r We shall overcome, " several times in one of his 'speeches, and lent them his encourage-
ment. Didn’t he know that this was the’title of a song written for the civil rights marchers
by Pete Seegar, a person who had been identified under oath as a Communist? iVhen Sceger
wrote "We shall overcome” it is not hard to imagine ‘that what he meant was ,r vVe, the
Communists, shall overcome. M

It was no less than President Johnson who greeted an audience of students in the
summer of 1965 as "fellow revolutionaries" and told them: "I am proud to salute you as
fellow revolutionaries. We want change ...... I hope you will go out into the hinterland and

arouse the masses, and blow the bugles, and tell them the hour has arrived, and their day
is here, ” .Well, the bugles have sounded all right — in Newark, in Cambridge,, lid. , in
East Harlem, in Detroit, in* Milwaukee, and dozens of other- cities — and the day is here. .

And speaking of encouragement, I wonder if Vice President Humphrey cares to
recall his remarks in New Orleans in the summer of 1SSG when he said that if he had to
live in the slums "I think you’d have more trouble than you’ve had already, because I’ve got
enough spark left in me to lead a mighty good revolt. 11 Well, Mr. Humphrey’s services were
not needed — there were plenty of other volunteers* ,

And let me insert right here that it is not buildings that make slums, it is people

who malic slums. You can take the same pecnle cut cf the slums ar.d put thorn in well built

■C'".

high rise apartments and those apartments will soon become more filthy and more dangerous
than the slums they left. That has been well demonstrated in Nov.; York City.

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• And how about the carpet-bag Senator from New York — Senator Robert F.
Kennedy when he said in the summer of 1955: "There is no point in telling Negroes to
obey the law. To many Negroes the law is the enemy. " - - • “-T

And back to President Johnson when he said in 1954: "We are going to try and
take all of the money that \vc think is being uimecessarily spent and take it from the 'haves'
and give it to the ’have nets' that need it so much. " What land of expectations did he think
that he was arousing? He can look about him and find the*answer.. r .

Behind the criminal insurrection in Detroit and elsewhere are liberal counsels of.
appalling irresponsibility. The rioters, looters and arsonists have been encouraged in
recent years to believe that- they were above the law. When disturbances took place in
Southern communities, for example, hundreds of clerical carpet-baggers descended on these
towns and cities to condemn the law enforcement authorities. Now the shoe is on the other
foot and the home towns of the liberal clergy and liberal professors are engulfed in the
smoke of armed rebellion against lawful government,* and Southerners cannot be used as
scapegoats/ * * . •* •/ ■ .

Looking back at the disastrous Detroit riot Americans may properly, I think, be
dismayed at President Johnson's highly political reaction to the disorders. Whereas the
. White House in the past has been quick to send federal troops into Southern states A the

earliest opportunity, Mr. Johnson delayed and delayed sending soldiers into strife-torn

* - .. _

Detroit. The delays persisted despite pleas by Republican governor George Romney of Mich-
igan and the Democratic mayor of Detroit. - 7 ~

When the troops finally were dispatched into the city (and they constituted only a
fraction of the massive force President Kennedy used to overwhelm the small town of
. Oxford, Miss. , in 1952) he employed a nationwide TV address to explain his extreme re-
luctance to employ federal troops.

./Under the circumstances this explanation seemed peculiar. If there ever was an
occasion for federal assistance, this was It. The troopers were requested by state and local,
authorities. The havoc being committed in Detroit was equal to.what an external enemy of
the United States might achieve In a massive bombing raid.

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Mr. Johnson apparently was trying to get oft the hool: with "civil rights” groups,
but the vast majority of the American people are not political-minded "civil rights” activists.
They are people who expect the President to assist the states in upholding lav/ and order.

In the aftermath of the rioting, Mr. Johnson asked the country to pray for domestic
peace. He also appointed an investigative committee to Inquire into the cause of the riots.

* ‘ Certainly prayer is in order as a proper avenue to reconciliation. On the other
hand, Americans cannot overlook the fact that the liberal clergy is partly to blame for the
disorders now shaking tins nation. In recent years hundreds of liberal priests, ministers .
and Rabbis have given their endorsement to civil disobedience and to protest movements
winch tramp ied on municipal and state laws. In Selma, Ala. , there was an invasion of clergy-
men from the North. One wonders: Where were these clerical voices of ’'conscience” when ^
the rioting broke out in Detroit and other cities? How is it that Martin Luther King didn’t
invade the streets of Detroit to call for non-violence? There is a distinct smell of hypocrisy
in this situation, .

As for the presidential Investigative Committee; no doubt the members, according
to their lights, will search for answers. It would be a mistake, however, to expect much of
the Committee. For instance, I refer you to the Warren Commission, so-called, to investi-
gate the death of President Kennedy. The members of this Investigative Committee share in
general the social outlook which has prevailed in places of power in the last generation.

That is to say, they believe that uplifting of backward people and the ending of public discipline
problems can be solved by massive federal expenditures. Thus it would be very surprising
if the Committee came up with anything but a recommendation for vast increases in govern-
ment anti-poverty spending.

President Johnson certainly has indicated his approach tp die riot problem. He
has spoken of the riots in Detroit, Newark and other cities* in such a way as to employ these
tragic situations as argamcnSs.icr salvaging his Great Society programs, in. other words,
the American people have been listening to him hoping to hear a crystal clear demand for

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law and order, and instead they received, a stone in the form of a political message for more
big government spending in metropolitan centers. - ■.

The ordinary citizen in the aftermath of a period of savagery and rampant looting,
certainly knows the score. It is likely that President Johnson will feel the sting of‘a
real law and order backlash If he persists in trying to end street revolution by bowing to
the blaclmiail of Negro militants who try to pressure the country by using fire bombs and
snipers* bullets. ' ; / • '

The third cause of riots is the preaching of civil disobedience and so-called "non-
violent" resistance against society. The preachers of civil disobedience have gone so far
as to say that "society" owes the Negroes what might be called 400 years of back pay —
and unfortunately many of the people believe them. Actually their ancestors were sold into
slavery in the beginning by their own chiefs at the time. One of the clear thinking, clear
headed Negroes in tills country went to Africa not long ago, and alter comparing the Negroes
of that continent with the Negroes in this country, came back and said: "Thank God, my
ancestors were sold into slavery. **

‘ Unfortunately , not many of the Negro leaders have that attitude. Too many of them
have told the Negroes: "Obey those laws you think arc just; don’t obey those you think are
unjust” — thus advocating that each person decide for himself what is the law. Nothing
could cause complete anarchy more quickly.

The fourth cause of the riots has been the invidious court decisions that have
disarmed law enforcement and made law tiic protector of wickedness. These well known
court decisions have dimlnshcd the law itself. Since die federal Brown decision of 195*1
the law has abandoned its impartial majesty and become a tool of favoritism and social
distortion.

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After all, what* can you expect from the courts when the President nominates a man .
for Inc court of last resort — the Supreme Court of the United States — not because he was

the best man available, but because by doing so he could gain a lo: of votes from a minority
bloc in the next election. - - >

The fifth cause of riots which I should mention is no recpector of race. It is the
fact tJi at perhaps criminal instincts lie hidden in die heart of man. All men must struggle
with die grace of God to overcome their baser nature. Mob rule drowns the pangs of guilt
and the objections of conscience, and makes an individual feel, erroneously of course, that
he is not guilty of his acts. It is a warning that white mobs may jet be set against Negro
mobs by the calculating manipulators abroad in die land. In fact, v/e saw some of this in
Milwaukee last summer. It may get worse, not only in Milwaukee but in many other places.

V/e have heard and read much this past year about the "long, hot summer" ahead
of us, indicating that it would be during that summer \vc would have riots and anarchy. No
doubt we have many long, hot summers ahead of us. Governor Terry of Delaware told the
Southern Governors Conference at Asheville last fall that the troubles of 19 S7 are not "any
at all compared with what we are going to have next year. " Governor Terry offered no
solution except to say: "We must get ready for it, be prepared for it, stop it, or we are
going to be taken over." He referred to Black Power agitator Rap Brown's threat of "the day
of the atom bomb" — a statement v.iiich Terry said will be the "signal" when rioters "will
come out with guns in every city across the nation, " and that, Terry said, "will be a sad
day unless we do something about it." He still didn't suggest what to do.

And so I go back to my opening statement that the mayors of the cities and the
governors of the states should now issue proclamations lead and clear that the time has come
to be firm, to be positive, in fact, to get tough. Unfortunately, tills is die only language that
law-breakers understand. They must proclaim that law- aV.d order must be preserved in this
land by all people alike, that any cue caught using a Melc-tov cocktail or a sniper's rifle or
looting a store will be shot on sight. .

262

Law enforcement officers arc finally beginning to realize there is no other
solution. The Chief of Police of Philadelphia issued such orders last fall; later the Chief
of police of Miami, shortly before Christmas, issued similar orders, saying:

"When the looting starts, then the shooting starts. " Since then at least two Associated Press
stories out of Miami have related the tremendous drop in crime since that order was issued.'
Not a single Negro has been shot by a Miami policeman since then — but crimes of
violence have shown a 705 drop. Surely, there is a lesson to be learned from this experience.

The time has come for action. And t by action I don't mean rushing millions of
dollars into riot- torn areas as a corrective measure -- I mean swift, vigorous police action,
expedited trials and convictions when supported by the facts. Detroit, for instance, had
received $100 million since 19G0 for urban renewal, and $41 million in poverty funds.

Detroit was a model city in those respects; yet there occurred the worst riot, the most
people Wiled, the greatest property damage in any city in the land.

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Now wc- conic to the second part of my speech j mainly centered,, of course,
on the burning, shooting and looting occasioned by the assassination of Martin Luther
King Jr. , on Thursday evening, April 4th. Law and order have teen violated in more than
100 cities of this land during the past ten days, all of it triggered by King's death.

The man who hilled Martin Luther King, Jr. committed a senseless, tragic -
crime. He violated law and order. lie should be apprehended if possible, and brought to
trial for his crime.

• However, the country seems to have been caught up in an orgy of emotionalism
since King's death, and many people have said many things and have done many things that
* are not supported by facts and reason. It is not too m uch to say, in fact, that Martin ..Luther
King Jr. brought this crime up on himself. He went around over this country for years
proclaiming his belief in non-violence and yet nearly everj'whcre he appeared and spoke
It resulted in violence. CXie of his basic beliefs was that people were morally obligated to
obey only those laws they thought just. He said they were not morally obligated to obey the
laws they considered unjust. As I mentioned earlier in my talk, putting these beliefs into
-practice leads very quickly to complete anarchy.

What Martin Luther King should. have realized in adopting this philosophy is that
It might work both v, -ays; in other words, his assassin: may very well have said to himself,

*T ihink Martin Luther King should be killed. I realize there is a law against murder, but

\ — -

in this case, I think the law is unjust. " Anyway, we all know the result.

As Congressman John M. Ashbrook of Cnio said in his speech to the House last
October 4, in speaking of King:

1 'While preaching non-violence, I believe the record clearly shows him to be
an apostle of violence. While gaining major support from clergymen, I believe he has
preached an expedient,, totally materialistic line, which Is the antithesis of religious teach-
ings. He has openly associated with the most radical elements in our society. I believe ha
•has done more for the Communist Party than any other person of this decade. "

Mr. Ashbrook went on at length to support these allegations and many others.

He pointed out that King made a major speech on Vietnam just a year ago this month.

He further said, "I believe that any thinking American who v.ill study his (King's) words
must conclude as I have that he is disloyal to the United States. He maligned his country
• -with lies and accusations that came straight from die Communist Party line. A strange
statement, you say. Listen to what he said. He praised Ho Chi Minh as the only true
leader of the Vietnamese people, ljc condemned die United States as the 'greatest
purveyor of violence in the world today' and likened our nation to Hitler's Germany.

He threw out wild charges like the United States may have killed 1 million cliildren

in Vietnam He said we have no honorable intentions in Vietnam and our minimal

expectation is to occupy it as an American colony. These are a few of the wild accusations
of the Nobel Prize winner many people have been led to believe is a man of peace.

Even the Washington Post could not stomach King's blatant lies and propaganda.
Roundly condemning King in an editorial headed ’A Tragedy, * the Post ended by saying:
•'Many who have listened to him with respect will never again accord him the same con-
fidence. He has diminished his usefulness to his cause, to his country and to his people.
And that is a great tragedy. "

Early tliis year, following a meeting with Stokcly Carmichael and other agitators
In Washington, Martin Luther King promised that more American cities w'ould go up in
flames this summer unless — and this is where the blackmail comes in — unless the
Congress does exactly the bidding of the Black Power movement. King was unable to put

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ii.

a precise pricetag upon this blackmail, but he said it would cost somewhere between
ten and thirty billions of dollars to do it to give every Negro in America a guaranteed
income, a "good” home, and, of course, "open housing. " Failing to get all of this, he
said, the Negroes of American plan to take to the streets this summer in fifteen major
cities and countless smaller ones. "Our nation, " King threatened, in — what does he call
it? — his non-violent way, *\vill sink deeper and deeper into the tragic vallej' cf chaos,
and our cities will continue to go up in flames. " Stokely. 1 Carmichael, standing nearby.

Just grinned. . .." ' ' . •

r Were these the words of a minister of the gospel, of a man of peace, a believer
In non-violence? The answer has to be — no, they were not.

Two years ago I made a two-months * trip to Rhodesia, South Africa, South West
Africa and Liberia. Now I have just returned from a five-weeks* trip to South America,
visiting eight countries including the Panama Canal Zone. The more I study the situation
abroad and the more I study the situation in this country, the more convinced l am that we
are overlooking the fundamental issue at hand in our emphasis on welfare measures;
namely, that it is not the function of government to guarantee prosperity to everybody,
provide our citizens with a guaranteed income, provide them with government-subsidized
housing, etc. It Is only the function of government to provide a favorable climate in which
a citizen may prosper. Then it is up to the citizen himself to produce his own prosperity
and provide for his own welfare. Anything that is given a citizen beyond this must be pro-
vided by charity, not by government.

. Appljnng this to our present-day situation, let me say that it is not the function
of government to give a man. a job or sec that a job is given him simply in order to sec
that a minority group is represented on a pro rata basis, or represented at all. A man
should be employed simply because of his ability, because he is the best man for the job,
and he should be paid accordingly.

Let me also say at this point that one group of students in our pumic schools <
should never be bused across the city to assure proportionate representation of citeor

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race in our schools. Common sense and logic should prevail here, not a foolish ideology.

Now, considering the events since April 4th, let's pick up two or three
loose ends. * . .

I mentioned Stokely Carmichael and Rap Brown earlier in my talk. Stokely
Carmichael made some talks in Nashville before the students of the Negro universities in
early April 1967. It was undoubtedly these talks that triggered the riots that shortly fol-
lowed, . the first Nashville had had. Not too long after that, Carmichael went to Cuba,
then behind the Iron Curtain, and then to Hanoi, thus violating all passport rules as laid
down by our State Department. .However, the Attorney General of the United States did net
see fit to take any action concerning him when he finally returned to this country. Since
then he has conferred with civil rights leaders and been active in many ways'— still
nothing has been done. *

- Rap Brown, who succeeded Carmichael as. head of the SNCC, has been in jail

for quite a while because he violated terms of the bail granted him by a federal judge in
Richmond, Va. , last September, lie has been under arrest for this violation, and just the
other day the federal judge turned down his plea to release him in the interest of racial
harmony. You will note his pica to be released was not based on the fact that he legally
should be released, but in the interest of racial harmony. To a defense attorney's sug-
gestion that "We may be fiddling while our cities are burning, " Judge Mcrhfge made this
significant and courageous reply: "Assuming the cities arc burning, that makes it more
Important that the law must be obeyed, I’m not going to be bullied by kooks on one side or
the other. "

The Justice Department is finally investigating Stokely Carmichael's activities
In recent days — something they should have done and should have acted upon months ago.
At a news conference in Washington, 14 hours after the death of Marlin Luther King,
Carmichael sold Negroas would 'have to get *uns" and lake to the streets to "retaliate for
tbe (Ifing) execution. *' Carmichael was on his way at the time to attend a court hearing in
Richmond, Va. , for Rap Brown on his bail appeal. He said further:

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13.

"When White America, killed Dr. Kin?, it declared war on us. We have to retaliate
for the execution of Dr. King. ■ *

"Black people know that their way is not by intellectual discussions. They kr.ov.*
that they have to get guns. Our retaliation won't be in the court room but in the streets of
America. ”, t

In other words, Carmichael denied completely that the Negroes of tins country are
controlled by the rules of law and order. However, Attorney General Ramsey Clark had
nothing further to say about him in his TV interview on April 8 other than that federal investi-
gators are cheeking his statements to see if "he may have violated any one of a number

of statutes. " This seems to me to be a very weak statement, a very immature approach to
handling two of the most militant civil rights leaders in the country.

Now concerning federal troops, when the rioters camped on his own doorstep,

President Johnson rather quieldy got over his reluctance to use them, as was true in Detroit
last summer. News reports are that more than 60, 000 federal troops were called into ser-
vice during the last several days, being mainly used in the cities of Washington, Chicago,
Baltimore, and elsewhere in the North; Even so, in many cities for a period of time looting
went uncontrolled, even on the main business street in Washington. It is too early yet to
say whether the combined burning and looting and killing amounted to more than in the city
of Detroit last summer, but there is hardly any question but that it did. . .

The assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. has been followed by an orgy of mob
violence unprecedented in this country's history. The protest leader who espoused what he
called a philosophy of "non-violence" left behind him a heritage of violence among his followers
and admirers. As for flying flags at half-mast, as was clone through Tuesday of last week,
that, it seems to me, was very fitting — not for the reason given, but because the nation has
.been shamed by savage rampaging such as goed citizens never believed they would see in this
proud nation. The death of one Negro soldier in the American armed forces in Viet Nam is
a thousand times more worthy of Gags being flown at half-mast than was the death of Martin
Luther King Jr.

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14 .

This heritage of violence is no doubt led by a relatively small percentage of the
Negro people; intact, joined in altogether by only a minority of the colored population.
However, Hi at only makes the situation more tragic, in that a small part might destroy
.the whole. What wo must all realize in this land, both blacks and whites, is that v:e must
observe all the rules of law and order if wo arc to continue to live under the kind of govern-
ment left us by our forefathers . , *

All people in this country must realize that tins Is a land of liberty., not a land
of license; that this is a land where laws must be respected, not violated; that tills is a
land where each man is free to carve out his ov.71 destiny and choose his own future so long
as he harms no one else in the process; that this is a land where a man’s value is not
.determined by his race and his color, but by what he has contributed and is contributing
toward making tills a decent, law-abiding society In a free nation.

Mr. Evans. The committee’s investigation also determined that
the intellectual milieu of the Southern States Industrial Council
had been touched by the publicly expressed opinions of J. Edgar
Hoover. Mr. Hoovers statements on the efforts of the Communist
Party to infiltrate the “Negro movement” were approvingly quoted
in the Council’s 1967 “declaration of policy.”

Mr. Chairman, I think it would be appropriate to have that
“declaration” inserted into the record as MLK exhibit F-578A.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the
record.

[The information follows:]

270

SOUTHERN STATES INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL

- Organized in 1933, the Southern States Industrial Council officially
represents the sixteen Southern State area from Texas toL Maryland
inclusive. ^ L , v - ■"> C •

* V.,-. : <;/ "• ; !*• *

Members of the Council come from all lines of professions and of <
business and industry in the South— large and small. It also has many
/ members from outside its region^ The Council is operated as a non-;
profit' business association and corporate dues are tax-deductible as a
business expen se*v- : . •; - .’v • • J v ^y .V

v * ' * J' r\:~-:r ■: ■■ * • -• ;

31i© fimdameDt^ pi^bse ortlie SoutHOT Stqtes'Industrial Council."
is' to restore and preserve to future generations the traditional American
free enterprise system which is the basis of our strength as a nation —
and which is the product of freedom itself. The Council is entirely non*
partisan, dealing only with principles and not with political parties. -

, l f- . *. v. • w -‘i - .- v *;/x ..r •.« * ■ 1 *.

The special function of the Council is to represent the voice of free
■j enterprise from . the ^conservative Southern viewpoint. This Southern '
- viewpoint has been . a. stabilizing influence in .the life -of the nation*:

particularly iii recent years,' and bids fair to" continue so ip the y?3r3 : 1
'ahead. *&?i*~*2

* ; . V There, is a great body of . sound, Conservative thinking in the South -a
that has unswervingly supported the basic principles of our form of ;.
government— the rights of local and state governments and the freedom
; : ,of the individual."

i- '■% This thinkin g has not submitted to centralized government, it has hot
been misled by federal aid, it has held fast to basic economic principles. Jr
' It 13 this tli inkin g to which the Council gives unified utterance, x^.-. ^ '.'i; ';-

^ ’Organized on a regional basis, the Council can only speak for the
•‘.South as a region, but the. work it is doing is in the interest of the, whole
nation— the preservation of free enterprise is. just as important to one’

... part of. the nation as a3i$ther. / > ; '-S:

For further .information, address: Tf - > :

SOUTHERN STATES INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL; ; "

> ^President

u ‘.y.4 .i* V;. ; V . 1 103-1111 Stahlman , Building ; »*/.£< .'V." £'v* -g

j • v.; V Nasliville f Tennessee 37201 -V. ; ’ r ' v ‘ - ‘ ' '

271

A DECLARATION OF POLICY

WE. TBUST*

We cherish the fact that oar beloved country is deeply rooted in
religious faith. This we attribute to the wise and virtuous men who
established themselves upon this land through individual enterprise and
self-reliance while unashamedly acknowledging God as the ultimate
source of their strength and the author of all their blessings.

- The Council is gravely concerned and disturbed at many of the
/ changes now taking place in the life of our nation, including the grow-
. ing secularism of .the people. 1 This lamentable trend is — in effect —
' sanctioned and.abetted by court-directed assaults upon the.free practice
of religion. ' ' c •- ./

Therefore, file Southern States Industrial Council takes this oppor-
tunity— -solemnly and humbly—to reaffirm its unalterable faith in Al-
mighty God. V..’

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

T'Vi

'-■.■ft

; Rational Soy^eignty:;;

j ^..Sovereignty, Nationalism^ Patriotism, Individual ... Liberty — these
& are the living principles under which this Nation has come into being,

" and;’ for more than a century and a half, has grown and prospered. -

rr-f Ini recent years, we have been witnesses to.the progressive weakening
^/and , undermining of these basic principles.. Our Sovereignty, has been
;/■ impaired., -Nationalism has come into . considerable popular disf avorl
f [Patriotisci is not as highly revered as it once, was. Individual Liberty
^js' being constantly eroded . by .actions of our national government;"^’

;^.|: J r The Council reaffirms its unalterable opposition to these, trends. It
commends the Senate for its, refusal to ratify the United Nations-spon-
? sored Genocide Convention and urges it to take similar: action when,
and ' if the Declaratiou of Human Rights— also United Nations spon-
- soitd— -is submitted. •• ] i "•

: §&£ TTi^'Council' also,; opposes repeal of the Connally Reservation ; re-;
stricting the jurisdiction of •.the’. World Court and urges the Senate
Foreign Relations Comniittee to shelve this proposal, as it did in 1960,
^{should it be brought up ^ / r : ‘ ‘ ‘

-• .T { • ' '■■■ -Hr /S i -

272

The United Nations: • *

Since the United Nations came into being, ostensibly as a mecha-
nism for promoting world peace, the government of the United States
has made support of the U.'N/a keystone of our foreign policy. ! *

1 The high hopes which inspired this support have ended in disap-
pointment, and serious doubt now exists as to whether “peace’! is a real
and foremost objective of most U.N., members.

Lx addition, the character, composition, ant? activities of the World '
orga ni z a tion have radically changed/ This is due to the influx of new
African and Asian * ‘nations.”' Each of them has the same voting power
in ihe U.' N. Assembly as. does the United. States - and hence they are 1
-in hpcsitionitb^dominato'-the

Lx view of the foregoing, the. Council feels that the United States •
should consider withdrawing totally from the U. N. and from all par- -
■ ticipaiioh in UC'N.-sponsorbd activities .and .organizations. It alsore-r,'
questo that UiN. headquarters he removed from ^ the-- •'

• • ■ • :■ .. • i* ' ; \ 1 * '/ r X.' ■* 1

Sanctions AgalnstsRhodesia: *. V ^ '■

.... ■ ... * -■ i VV'y : 'VV:. , i ’! ,r ‘ /'

4" y.’ The Council condemns in the strongest "possible’ terms - tneVshamef^
^action of , put .otto- government in - imposing a - U*. ^-sponsored*, trade
e mb a r go .upon Bhodesia. Spch action is pot only contrary to the Amen-T,.
can tradition of self-determination; could easily lead to die involve-.’
‘ m erit of this Nation in a war in which die United States would he fighting”*
on the side of barbarism and dxaos and against civilization. We earnest-

r Fortign Aid:.^; ;> ::^x? < J'dc' > d r , ??$.:■& ± wit? iAv ’ £?.<■'-

. ; -;-The .Coimcil notes with satisfaction the' growing disenchantment £/
-with foreign aid. It has never believed it possible to buy reliable friends^
{anid allies. Eurhermore, the Council specifically rejects any f urher aid iy
to Socialist or Communist' <touxxtriM4y

r :. _We believe our government should avoid dissipation of, thcNation’s
resources in futile attempts to, raise die living’ standards of Vast seg-'r.
merits of the worldV.eveigrovnng p opulation. We believe that aU'such;-
ill-conceived attempts are foredoomed to failure, and, by raising false.;
r i hopes, make more - enemies than friends,

r .- -|{vx - ■ .“ v: J il* , . V; v ’ 4 * ’ ; V- V->‘ ’ ; ■ y ■ - \ ■ “ • v <* ii’v * 'fViV - ': vvf# * .• • .. *

.; \:;y . The Council. favot 3 the substantial annual; induction of foreign-;
^ec^ncmic aid with a view to its early elimination and a continuing re-^
... . view of our policy of military aid. . V-Y * • " ' ' •

273

International Trade:

The power to regulate foreign commerce is expressly and ex*-*,
dusiyely vested in Congress by paragraph (3), Section 8, Article 1.
of the Constitution, which says: “The Congress shall have the power
to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several,
states, and with the Indian tribes.”

TheCouncilurges:-,

■t-y- 1 . 2 . The restoration of Congress’ authority over tariff-making. :

* .%' 2. El imin ation of the balance of payments deficits and the drain
re;, ' ''' on i oar S°ld reserves.

’.^;'3.:;‘ < An Immediate review of the entire Trade Agreements program:.*-' :

* with a-view to such rate, adjustments and/or the imposition of •

• “ ' y such quotas gs are necessary to protect American producers and

workers from unreasonable and unfair competition based upon
V ; > cheap foreign labor. This should include a prohibition against
/ ^ dumping of foreign produced materials in this country at prices
" • •• ! 7?, ■ ' lower than those charged in the producing home markets. , * *

* Rejection of the idea of government subsidies for domestic in- ,
.dustries injured by the Trade Agreements program.

t; The establishment of a joint-watchdog committee comprised, of ^

.t^^embers of the Ways and Means and Senate Finance commit- ' • *
to keep constant watch over the effects of imports upon ,

•(- U. S. industries, including employment,, profits- and -prices,* ri

i6- An immediate elimination of all trade with Communist nations.

VThe council applauds 6ui government for imposing a Complete embargo :ytr
on trade with Red China and urges that it be maintained. • ■

v Protection of Foreign Investments: ; * . 4 ; -J ' ’,..1 .

^h^ Jnvestment.^ of United States private capital in foreign countries
V should he protected through agreements fostered by our government.

£ Such agreements should guarantee fair and. non-discrimmatory treat-
Tment of present and future investments, provide firm! assurance against
; expropriation without adequate and prompt compensation, and permit
*7 investors to repatriate their earnings. The Council calls upon our;

government to adopt, without delay, whatever legal measures may be: ^ ;\

, necessary to accomplish these aims. • V\ v ; : 7.

7 \7V The Monroe Doctrine states in part: * . .[s . • ,• , -

- “We owe it, therefore, to' candor and to the amicable relations
.existing between the Uuited States, and these (European) powexa^ to

274

declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend,
their system to any portion of this hemisphere as ..dangerous to our
peace and safety.”

The evil and malevolent' system of Communism is now firmly en-
trenched on the island of Cuba, from which it is spreading to other
Latin American countries. Instead of resisting this sinister development
with all the power at its command, our government treats Cuba as an
inviolable Communist sanctuary and orders a wrong-way blockade
against Fighters for Freedom instead of against Castro. v-

The Council favors the prompt, stern invoking of the Monroe Doc-'
trine. in the case of Cuba and otter threatened Latin American conn- •

fn.. nn/1 onfAmm rr hi • *_> ■■ . - ‘V- T *- — _ ' ' j . V' ‘ - ■ ' . .2.

tries

JV -(i-'sA*. • V ■

•f’ Vv*'

t. .V •-

a V?

Isthmian Canal Policies:

. A major' objective of the Communist conspiracy in this hemisphere -
is to gain control over the Panama Canal; The Council urges Congress
not to surrender, in any degree. United States ownership of, juris-
diction over, and: control of the Canal Zone to Panama or any other
nation or international body. ....

-..A*

rr m ;\

v \s.'V StVaCV

Immigration: >; v

■> " Jhe test oF any uuniigrarion policy slxotdd b^ Hvhht is best for
'America? Measured by this test, it remains to be seen whether
the new immigration law of 1965 represents any improvement over-
' the McCarran-Walter Act, which it supplanted. The Council doubts that
it will, primarily because the new law contains no provision — as did ,
the McCarran-Walter Act — for a National Origins Quota System. s .;

Viet Nam?'

; . Xr..- • ;t.v. ' '*■ • - ' i'-U'.'Y-?.

' r * rV" >. ’ ,~-Si * r _ ^ -V . ) • ... ;

.i •**'*?■. y\ '■ * ♦ -v*- ‘M -“■*» v

The Council supports the efforts of. the President to tum back and "
defeat the Communist drjve on South Viet Nam. However the Council
. disapproves the simultaneous diplomatic- :< ‘Peace Offensive” which 4 •:*
weakens and sometimes contradicts the military effort there.: The oh- in-
jective of war is not “negotiation” but victory over the aggressor, and
judging by past U. S. losses at the conference table, “negotiation” might
,well allow the Communists to achieve by guile what they have failed, to ;’
gain by force. The Council favors the use pf all appropriate means to. ;

: destroy the Viet Cong and— if neces3arj r — to overthrow its Communist):

* masters in Hanoi or wherever located.

275

TL NATIONAL DEFENSE

Maintain an adequate defense— strong and balanced armed forces—*
maintain always a military superiority over our enemies.

Disarmament:

Any unilateral or unverified program of disarmament would be
suicidal. The Council is, therefore, opposed to any form of disarma-
ment, whether it be by treaty — such as the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty —
» or by executive order— such as the failure to develop adequate new
' strategic weapons systems for future defense needs in land, sea, air or

"space.--,

"Test Ban Treaty Safeguards:

Before the ratification of the Test Ban Treaty, the numerous risks
and hazards of the, pact were; admitted by the Administration then in
- power, but strenuous promises were made that all necessary steps would
*x be . taken .to reduce them to the lowest possible leveL Nothing of
die soil has been done. Therefore, the Council calls upon the Johnson
Administration to take positive action to ensure national security against
'X-the dangem inherent in the unpoliced Nuclear Test Ban. . ^

■ Arms Contrbl ahtl Disaxmainent Agency:: *

i: ; • : . • ‘V • • : -

vi;'-;- -Tlje; Council feels that the.U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament
■I Agency has .proven itself .utterly useless and futile. . It should be ' ,
. ... abolished . n - 4' :

H -u" t'ii-*- • Js;

;;"’pyer-E^mmiori^pf f Forces: ....... I t

*)4; % 4The Council notes yrith' grooving concern our increasing military
r T 'cominitments around theworld. We are:now formally committed to the ?*;
i protection of the freedom of over 40 Nations. Secretary of State Rusk v
has stated— in effect— that there is no limit to our role as world police- J
man. The Council seriously questions the wisdom of any such attempted ■ '
v .r role and feejs that the end result could be catastrophic. .

^ • SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

" J-r/ ’V . •: 1

The' .Council;' rea£Srms its unalterable hostility to Communism,
4-Socialism, or any foym of 'totalitarian government, and favors the ex-
4 posure and eradication: oj similar subversion wherever, ii exists. ‘

W v.v-"^o<_.Oi**r V ' ;• Ur'i-.V-v.

276

Loyalty Oath: . W •" ... .

The Council is unable to discern 1 any Valid 'reason why American
college students, whose education is being paid for. by the taxpayers,
or anyone else receiving Federal funds, should object, to. taking an i
oath .of loyalty to their own country. We express the hope that this oath,
will be preserved and, if necessary, strengthened. . . ; . •- , ‘>v/, r , ' ! i

Communist Infiltration: • :>

The late Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activi-
" ties, the Honorable Francis E. Walter,' once said:'”;' .; :

(the Communists) objective remains the same: destruction of

- ^ all free societies, conquest of the world and .the enslavement of ./;.
"" .^ 'mankind'. ; The battlefields are eveiy:. institution and organization " '

' ; - of society, including the home, the church, the school and every .
agency of our government.” '■;//. ’/i'"'"!; ^ /

' '"-’yjjlae Cdtmcii'nrges .Cchgr^s'fo pass legislation that, wo^d compel^,
the'suhunary' discharge of any non-elective Federal employee upon a
. written finding and certification by the FBI to the agency concerned „
that reasonahle douht exists as to the loyalty of such employee to the
IJpited States. Government employment is a privilege, not a right,' ;.;/ ;/V

Tnfiltxationof fhe Peace. ; Mov^ent:';| : ^

It is apparent, to even the casual dbserver that the numerous “peace’’ in-
groups demonstrating throughout the land are not pacifist in nature but *
are actually in favor of a military victory by the Communists in Viet :
Nanu When viewcd v/ithin the context of the current Communist Party ;,:'
Line, it is also obvious that the so-called Peace Groups are giving aid /

- and comfort to the Communist enemy. The Council urges immediate*-';
/Congressional investigation of the Peace Movement .: ; =■• ••

.W.T »*.<;>' n,;.;- ....V - -O .V ^

- The Council further calls on the Justice Department to prosecute

those persons who violate the Selective Service Act by urging young ;•
Americans not to serve. in the Armed Forces. i - ( V-£>~V;£v!£'

$ Civil Bights and Civil ‘Wrongs: • ,.y ^

Av The . Council ‘ views with grave ' concern the mounting violence and
^lawlessness ostensibly carried out in support of various aspects of . the
so-called civil rights program. It views with even greater alarm and \
:>• misgivings the actions/ of the President and other high officials and { .

' ' members of Congress of both parties. and the Supreme Court in not >

;; only failing to oppose and condemn such violence and open disregard 3
‘ of State and local laws, but actually encouraging and condoning it.*:

277

Crime: . .

' The' Council views with alarm recent Supreme Court decisions — '
Mallory. Escobedo, and Miranda cases— which have had the net effect
of barring criminal confessions under almost all conceivable circum-
stances, thus allowing the guilty to go free. The Council supports legis-
lation ;'to correct this situation.

Infiltration of the Racial Movement:

c s^Oh April 22, 1964, J. Edgar Hoover; Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, stated: . * .

' VThf, Communist Party is attempting to ; use the Negro movement,

• as it- does everything else, to promote its own interest "rather than the
welfare of those to- whom it directs its agitation and propaganda. . . .

“The number of Communist Party recruits which may be attracted
' from &e Jarge. Negro racial groups in fiiis nation is jnot the important
: thin^ The old Communist principle stdl holds: :

. 'Communism must be built with non-Communist hands.* |

fi°! Imow fliat Communist influence does exist in the Negro
. ^movement and it , is this influence which is vitally important. Tt can he .1
^ the meani through ^vluch large masses are caused.to lose perspective < -
^ on fiae issues involved and, yrithout realiring it, succumb to theParty’s

•;i|ri^aganda ; lnies^^"^.yv^ .

The Council, therefore, urgently (alls for an immediate Congres-
■<r sional iny^stigation into the Communist infiltration of the Negro move- .,
"pment in the United States. ,~ r v : -' :■ : ' I "

X.TPBl, Succession: - ' XXX :. • ’-V .I-.-* . ... • .

supports legislation to make future appointees as Di-
* % rector of the FBLsubject to Senate confirmation, v ' , - ;

X-XXXi XXv-X X.

vi -x^The Coimcn noteswith.sadnes3 andconcem the continued flagrant
fifbias on the part of much, of the Nation’s press, radio and television - •
^■ jmedia in reporting on , Southern race relations. In the opinion of the
Council, such reporting— some of it thoughtless arid irresponsible —

'^ ‘some hf it plafifiy. malicious— docs not help and frequently hurts the
i': cause of restoring harmonious' relations between the white and Negro .,
•' races in the South and elsewhere. It calls upon the news and opinion
—media of the Nation to get back to honest, objective .reporting;.-. ’*• ':*'V

278

IV. EIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL

..... .... _ .. . * >. . -

Protect in every way the rights of the individual as guaranteed by the
Constitution. These fundamental rights are inherent in every citizen and
must be preserved inviolate. ' . -

Unalienable Bights: /;■. . ■■■•_

The Bill of Rights of the U. S. Constitution is based upon the philo-*
sophy, first proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence, that all
men are endowed by their Creator with certain, unalienable .rights. .

This philosophy is directly contrary to the totalitarian principle
that man’s rights are conferred upon him by government and mat what
government gives, it may also take away.-“-y>

’ The Council rejects as inimical to the fighls'and di^ty of man the
whole socialistic, leveling down philosophy of the welfare state. -7 '

Firearms Control: •. ^ t

The Council looks with apprehension hpon the firearms control 'and .7
registration bills being Considered by Congress. The Council emphatic-
ally rejects all firearms control laws, no matter at what level of govern-
ment or what the purpose. Such laws cannot impair; die criminal’s use ~

. of arms. The criminal will obtain firearms illegally if he desires them, H
whereas, the freedomoflaw-abidingcitizens to keep'' and bear armi C!

‘ 'would be iestricted./ ; ^.’T;j^ ?

** ^ -r -^:*iVV^ STATE^ EIGHTS

Safeguard the rights of individual States by holding the Federal Gov-
enanent to the delegated power as specified in the Federal CpnstUutum??'*
' and to the statutory procedure in administering that pdwer.

The Republic: * ;;

, Vl « • m ‘ -ly’i/x* A- - *.■ • *,* .-v • v * - ./ v. .

-•?. V’; Onr Constitutional fathers, familiar with the strength and weakness ^';'

of both autocracy and democracy, with fixcd principles definitely in V .

. ' rnind, established a representative republican form of government. They ‘‘ t*
'"made a very marked distinction between a republic and a democracy" 7
and said repeatedly and^mpbatically that they had founded a republic.

1 r These men knew full well the dangers of a democracy, and never ' ’ ,

■ intended that we should have one.- Our pledge of allegiance refers to v
: the flag “and to the Republic fox which it stands.” When Benjamin
Franklin came out of the Constitutional Convention on Sept 17, 1787, ....
’he wa 3 asked, “Well, Mr. Franklin, V/bat have we got?” His answer
. ..was, “You have a Republic, if you can keep it.”. -; , ; V , . • ;•... 7

' ; ; Thof .Council believes that- the . time is here when the American ;

... people must reaffirm their desire to retain a Republic.

279

Big Government:

The Council notes with extreme concern the ever increasing size,
cost and power of the Federal Government, and urges citizens in and out
of Congress to take a determined stand against its continued expansion.

Apportionment and Beapportionment:

The Council supports immediate Federal legislation to withdraw
from the Supreme Court of the United States appellate jurisdiction in
apportionment and reapportionment cases and also to deny jurisdiction
.. to the S, District Courts to entertain any petition or com-
plaint. seeking apportionment or reapportionment.

/• -j . The Council also supports Senator Diiksen’s determination to amend
c the Conatitution tp *pxqvide that in all States having two-Hotise legisla- ' '
tores, members of one House may be chosen on a geographical or
other non-population basis. ■ - ‘

Prayer and Bible Beading:

The Council decries die Communist-inspired drift towards atheism,
and urges Congress to provide that the Bible may he read and prayers
offered in the public schools with voluntary participation. The Council
. further believes that prayer in the public schools and public ceremonies
> should be. encouraged ratber tbaii forbidden. - . * r ; s v

i Another Bond to Socialism: - t . . y- • 'y—y .

^yjfAs- bhe' mcans 'bf promoting more rapid economic growth, if has
. been suggested that a larger share of our total earnings and resources
v /. he channeled by the Government, into public, as distinguished from
^ 1 private,; investment. The Council * opposes this notion as leading to ■ .

. bigger, more centralized government, more intervention and control, -
.1; and outright socialism as the ultimate, if not avowed, goal.. '

' v"' v ?.y , ; ,-y

< y. y .yihe Council commends and pays respectful tribute to the conserva-
five’ coalition in Congress and pledges its continued support.' It especi- -y •
v ally commends the -coalition in the Senate for defeating repeal of Sec-
.> tion 14(b). of the Taft-Haitley Act. ,> • ' ’ ..

?i ' .yy -yy y 'yy "

The Council believes that a return to the fundamentals of education
J is long overdue,; that the , public, school ~ system should .. rem a in under v
'.■' local control and that it, along with the home, and the church, should .

* constitute a strong first line of defense against subversive attack from-

280

Federal Aid to Education:

The Council opposes Federal aid to education because, whatever
may be said. Federal aid has always meant 'and will and must al-
ways mean. Federal control which enables thought molding on a na-
tional scale by whatever small group has control of the Administrative
Branch of the Federal Government. The potential , evils of $nch power
are obvious.

■ Guide Lines: V " ■’ r - V-

vln the opinion .of the:Coimci3,''1t^!'acdon of the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare in attempting to make compliance with
..SD'Called integration, ‘‘Guidelines” a coition of -receiving public tax
, funds is botli dishonest and a pereision of the intent of Congres3. The \
Council calls upon Congress for relief from this Bureaucratic edict. - •

Supreme Court:

The duty of the Supreme Court is to determine what the law is, not
to set itself up as a third legislative chamber. It also has a duty to
avoid Federal judicial involvement in matters tradionally left to State
legislative policy making. The Council earnestly urges Congress to: ’

' ' ■ L‘ / Propose a constitutional amendment vesting exclusive control of %
the public schools in the States and tiieir political sub&visioj»;G' 3
• >and i •> ^ ^

V s >2. Pass legislation to restore tb£ balance of power aiUong the three^
branches of the Federal Government and between the federal 7 *
„ Government and the States. ( . ... . . . .

- ,-ff. :r - - ; li ihW'%

"The Council also believes that the Supreme Court is misinterpreting: ,
and mis-applying the general welfare dause of .the Preamble to the' ";’
Constitution, as well as the 10th Amendment reserving to the States" or r J_
the people .all powers not specifically, delegated to the Federal Govern-

-The Council further holds the view that, no'oue should bp appointed, i:
to the Supreme Court wjio has not had at least five, years, prior appellate •.
judicial experience. - •

.. Federal "preemption: f r :-Y-v! ^

The Council supports .Federal legislation to require that no act of v;
Congress 'shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of Coh-. r ?
" grass to occupy the field. in which such act operates, to the exclusion of ;

State laws on the same subject matter, unless such act' contains an ex-7’

' press provision to that effect. -'- Y’ — ' r

281

Force Bills:

The Council profoundly resents the action of Congress in passing,
and the Supreme Court in upholding, P. L. 89-110, the so-called Voting 4 .
Rights Act of 1965. Bom of hate, hysteria and hypocrisy, this law re-
imposes reconstruction on certain States of the South with no appeal to
the local courts. It does this by requiring these States to entreat Federal
authorities for approval of local laws before they can become effective.

As Mr. Justice Black said in his dissenting opinion: “Any State or
States treated in this way are little more than conquered provinces.”

' The Council opposes so-called Federal civil rights legislation as a
further unwarranted encroachment by the Federal Government upon
the rights of the individual citizen, the State and local communities.

.. It also opposes- — arid fop the same reason — executive action in this

area. ■ ' - V

Presidential Electors:

The Council recognizes the right of the several States to appoint
Presidential electors as they choose, but favors the principle that such
electors shall be chosen in the same manner and upon the same basis
, as are members of Congress.

/ /GOVEaiNIlIENT' ECONOMIC POLICY

Promote honesty, economy and efficiency in government — Federal,

" ^taie^ia^'loceL':-^ V, «• - ; >r ;.Va . • v. :

. Fiscal "Policy: ‘"’’V-'';

^'-/; The hational deht now amounts to $331 billion, up $8 billion from
.last year; This does not include government-guaranteed loans and other
contingent liabilities, conservatively estimated to aggregate more than .

-triUiop,-;.\;i }[C. V f./v . . a;.'-"' V V

t..;.: Notvvitbstanding the recent tax reduction, taxes are still far too
highi ln sqme States having State income taxes, the combined Federal-
? State rates actually exceed confiscatory levels. .

In the light of these facts, the Council urges the Congress to take the
‘following action :;. ' • . - *

; -L ;:" Reduce .the Federal budget by reducing expenditures that are

essential to the functioning of the government as defined in . „

> the Constitution,

;V- V 2, ;j ' Avoid any further increase in the debt ceiling and’ the con-
/L”V. :r ' 'tracting cfanyfurther obligations outside tins. ceiling. i ;.

282

3. Approve an amendment to the Constitution limiting Federal

expenditures to receipts in time of peace. , ,

4. Limit Federal income tax rates by Constitutional amendment

except in time of war. ,, . . • r v ;

5. Provide for a return to a convertible gold coin standard and
the liquidation of the present managed currency system.

6. . Approve an amendment to the Constitution requiring reduction
in the national debt except in time of war or congressionally- - -

. f declared state of emergency, f . .. ' . ^ .. .. w

Inflation: . ^

v have had .a deficit in our national budget for 31 of the past 37 ^

years. This is' largely responsihls for the'58 per cent decline in the .
purchasing power of the dollar and .this decline is accelerating. ' ■

„ The deficit for the current fiscal year (ending June 30) is estimated
at over $11 biflion, while: President Johnson estimated next . year’s ”
deficit at $8.1 billion— a figure generally regarded as highly unrealistic
in view of the increasing costs of the “Great Society” and . the war in ....
Yiet Nani In these circumstances, tiie.Council recommends a substantial ;
cut-back in' “Great Society” spending. ; We ' do not believe that a tax v
^increase would be significantly deflationary since it would only reroute
funds from private .to public genders.' •;<; • -r :

The New Economics:

nivminc* <?'

While die Council recognizes that, as with a family' going into debt
to meet living expenses, the day of, reckoning may be postponed for a' 5
time» it rejects the whole of the so-called “New Economics” as a cyni-
cal, cruel and demogogic hoax designed primarny to gain votes, ' ; , "

Depressed

The Council reaffirms its opposition to this type of legislation, the
v .cost of which will run into the, billions. It suggests that a meaningful
solution of the problem, of depressed areas and regions will not be
. , fonnd in subsidized federal pump-priming; rather it .will be found
in the dynamic workings of the free enterprise system. V’

The Federal Deserve System:

' " * Tohave a sound monetary, credit and fiscal policy, it is essential
that the Federal Reserve System continue to function. as an independent
. agency. y "^ r - : '• '

283

Subsidies:

In general. Federal subsidies, including rent subsidies, are politic* *
ally motivated. They also make for additional Federal controls. The
Council believes that the general -welfare will be best served by
the progressive elimination of all subsidies, except where necessary to
the national defense.

- In addition, the Council favors a fair and equitable user charge to
. be paid by those industries which use publicly-financed facilities and
which compete -with other industries which do not use such facilities.

Agriculture: v . ..

. ' V.; One of the largest and most expensive of our many ventures into
welfare statism is the* farm program which resulted in the accumulation ;
of vast surpluses and the loss of billions of dollars annually. Now these '
surpluses (except in the case of cotton and tobacco) have largely dis-
appeared due to the food give-away programs in India and elsewhere
and the U. S. may face a shortage of feed grains notwithstanding the
15 per cent increase in acreage recently ordered.

The Council feels that this situation offers a unique opportunity for !

" the government to make at least a beginning towards freeing the farmers
.v from the bureaucratic stranglehold under which they have operated .

■% these.many years. It urges prompt revision of the lavra governing -agri-;.-,.^r
t cultural production and marketing with a view to returning control to-^r ,
: the farmer; restoring the law of supply and demand* not only for what
V the farmer Has. to sell but for what he has to buy; and giving farmers '
v and consumers the. benefit of a free, unrigged market.

,^odsei|$.' :, -f - v '

} ; r vlt is beyond the ability of Congress as presently organized to in- . '
form itself as to each of the items, in the budget and to know which

be .eliminated. or reduced without injury to essential public services,;;;.^
r^Tn r^rnpfty tbiR nrifl to restore to Congres9 control of spending, the
i* Council recommends the establishing of a joint House-Senate Commit- <.<
.: L'tee with an adequate staff to- make a continuing study of the budget/ ,
■CP.ani advi$e ; )Congresi ' 1 •

l^r ? ;The Constitution' of the United States provides that “no money,

' shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations
made by Jaw.” Notwithstanding this clear prohibition, the practice has
^ grown in .'recent years' ’iff antborizing the heads of government agencies
to go directly to the Treasury for their money without, further appro- >
priations action by Congress. The Council urges an end to this uncon*
stitutional and irresponsible practice. ■ ' • — •

284

One General Expenditure Authorization Act
For Each Fiscal Year:

The need for reform in Congressional procedures for enactment of
spending legislation is obvious. Congress has lost control over Federal
expenditures and acts on spending bills without relating them to reve-
nue and without knowing whether it is creating a deficit or surplus.
Partly as a consequence, deficit financing has been the rule— not the
exception — for more than a quarter of a century. The Council .advo-
cates one general expenditure authorization for each fiscal year.

Uses for Non-Convertible Currencies:

; As a result of food sales and the counterpart funds generated by
the foreign aid programs, the U. S. jGoverament now owns billions of
dollars worth of' non-convertible currencies; Both as a meaps of. econo-
mizing in the expenditure of dollars and to help our balance of pay-
ments deficit, the Council favors: :

. 1. The use of these non-convertible currencies in payment of the
. , i cost of 'any U. S.‘ activities and otherforeign commitmentsin .
the respective countries; and :

2. Sale of these currencies to U, S. t tourists for use in the countries .
....... of origin, .„ ^

Pepaftmehit^ of “flousing. arid XJrjb ah Developmmitf^'rr' ^

.. ..' The Coiincil opposed this primarily for the reason that it would
further increase the power of the Federal Government over municipali-
' ties. It believes that towns and cities should be encouraged to finance
their own development and work with state governments before looking
to Washington for assistance and planning. J. ...... .... ,< .

FEDERAL f AND' STATE

Help develop :an ' equitable ^ tax-; system that will restrict the Federal ,
Government to its proper Constitutional functions, : reserve certain
sources of taxation to the State and local government, broaden the tax
base, eliminate the double taxation of corporate,dividends,and provide i
"equality of taxation to all competing business:, enterprises ;• i./vn •

Constitutional Limitation of Federal Taxes’s'^'T '* v ' .'i'll .1"

^ ). . . The Council submits that a fixed ceiling on the rate at wb ich Fed-. ;’’ •
J - eral income, estate, and gift taxes can be levied and collected, except. ";•• •
on income taxes in time of war, sbould.be written into the Constitution.!!. r -
f- The unlimited power -to tax presently exercised by. the' Federal y .
? . Government is socializing earnings, preventing the formation of risk >■
t.;* capital, and destroying the profit incentive. It 13 also taking away im-
*-vTpoitaat sources of revenue which should be reserved for the State and ; -
T < '/local governments.

285

State Sharing in Federal Income Tax:

The governors have requested the President to initiate a study of 4
how the States should share in the Federal income tax. In the opinion
- of- the Council, any $ueh sharing would make the States even more de-
pendent than they now are on Federal revenues and this should be
avoided. However, if a Federal sharing plan is adopted, the Council
, holds that the states should be reimbursed in proportion to the amount
collected by the Federal Government from each state. .

Double Taxation of. Corporate. Dividends: . ,

Individuals should be exempt from Federal taxation of that portion
f: of their income derived : from corporate dividends, since such income
; % has already , been ta?ed ;once to the . corporation. The Council urges
'^Congress to^take appropriate action to correct this inequity. ' > ■*

v ' Tax Equality: ,> '* ; .

„ In the interest of free and fair competition, the Council urges Con-

* gress to plug the remaining loopholes in those laws which give coopera-
tives, credit unions,' and similar businesses an • unfair tax advantage.

, Capital Cains Tax: .'' : V •• • ■- ■ - -uC. .

• ' v ; This tax.retards the free flow of investment, capital and has a
" stifling effect on our. economy. r It shculd.be repealed, thus permitting,

; - such gains to remain tax free’ foy reinvestment. ' , V: : -. a:,v-

Adequate AHowance for Depreciation: / '

. During a' period of inflation the cost of replacing wom-out or
obsolete buildings and equipment is much more than the amount al-
, lowed as a charge to depreciation under present Federal tax lawsi This
is particularly harmful when ' taxes are taking more than 50 percent.,;

' of the profits earned by many businesses.

r .We urge that Congress establish a current value formula for de- ...
^termi^ing depreeiadon based .upon the current cost of replacement.

:• Investment Tax Credit: - ■/.. V •-

-ivot-. ? .vThe.- Council commends the President for recommending and the
Congress for passing a measure to restore the 7 per cent tax credit for
• machinery and equipment and the tax benefits of accelerated depreci- •
f ation of commercial buildings. ’ .. . , : : : > . '•••;

Deplciion;.A]IbwariC^:\ ' J- ./•

Tbe Council supports. the principle that industries based upon the V-
extraction of exhaustible resources should be allowed adequate dep] e-. “
t ticn allowances. ‘ ‘

39-935 0 - 79-19

286

No Censorship by Taxation: . .

The Council believes that contributions and expenditures by busi-
ness enterprises to support or oppose legislation at all levels of govern-
ment should be deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses
for Federal income tax purposes. *•>•...■

State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: , v _ •„ .

He Council urges the States to get together and formulate and
adopt uniform standards in this field.

• ^ •• , Vm. PRIVATE ENTERPRISE

' . Government competition with privateenterprjse is contrary to the prin-1-
: ciples upon which our economic system rests and should be eliminated.

Socialization of Commerce and Industry: .

' The Council opposes • government competition with taxpaying pri-
vate enterprise in all fields of endeavor, including but not limited to
transportation, home building, home financing, banking, consumer
financing, insurance, fertilizer, and other manufacturing. In particular,

, the Ccmncil opposes government encroachment into the'-electric power,*
business by; such governmental agencies as the Tennessee Valley Au-; ^
' thority, Bonneville Power' Administration, .Southwestern, Power ..Ad-
ministration, Southeastern Power . Administration,'; and.J Rural '
^Electrification Administration. ^ Y ■-./■'i y'v iy' * y ^ ^•• r .

The Rural Electrification Administration was authorized some 30
years ago and was empowered to make loans for rural electrification to -
" persons in. rural areas who at ; that time were not receiving central *
^ /station service.*' : ..V >'’■?

The REA loans money to the Rural Electric, Cooperatives at .2%'^
interest and on terms tip to 35 years. Cost of thismoney is considerably
■ less than the cost of money to the government' This means that the Rural '2
^Electric Cooperatives are being subsidized by all the taxpayers in the *
f - country and, in addition, they are income tax .exempt’

The Council urge^ongress to discontinue financing rural electric;
cooperatives by ceasing to appropriate tax money for REA. Since 98% *
of the farms in America now hive electricity available, there i3 no /
reason to continue appropriating millions of dollars which this bureau-
cratic agency, seeks in order to expand its public power operations far
beyond what it was originally commissioned by Congress to do.*’ •

•; y r The Council calls on Congress to phase out REA which ha3 com-;,'
r pleted the job for which it wa3 created and, in the meantime, insist that
it be compelled to operate within the law. ’ '

287

The Function of Profits:

Profits and the concomitant risk of loss are what make the free
enterprise system run, the dynamic, driving force of industrial pro- *
gress. Without profits there would be no investment to provide new jobs
and additional opportunities for the growing work force of an expand-
ing population. A no-profit economy inevitably results in a socialistic
economy.

The Council deplores the government policy of attempting to in-
fluence wages and prices. V '

^Business Size and the Public Interest:

American industry and .business. have evolved over the years in
■"•/.response to the- changing needs and desires of the consuming public.

,'T/ The/CouncU fayom fair;} and .effective enforcement of the anti-trust
laws, bpt rejects the yardstick of mere size as a criterion of monopoly,
undue concentration, or lack of competition.

Administered Prices and Wages: . ,

There is no justification for Federal interference with manage*
ment’s price-making procedures on the basis of company size in re-
lation to its particular industry, or any other basis. The Council also
believes that individual sellers should be left free to meet price and
pother forms of competition, and that price controls of any sort including j
^ wage and price “guidelines” are unnecessary and harmful. , ; : ' ;

Truth in Lending and Packaging:

The Council believes that regulation of consumer credit and other j
so-called consumer safeguards including so-called “Regulation W”

- controls proposed by the President and/or Congress Rre properly func- -
tions of the States and not of the Federal Government. ‘ . . i.

*> Natural Gss: : .y[;/ ; ■ ‘ '• ' v -

' Since' die production 'of natural gas is not a monopoly, it is de'sir-;-;;',
// ahle/^hat legislation he.enacted to remove producers :pf natural gas
? t ^;from .rate,, regular with. the. principles of our free:, ,-v

*5enterprise'system. : ;:;^:^ ; r r-. •’ ■

Railroads: *•

>■ ; s. v ‘-, The usefulness of the Nation’s railroads to shippers and to national
i defense is definitely handicapped by inequitable regulatory laws, by ~
discrimination - in taxation by state and local communities, and by 1
enormous government expenditures for the benefit of other modes of
^/'transportation, sometimes, at no cost .'to : the. mode ..of transporta- • f
tion receiving the benefit These policies prevent the maximum utiliza-
-'tion of one of the Nation’s most vital. resources and add billions of/
dollars each year to the pubhe’s Transportation bill/ Continuation of -

288

present regulatory practices prevents the railroad from lowering tran 3 -_
porta tion rates, thereby impairing the financial health of the railroads
by depriving them of traffic they can handle at a profit and placing an
unreasonable burden of transportation charges on the shipping public. .

■^1® Council accordingly requests in the national interest prompt
action by the Congress to correct regulatory laws which impair the
efficiency of the railroads and prevent them from passing on the bene-
fits of lower cost transportation to the public. It further ' requests
that the Congress and state legislatures enact legislation to recover the
. public expenditures from the modes of transportation that receive the
benefits from such expenditures in order.that the competitive inequality
forced on the railroads be alleviated. ; ; -;f v C. ; i. /.’_••■

± that inequitable taxation be removed, particularly ^

. that with respect to , assessments by state and local' authorities of rail- ^
'■ road properties at .higher levels than the comparable properties of
others. ‘

Federal l&ens^S of Coiporatiofisri

Tie Council is opposed to the Federal licensing of corporations as v
' 8 condition to engaging in interstate and foreign commerce as an un- -
warranted extension of the Federal poweri*V-'-v.r'’-;ri>-'V-

' '' ■ ‘ y 1 ■— - ;v,

i s v • i> . ' v

Furthermore, the Council is opposed to the Federal Communications ,r
Commission’s so-called “fairness doctrine” concerning the presentation ’•
2s of the conservative viewpoint over rtdio and TV, as an infringement of. <
free speech. - :■ ;• y-y; -fitk |V ; '- u

' ^ Aibralc Ppwer: {■ * *

t - The Council believes that atomic plants, for generating electricity-;,
should be built and operated by private enterprise.

' Federal Control of the Transmission of Electric Energy: ; '; •/}

?£■* "The Council opposes the construction of a national Fcderally-con-.

-i ! trolled network for the transmission of electrical energy so as to inter-’S^
connect Federal powej£marketing agencies through the use of Federal ^ .
• . appropriations, powCT revenues, loans or grants, or funds available to v>
> State power authorities ' or other State or local agencies. The Council, *-
‘ further opposes turning Federal transmission lines into so-called xom- ;

: man carrier transmission lines. Inevitably this will lead to the require- ;
‘vrinent'that all non-federally owned transmission lines become common- ’ :
T ; carriers with the result that the Fedral Government will then. effectively'"'"
^control the transmission of electric energy nationally, regardless - of :
^source or ownership. - ; •

289

The authority to preserve and protect the public lands and any
regulations purportin g to bs issued thereunder should not be misused
to advance the Federal power operations nor to hamper the planning, *
construction and operation of non-Federal transmission lines.

^ ; IX. SOCIAL WELFABE

Oppose those government plans which destroy individual initiative and
, self -reliance^ - '\'- 7

Socialized Medicine: ...

The Council continues to oppose any program of compulsory health
' insurance, including social security-connected hospital care for the
aged. It believes tbit Medicare will prove a serious disappointment
' to those it is intended to benefit and will result in a general deterioration
of the quality of medical care and increased expenses.

War On Poverty:

Our nation was founded on the Christian principle of individual
freedom, the right and the responsibility of the individual to work out
his om destiny and to choose his own future. The proper function of
government is to provide a climate favorable to freedom, initiative and
v growth, leaving to the individual the largest possible area for dcvelop-
x mchtl; Furthernipre r ..ths Council believes „ that direct relief, ' yvlien.

;; necessary, is the responsibility of the States and localities. For these , *.
’r.Teasons the Council advocates theelimination of the Federal Govern- :,
ment from, this field.; - ; ; . ; .y ! - - .• r ;

Public Housing— Urban Senewal;

Tb.e. Council opposes subsidized public housing because it uses the • ;

-- taxes paid by all thepeople for the benefit of a few. In particular, it -

5 condemns the abuse of the power of eminent domain to seize homes and
. other private property, yvliich are then resold, below cost, to private
developers. Slums are created by people and could be minimized if
local governracnts would adopt and enforce decent housing codes. > . ;

Unemployment and Workmen’s Compensation: > - v

- The States should have maximum latitude in the solution of unem*

- ploymcnt problems peculiar to their localities. The Council strongly
opposes any Federalization cf the unemployment program, or work-
men’s compensation program, including Federal payment, of benefits
or the imposition of Federal standards for the payment thereof.

Job Corps Program: /" '• M;/ ’ ’ '• ■ .

V:,v The Council does not believe that this program will solve the prob-
lem of untrained yemig people. The young people of America need to

290

work In free enterprise organizations, not in any- form of Federal labor
Battalions. But they must first receive at least an elementary education,,
and some vocational training. The Council believes' that such a program
under State control would be far more productive of the desired results
- than temporary service in Federal job corps. . -

y V X;. LABOR RELATIONS .

Protect the rights of the individual worker and the general welfare of
ike people by opposing compulsory and monopoly unionism and by .
advocating State control of strikes and picketing. ..---y

Compulsory and Monopoly Unionism — Industry-Wide i ^ ,

Bargaining — StateControl 3 of Strikes and Picketing: - ■ -uy - ;

i - Ki. Jhc Council believes, that;. the privilege of Peeking and keeping ~
. -employment, with or without union affiliation, is a birthright of every
American citizen guaranteed by the Constitution. j' ;

Under existing Federal law permitting theimpositionof.the union -
* shop,, the individual worker, may be compelled , to join the union in .

order to keep his job. Present law; also permits industry-wide bargain-
• v . ing and industry-wide strikes. This.further limits the worker’s freedom
of choice and giYes^to a few union officials the power to paralyze the
•<W . industrial life of the Nation*, To remedy this situation, at least.in part, -
’ . - the .Council- advocates >>Vy ;>• •; v.yy, y .;•>/'

" 1. ' That the States be allowed to exercise ; their constitutional au-

2*. '£i- tbority, to deal with striked, picketing and boycotts and that ;
this poorer not be usurped by the Federal Government. .

«. r ... 2. :■ That Federal anti-trust laws be made to apply, to unions as they-'.
; r :.-.-- : rT- y.r y now apply to industry and business; . ■ • V- V : - 1

V j '3,:. ; That strikes be made subject to control of the bargaining ' unit
vVi ^ v' . v : hy secret ballot of membership after consideration of therein- 7
: ployer’s last negotiated best offer;';' ; ;

/.;• 4. That picketing for organizational purposes be made an unfair
. labor practice; , v - . ’</ . Zld f y y*-.

and strengtbohdd; //. ; ,yy.- -- . , * ,

f 6. That compulsory check-off of union dues be prohibited: when-
. ever check-off of any nature is allowed, that the employee be

- permitted to terminate the check-off agreement on exactly the
Vy v same basis that was used in agreeing to the check-off; • ^

. y - ;.'- 7 . >} That all union officials be elected rather than appointed, such
; V : • elections to be held regularly by secret ballot.

291

National Labor Eolations Board:

. The NLRB has completely lost any inclination to act as an impartial,
judicial body. Instead it has become a policy-making tribunal which is >
blatantly pro-union .and anti-employer and anti-free enterprise. The
whole concept of * ‘administrative” justice is fallacious and unwork-
able. The Council believes that the NLRB should be abolished and
legislation passed to replace it with a labor court similar to a federal
tax court.. - . :

Eight to Work:

y / The Co un cil is opposed to; all forms of. compulsory unionism, in-
y eluding the closed, union, and so-called agency shops. It supports State
.. Right-to-Work laws, and opposes repeal of Section 14(b) of the Taft-
^ Hartley Act, yrhich authorizes them. •• -

jCtanugoa^

The Council feels that existing Taft-Hartley prohibition against
secondary boycotts at construction sites should be retained..

Strike Violence and Lawlessness: — t , - r

The use of physical force, threats, violence and mass picketing
interferes trith the employee’s freedom of choice and should net be
. permitted. Conscientious and fearless enforcement of the law at State
?and„Iocal levels would largely eliminate these evils. In many instances,

; p ublic officials, ’ charge d under their oath of office with law enforcement,
have been grossly J derelict in their duties. •* '•* * ; ‘ ' ‘ : V ; V

Fair Labor St andar ds, Walsh-Healey and Bacon-Bavis Acts: ; •

The Council opposes government wage and price fixing on principle. ■ "
V However, so long as the present Wage-Hour law is on the books, minima ; =
established under it should also become the minima for employees > ’
^engaged in v/ork on government contracts. V .

The' maladministraticn of the Walsh-Healey and Bacon-Davis Acts
regulating the wages paid. on government procurements and construe-
-:*tion contracts constitutes a prime example of executive distortions for
: political- purposes. The Council believes that both of these laws should v

■ bQ i ' y sj,;; * 'V?. 1 r ■■ ,

v . . It opposes current proposals for rationing job opportunities (shorter
work week and double pay for overtime), and believes that the Federal ;
•minimum wage law should be amended to peimit marginal workers, y
, including die least skilled and the very young and very old, to obtain
; jobs at rates they are drilling to accept and employers are willing to
pay.; In addition, the regulations now ' applying 'to youthful workers
.. should, be relaxed so as to permit them to work at any nen-kazardous \
occupation.:' ' '

292

THE COMMITTEE ON DECLARATION OF POLICY

W. M. Blount, Chairman, Blount Brothers Corp, Montgomery, Ala.
Allen Ndcqn, President E. C Barton Co, Jonesharo, Aik:

WiLtxur B. Bryan, Assistant Vice President, Southern Bell Telephone
& Telegraph Co., Atlanta, Ga, :

Chester Gulick, General Manager, Kentncky-Termegsee Clay Co.,
Mayfield, Ky. ~

Off <BTj:s W. WiLLACB^ Chairman, Union ■ ^Wi^.l^<xaroB v

" • \ ♦: ^ -?r v ** Vs.% >* •£**'. r • >

-■ TV*--* - %

Frank G. Sui^Vice Pt^den^B'Iissisappi J^dwex &ligbi Co., Jack-'

. son, Miss.' =

. • r ‘ V : lv ■ -r ' v *jv jy y?r* r T :* : ki % <

John R. Grotiths, Vice President American 2Spc Co, St, Louis, Mo..
Loub V. Sutton, Chairman, Carolina Power & Light Co, Raleigh;

293

Mr. Evans. Despite a major effort, the committee was unable to
identify the “secret southern organization” that Mr. Sutherland
referred to, according to Mr. Byers, but it did establish strong
segregationist leanings in at least two of the organizations he did
belong to, and in Mr. Sutherland himself. Indeed, one close asso-
ciate told the committee that Mr. Sutherland was a “diehard south-
erner” who would “never let the Civil War die.”

A committee investigation of Mr. Sutherland’s financial condi-
tion revealed that he left an estate valued at more than $300,000.

While the committee has been unable, 10 years later, to show a
direct link between either Mr. Kauffmann or Mr. Sutherland and
the events in Memphis, it did determine that they met the neces-
sary criteria for being considered participants in a serious conspir-
acy, to wit: (a) they had the motive — in Mr. Sutherland’s avowed
social, political and economic attitudes and Mr. Kauffmann’s readi-
ness to earn money legally or illegally; (2) they had the monetary
means — from Mr. Sutherland’s own funds and from those of asso-
ciates; and (3) they actively sought an opportunity to carry out
their objective, as evidenced by their alleged solicitation of at least
Mr. Byers.

The committee was unable to find evidence to counter Mr. Byers’
claim that he declined the offer to assassinate Dr. King.

Because of the apparent serious character of the offer to Mr.
Byers, the committee explored the possibility that the offer might
also have been communicated to someone other than Mr. Byers, or
that Mr. Byers, intentionally or unintentionally, so transmitted it
himself. The investigation yielded four theories of possible connec-
tives between Mr. Sutherland, or Mr. Kauffmann and James Earl
Ray, the convicted assassin.

I would ask at this time, Mr. Chairman, that MLK Exhibit F-
579 A be inserted into the record and appropriately displayed.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the
record at this point.

[The information follows:]

ST. LOUIS CONSPIRACY (1)

MLK Exhibit F-579A

Mr. Evans. There are a total of four exhibits here, Mr. Chair-
man, and I would just like to enter this one at this time, and the
total of four illustrate the theoretical connectives, though emphasis
should be placed on “theoretical,” since the evidence available
cannot be taken as having shown that all individuals and organiza-
tions identified on the charts were actually involved in a conspir-
acy to murder Dr. King.

The charts merely are intended to depict the means by which
word of the existence of an assassination contract might have
reached Ray. Each theory, in turn, will be considered.

294

The first chart which is displayed, is called “St. Louis Conspiracy
(1),” shows how there could have been links from Mr. Sutherland,
Mr. Kauffmann, and Mr. Byers via John Paul Spica, a relative of
Mr. Byers who was a fellow inmate of Ray at the Missouri State
Penitentiary.

The committee determined that Mr. Spica, a brother-in-law of
Mr. Byers, was convicted and imprisoned in 1963 for the contract
murder of a St. Louis businessman. Missouri State Penitentiary
records show that Mr. Spica was incarcerated from 1963 to 1973,
and that for at least part of that time he occupied a cell in the
same cellblock and same tier of the prison as Ray.

In testimony before the committee, Mr. Spica has acknowledged
that he was acquainted with Ray, but he denied having had close
contact with him. Committee interviews with prison officials and
other inmates, on the other hand, indicate a much closer friendship
between Mr. Spica and Ray than Mr. Spica admits.

Mr. Spica has stated that he knew nothing of the offer to Mr.
Byers by Mr. Sutherland and Mr. Kauffmann until Mr. Byers
advised him of the committee’s investigation in 1978.

As Mr. Byers has told the committee, he never mentioned the
offer to Mr. Spica in visits to the prison. A check of prison records
reveals that visits by Mr. Byers to Mr. Spica at the prison occurred
after the assassination of Dr. King.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to have introduced into the record
now that which has been premarked MLK exhibit F-579B.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the
record.

[The information follows:]

ST LOUIS CONSPIRACY (2)

MLK Exhibit F-579B

Mr. Evans. This chart labeled “St. Louis Conspiracy (2)”, shows a
possible connective to Ray at the Missouri State Penitentiary
through Dr. Hugh Maxey, a medical officer at the prison.

Interviews with relatives and associates of John Kauffmann indi-
cate that Mr. Kauffmann and Dr. Maxey were associated for sever-
al years. Mrs. Kauffmann said it was a purely social relationship,
one that lasted from the early 1960’s until Mr. Kauffmann was
sent to Federal prison for the sale of amphetamines.

Dr. Maxey, who is over 80, acknowledged in an interview with
committee investigators that he had known Mr. Kauffmann. He
declined to discuss the association, except to say it was social.

295

The committee looked into other reasons for an association be-
tween Dr. Maxey and Mr. Kauffmann. It was learned, for example,
that Dr. Maxey assisted Mr. Kauffmann in obtaining the services
of parolees in work-release programs; and there were reports that
Dr. Maxey was involved with Mr. Kauffmann in the distribution of
amphetamines in the prison. While it was confirmed there was an
amphetamine problem at the prison in the 1960’s, the charge that
Dr. Maxey was involved in distribution could not be substantiated.
Dr. Maxey also denied any participation in illegal drug distribu-
tion.

Prison health records show Dr. Maxey had contact with James
Earl Ray at the prison and the doctor told committee investigators
he did know Ray, but only as a patient.

While Ray was pushing a food cart in the prison hospital, John
Paul Spica, in fact, worked for Dr. Maxey in the same hospital.
During this same period Ray was disciplined for trying to smuggle
contraband into the prison infirmary.

Dr. Maxey said he was unaware of an offer to murder Dr. King
circulating at the prison while he was employed there.

Sixteen Missouri State prison inmates were questioned as to the
existence of an offer to kill Dr. King, or any rumors that one
existed, and most said that speculation about a reward did not
arise until after the assassination.

The chart labeled “St. Louis Conspiracy (3)” which is MLK exhib-
it F-579C, I would like to have entered now, if I may, Mr. Chair-
man.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it will be entered.

[The information follows:]

ST. LOUIS CONSPIRACY (3)

MLK Exhibit F-579C

Mr. Evans. This chart shows a possible connection between the
offer and James Earl Ray through a Spica associate and Ray’s
brother, John.

Mr. Byers told committee investigators that he was acquainted
with a St. Louis resident named Robert Regazzi, and that Mr.
Regazzi and Mr. Spica also knew each other. The significance of

296

this is amplified by the knowledge that Naomi Regazzi, a former
wife of Robert, was a bartender at the Grapevine Tavern in St.
Louis from January to July 1968. The Grapevine was operated by
John Ray at the time.

The committee reasoned that if Mr. Byers had told Mr. Regazzi
about the offer of money to kill Dr. King, Naomi could well have
been aware of it and, in turn, communicated it to John Ray. Mr.
Byers said, to the best of his recollection, he did not discuss the
offer with Mr. Regazzi.

Mr. Spica was questioned about his association with Mr. Regazzi.
He said he knew him but there was no friendship between them.
Since — as Mr. Spica has claimed — he had no knowledge of an offer
to kill Dr. King, he could not have passed it along to Mr. Regazzi.

Mr. Regazzi, when interviewed by committee investigators,
claimed he had no knowledge whatsoever of the King assassina-
tion. He said he had been separated from Naomi at the time she
was employed at the Grapevine and he could not have communicat-
ed an offer to her had he known about it.

Naomi Regazzi told committee investigators she did not recall
hearing about an offer for the murder of Dr. King. She said she
had never talked with John Ray about Dr. King, except to ask him
if James was his brother, after he had been identified as the
assassin.

Naomi Regazzi confirmed she was separated from Robert during
the period she was employed at the Grapevine.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to have entered into the record now
MLK exhibit F-579D.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered.

[The information follows:]

ST. LOUIS CONSPIRACY (4)

MLK Exhibit F-579D

Mr. Evans. This chart shows a possible connective through the
American Party campaign for the Presidency in 1968. Both Mr.
Sutherland and Mr. Kauffmann were active in the party, also
known as the American Independent Party. Mr. Sutherland was a
political activist, while Mr. Kauffmann appears to have worked in
a supportive capacity.

Committee interviews with officials of the American Party in
1968 have revealed that Mr. Sutherland, who was a candidate for
elector, was active in behalf of the party at both the local and
national levels. Committee interviews with American Party mem-

297

bers in St. Louis in 1968 indicate that support was derived from
people who felt that both the Republicans and Democrats were too
liberal on civil rights.

Former associates of Mr. Sutherland also said that his strong
support of the American Party was based in large degree on the
party’s conservative positions on civil rights. The committee also
learned that considerable support for the American Party cam-
paign was drawn from a White Citizens’ Council in St. Louis, an
organization dedicated to racial separation. As has been noted, Mr.
Sutherland was a member of the council.

Floyd Kitchen, a former White Citizens Council field director, an
organizer for the American Party in St. Louis in 1968, and a
Missouri State chairman for the American Independent Party, in-
dicated to the committee that his AIP salary of $600 a month was
paid by Mr. Sutherland.

John Ray was also active in the 1968 American Party campaign.
Investigation by the committee, as well as testimony by his own
brother, Jerry Ray, indicate that the Grapevine Tavern was a
distribution point for party literature. At the same time, James
Earl Ray was engaged in party activity in California.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the overlay which has been
marked as MLK exhibit F-579E be entered into the record.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection it may be entered into the
record.

[The information follows:]

ST. LOUIS CONSPIRACY (4)

MLK Exhibit F-579E

Mr. Evans. John Ray’s interest in politics seems out of character
since he apparently had never evidenced it before 1968, and since a
convicted felon, he was not able to vote. Nevertheless, extensive
research of party activities in St. Louis in 1968 revealed that a
woman who was extremely active in the party in the southern part
of the city was Viola Anderson. Her home at 2105 Arsenal Street
was only about 100 yards from the Grapevine Tavern. Though Mrs.
Anderson died in 1977, her widower, Stanley Anderson, confirmed
her party activities.

Mr. Chairman, it would be appropriate at this point to insert
into the record and appropriately display MLK exhibit F-580.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection it is so ordered.

[The information follows:]

298

GRAPEVINE TAVERN RELATIVE TO ANDERSON RESIDENCE

Mr. Evans. Mr. Chairman, I would also like to have entered
what has been previously marked 580A, 580B, and 580C which are
photographs.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection they may be entered into
the record at this point.

[The information follows:]

MLK Exhibit F-580B

'Skfik-i

MLK Exhibit F-580C

Mr. Evans. Mr. Anderson acknowledged to committee investiga-
tors that his late wife had met Mr. Sutherland, but she was not
close to him. Mr. Anderson insisted that neither he nor his wife
nor Mr. Sutherland were prejudiced against Black people. Mr.
Anderson also said that he and his wife had once met J. B. Stoner
of the National States Rights Party. He said that he did not feel
Mr. Stoner was prejudiced against Blacks.

39-935 0 - 79 - 20

302

Although Mr. Anderson said he could not remember ever meet-
ing John Ray, he volunteered that he and his wife and another
party worker visited the Grapevine on at least one occasion.

Mr. Anderson denied ever hearing of an offer to assassinate Dr.
King, but he indicated, after repeated questioning, that conversa-
tions critical of Dr. King’s activities occurred frequently at meet-
ings he and his wife attended prior to the assassination.

In an effort to gain further insight into the activities of the
American Party in St. Louis and their connections, if any, with the
assassination of Dr. King, the committee turned its attention to
Glen Shrum. Mr. Shrum, it was learned, became active in the
party in December 1967 or January 1968. He was instrumental in
the organization in the Third Congressional District, and he was in
close contact with Viola Anderson in building neighborhood sup-
port.

Stanley Anderson told the committee Mr. Shrum and Anderson
remained in close touch for several years after the 1968 campaign,
and relatives of Mr. Shrum, who subsequently died, said he was
also in contact with John Sutherland. While they maintained such
contact was minimal, other committee sources revealed Mr.
Shrum’s activities were directed by Floyd Kitchen.

After the 1968 campaign, Mr. Shrum continued to be active in
the American Party in St. Louis as an official and board member.
Along with Mrs. Anderson, he also became involved with the White
Citizens Council, of which Mr. Sutherland had been an early orga-
nizer.

The committee contacted several American Party and White
Citizens Council members who said that several informal meetings
were held at the Anderson home during the 1968 campaign. Re-
portedly, Shrum attended many of them. According to Mr. Ander-
son, he also was a patron of the Grapevine Tavern.

Shrum was also described to the committee as an activist with
radical right wing organizations. He belonged to the John Birch
Society and the Minutemen. He attended meetings of the National
States Rights Party, and he may have been in contact with the Ku
Klux Klan. His friends also indicated he held strong opinions on
civil rights, leading him to be openly critical of Federal legislation
and court actions dealing with equality for Black people.

The committee further learned that Dr. King and his efforts in
behalf of the civil rights movement were frequently discussed in
meetings at the Anderson home and elsewhere. Witnesses of the
meetings were unable to recall specific statements with regard to
Dr. King, but they did say the general attitude was not favorable to
the endeavors of the civil rights leader.

Committee investigators asked the witnesses about the reaction
at the meetings to Dr. King’s death. No one was greatly disturbed
they said. In fact, there was an atmosphere of jubilation at one get-
together shortly after the assassination.

One further aspect of the committee investigation of the Byers
allegation must be mentioned. The committee also sought an
answer to several other questions: Did the FBI know of the Kauff-
mann-Sutherland offer prior to the assassination? Did it know of
the offer during the active investigation of Ray?

303

Assuming it had no knowledge prior or subsequent to the assassi-
nation, at least until 1974, should it have uncovered the offer at
least following the assassination? This aspect of the investigation,
as well as others, continues, but certain results may be reported
now.

A former St. Louis County detective has been interviewed. He
advised that sometime in 1971 or 1972, he was not sure exactly
when, a St. Louis Post-Dispatch reporter asked him to check out a
rumor that Mr. Byers and an unidentified lawyer had been in-
volved in an offer to kill Dr. King. The detective said he had been
unable to develop further information on the rumor. The reporter
himself died on February 14, 1974.

Investigators also interviewed a man who, acting under police
instructions, had frequented the motel owned by John Kauffmann.
The man now occupies a respectable position with a major Ameri-
can manufacturing company. He says, he and a number of
“friends” who lived at the motel in 1966, 1967, and 1968, indicated
that during that period, those “friends” had engaged in a number
of thefts that provided them with a source of income. Kauffmann’s
role was that of a fence. The individual also stated that he had
overheard discussions of other income sources, including “picking
up $10,000 or $20,000 or $30,000 from John for killing King.”

He said he believed the “John” referred to was Mr. Kauffmann,
though he added he had no information that any of his acquaint-
ances at the motel had actually participated in the assassination of
Dr. King. He said that this information had been supplied to local
police officials at the time.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes this report. I would be glad to
answer any questions.

Chairman Stokes. The committee will operate under the 5-
minute rule with reference to questioning Mr. Evans.

Mr. Evans, let me ask you this: You are an experienced homicide
detective, one of extensive experience with the New York Police
Department. Can you say to the committee that in terms of follow-
ing all police leads relating to the Byers’ allegation, that as an
experienced investigator the committee has done everything possi-
ble to run out every possible lead?

Mr. Evans. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. My next question perhaps either you or Pro-
fessor Blakey might be able to respond to. It would relate to our
exhibit F-577 which is now part of the record.

In the FBI report over to this committee, I want to refer to the
exact language of what it says there. It says:

During the fall of 1973, 5 or 6 months ago, date not recalled, Byers came to the
shop inquiring as to whether they could get together to talk, and they later did so at
Pizza and Cream, Clayton, Mo., in the area of a Broad-Dugan Paint Store, where
informant had traveled on business.

Byers talked freely about himself and his business and they later went to infor-
mant’s house where Byers told a story about visiting a lawyer in St. Louis County,
now deceased, not further identified, who had offered to give him a contract to kill
Martin Luther King. He said that also present was a short, stocky man, who walked
with a limp. (Later, with regard to the latter individual, Byers commented that this
man was actually the individual who made the payoff of James Earl Ray after the
killing.)

304

Now in light of Mr. Byers’ testimony here this morning where
there was no mention of this particular allegation with reference
to a payoff of James Earl Ray, what can you tell us about any
information on this?

Mr. Evans. Chief counsel will take that question, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, let me comment on both the ques-
tion that you asked initially of Mr. Evans and respond more par-
ticularly to your question with reference to the FBI report.

Let me do the first first and the second second.

Mr. Evans is quite right that this committee has utilized all the
investigative techniques available to it as a congressional commit-
tee to explore this allegation. We have conducted field interviews
of everyone we have been able to identify. We have subpenaed, of
course, through the committee, the key individuals and talked to
them in executive session under oath, and where necessary utilized
the immunity techniques to make an effort to break through the
normal ring of silence that would surround a conspiracy of this
character.

Frankly, though, the question seemingly implied whether every-
thing had been done that could be done. To that question the
answer has to be no, that there are investigative techniques availa-
ble to an executive agency to explore conspiracies of this kind. It is
not the normal thing for a congressional committee to develop paid
informants in and around a conspiratorial group. That technique
has not been employed by this committee. It could be employed by
an executive agency. It is prohibited under law and specifically
contrary to the rules of this committee to employ either consensual
or nonconsensual but lawful electronic surveillance.

Those techniques could be applied in this situation to investigate
this case if it were handled by an executive agency. Both of those
techniques were available to executive agencies in 1968 and could
have been applied at that time. With what results, of course, only
educated guesses can be made.

To answer your second question, an effort was obviously made to
see if verification could be made of that aspect of the informant
report that indicated that the individual probably under the cir-
cumstances of Mr. Kauffmann was according to the informant,
from Byers’ statement, the one who actually made the payoff to
James Earl Ray.

As Mr. Evans indicated in his statement, the committee has
identified the informant involved and had extensive conversations
with the informant. The committee, of course, has also had exten-
sive conversations with Mr. Byers and the committee has been in
contact with the FBI agents involved.

The FBI agent has no specific memory, including this informant
report. The informant indicates that he did not say that and Mr.
Byers indicates that he did not say that. Consequently, that aspect
of this informant report is unsubstantiated.

Chairman Stokes. One further question.

I notice the same FBI report says:

Extensive further research in the St. Louis indices has failed to reveal this
information was in any way disseminated and the information simply reposes in the
informant file.

What can you tell us with reference to that?

305

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, shortly after this memorandum was
forwarded to this committee, the committee was contacted by FBI
Director Webster and a request was made of the committee for its
permission for the FBI to conduct administrative examination of
why this memorandum was misfiled, mislaid or not properly dis-
seminated within the FBI.

That permission was given and an administrative investigation
was conducted by the FBI. The reports based on that administra-
tive investigation have been available, made available to the com-
mittee, and of course are in the committee files.

In broad outline, that report indicates that this was nothing
more than an administrative error. All of the agents involved were
interviewed by FBI agents and all indicated that they just made a
mistake.

The committee itself has not yet conducted its own investigation
of the administrative issue associated with this report. Candidly, its
investigative resources have been allocated elsewhere.

I might note for the record that it was necessary for Judge
Webster to ask the committee for permission to conduct this ad-
ministrative investigation since under the memorandum of under-
standing between the committee and the FBI, anything having to
do with the King case will be investigated only by this committee
and not by the Department of Justice, or more particularly, the
FBI.

Consequently, when this memorandum showed up in 1978 in a
file review of an unrelated matter, the FBI and the Department of
Justice, under the memorandum of understanding, did not have
investigative jurisdiction to act on it at that time.

Chairman Stokes. Just one further question: In his testimony
this morning, Mr. Byers, in response to a question I posed to him,
indicated that he has never been interrogated or talked to by the
FBI. Is that your understanding of our investigation of the matter
also?

Mr. Blakey. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Evans. That is true.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you.

I have no further questions.

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer.

Mr. Preyer. I have no questions at this time, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine.

Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Evans, just to clarify the record, on page 10 of your testimo-
ny, the third paragraph from the bottom, you say 16 Missouri State
Penitentiary inmates were questioned as to the existence of an
offer to kill Dr. King or any rumors that one existed, and most said
the speculation about a reward did not arise until after the
assassination.

Now the 16 inmates were interviewed by whom? Our staff?

Mr. Evans. Our staff, that is correct.

Mr. Devine. Did any other information develop from these in-
mates relative to either James Earl Ray or this particular offer of
a reward?

Mr. Evans. Well, some of the inmates indicated that James Earl
Ray was involved in the pushing of amphetamines within the

306

prison, but we were never able to specifically pin this down with
any hard evidence, so we omitted that from our report.

Mr. Devine. These 16 inmates, among those were some that were
associated with James Earl Ray?

Mr. Evans. That is correct. They worked with him on details.
They were housed with him in different cell blocks during his
period of incarceration.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from the District of Columbia, Mr. Fauntroy.

Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Evans, were we able to investigate any possible linkage
between this allegation of conspiracy and any others which the
committee may have been pursuing, more specifically, between this
allegation and the one dealing with Leon and Claude Powell and a
mysterious person identified as Ralph who offered, as I understand
it, $50,000, according to the allegation, at least one of the allega-
tions, to them to kill Dr. King?

Mr. Evans. Mr. Fauntroy, we made extensive efforts to hook this
conspiracy up with other conspiracies and in particular the one
that you are referring to in Atlanta. But to date we have been
unable to connect the two.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Fauntroy, it might be appropriate for the record
to note that the information dealing with the Powell’s came to the
committee prior to the information dealing with the Byers’ allega-
tion.

Nevertheless, the similarity between the two offers, the similar-
ity in the nature of the offer, the amount of money involved, and
the apparent kind of people involved is obvious to the staff and an
effort was made to see if all people who might be associated with
Sutherland could be in some way identified and then compared or
contrasted with the individual who allegedly made the offer to Mr.
Powell.

An extensive effort was made to do that; looking at photographs,
reviewing lists of businessmen, lawyers and other associates. To
date the committee staff has been unable to show any relationship.

Mr. Fauntroy. Do you think further investigation of both these
allegations could produce any more information than we have been
able to obtain thus far?

Mr. Evans. Mr. Fauntroy, we are continuing with the investiga-
tion until December 31. Up until that time we are still making
every effort to further pursue the Byers’ allegation or to under-
stand better the implications or the facts surrounding the Powell
allegation.

Mr. Fauntroy. Two quick questions.

You mentioned a St. Louis Post-Dispatch reporter who had been
making inquiries about an allegation of conspiracy; namely, this
one, who died. I wonder if you can tell the committee how old that
reporter was and under what circumstances did he expire in 1971?

Mr. Evans. His death was due to natural causes, I believe. We
are in the process of making contact with the publishers of the
paper to obtain his files. We are also still in the process of follow-
ing that particular lead out. I think we will be able to better report
on that at a later date.

307

Mr. Fauntroy. Can you tell us when and under what circum-
stances did Mr. Kauffmann die in 1974, Mr. Sutherland in 1970?

Mr. Evans. That is correct. Natural causes, as best we can deter-
mine.

Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford.

Mr. Ford. Mr. Chairman, I don’t have a question but I do have a
comment that maybe the chief counsel or Mr. Evans could respond
to. I am concerned about the purpose of this summary.

We have discussed the offer that was made to Mr. Byers and
possibly others that might have been made to them.

Do you think there is anything that could be forthcoming out of
this particular area, this offer in connection with the Ray family,
before we complete our investigation December 31 that would give
us more information than we have at the present time?

Mr. Evans. I am hopeful, Mr. Ford, that we will be able to
answer this conspiratorial allegation as well as others. We are
always open to new and additional information. We are in fact
obtaining additional information and continuing our investigation
relative to the allegation as well as others that we are aware of.

Mr. Ford. We only have 30 or 35 more days.

Mr. Evans. That is correct.

Mr. Ford. Mr. Blakey, after of December 31 would the committee
staff continue on beyond that?

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Ford, all things, good and bad, come to an end
and this investigation will come to an end as well. While it is true
that the committee can continue the investigation through Decem-
ber 31, I think candor requires that we say on the record that the
resources that can be devoted to the active investigation are dimin-
ishing and that the realistic expectation of a major breakthrough
in this area between now and December 31 is small.

I would also make the assessment for you in this public hearing
as I would elsewhere that a realistic possibility of a major break-
through in this body of material by a congressional committee
given the inherent limitations of a congressional committee in
conducting this kind of investigation is small.

Mr. Ford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. Sawyer. Yes, Mr. Evans, I listened with some interest to the
Judge’s speculation, knowing Mr. Byers, as I undestood what he
said, that he thought perhaps Byers had really made this offer up
and floated it through this gentleman named O’Hara to see if it got
back to the FBI so he could confirm the identify of a report of an
informer.

Did you catch that testimony?

Mr. Evans. Yes, I did.

Mr. Sawyer. How do you weigh that?

Mr. Evans. Well, I know Mr. Byers and Mr. Byers would avoid
any kind of contact with the FBI if he could. I think he would seek
to establish whether or not the individual was an informant
through any other way at his command rather than involve him-

308

self in any sort of conspiracy allegation, conspiracy to assassinate
Dr. Martin Luther King.

Mr. Sawyer. But here, of course, under his story, he never had
any meeting of minds with anyone. He rejected the proposal. He
doesn’t become involved in a conspiracy and I am sure he is well
enough informed on criminal law to know that when he turns it
down.

Both the other gentleman are dead. So he is not really running
any danger. Would this be just an ideal thing to try out on an
informer and you could almost be certain if he was in fact an FBI
informer that such a thing would get back to the FBI and he would
be questioned.

Doesn’t that sound like an appealing ploy to you?

Mr. Evans. I beg to disagree, sir, but what I know of Mr. Byers,
Mr. Byers is quite active in certain kinds of activity and he would
rather not have the FBI or the local police looking at. That kind of
a ploy by him by its very nature would insure that he would get
some supervision or surveillance over a period of time even after
being brought in and confronted with that.

Mr. Sawyer. Wouldn’t it be less surveillance than associated
with a suspected informer? Might it not be much the better of two
evils?

Mr. Evans. One might just cut one’s connections off with that
particular person and he can still continue his activities, whatever
they might be.

My assumption, and it is perfectly an assumption, were that
those activities were of a criminal nature. Mr. Byers is well known
in the St. Louis area for his connections.

My thought is that he would avoid that person rather than give
the FBI any reason to supervise his activities or to question him.

Mr. Sawyer. Thank you. That is all I have.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian.

Mr. Fithian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Evans, I take it from your report that you have surveyed
and contacted, et cetera, about everybody that you can think of
who frequented the Grapevine Tavern on a regular basis; is that
correct?

Mr. Evans. Well, we made an effort in that direction, but the
area— the Grapevine is now closed. It is called Tom’s Place and it
has been closed for some years. The area where it was located is a
transitory area and people frequently move.

I had my investigators there for a couple of weeks conducting
canvassing of the neighborhood. They were not well received in
view of the fact that that area is still, in my opinion, mainly an
area where people, a blue-collar worker area, and they are not
quite receptive to this investigation, nor were they to my investiga-
tors.

Some had doors slammed in their face and dogs were put upon
them. Those people that did talk to us would only indicate that the
bar was a place that they did not frequent but they knew that it
was there and they cannot associate any activity with it other than
there was some Wallace campaign activity in that area.

309

Mr. Fithian. Then at this point you cannot really indicate how
widely known, if this offer were indeed made, how widely known
that would become in the area of the Grapevine and its inhabi-
tants. Is that what you are saying?

Mr. Evans. Well, I can’t say now what had occurred in 1968, but
our investigation shows from other interviews that we conducted
that there was talk and there was a rumor of a $50,000 contract to
kill King.

Now whether the persons that reside in the area of the Grape-
vine Bar were aware of that or not I don’t know. As I said before, a
lot of residents that are presently there denied that they frequent-
ed the bar, although they often passed it.

My investigation revealed that the patrons of the particular bar
were persons that did not necessarily reside in that particular area.

Mr. Fithian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no further ques-
tions.

Chairman Stokes. I just have one further question for either Mr.
Evans or Professor Blakey.

In the narrative this morning some reference was made to other
conspiracy allegations that were investigated, reference just being
made to three or four of them as I recall. I do note over the last 18
months the King subcommittee spent an enormous amount of time
in executive session questioning witnesses with reference to 21
other conspiracy allegations.

I do know that Mr. Evans’ investigators have been all over the
country pursuant to running out those allegations. I think it might
be good to have some comment since we have now zeroed in on
only one of those conspiracy allegations in a public hearing, to
have some further comment with reference to the results of the
other 21 and what the public can expect to learn in terms of some
final report.

Mr. Blakey. Well, Mr. Chairman, consistent with the practice
that has been followed in these hearings, on the whole the staff has
not made an effort to evaluate the evidence but really has reported
it to the committee.

The ultimate judgment of whether these other five here that
were mentioned as more serious and the others that have not been
mentioned as serious but have been investigated carry weight obvi-
ously will have to wait for the committee’s final determination in
its final report.

If you would want a general evaluation of them, I suspect I could
say a lot more than the one the staff has brought to the committee
in the public session. Obviously, as the committee has said, this is
the one that seems the most serious.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you.

Is there anything further from the committee?

Mr. Evans?

Mr. Blakey?

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, I might ask Mr. Evans if he might
comment on the general character of the population that did fre-
quent the bar. You indicated the geographic character. I wonder if
you would indicate the character of them.

Mr. Evans. What our investigation revealed, my investigators
met a lot of hostility in that area in view of the fact that they were

310

investigating the assassination of Dr. King. Somehow, and we sus-
pect through a local citizens council, the residents of that particu-
ar area were alerted that we would be coming and they were quite
lostile. I think their actions sort of reflect a racial attitude, much
of which we found when we spoke to people in the local citizens
council of St. Louis. That attitude was definitely anti-Black, anti-
investigation.

Mr. Blakey. I wonder if you would comment on whether or not
your investigation indicated that any of those people who associat-
ed together and were together at the Grapevine Bar in the period
1967 to 1968, prior to the assassination, had criminal records?

Mr. Evans. Yes, we found that many of the patrons of that
particular bar did have criminal records.

Mr. Blakey. Was that on occasion a meeting place?

Mr. Evans. Yes.

Mr. Blakey. Where robberies and burglaries were planned?

Mr. Evans. Yes, it was. The St. Louis intelligence file indicated
that it was a place where one could in the vernacular sort of find
out what is going on in town, a place where one could hook up a
contract and make money.

Mr. Blakey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The committee is advised that immediately
upon adjourning this open session of the committee there will be
an executive session of the full committee in room 304 immediately
after we adjourn here.

There being no further witnesses to come before the committee
this afternoon, this meeting is adjourned until 9 a.m. tomorrow
morning.

[Whereupon, at 3:31 p.m. the committee adjourned, to reconvene
at 9 a.m., Thursday, November 30, 1978.]

INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1978

House of Representatives,

Select Committee on Assassinations,

Washington, D.C.

The select committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 9:20 a.m.,
in room 345, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Louis Stokes
(chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Stokes, Devine, McKinney, Fauntroy,
Sawyer, Ford, Fithian, and Edgar.

Also present: Mark Speiser, staff counsel; Elizabeth L. Berning,
chief clerk, and G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director.

Chairman Stokes. The committee will come to order.

The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey.

NARRATION BY PROF. G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL
AND STAFF DIRECTOR

Mr. Blakey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

When James Earl Ray appeared before this committee last
August, the question of his participation in the assassination of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. was examined principally through the
questioning of Ray himself. Ray’s own story was also put in the
context of the overall investigation, and such important issues as
the validity of his guilty plea and his alibi were considered.

In this current set of hearings, evidence of Ray’s participation in
the murder has been more fully explored, and the committee has
examined facets of his possible motive. In addition, the question of
conspiracy has been raised, as the committee has probed a number
of puzzling issues, some of them suggesting that officials of the
Government might have been guilty of complicity in the assas-
sination.

Yesterday, Mr. Chairman, the committee heard evidence of a
conspiracy that might well have led to the death of Dr. King, one
involving certain individuals in the St. Louis area. Part of the
report of the investigation that was presented by Mr. Evans, the
chief investigator of the King staff, was a series of possible ways
that word of the contract for the assassination might have reached
James Earl Ray, the convicted assassin.

Today the committee will look further into the question of Ray’s
possible role in the conspiracy. In doing so, the committee is reach-
ing the climax of its investigation of the King assassination.

This much can be said with confidence at this time — if, in fact,
there was a plot to murder Dr. King, as the evidence yesterday

( 311 )

312

strongly suggested, it is logical to assume that the convicted assas-
sin was a party to it.

As those who have followed the hearings will recall, the commit-
tee gave careful consideration to the conspiratorial implication of
Ray s accounts of his dealing with the mysterious Raoul, even
though Ray himself was unable to provide further identification of
this individual. All leads on Raoul were pursued on the assumption
that such a man might indeed exist.

Nevertheless, when you come down to it, the Raoul theory that
seems best to fit, although the ultimate question is for the commit-
tee, is that the mysterious accomplice might actually be one of
Ray’s brothers, Jerry or John, or a composite of the two of them.

The committee has tested this alternative theory against the
evidence provided in the statements of James and Jerry them-
selves, and although the ultimate validity of the theory is obviously
something that the committee will have to wrestle with later, it
seems to be true that at each point where James’ movements or his
funding during the fugitive period are explained by James by refer-
ence to Raoul, one of the brothers is in fact either on the scene or
in contact with James. One question the committee must explore
today, is this more than a coincidence?

Four charts have been prepared to demonstrate or show a pat-
tern of James Earl Ray’s associations with Raoul, according to
James’ own story, and with his brothers, according to Ray and
other sources.

I would ask at this time, Mr. Chairman, that Martin Luther
King exhibits F-607, F-608, F-609, and F-610 be entered into the
record and appropriately displayed.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection they may be entered into
the record at this point.

[The information follows:]

313

JAMES EARL RAY'S TRANSACTIONS
IN CANADA --
WITH "RAOUL;"*

WITH HIS BROTHERS

7-18-67 Ray rents room in Montreal

7-25-67 About a week after arriving in Montreal, Ray
meets "Raoul" at the Neptune Tavern*

7- 30-67 Ray goes to Gray Rocks Inn, north of Montreal

8- 4-67 Ray tells female friend at Gray Rocks that he had

been at the inn about a week, and that he would
be leaving in a few days to meet his brother in
Montreal

8-5-67 Ray checks out of Gray Rocks, returns to

Montreal where he meets with "Raoul" several
times*

8-18-67 Ray, visiting in Ottawa, tells female friend he
or is working for his brother, that while there

8-19-67 isn't much to do, he is well paid and that he
has no problem with money, since he can
always get some

* According to Ray's own account

MLK Exhibit F-607

314

JAMES EARL RAY'S TRANSACTIONS,

CANADA, CHICAGO, GIRMINGHAM -

WITH “RAOUL,-"*

WITH HIS BROTHERS

8-21-67 Ray receives $1 4500 paymentfrom "Raoul" at
the U.S. - Canadian border*

8-22-67 Ray meets with brother Jerry in Chicago

8-28-67 Ray rents safe deposit box in Birmingham

8-30-67 Ray receives $2,000 payment from "Raoul" in
Birmingham*

8-30-67 Ray purchases 1966 Mustang in Birmingham,
costing approximately $2,000

8-30-67 Ray receives $1 ,000 payment from "Raoul" in
Birmingham*

* According to Ray’s own account

MLK Exhibit F-608

315

JAMES EARL RAY'S TRANSACTIONS,

LOS ANGELES, NEW ORLEANS, LOS ANGELES - -
WITH "RAOUL;"*

WITH HIS BROTHERS

1 2-14-67 Ray cancels an appointment with a

or psychologist, stating his brother had found a

1 2-15-67 job for him in the Merchant Marine based in
New Orieans

12-16-67 Ray calls brother Jerry enroute from
Los Angeles to New Orleans

12-17-67 Ray receives $500 payment from "Raoul" in
New Orleans*

12-21-67 Ray makes $364 payment for dance lessons,
to 1-68 later advising instructor he had met his
brother in Louisiana

* According to Ray's own account

MLK Exhibit F-609

316

JAMES EARL RAY'S TRANSACTIONS,

LOS ANGELES, NEW ORLEANS, BIRMINGHAM,
ATLANTA, BIRMINGHAM -

WITH "RAOUL,-"*

WITH HIS BROTHERS

2- 68 Ray is told by "Raoul" to meet him in

New Orleans in March*

3- 2-68 Ray states intention to go to Birmingham

to visit his brother

3-9-68 Ray turns down a bartending job, explaining he
is leaving Los Angeles within two weeks to visit
hisbrother

3-17-68 Ray departs Los Angeles

3-21 -68 Ray gets message in New Orleans to meet
"Raoul" in Birmingham*

3-23-68 Ray meets "Raoul" in Birmingham, they travel
to Atlanta*

3-29-68 Ray and "Raoul"go to Birmingham to purchase
rifles*

3-29-68 Ray receives $750 from "Raoul' 'and buys a rifle at
Aeromarine Supply Company, but"Raoul"rejects
it and tells Ray to exchange it for another model *

3-29-68 Ray tells Aeromarine salesman by phone that,
based on a conversation with his brother, he has
purchased the wrong rifle, that he wants a
Remington 760 30.06 caliber in its place

3-30-68 Ray exchanges the rifle fora Remington 760
30.06 caliber

^According to Ray's own account.

MLK Exhibit F-610

317

Mr. B lakey. The first chart, Martin Luther King exhibit F-607,
refers to Ray’s trip to Canada in the summer of 1967. Having
arrived in Montreal on July 18, Ray claims to have met Raoul for
the first time in a bar on July 25. Then, on vacation in August at a
resort in the Laurentian Mountains, he told a woman companion
about his brother who lived in Chicago, an apparent reference to
Jerry. More significantly, he told the woman he would be leaving
shortly to meet his brother in Montreal. And with whom did he
meet in Montreal upon his return? According to James, none other
than Raoul.

Later in August, Ray visited the woman in Ottawa. He told her
then that he was in business with his brother, and he was well
paid for doing little. Ray also said that he had no problem with
money, that he could always come up with some.

The second chart, Martin Luther King exhibit F-608, covers
Ray’s move from Canada to Birmingham, still in the summer of
1967. He says he met at the Detroit- Windsor border with Raoul,
who paid him $1,500 for helping in a smuggling operation. This
was supposed to have occurred on August 21.

On August 22, from accounts given by both James and Jerry, we
know the two brothers met in Chicago. Ray reports two payments
from Raoul in Birmingham in August for $2,000 and $1,000, with
which Ray says he paid for his 1966 Mustang and some camera
equipment.

So these facts can be established about Ray in August 1967. He
had received or was receiving a substantial amount of money. This
we know from his own account and from his expenditures.

He met with Jerry. Thus, the inference that Raoul, the source of
his funds, is actually Jerry, is one that the committee must wrestle
with.

The third chart, Martin Luther King exhibit F-609, is for the
latter half of December 1967. On the 14th or 15th, Ray canceled an
appointment with a psychologist in Los Angeles. His stated reason:
His brother had found him a job in the merchant marines in New
Orleans. There is circumstantial evidence that the brother again
was Jerry, for en route to New Orleans on December 16, he placed
a telephone call to Jerry. Yet, Ray claims it was Raoul who gave
him the $500 in New Orleans on December 17, although back in
Los Angeles he told a dancing instructor of a recent meeting in
Louisiana with his brother.

In a conversation with a committee witness, who has asked for
anonymity, Jerry Ray has admitted he was in New Orleans with
James in December. And the fact that James received a payment
of at least $500 in New Orleans is substantiated by the fact that,
back in Los Angeles, he made a lump sum payment of $364 for
dancing lessons, while prior to the trip to New Orleans he had
been paying for the lessons at a rate of $29 to $50 a week.

The fourth chart, Martin Luther King exhibit F-610, takes Ray
from Los Angeles to Birmingham via New Orleans and Atlanta in
February and March 1968. Ray claims that in February Raoul
alerted him to a meeting in New Orleans in March. Then on
March 2 Ray remarked in the presence of a witness at a bartend-
ing school in Los Angeles that he was going to Birmingham to
meet his brother.

39-935 0 - 79 - 21

318

Again on March 9, as a reason for not accepting a bartending
job, Ray explained his intent to depart Los Angeles within 2 weeks
to visit his brother. In fact, Ray departed Los Angeles on March 17,
arriving in New Orleans on March 21 where, according to his story,
he got a message to meet Raoul in Birmingham.

After the alleged meeting in Birmingham, according to Ray’s
account, he and Raoul traveled to Atlanta on March 23, whereupon
Raoul took off for points unknown, leaving Ray alone until March
29.

On March 29, again according to Ray’s story, he and Raoul went
to Birmingham to purchase the assassination rifle. Ray claims he
bought a rifle at the Aeromarine Supply Co. with $750 given to
him by Raoul. Ray claims further that Raoul rejected this rifle and
told him to exchange it for another model, but when Ray tele-
phoned the salesman at Aeromarine, he said he had learned he
had purchased the wrong type of a rifle from a conversation with
his brother. The following day Ray made the exchange for the rifle
that was found at the scene of the King assassination.

The witness today, Mr. Chairman, is Jerry Ray. He is the brother
to whom James refers in all of his admitted contacts with the
brother during the fugitive period. What is more, he has spent
more time than anyone else with James since his arrest for the
assassination itself.

It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Jerry
Ray.

Chairman Stokes. The committee calls Mr. Jerry Ray.

Would you please stand and be sworn? Please stand. Raise your
right hand.

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you give before this com-
mittee is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so
help you God?

TESTIMONY OF JERRY RAY, ACCOMPANIED BY FLORENCE R.

KENNEDY AND WILLIAM PEPPER, ATTORNEYS FOR MR. RAY,

AND BETSY WEST, PARALEGAL ASSISTANT TO MS. KENNEDY

Mr. Ray. Yes.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. You may be seated.

Would the other persons at the witness table please identify
themselves for the record?

Ms. Kennedy. My name is Florence R. Kennedy. I am an attor-
ney, 8 East 48th Street, New York, N.Y. This is my assistant
paralegal, Betsy West, 8 East 48th, New York, N.Y.

Mr. Pepper. William F. Pepper, attorney from Westerly, R.I,
associated with Florence Kennedy. We have been called to repre-
sent, and accepted the call to represent Jerry Ray, pretty much at
the 11th hour, Mr. Chairman. In light of that, and in light of
ensuing publicity over the course of the last 2 weeks, which we
think has been distressingly inflammatory with respect to this
witness, we would request an opening statement of 5 minutes,
which is certainly within the realm of the committee’s power to
grant.

Chairman Stokes. The Chair would state that there is no provi-
sion under our rules for an opening statement by the witness of 5
minutes. There is provision under our rules at the conclusion of the

319

witness’ testimony for either the witness or his counsel to make a
5-minute statement to this committee, at which time the witness
can amplify or explain or in any way make further comment upon
his testimony before this committee

Ms. Kennedy. Mr. Congressman, let me just say for the record
that in light of the fact that counsel for this committee has stood
here and indicated on the record a number of speculations, a
number of possibilities, a number of leaps of logic to this media
event makes it very prejudicial to Jerry Ray.

We have found this throughout this committee’s hearings that
every truth or everything that works against the theory that
James Earl Ray is a lone assassin has been covered by a story
based on speculation and circumstancial evidence, and you just
heard a perfect example of it this morning, and these people have
taken this statement, and now you deny us the right even to make
a statement in response to that, and this is typical of the way this
entire subcommittee has been handling this affair.

Chairman Stokes. Counsel’s comments will be noted for the
record.

At this time the Chair desires, Mr. Ray, to address you with
reference to the scope of the inquiry that this committee will be
conducting today. The scope of the committee’s inquiry is defined
in House Resolution 222. It is to conduct a full and complete
inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding the assassina-
tion and death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. This will enable the
committee to examine the adequacy of existing laws, including the
civil rights statutes, and the investigatory jurisdiction and capabili-
ties of agencies and departments of the U.S. Government, and to
recommend the amendment of existing legislation or the enact-
ment of new legislation if the committee deems it appropriate

The Chair at this time recognizes counsel for the committee,
Mark Speiser.

Mr. Speiser. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to welcome you to Washington, Mr. Ray. Before I
begin my questioning of you, Mr. Ray, I would like to ask and
address one question to counsel, and that is, I would like to have
counsel answer on the record whether or not he and she are or
have been in the past affiliated with any other attorney that has
represented a witness in the past before this committee?

Ms. Kennedy. Would you want to name the attorneys that you
have in mind?

Mr. Speiser. I do not have any attorney in mind. I am asking you
a question of a general nature.

Ms. Kennedy. And may I ask the nature of the association you
have in mind? You want to know whether we know any of the
other attorneys?

Mr. Speiser. I am asking you whether you are associated as
counsel with another attorney that has represented another wit-
ness before this committee?

Ms. Kennedy. I take it you are fishing to find out if we know
Mark Lane. I know Mark Lane. I have seen him about three times
in 10 years.

Mr. Speiser. Ms. Kennedy, you can comment as you choose on
my question. I am asking you for a direct response. Are you or are

320

you not affiliated with any attorney that has represented a witness
in the past before this committee?

Ms. Kennedy. I don’t know all the attorneys who have represent-
ed witnesses before this committee. I know Mark Lane, and I know
Mark Lane for many years, and I have seen him twice or three
times in about 10 years. I have not discussed the representative,
the representation of James Earl Ray with Mark Lane.

Mr. Speiser. Thank you very much, Ms. Kennedy.

Mr. Pepper?

Mr. Pepper. Counsel, I have not been associated with any attor-
ney who has represented any witness before this committee.

Mr. Speiser. Thank you.

Mr. Ray, before I begin my questioning, I would like to advise
you of the posture which you take before this committee. This
committee views you in a dual capacity. You are appearing here as
a witness to assist this committee in its investigation in areas that
are relevant and pertinent and material to this investigation.

In addition, I must advise you that we have received information
of an incriminatory nature which would suggest that perhaps you
might be involved either as a coconspirator or otherwise in assist-
ing Mr. Ray to escape from prison, harboring him once he escaped
from prison, financing him while he was a fugitive, and, last but
not least, assisting him possibly in the assassination of Dr. Martin
Luther King. So I want to emphasize to you, Mr. Ray, that you
must be aware of the posture in which we view you when you are
testifying here today.

Now we have called you back today not for the sole purpose of
questioning you strictly on the areas upon which you were ques-
tioned when you were here in executive session. Some of the ques-
tions that will be propounded to you in fact were addressed to you
while you were here in executive session, but the reason why that
is being done is because, subsequent to your appearance here, this
committee has received information, credible information, which
would suggest that your testimony was perjurious, false, and inac-
curate.

In addition, Mr. Ray, the second reason why we are asking you
to appear here in public session is that new information has been
uncovered since your prior appearance, information which you are
no doubt aware of through coverage in the press, concerning possi-
bly a St. Louis-based conspiracy that might be responsible for the
assassination.

In view of this, Mr. Ray, I would like to advise you that this
committee, on November 8, secured from U.S. District Court Judge
Charles Bryant an immunity order. This immunity order can only
be effectuated upon your assertion of your fifth amendment privi-
lege. Whether or not you assert that privilege is a matter that is
up to you and a matter which I suggest that you should discuss
with your counsel, but this immunity order will not take effect
until you assert your fifth amendment privilege. Do you under-
stand that?

Are you ready to begin?

Mr. Ray. I would like to ask one thing. You uncovered reliable
information that I was involved in the murder of King? Is that
what you said?

321

Mr. Speiser. This committee has received information which
would suggest that perhaps you were involved in the assassination
directly or indirectly, or perhaps facilitated the means by which
the assassination took place. We will get into that area at a later
juncture in this questioning, but I just wanted to advise you of that
fact to make you aware of the posture in which we view you here
today.

Mr. Ray. I was wondering

Mr. Speiser. Will you speak into the mike, please?

Mr. Ray. I was just wondering if it came from people like this,
Ollie Patterson and Richard Geppardt?

Mr. Speiser. Excuse me?

Mr. Ray. I was just wondering if information came from people
like this.

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Ray, later on in our questioning we will enlight-
en you perhaps on the source of information. Now that you
brought the matter up, I want to advise you further, Mr. Ray, that
this is not a grand jury, and consequently we are going to confront
you with all the information that we have, and that has come into
our possession, because we are here seeking the truth. We are not
here seeking to entrap you. We are not here seeking to trick you
into making perjury. We are going to confront you with all the
information that we have. Do you understand that?

Mr. Pepper. Would counsel advise our client why this confronta-
tion has been a unilateral one for the last 2 weeks in the media
based upon leaks from this committee, rather than this committee
and counsel waiting so there could be a face-to-face confrontation?

Mr. Speiser. I do not think it is appropriate for me to

Chairman Stokes. I do not think that counsel has to respond to
that. It is not true, and counsel is out of order.

Proceed.

Ms. Kennedy. Mr. Congressman, I want to know if there is going
to be any limit to the amount of speculation, the amount of testi-
mony referred to, information alluded to, without any support that
can be cross-examined or even heard by this witness. And I want to
know whether or not counsel is going to be able to indulge in any
fantastic theory without giving defense, the witness, an opportuni-
ty to learn whether or not an equal amount of inquiry has been
made into other possibilities to account for what seems to be an
effort to cover up other conjectures, other possibilities, and other
facts which have been brought out.

It would seem to me that if this much latitude is given to this
committee, with all these charts which give validity to the sort of
testimony that you heard on yesterday from a lawyer who, in
violation of the client privilege, has indicated

Chairman Stokes. Will counsel suspend? The Chair is not going
to entertain some form of final argument at this time.

Now the Chair will recognize you as counsel to represent your
client adequately at any time you interpose objections. There is
nothing pending before you at this time to object to.

Ms. Kennedy. All right, Your Honor.

I move that the entire statement just made by this counsel,
whose name I can’t see from here, be struck from the record in
that it involves a tremendous amount of speculation possibilities,

322

and that this committee does not afford this witness an opportunity
to respond or to hear the testimony on which this purported ques-
tioning is based.

Chairman Stokes. Objection is overruled. Counsel will proceed.

Ms. Kennedy. That figured.

Mr. Speiser. Ms. Kennedy, for your information, my name is
Mark Speiser, so that you can refer to me.

Ms. Kennedy. Can I have the spelling?

Mr. Speiser. S-p-e-i-s-e-r.

Ms. Kennedy. First name?

Mr. Speiser. Mark. *

Ms. Kennedy. C or k?

Mr. Speiser. K.

Mr. Ray, I would like you to acknowledge for the record that you
are appearing here pursuant to a subpena.

Mr. Ray. Yes; correct.

Mr. Speiser. And Mr. Ray, I would like you to further acknowl-
edge that this committee on May 4 of this year, November 7 of this
year, and November 22 of this year sent to you letters in which we
outlined the scope of our inquiry as it was directed towards you,
and the urgency that you retain counsel, and bring counsel with
you.

Now I see that you have brought counsel with you. I would like
you to acknowledge for the record that you have received these
letters.

Mr. Ray. I received the letter telling me I couldn’t have Mark
Lane as my counsel.

Mr. Speiser. For the record, Mr. Chairman, I would choose to
have these letters entered into evidence as MLK exhibits F-590, F-
591, and F-592, and if Mr. Ray’s current counsel do not have copies
of those letters, I see no problem in the clerk showing them to
them at this time.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, they may be entered into
the record at this point, and will counsel specify the basis or the
reason for the insertion of the letters?

[The information follows:]

323

MLK Exhibit F-590

... C , „ LOUI* MSM*. WOO. CMMaWM*

ruirx. m.c. mUUcl l. Dfvwi. onto

. wkvTM'u rAuHrmrf, ox. rrcw*irr *- »cun«ii. w*%.

. tvohmc MATHWAirc buhki. e MJr. OWB.C5 twoh*. hob.

tHMircmcB 4. Dooa. cowi hawqu> ». «*wvc*. micm.

trnwu» c. roB3, tin*

\ J, FtTHlIN, <«0.
Vw. IUJOAK.

Select Committee on £fc4o&matton£
of &epre£entatibe£

M31 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING. ANNEX X
Washington. D.C. 20313

May 4 , 1978

Mr. Jerry Ray

591 Cherokee

Marietta, Georgia 30060

Dear Mr. Ray:

In connection with your forthcoming appearance before
the House Select Committee on Assassinations, Committee staff
attorney Michael Eberhardt has advised me of your request to
have the Committee reconsider the prior disqualification of Mark
Lane as your attorney due to his conflict of interests in
representing both James Earl Ray and yourself before the Committee.
I must advise you that, while you are certainly free to petition
the Chairman for a reconsideration of his earlier ruling, counsel
for the Committee has determined that the facts surrounding
the earlier ruling by the Chairman as to Mr. Lane's conflict
of interest remain essentially the same. Therefore, counsel
would urge the Chairman to abide by his earlier ruling on this
matter.

Mr. Eberhardt advises me that you are perhaps contemplating
an appearance before the Committee without the assistance of
legal representation in view of Mr. Lane’s disqualification.

As a general proposition, and in view of recent problems this
Committee has faced with certain witnesses (whose identity I am
not at liberty to divulge) where such witnesses have given the
appearance of obstructing the investigation of the Committee by
fabricated failures of memory as to significant matters, I would
suggest to you that an unrepresented appearance on your part would
be quite unwise. While the Committee has no current -reason to
believe that you will embark upon an obstructionist course
during your answers, it is important for you to realize that
there are numerous and somewhat complex legal ramifications for
such conduct. Furthermore, if you recall, the Committee has
indicated that you are a potential subject of its inquiry and
that an examination of you might tread upon areas involving
criminal conduct on your part. Indeed, you have already invoked
the Fifth Amendment and been granted immunity. Apart from your
rights under such a grant of immunity , the Committee can foresee
possible legal questions as to other rights and privileges which
require your benefit of advice from counsel;.

324

While you have expressed an interest in having counsel familiar
with the facts of James Earl Ray’s case, I would recommend to T
you that even counsel without the benefit of such knowledge could
assist you in terms of your own legal posture before the Committee,
Therefore, I strongly suggest that, in view of your prior indication
as to the lack of necessary funds to retain counsel, you permit
the District of Columbia Bar Association to appoint private inde-
pendent counsel to represent you- Should you choose to follow
our recommendation, please call Mr. Eberhardt and he will make
the necessary contact with the District of Columbia Bar Association
which in turn will arrange for counsel.

As I am sure you are aware from the prior remarks made to
you by the Chairman, and indeed from this letter itself, the
Committee has no desire to deprive you of your right to counsel
before the Committee. While circumstances have precluded Mr. Lane's
representation of you due to a conflict of interest on his part,
you should be cautioned that any appearance by you before the
Committee without counsel would in our opinion be a grave mistake.

Your appearance before the Committee is now scheduled for
May 10, 1978 at 1:00 p.m. Please contact Mr. Eberhardt for
further information as to the place where the hearing is to be
held.

Very truly yours,

G. Robert Blakey

Chief Counsel and Director

GRB : meh

325

S>dcct Committee on Sto^sinatiomJ
3J.£>. &ou$e ot ftepretfeittatibeS

53*9 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
Washington, D.C. 20519

November 7, 1978

Mr. Jerry Ray

591 Cherokee

Marietta, Georgia 30060

Dear Mr. Ray:

In connection with your scheduled appearance
before this Committee in public session on November 30,
1978, the Committee again wishes to advise you that
such an appearance without legal representation would
not, in the judgment of the Committee, best serve the
protection of your legal rights. As you are aware,
the Committee has urged you (to no avail) to either
retain private counsel or accept counsel appointed by
A the District of Columbia Bar Association ever since

^ the disqualification of Mr. Mark Lane as your attorney

before the Committee. Attached hereto is a copy of our
earlier letter of May 4, 1978, on this topic. Further-
more, given the possible perjurious nature of some of
your testimony in executive session and the apparent
involvement on your part in serious criminal activity
in the past several years, it would appear necessary,
again in the judgment of the Committee, for you to have
the benefit of legal advice during your public testimony
and in any ensuing actions.

Sincerely,

Michael C. Eberhardt

Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel

MCErlh
Enel :as

lcws nwa, o*oo, oummam

mch*m>wn pnrvcft. »*x. lAMUtt u mvinc, omk>

WALTER I. FAVHTHOT. B.C. tTIWAW ft. MC KIHMCT. COM*.

? ***** ITK CAJLir. CHAMUt TWMf, tWW.

-HMIATOPMAII J. DOOO. COM*. HAMOCO s. KAWYEJt, MICH.

C. rooo, TCMM.
r ^ J. PITHtAM. MO.

^ hr w. kooah. pa.

(202)223.4924

MLK Exhibit F-591

326

defect Committee on 2feKa**(nat(an*
E6. lit at Jfeprmntatfbt*

XU» HOUSS OFFICE ■UU-DWO, AMOX X
WASHINOIBN. OjC. 30918

November 22 , 1978

Mr. Jerry Ray

591 Cherokee

Marietta, Georgia 30060

Dear Mr. Ray:

Mark Speiser, Committee staff attorney, has
advised me of his conversation with you on November 21,

1978 in which you confirmed your intention of traveling
to Washington by car and your securing of your own hotel
accommodations while you are here, pursuant to subpoena
to testify before this Committee on November 30, 1978.

Let this letter serve to remind you, as we have
done in prior correspondence to you on May 4, 1978 and
November 7, 1978 that it is our firm belief that you should
be accompanied by counsel when you appear to testify at the
public hearings. Counsel will be in a position to advise
you as to your constitutional and legal rights. This should
be of paramount concern to you in view of our earlier warning
to you that you are considered a subject of this investigation
and furthermore, in light of the apparent falsity of
portions of your testimony in executive session.

Our position remains unchanged with respect to your
representation by Mark Lane. Mr. Lane, in view of his
serving as counsel to your brother James, would have a
conflict of interest should he likewise appear as your
attorney. Mr. Lane l s -disqualification in executive session
will not be reconsidered merely because you will now be
testifying in a public forum.

Therefore, should you choose to bring counsel as
we suggest you do, but are unable to afford the cost of
such legal services, please contact Mark A. Speiser .{202
225-8353) i m mediately so he can arrange to have independent
counsel selected for you by the District of Columbia Bar
Association.

Sincerely,

Cf !>-/ v.

G. Robert Blakey

Chief Counsel and Director

GRBzmsc

MLK Exhibit F-592

327

Mr. Speiser. The records are being inserted for a twofold pur-
pose: No. 1, to show that this committee has attempted to bend
over backward to advise Mr. Ray prior to his appearance of the
nature of the inquiry and the urgency that he retain counsel. Mr.
Ray had advised this committee on several occasions that if he
could not be represented by Mr. Lane that he would not appear
with counsel, and these letters stress the fact that we would be
willing to work with the District of Columbia Bar Association to
have counsel appointed for Mr. Ray free of charge, in the event he
could not afford counsel

Chairman Stokes. Will counsel make a statement with reference
to the conflict-of-interest issue, so that the record is complete on
that?

Mr. Speiser. Well, at this time, Mr. Chairman, there does not
appear to be a conflict of interest with Mr. Ray being represented
by Ms. Kennedy and Mr. Pepper.

Mr. Ray had represented to this committee, in fact when Mr.
Ray appeared here in executive session he appeared initially with
Mr. Mark Lane, who was current counsel for James Earl Ray,
Jerry Ray’s brother, and this counsel felt that there would be a
definite conflict of interest in Mr. Ray, in the two Ray brothers
being represented by the same attorney, Mr. Mark Lane.

James Earl Ray is the admitted assassin, and Jerry Ray, based
upon information that we have, possibly could be incriminated in
the assassination. For that reason, in anticipation of a possible
conflict, we felt that Mark Lane at that time and at this time could
not satisfactorily represent the rights, constitutional, legal or oth-
erwise, of Jerry Ray. And we want to set forth that fact in these
letters that I have just marked and requested be entered into
evidence.

Ms. Kennedy. We appreciate your concern for avoidance of a
conflict of interest between Jerry Ray and James Earl Ray. Howev-
er, I am a little mystified by the arrangement that you came up
with, which was to appoint counsel from the D.C. Bar. Does this
mean that counsel of his own choosing will not be compensated or
will not be approved for compensation, because if it does, it means
that his right to counsel, a constitutional right, is seriously jeopard-
ized.

Mr. Speiser. Ms. Kennedy, I think the question is moot at this
time, and I would choose to proceed to the substance of our ques-
tioning today.

Mr. Ray, are you currently married?

Mr. Ray. No, I am single.

Mr. Speiser. Do you have any children?

Mr. Ray. One.

Mr. Speiser. Are you currently employed by Mr. J. B. Stoner?

Mr. Ray. That is correct.

Mr. Speiser. And is Mr. Stoner currently affiliated with the
National States’ Rights Party?

Mr. Ray. That is right.

Mr. Speiser. What is his relationship with the National States
Rights Party?

Mr. Ray. He is the head of it; chairman.

Mr. Speiser. When did you first meet Mr. Stoner?

328

Mr. Ray. Late 1969.

Mr. Speiser. Late 1969?

Mr. Ray. Late 1969.

Mr. Speiser. It wasn’t near the time that your brother was
getting ready to plead guilty to the assassination of Dr. King,
which was in March of 1969?

Mr. Ray. No. It was after the guilty plea.

Mr. Speiser. It was after the guilty plea?

Mr. Ray. After the guilty plea.

Mr. Speiser. Substantially after the guilty plea?

Mr. Ray. Yes.

Mr. Speiser. In what capacity are you employed with Mr.
Stoner?

Mr. Ray. I wouldn’t know how to describe the job. I just run
errands and pick up the mail at the post office, and things of that
nature.

Mr. Speiser. Since when have you been employed by Mr. Stoner?

Mr. Ray. Since the FBI got me fired off my job at the Twin
Orchard’s Country Club.

Mr. Speiser. I do not know if you answered my question. At what
point in time was

Mr. Ray. It was when he escaped the place.

Mr. Speiser. The escape from Brushy Mountain?

Mr. Ray. In June 1967, 1 think.

Mr. Speiser. Are you employed as a bodyguard for Mr. Stoner?

Mr. Pepper. Mr. Chairman, I want to object to this whole line of
questions that deal with any activities of Jerry Ray subsequent to
the arrest and capture, and in this instance even the guilty plea
offered by James Earl Ray. I want to object to this whole line of
questioning on the basis of pertinence, with respect to the scope of
the resolution that has established this committee, dealing, there-
fore, with the assassination of Martin Luther King, and the events
subsequent to that with respect to Mr. Ray; I respectfully suggest
to the committee they are not pertinent, they are not relevant, nor
are they material.

Chairman Stokes. Does counsel to the committee want to be
heard?

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Chairman, I would respond to that by pointing
out that questioning of Mr. Ray concerning his activities and ac-
tions subsequent to the assassination are definitely pertinent and
relevant to the scope of this inquiry.

Let me finish, Mr. Pepper, please.

Following the assassination of Dr. King and a plea by James
Earl Ray, I submit that actions and activities of Jerry Ray subse-
quent to those dates are relevant, since they serve as a good
indicator of prior actions of Mr. Ray.

Second, they served to establish, in the committee’s eyes, the
credibility of the witness, namely Jerry Ray.

For example, this committee has been furnished with certain
information concerning the activities of Jerry Ray subsequent to
the plea by his brother to the assassination of Martin Luther King.
This information appears credible and verifiable.

Now if Mr. Ray is going to sit here and deny those actions
concerning activities he was involved in subsequent to the plea,

329

then that would serve as an indicator to this committee as to
whether or not he is telling us the truth about actions and activi-
ties he was involved in prior to the assassination. So for those
reasons, Mr. Chairman, I feel that the questions that I am pro-
pounding to Mr. Ray are directly relevant.

Chairman Stokes. Does counsel desire to be heard further?

Mr. Pepper. Mr. Chairman, we are referring specifically and
focusing on those questions subsequent to the capture of James
Earl Ray, not merely subsequent to the assassination between the
period of time of assassination and capture. We are talking about
questions that relate to the arrest and capture of James Earl Ray.
We do not share learned counsel’s position that an individual’s
future actions, present or future actions, are necessarily linked in
relevancy with his past actions or behavior, or should they be given
the same credibility.

We will not advise, counsel will not advise that Mr. Ray not be
responsive to these questions, but we for the record want to note
our objections and our exception to counsel pursuing this line of
questions.

Chairman Stokes. Counsel’s objections are properly noted and
the Chair rules that they are pertinent.

Counsel may proceed.

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Ray, in view of your association and affiliation
with J. B. Stoner and the NSRP, do you share the basic tenets and
principles of that organization?

Mr. Ray. Let me to respond to one thing. I never heard of J. B.
Stoner or the States’ Rights Party until J. B. Stoner visited James
Earl Ray in the Memphis county jail in Memphis, Tenn., and the
first contact I ever had with him was after the guilty plea when he
didn’t have no attorneys, and J. B Stoner offered to represent him
for free. And since that time I have been unable to hold a job on
account of FBI harassment, and so the only place I can work at is
for J. B. Stoner.

Mr. Speiser. Is your answer then no or yes? Do you share the
principles advocated by J. B. Stoner and the NSRP?

Mr. Ray. No, I don’t share every principle J. B. Stoner has. I
don’t share principles you have. The only way I ever got in contact
with him was him being James Earl Ray’s attorney.

Mr. Speiser. So your answer is no?

Mr. Ray. No.

Mr. Speiser. You are aware, are you not, that the organization
headed by J. B. Stoner advocates white supremacy and racist prin-
ciples?

Mr. Ray. Oh, yes, I know that. It is in the papers.

Ms. Kennedy. May I just put on the record that this kind of
prejudicial questioning is a bit absurd in a totally racist society.
Most people are employed by people who have either capitalistic
views or corrupt views, whether it is Lockheed or whomever, and I
don’t understand why it will be used further to prejudice this
witness, to try to ask him whether he holds with the views of his
employer. I don’t really feel that this is appropriate, except to
prejudice this witness.

Chairman Stokes. The Chair wants to admonish counsel. The
Chair will not indulge in statements of this type.

330

In the first place, you have not even placed an objection before
the Chair. You are merely making a statement which the Chair
will not indulge. You are overruled. You are out of order.

Proceed, counsel.

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to have
introduced into the record MLK exhibit F-593.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, so ordered.

[The information follows:]

331

MLK Exhibit F-593

* : ; V/the\w#£\^a ns viewpoint/ ' ; • - .• -

BQ> 6265, SAVANNAH. GEORGIA 31405

King Victim Of Own Terrorism

Politicians Protect Black Revolution

Tbr death of Martin I ucllttr
— - _ 1 King fc Memphis was the natural

Demands Investigation

proclaiming defiance af (be lavs

f • _ ak «f Iht land. Me was in Memphis

Of Riot Protectors stjessess

_ of (SeBbersteli violstiiig the Fed-

Congressman John R. Rartck of Louisiana
, is demanding an investigation of why Lyndon •

Johnson used troops to protect the rioters
"in stead of using them to end the rioting in
Washington.

"Earl Warren’s dream has now departed
from loft}’ platitudes and sugar-coated force
laws to become a nightmare for all Ameri- -
cane," Rep. John- ft. Rarick of Louisiana’s i
_ .Sixth District said in a speech before Con- |
greBB yesterday. ,, - '* •- "j

“All about us is Earl Warren’s dream j
come true. Forced equality, court decreed 1
laws favoring “Communism, minority pres- -3
sure ''Control, reapportionmerrt, handcuffing j
of law enforcement officers, and destruction
of all States* rights — have now centralized
all power in the hands of a few who have
demonstrates! thetr incapability or lack
courage to protect their -country and people,? ■

Rarick told his col leagues. . ..

** America's cities are ravished by hordes *
of revolutionaries, sacking -our land. While
the nation’s capita] burned, the President pro-
claimed again, “We shall overcome,** fta- ;
rick pointed out- “His behavior raises the
question, *Do we have a President of all!
the people or a commander- in -chief of the
revolution in the White House?* ** '

■“Hundreds of thousands of Americans
want to kno w why some 20 hours elapsed Martin Jak

in Washington. D. C.. before the federal rf Wt fBjtmctkl] ijsta c?
troops w e re called to offer an image of con- . *???? * m*jat*e tuck
cere over the wholesale burning and kxrt- 10 ^

rJS«ig. - **'. "***,': "IT" T.. . x - . *™r

V : feel etrongly that the House owes a agate* * time n«t.

." 'duty to every American citizen to ascertain ** t> * 1 * ■

V! why, in the federal District of Cohimbtm, ] ^ rtJ D to ) ta ^

five headquarters of the government of all I am* Ac 1^1 court*.
.. our people, immediate effective action was | *“* “wsp*

/j'Wt taken to protect life and property,’* R®* |

rick declared. ~ .' I new* w fare* hkh to

S-For this reason, 1 am introducing today ***<

^..resolution calling for a special investlga-

“ «on of this matter by a Select Committee htackiawiestoiteE

^b^pouited by the’ Speaker.** Z“r'- ■ - J .

copy of the resolution is attached. attest,, tht^Va*

SSKs: :^ A r*ajas.; uw * ^

^SOLVED. -y hat there is hereby created

>opwJHee Tolbe composed of seven ly,

White qiaL.Wbc stool King did
« “what ni! am tally the dury afj
Presides! Jobnsoo. the federal I
marshals and the U. S. Army to
do. He upheld the Ite -md die
dignity of tbs federal courts and
dir exeoajve branch of govern-,
men: by doing their duty fori
! them. He should be glvex, thej

card hjiucdo} .j.H!,.

him ■ massive bl»ci

a"** 1 ** •»* designed to^wl ]
to rk*te* tad vfekace.

^ *®T has TW'-ksrf 1
to ktefe Roe *. ']
art- ^ <Wcrt, Mfeslssippi, i
■aniflft Vtkir p| ir , g ^ fg^ 1

W® 6 v> d t iji tW inftnc- ^
^ *eten Court*, i
|*cs*jW' ttw- that troop* ire !
! o#»*e twDe Wbto people j

AW*** to totfhato* from e'
,aoi* *wdw«l <f -Justice-

«Wt*f<Wws MackTawfastetes"

Coqgresstoaal Medal flf. JJa*or
md ■ large tuuual pmstoo lari
Ufa. pkte i Presidtsidal perdaj^

Wes's docL'lncof noci-vloleace
was ody a u> ™l»i» him to

mart: cflecxbtoly tncfu vioiatce.
He vu bctoaUy waging band fa
hand wttt Smtoety CarmkchaoL
Rap- Broun and ocher nrbe

advocate vtoknea. Kfag dearly
rttit rtkp t(Fthco0Uot bUdi
m«rdb on ViAinjtai wv&
ed fa paratyxc our oachiii’s'capl-
ul and done dow> (he federal
fovemmtjoi veil k graund ibe
demande d (he Mad revoto-
draarie*. Thai meum vtohmet
regardlev* ct too* mud Clog
screamed -wB-vioienon.'* Hi*
brand of noo-vloleoce ha* al-
nya teen a tea* and a tnusL
CONGRESS Y 1 ELXS TO

li Ate *ftonaa*h^(< Kite's
dsatb Ccagrcs* passed innrhar
sn-caTlod vldl rights IgU -thfa

I xatef mare Coe stlaitf dial right*
•wsy from White? and gives them
co black beasts. The latest civil
rights law tr know, as the Dirk-
sen AC, because LBJ was doc
able to pass li until bactsrabbing
Dlrkstsj betrayed the White peo-
ple of Ilibolf and America by
joining with L£J to force ii
tbroogli the Stoiate said: the sup-
pmr of both the Democratic and
Republican parties.

CONGRESS HAS ABDICATED
A majority of the members of
Ctmgresr are degenerate black
hearted scum who were happy to
use King’s death for passing an-
other dvil rights law against (he
White people tf America. There
are only a few patriotic loyal
Americans ir, Congress and one
, o! them Is tin Kooorabfe Jote
j Rarick of Louialana. The otter*
are the dregs of creation and not
fit to associate With decent men.
KING'S DEATH MEANS
MORE BLACK ANARCHY
King's death "Is being used by
the Jew money power and jew
financed blacks as an excuse far
genera] lawlessness and a
upping up of the re-voludge,
against tus Whites.

mayor dally pressured

Mayor Richard Daley of Chi-
cago knows what kind cf methods
are necessary *> stop arsmi,
looting and genera] insurrection.
He gave orders to <gfy the revo-
lutionaries by shooting to maim
and shooting to kill, orders that

are to support of rhr ctsnnK*

law and American law to general
as It has always been the ire.

As stxn ac Mayor DUey gave
the kind of orders to the polio:
that would stop black rebellion,
he was ectodemaod by Mayor
Lindsay oC the Jew-owned CMy <W
New York and by Ramsay Onrk.
the lawless Anorney General of
the Ifalted Staler. Delay's na-
efaods would scop black rebelibrn
by allowing the local poller to <k>
ttelr duty and uphold the law. Use
Jew method tcC Lindsay aad Clark
would rrndor the local police
helpless and then c auteur to
protect ite black revnlnrkaarfa*
with the Army While the black
twusts looc. tent, ard tad

The Thundosteli believes fa
law and order and flanands (tea
the black retemca be crated a*
provided by law. Thl* means (ton
the police should ha given ite .
necessary arm* ao! amnumltiCB
aad ordered ■» mow (be bleak
rebels dow*. That U The trett-
(local and customary way thto
rebellksis are lerminated. Ote
erwtse, (he White people MB
protect them selves as they hMQ
a right ta fa tV-Y -L h V- £■

•iSiMit. .

332

Negro
Solicitors
Irk Valley
Housewives

San Gabriel, California

"Dt jog bate Negroes'" a** the Negro man of the lady rf

nd rightfully »-tefo(

WL.”

‘•Wen, tore ynj wuHnl mind con tr footing to a Watts
chUdret i recreation cento.*, would you’” Uw mac says.

Goctw d 6c women who havt r^iortod such encounter*
recent)} to toe* poliet agencies sid *hai H*) *dined to con-
tribute tot aoJieiior ads to um toe bathroom. When per mi***®
ft granted, (he mac, the wooed reported, enters and d alfire
around the inside of <ht bouse Hiking everything over. Game
householders. cuntetuted to the dtHfrai’s sriff and M U gn ft
that

As Harry Gm, E Mom* (ftj* teeasars pal It, Tl
*u a poor approach.”

Gift bad just gotlM borne from work recoct)} when a young
mac using the same words called at him through fail front
tereened door. Gist said ashegwi^tcgotetbe door, ftto
e&Ber started id waft into bis base. Gik said be ftopped ibe
young man and toW hare tut he did not wak to cootrtete to
•to child's center. He then asked the man tor bfe aakdWa
lease.

The young mat produced file tense, said Gist, tb® Gift
said be advised the oolitfUr that tl was in (Gist**; tegnaWra
that was written oe his E Monte license.

Gist explained that late toE men represosting (bemaetea as
dftfcftxgtr* of the Black Mushm 1 ! newspaper, Mtfcanond
Speifc. were issued E Monte licenses to aeO their newspaper
to E Monte ft is dassfied * a religious pkrijatBon.

He said “they” canto back recteiy and wanted fee exoqit,
permits tc wforil far the dtikfcm’s cents' to Watts. Gift Hid
(he permits were also issued.

Qne of toe problem* toa*. has come up ft tttoL, adhcllDfi w-
ing this distinctive approach have bees popping up to toe
Angaes. Whither, Gorina, San Dimas and efcewbere. Of
eoune, the aohcitattoc fiemses are <*h good in the d B
Mode bid unless a persoe were to read the *mafi print tn tfa*
Ucenst he woito not be kite to to!) where (he tosat ni

Cue possibility tor foing to E Mona fer toeir Scone
cecdd be fiul hceoses d tou tjy» are eoy to gel to D Mate
The Tribune checked with CouncUmac John Gtoaon's Watts
field office and wKb Mubammud’s Mosque No r to Lea
Angeiez. toe Black Muslim Temple.

Black Muslim minister Herman Hasson! and a spokesman to

toMC a diaritobte aoUdtaltoc far a Watte ctsktoa'i recreation
center lc fad, neittier knew of a planned center at aH

Rassou) aasd, “ll u not a legitimate solicitation as tar re 1
jut concerned. IT we ccoW fftd out wte> la (totog fa, re reuftd
take kgai action to pot a hah to It ”

He said. "With toe racial sltuati® v tore aa tl b, ton ft

|Ml«1U<hii^ tltf{ prtrtM fa y n

The law eitfarcsnM agencies wtndh bare lad iaqufrrea
tmn cUmbs regarding these solid ten, however, tay toft ft a
very dtf&jdf thu« « which to tteUin a formal wmplainL 1ft*
reason ft that the perms who art confronted either do ml ob-
tain — wteit* informal**: about toe tebdior while be Is making
his pilfti or would rathe- just forget It than become involved.

Musician Gives Quarter
Million To Israel

One of dir nKHT popular band: with the yowiger act Is the Tla juana
Brass. Most people chink they are Spanish, bur Herb Alpen, fcs leader,
IS Jewish. Recall) he gave a quarter of ■ million dollars to the
Untied Jewish Appeal. All this man) won to Israel to he used against
the Arabs.

AD his nawy come* from the sale Of records to White ChrUttaa
children. Lea's eti* buying records which support Israel.

Negro Officials
Unable To Function

(Continued Fran Page 8)
biera: of governing undeveloped
countries bsvlqg primitive pep.
illations know Chai tog first Im-
perative essoiUaj is STRICT
SEGREGATION' (or separate dr- j
veJopemetit) lr. schools, college*, j
churche.- bousing, business,
government and armed force*.

It should be recalled that Aiv
raham Lincoln Stated In 1858:
**„J air not, nor ever bare
been, to law of miring vo-
ter: or juror? of negroes, nor
qualifying them to hold office.”
Note that the recent legislation
permitting ill iterate negroes (and
whites} to vote Lf just a Rod-
inspired scheriu welcomed by
unscrupulous politician'- to give
political centre) tc the enemies
of our L.&.A. The entrance tar-
men: of unqualified raters abould
be rescinded*

Sure)} It is urgent to stop all
law-defying movements, Includ-
ing racial violence and rioting.
All agitator*, especially those
wuh Red affiliations, should be
promptly arrested and given leug '
prisor sentences. Since this law-
lessness li a prelude to the
Ultimate violent revolution plan-
ned by the Ctmummins to seize
ccntroJ of the United States, the
authorities of our nation, state*
and tides should use whatever
FORCE is necessary to preserve
order.

b, countries where anci da*- i

page 9

Stoner Speaks In Meridian, Mlts.

LIKES KING BETTER - J. fa. Stoner, *k*<h.irman
to the Ration*: State* Right* Party, a«M here last night to
tba death to Marlin Luther King that *He'i been a peed
nigger now since eia m aeven o'clock tonight.”

-stair PftMe

J, B. STONER SPEAKING—

clpUne 1* enforced and all sub-
versive activities are put down
with an Iron band, hard-boiled
rulers would not hesltUte to
atop the propagation of vnvier si-
rs bl» citizens to, compulsory
sterilization of feeble-minded.
incurably Insane, habitual ert-
mtnii* and

Should we a Doe our United
States of America to became the
Soviet Suies of America -
a slave state?

Research Department
Grets Roots League,
be.

Cbarlemn. S.C

Charges Pro-Rad
Officials Hamstring
Military Action

A well tatw military expert
Gen. Thomas A. Lane ha* an-
alyzed America** toablUry to
ctaauer Communis: attacks and
states: *'There 1* cnly eve way to
Pueblo type Incident a.
den (X the Mfxr must
have authority tc met wbb all
available power to protect the
fauereoi of tter Ebbed Slate*.
These arrack: will ceaae only
when the Kremlin know* that this
authority rest* to the field com-
manders. In days when tto United
Staces war more respected, com-
mander? had this authority.*'

(Edlitr? Kore: LB.J has had
all military declaim* rranslermd
to a handful) of so-called drill*
advisor? — most of whom are
Jews. See article elsewhere to
■his issue ai Jewiah infllrretire
of high government posts.)

Gen Lane else said; "Is the
Lb bed Stetes so tearful of apo>-
lng a new front In Kona that t.
will condone the Pueblo piracy?
We are weakened dot ptoysicaDy
ton psychologically. U'aatiin#-
too's llhialtei* about peacemak-
ing Incite the Communlai attack.
The enemy knows that reck
diruns wll) he mol not with In-
euni retaliation too with pro-
tracted negortedon. The men set
of negotieiteg such an Issue de-
mand* the lb kad States and ad-
vances (he Co
to Ibe wortd.”

More Violence Predicfed
In Wake Of King's Death

The vice dwirman of the
“white racurt” National Suies
Right* Party predicted here lab
right His: Martin Luther King's
death wiE bring more Negro de-
monstrations and violence than
anything since toe Civil War.

"King's death, I predict, will
trigger off more nigger violence
than we have had in the las’,
year or to toe last UO yean." J.
B Stoner aaid. "The black
power niggers srill no** say tha)
non-violence has failed and that
violence ft toe only answer "

Stoner, who was to Meridton
for an organftaliona't meeting to
toe NSRP, told a small group
that his party ft a “while racist.
anti-Jew" argimftation.

“We a It while racist* and at-
ari proud to br wfute racists"
he aaid. "TV black supi-cmisu
are proud to br black mu
I wsraiiU

|^*Thr National Stain Right'
Party adracaus an end to ell
friendship he ween thr black
and white men. . -an end m all
relationship between the races"
be said.

Sumer chirped that King was
no! non -violent, but that King,
“like all nigger*.'' hated lh*

jjBfeerocs to protest.

^ Sumer said that bis group is
planning marches and rallies to
its own — beginning to May— in
support of Ihcir “political"
aims.

*To: many yr.irs toe FBI bas
guarded King > tioosc and
guarded him ■ ererywbere be
went, and yv! hr is dead"
Stoner said ”l'd rather die in
combat than toying in a conren
tration camp."

He said ihi NSHI* nillir* and
marches wil< sun m Mississippi
h; M i and “V-fore tor siimmcr
is m i r I thiid: wr -can amiv the
majority of (he wtru pcre»e in
Mississippi '

Asked about reponx Dial
King s death might increase
Seri. Rohm Kennedy’s chance*
to becoming ‘tor next president.
Stoner replied .

"I wouldn't think so at all. . .1 .
ttiii* the nigaere wttt going to
toy low all sumrnrr te help Bob-
b)‘ Kenned) . bu: now they won't
he able to control them They
won't tn- ahk- io control the nig

“King was iw oun-viutefit." he
■aid. *‘AU the time he was say
big non-viojmee hr 1

war was bloody and rintrm. . -hr
wanted a blood) revolution.

“In this hatred few u> they
have brought about the second
Gvil War. and that's what we
are now In.” Stoner aaid.

“He has been a good nigger
now ainor S or T e'dock
tonight,” Sunn- aaid of King s

Hr laid IV NSRP welcomed
tor note which are expected to
follow and that they were glad
■re others encouraging (ft

• .We {Zionists; are eager
to Joto hand: with tor Jews of
tor Sc*rttt Journal of Jewish
Life and Letter?* (New Vort).
Aufnat 1H3. p. 4.

333

Mr. Speiser. MLK F-593 is an excerpt from the tabloid published
by the NSRP entitled “The Thunderbolt.” At this point I would
just like to read a small excerpt from that magazine. This is on
page 1:

The man who shot Dr. King was actually upholding the law of the land and
enforcing the injunction of the U.S. District Court in Memphis which had forbidden
King’s marches. The white man who shot King dead did what was actually the duty
of President Johnson, the Federal marshals, and the U.S Army to do. He upheld the
law and the dignity of the Federal Courts and the executive branch of Government
by doing their duty for them. He should be given the Congressional Medal of Honor
and a large annual pension for life, plus a presidential pardon.

Do you agree with the statements in that?

Mr. Ray. When was that published?

Mr. Speiser. In May 1968?

Mr. Ray. I never heard of J. B. Stoner when that was published.
I am not responsible for what the Thunderbolt publishes.

Mr. Pepper. Mr. Chairman, counsel objects again to this whole
line of questioning, particularly as it impinges on the client’s first
amendment rights embraced by the whole process and range of
associations. If counsel wants to proceed to the substance of this
hearing, we suggest that you do so rather than dwelling upon any
associations of Mr. Ray, and perhaps we can get to the heart of the
matter.

Reading such a statement as that into record is inflammatory
and we object and ask that it be excluded.

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate counsel’s argument and
position. However, we are trying to get at the racial attitude of
Jerry Ray at the time Martin Luther King was assassinated, for we
feel that that attitude was shared with James Earl Ray.

Counsel, I would appreciate it if you would let me proceed. We
have noted your objection.

Mr. Pepper. But your comment, counsel, does not speak to the
fact that Mr. Ray has already stated that he does not know J. B.
Stoner at that time. You read an article in the record which was
published prior to any knowledge or association with J. B. Stoner.
On that grounds it should be excluded.

Chairman Stokes. The Chair is going to sustain counsel’s objec-
tion and request that counsel for the committee proceed directly
into those pertinent questions relating to Jerry Ray.

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Ray, is it your statement that you did not meet
or know of J. B. Stoner until after the assassination of Dr. Martin
Luther King?

Mr. Ray. I never heard of J. B. Stoner or the Thunderbolt until —
the first time I ever heard when he visited James in the Memphis
jail when Arthur Hanes was his attorney. That is the first I ever
heard of him.

Mr. Speiser. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would choose to have
marked into evidence MLK exhibit F-597.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the
record.

[The information follows:]

39-935 0 - 79 - 22

334

MLK Exhibit F-597

And did you have a conversation v/ith Jerry Ray?

In the warden * s office at that time,

And can you tell me what that conversation was?

Yes, I asked him about the contract and he said he had it

with him and I asked him if I might read it and he handed

it to me and I read it and it was pretty lengthy, and a lot
that

of things in it/more or less startled me and I said it
will take a little time, it’s Saturday afternoon and I
want to get a copy of this and I don’t know whether the
warden has got somebody here to do it this afternoon or
not.

Jeff Factor - Excuse me, this was the contract between Hanes, Huie and

James Earl Ray?

Harry Avery - That's right and one of the things that interested me about

that contract was that it was signed and acknowledged by
Huie and Hanes a long time before James Earl Ray signed
it. He acknowledged it after he got back to the United
States before a notary in Shelby County in jail down there
and this thing was gotten up in Birmingham without Jartes

;; . - Kay having the slightest idea, that it was being

prepared and that interested me terrifically in saying
. to Jerry, it will take some time to get a copy on Saturday
afternoon. He said, well I've got to go to the Noal Hotel
and I'll be dcwn there awhile , can you tell me how to get
down to Noal Hotel and when I get back. I'll pick it up.

And I said well, I wanted to have some excuse for him to
ride with me and me have, a chance to be v/ith him and talk
with him, so 1 said I could tell you how to gut down then?

harry Avery
C' r Pieter
Harry Avery

335

Jeff Facter
Harry Avery

£ r Jeff Facter
Harry Avery

- but I'm sure you would get confused because they are
building an interstate across a lot of these streets
and they are blocked off and you have to take a sort

of a circuitors route to get downtown from here nov;. But
I said I 'm going to go and I * 11 be dcwn there in an hour
or two, why not just ride with me and I'll pick you up and
bring you back. I said what's the purpose of your trip to
the Noal? Well, he said, I am suppose to meet Stcner down
there and I said you mean — at that time I knew his given
name, I had read a lot about him and his representation
of that case in Alabama, and he said yea, and I sai d well
tell me how he got into it, into this case. And he said
why he's been our lawyer for at least two years before
Martin Luther King was ever killed,

- Could I just step you right there for a second? Are you
positive that he said that Stoner had been the family
lawyer for two years?

Had been our lawyer for at least two years before King
;Was ever killed, that was his exact words. - Now whether

- meant chit family lawyer, whether he meant just me and

Earl Pay, I don't khow^but he said pur lawyer.

- And you are certain about the two years prior to this?

W Yes sir, I'm certain about that. So I not only carried
; “ hira dewn there but I asked him then how this fellow Hill

‘ got into this case? I think his name is Hill, a young
lawyer freen Q-jattanooga and he said, well you know, I got
a daughter that lives here in Tennessee. No,. I said I
didn't know that. Kell, he said yea, she’s not the

336

Mr. Speiser. MLK F-597 represents an interview that was under-
taken by this staff with Harry Avery, who was the Commissioner
of the Tennessee prison system.

Mr. Avery was interviewed by staff counsel and Mr. Avery indi-
cated, when interviewed, that you advised him when he was taking
you to a hotel in Nashville to meet with Mr. Stoner, that Mr.
Stoner had been attorney for you and your family for 2 years prior
to the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King.

Is that statement accurate or inaccurate?

Mr. Ray. It is a joke, a sick joke.

Mr. Speiser. Did you make that statement and intend it as a joke
or are you suggesting Mr. Avery is lying?

Mr. Ray. Mr. Avery is lying. I don’t joke like that.

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Stoner has represented you in a prior criminal
action, is that correct?

Mr. Ray. That’s true.

Mr. Speiser. And Mr. Stoner has represented your brother, John
Ray?

Mr. Ray. Yes.

Mr. Speiser. And at a time Mr. Stoner has represented James
Earl Ray?

Mr. Ray. Yes.

Mr. Speiser. Do you know why your brother, James Earl Ray,
has furnished a waiver to this committee for every single attorney
that represented him with the exception of J. B. Stoner?

Mr. Ray. No; I thought he didn’t waive Percy Foreman. I
thought Foreman was up here illegally making up stories and
telling the committee a lie because James wrote a letter I think I
got in my thing that he didn’t waive Foreman’s thing and Foreman
just went ahead and came up here and tried to influence the
committee and so I thought Foreman and Hanes— Foreman and
Stoner neither one was waived.

Mr. Speiser. In April 1968 how were you employed?

Mr. Ray. April 1968? I was employed at the Sportsman’s Country
Club in Northbrook, 111.

Mr. Pepper. Mr. Chairman, does the committee have in its pos-
session a waiver of Percy Foreman from James Earl Ray?

Chairman Stokes. Counsel will reply to that.

Ms. Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, is it

Chairman Stokes. Just a moment.

The Chair is taking an inquiry from your cocounsel.

Ms. Kennedy. Thank you.

Chairman Stokes. The answer to counsel’s inquiry with refer-
ence to Mr. Percy Foreman is that Mr. Ray did give the committee
a waiver and pursuant to that waiver we interviewed Mr. Percy
Foreman on two occasions.

Subsequently, Mr. Ray revoked all of the waviers previously
given to this committee.

Mr. Pepper. Is the Foreman waiver a matter of the committee’s
record? Has it been entered into the committee’s record?

Chairman Stokes. I believe it is a part of the record.

Ms. Kennedy, did you have

Ms. Kennedy. Yes, sir, I apologize for stepping on my cocounsel’s
application, but I was wondering whether or not Mr. Ray can have

337

copies of the waiver and revocation or if the record can indicate
the dates involved in the withdrawal of the waiver for counsel’s
appearance?

Inasmuch as this has been introduced and counsel was not aware
that this would be introduced, I would appreciate copies of the
waivers and the revocation.

Chairman Stokes. Ms. Kennedy, I don’t think for the purposes of
the questioning here of this witness that that is either pertinent or
relevant.

The inquiry is merely made as to whether or not he was aware
and he has himself replied — he is the one who responded to coun-
sel’s question in a way that is now of record.

Ms. Kennedy. Well, Your Honor, in light of the attorney/client
privilege, it would seem rather important if an attorney is making
statements against the interests of a present or former counsel,
that the waiver situation be clarified.

I just want to make that for the record without taking any more
of the committee’s time on that point.

Chairman Stokes. The waiver is on the record and counsel can
proceed.

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Ray, in April 1968, you acknowledged being
employed by the Sportsman’s Club?

Mr. Ray. Yes.

Mr. Speiser. In what capacity?

Mr. Ray. I was the overnight watchman.

Mr. Speiser. What were your working hours?

Mr. Ray. Eleven at night until seven in the morning.

Mr. Speiser. What was your day off?

Mr. Ray. I believe it was Thursday, 1 believe.

Mr. Speiser. Thursday was your day off?

Mr. Ray. Yes.

Mr. Speiser. So you would get off work at 6 o’clock in the
morning

Mr. Ray. About 7 o’clock.

Mr. Speiser. Seven o’clock in the morning, Thursday morning,
and not have to return to work until 10 o’clock or 11 o’clock on
Friday evening?

Mr. Ray. Yes.

Mr. Speiser. Is that accurate?

Mr. Ray. Yes.

Mr. Speiser. When was your vacation in 1967 and 1968?

Mr. Ray. I cannot remember that. It would be when the season
was probably over, probably late in the year, November, December
usually.

Mr. Speiser. Did you normally have a Christmas vacation?

Mr. Ray. No; I worked on Christmas or somebody had to do the
job. I was usually around there for Christmas.

Mr. Speiser. In 1967 you did not take Christmas vacation?

Mr. Ray. I am not saying one way or another because there is no
way I can remember that far back. You can check my work records
and find out.

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Ray, I would like to direct your attention to
MLK exhibit F-598. F-598 is a copy of your visitor’s record at the
Missouri State Penitentiary in Jefferson City, Mo., which reflects

338

the dates that you visited your brother, James Earl Ray at that
institution. That exhibit is being shown and put on the easel there.

Chairman Stokes. Is counsel asking that exhibit be made a part
of the record?

Mr. Speiser. Would the clerk furnish the witness with a copy of
that in the event he cannot see the easel?

I will request that this document be introduced into the record.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered.

[The information follows:]

I Inc of RAY, Jfiaoo ^ I

datton Ifamtha* 1

\tm

■ i

■

| Signature of Visitor ' d vJ •

mtL

ll; 753

I73H

■

■1C

■I

— 0

LZ_

!■

■

“1

■

■ i

■

— 1

■

■eg

■

- -

—

“

““

Relation

Address

Stnutture

r~J

L "

—

h—

■

•m

■

—

t—

—

— -!

MLK Exhibit F-598

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Ray, does this record accurately reflect the
visits you paid to your brother, James Earl Ray, while he was
incarcerated at Jefferson City?

Mr. Ray. There is no way I can remember back that far, but that
looks like — that is my signature and I can tell my own signature,
and I visited him a few times while he was down there. I don’t
know how many times exactly. That — it might be true, I don’t
know, because that is my signature.

Mr. Speiser. Do you have any recollection — let me rephrase the
question. Did you have your own visitor's pass when you visited
your brother James?

Mr. Ray. I am pretty sure you can get a visitor’s pass. I think
you had to have a visitor’s pass to get in.

Mr. Speiser. Did you use anybody else's visitor’s pass?

Mr. Ray. I don’t think so. I don’t remember doing it. I don’t
think so. It is hard to remember all that stuff. That has been 15, 16
years ago.

Mr. Speiser. For your recollection, Mr. Ray, James Earl Ray
escaped from the Jefferson City prison on April 23, 1967. Do you
have any recollection of visiting James Earl Ray the day prior to
his escape?

Mr. Ray. I positively didn’t visit him. That is a positive.

Mr. Speiser. Do you know if your brother John visited him on
that day?

339

Mr. Ray. I don’t know what John did because he was in St. Louis
and I was in Chicago, the Chicago area.

Mr. Speiser. So your answer is no, you do not know if John
visited him the day before?

Mr. Ray. I don’t know if John did. I know definitely I didn’t.

Mr. Speiser. Were you aware that your brother James, prior to a
successful escape in April of 1967, had twice previously attempted
unsuccessfully to attempt to escape from Jefferson City?

Mr. Ray. There is no way I can respond to that because that goes
too far back to remember. I have heard since then about it, but I
don’t remember hearing about it before.

Ms. Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, before we proceeed too much fur-
ther, may I just request that the witness be provided with a copy of
this record in order for counsel to confer with him subsequently?

Thank you, sir.

Chairman Stokes. Counsel’s request will be granted.

Ms. Kennedy. Thank you.

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Ray, do you know who assisted your brother
James in escaping from Jefferson City?

Mr. Ray. Do I know who assisted him? There is no way I can
know. I am working in Chicago. I am working every night when he
escaped that place.

Mr. Speiser. So your answer is you did not assist your brother
James in escaping?

Mr. Ray. I did not assist him and there is no way — I hear
rumors, but I am not one that pays any attention to rumors.

Mr. Speiser. Well, setting aside rumors for a moment, do you
factually know who assisted James in escaping from Jefferson
City?

Mr. Ray. The only way I would factually know is if I was there
and seen the escape and I wasn’t there. I was working in Chicago
and there is no way I can know who helped him.

Mr. Speiser. Did anyone ever tell you they assisted James in
escaping?

Mr. Ray. I never — nobody has ever told me that.

Mr. Speiser. John never admitted that to you?

Mr. Ray. Never has admitted that to me.

Mr. Speiser. Did you ever tell anybody that John assisted

Ms. Kennedy. Mr.

Mr. Speiser. May I finish my question, please?

Ms. Kennedy. No; I want to refer to the question before this.

I would like to ask, Mr. Chairman, to strike the word “admitted.”
The word “admitted” suggests a fact and I would like the question
to be rephrased to eliminate an implication that this committee
has firm, factual evidence that John Ray assisted James Earl Ray
in escaping from the penitentiary.

Chairman Stokes. Ms. Kennedy, I don’t think counsel intended
that implication by his question.

Mr. Speiser. Ms. Kennedy, I asked your client whether John ever
indicated or admitted to Jerry that he

Ms. Kennedy. I am objecting to the word “admitted.” I am
objecting to the form of the question, and I am asking that the
word be stricken and a less culpatory, objective word be substituted
in the question.

340

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Ray, did you ever tell anybody

Ms. Kennedy. Could I have a ruling?

Chairman Stokes. Can counsel rephrase his question?

Ms. Kennedy. Thank you.

Mr. Speiser. Did your brother John ever indicate to you that he
assisted James in escaping from Missouri State Prison in April
1967?

Mr. Ray. Not that I remember.

Mr. Speiser. Did you ever tell anybody that John assisted James
in escaping from Missouri State Prison?

Mr. Ray. I have never told nobody anything like that, but I am
positive that you can run some informants up here, ex-convicts or
FBI informants that will say whatever you want to hear.

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to have
marked for evidence and introduced into the record MLK exhibit
F-599 which reflects the notes of author George McMillan, taken
in a series of interviews with the witness, Jerry Ray; attached to
the notes is a brief letter from Mr. McMillan to an attorney on the
committee’s staff.

Now, on page 25

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the
record.

[The information follows:]

341

MLK Exhibit F-599

£20341

March 16, 1978

Dear Mr. Eberhardti

l*m returning herewith the copy of the Jerry
Ray interview notes you handed me in your office
yesterday .

And, in compliance with your request, X have
underlined in red ink those words , phrases , and
sentences which are my own notes, thoughts, inter-
lineations • : , - i;.’

*' .* ' ' ' . . K

I understand from your phone call this morale
ing that you will be sending me a voucher for the V.
expenses I incurred in coming to Washington to'be^ v ./;- r
interviewed by you and members of your staff# r :'

. ,r:i i

Sincerely ji nfti >

... • %K ^

: l^,/Mic£aelEberhardt
J Select committee on Assassinations^
"U*Sv-House of Representatives ^

,3331 iitouse Office Building^ Annex 2 r : > .
^Washington, -DC ^20515 '&&*$&£***

342

JERRY RAY -- SECOND CHICAGO INTERVIEW

MON* DAY, JUNE 26, 1972 —

Went only once New Orleans — Florida several -yrQCT
tintes. He r d pull job. $1,000 — $1,000 — he’d take
off, go Florida-, New Orleans.

Dope started in Army

• &

He’d go on vacation after every hit (robbery)
--'go California. ** - —

He never screwed punk in prison*

p£to&/ran prison. Nash ‘was liked. Rumor is
Nash committed suicide (JER said) was because his
daughter pregnant by black man.

4 JER talked about Robert de Pugh, Minute Man,
leader.- There arc Minute Men iu Jeff City.

Melba was not prostitute.

That was KK did stabbing in Jeff City.

Some of those fellas make themselves The Klan after
they get in. Hadn’t been in Klan before. Menards JK- —
were Klan inside. They were dangerous, out to

themselves. v O'

They all pack shivs. Shivs, Jinny, Bums
file down a spoon. Nobody bother them. - -

He did get more bitter over, the years*

Stuff about Knasas City, girl, signature man gTXZ T
doesn't sound right now. * *

J )

I used to sit around -<wo or

three hundred thousand dollars -- g being

rehabilitated -- but these dreams fell apart when. I '
got out -- like ll charter a plane.

Your mind acts completely different in there
(in jail). Different lawyers have different ,

Even old crazy Hill.

343

ge Z - -Jerry Ray--2nd Chicago--Monday , June 26, 1972

If you took something of his, he'd kill you —
it.K was- some kind of a challenge to him.

He's fanatic about his health (mineral oil). —

Body — always does exercises no matter where he goes:
walks on his hands, push-ups. Been doing it for years
and years.

He always like kids; when he's around — they're
the only ones he shows afffection to, not grown-ups.

Comes out whenever you're around him.' 1 •

„ Don’t talk about your people in prison because^W^

that gets you in a depressed mood. ;

(Escape Meet)

The town was St. Auber — the trusties told
JER about town. Jack missed him because JER didn't
get there — Jack had given him pay phone and JER ; .

called it and Jack came.. Whal^he told Huie was true --
a k little creek by St. Auber "u Jerry went down there
a couple X of times. Little creek just before come in
to St. Auber from West -- Jimmy told Jack where to
pick him up. They went East St. Louis and then Chicago.

Jerry wouldn't eat rice at dinner — "That's . -

Japanese food.” Like father, like son.

Knollwood Country Club, Lake Forest, 111.

JER wrote Foreman 10 reasons why he wouldn't
plead guilty. Cot from Foreman 1) hurt my social
standing; 2) number Nixon, Wallace, Humphrey supporters
in Memphis -- that he would never be convicted.

JER was getting more and more depressed way
he was locked up in Memphis. Pleaded guilty becaase
he wanted get out of that place.

344

gage 3—Jerry Ray--2nd Chicago--Tuesday , June 27, 1972

(Atlanta Bombing)

Cuy

JER had 14th St. place in Atlanta, iuxy vas
from Atlanta. He didn't know tfaxy-Cuy well. Met him
in Atlanta. Guy didn't know anything about JER. He
was racist guy, hated King, Nggrocs, '-Met him in bar.
JER didn't trust Guy. They were gonna blow house up.
Guy was supposed to be expert.. If expert, he must
have been in dynamiting before. JER said Cuy lived
around there. JER frequented this bar -- it had pool
table — play pool with this guy. Also TV. This
brought discussion -- some trouble with Black — -

policeman shooting Black. This started discussion .
between him and JER -- Guy said should give cop medal.
Dynamiting came up. He knew Guy knew what he vas doing
but guy talked too much. The two of them talked
about it. They made plans. JER felt guy would be
bragging. He was big guy. JER called him BUTCH.

Butch vas always in that bar. He also came to JER’s
apartment. They made plans there. The guy had the
dynamite. Theyewasn't no money involved -- just for
their own satisfaction.

JER krnws all these groups -- where they are--
their addresses -- phone numbers. FIERY CROSS --
LIEERTY LOBBY. Would know must how to get in touch.

He knew Courtney -- how to get in touch --

Way JER told Jerry it was simply that they
met in bar over remarks about cop shooting Negroes.

JER dq- gsav u f" ?. T i ow Ms — — " -» ~ 4rc would be

listening -- know what everybody saying 3 or. 4 tables
. from him -- whoxx was for him, who against him.

Stoner never did have no contract with JER.

If he had, don't worry JER would have had plenty of
money to leave U.S.

(Fiery Cross)

Only organization ever mentioned was FIERY CROSS.
JER mentioned that several times. He asked me to
write to then -- THE SWORD and THE FIERY CROSS. This
was before he plead guilty -- when Foreman was on case.

-When. Stoner went sec JER he wanted criminal*
part, not //6 k* LIFE* JER wanted Klan lawyer in Memphis- -
Went to Ryan, even before Foreman. JER knew one guy
belonged to Klan -- something like Stephen^ -- from
Florida. JER met him in Alabama -- rooming house.

Met Stephens in Alabama. In Fla. (JER said) Klan
has kitty for legal defense. JER finally told me to

forget about iOftt[rG -in FlcJVf C/J.U 3$ - - he, tiLtto' os&fpg

345

Page 4--Jcrry Ray — 2nd Chicago- -Tucsdayy June 27, 1972

everything except zip code.

p 4 * / (Stevens)

i ouTtveY - /*dt

Son ir ij arz name was Stevens, Jacksonville, FLA* ^

. JER knew him while he was in ±a Biraingham—

But they weren’t gonna do anything together. Just told
me to get in touch to help get lawyer.

Stevens only bar-room or casual acquaintance.

He wouldn't have known what was on JER’s mind.

. (Last Phone Call)

That last phone call -- all excited and
worked up — more anxious couldn't wait for day.

- When talk Chicago- — or at no other time •
in the whole year — did he mention any group or
individual.

He wasn’t plotting nothing with Stevens
There wasn't nothing to tell me. , .

The only guy that I can put on any kind of
a conspiracy is that guy in Atlanta.

( Kennedy s)

Only people he talked hbout were/ politicians —
cussing Democrats -- Johnson, Humphrey -- Kennedys
(thought they were lowest trash in world — "Ail
three of them should meet same fate. Wiped out.")

Also Jacob Javits. Johnson was lowest of bunch -- a
southerner and a turncoat. His mind's on political
stuff all the time, then and now t alks nore about
people he hates than n co nle he _ likes'] ^Coldwat er
would have shot down Blacks . " JER

First tine 1 noticed anti-Black feeling was
after he got out of Army.

For all talking ue di<f those times, the most
talk was about how to make-^ Of course, you can't talk >
. to Jimmy but so long before politics comes up. lie likes
Nixon and Agnew.

(Chicago Meeting April 1967)

I knew all about escape but didn't know when
they would arrive. Jack net him because he was in
St. Louis and I was in Chicago. I was half-way
kaXrcc expecting phone call. I got -it. I couldn't
leave right then. Next day I went net Atlantic

Hotel. They had already checked in. Main reason took
separate rooms. JER been in long time. We all got
girls that night. One I got called Co-Co. We talked
in Jimmy's room. I registered Jerry Ryan. Jimmy
also registered Ryan. Don't know how Jack registered.
$6.50 or $7.00 for a room. .

ji if /tt was kind of strange seeing X was

but I knew better than t^ . him. He would
have knocked me down.

After we talked for so long we went down to
Victorian Hotel bar -- had several drinks.

Then back to rooms — Then JER said "I better
get me a head job" so we -parted for a while.

At bar, all the talk we did, not over 20 or 25
minutes, was just friendly -- he's serious, he's a
businessman — - -

Main thing we talked about was this pxa porno-
graphic business. Him and Jack talked porno -- Jack had
experience. Had figured out before, how to run ads.

They were just discussing, neither telling the other.

Jack said ads Midnight, Insider -- "The bigger the
ad, the more the response. Put everything in that" legal.
They send a legal picture. Then pay prostitute to make
some real strong pictures."

JER real interested -- said he read in prison
how guys get rich off it. Said get Mexican girls to
make pix — do almost anything — for nothing.

JER said in prison didn't have equipment to
learn how to make and develop pix. "That wouldn't be
no problem," JER said. "Problem is to get names and
sorting out good ones from bad ones. Have to be
careful because federal people get you."

'.John said, -- "Way to beat that is get pix.--
no fingerprints on pix or envelope -- no return address --
mail it at post office -- you get the money first

His big idea was to make plenty of money.

347

Pa.ee 6--Jerry Ray — 2nd Chicago--Tuesday , June 27 > 1972

He never vent all out on one thing but he
thought he would turn that' porno into a big thing.

But it’s a slow process -- You have to build that thing --
Who’s right and who’s not right and JER* s not too
patient a fellow.

(Chg o. Meeting — continued)

Ke discussed where to run them ads -- w
either in underground papers or scandal sheets.

Woman knows if she answers ad one of those papers that
you want everything. . \

When cane back Chicago after 1st Canada he
told me about ads he had run ads in Toronto paper FLASH J

or something like that. . He said something there about
French culture. He got a few replies. He met one
girl there from ad. He was surprised she was nice-looking
woman. Met her twice. She was all hot, got head job * —
divorcee. --

•’How can. person just go for one way — just
that one thing* r — said Jerry laughing.

Porno was the main topic that night — less
chance of getting caught — if you did it right
also he thought there *d be more money in it.

He had graduated (he thought) from this
robbery, burglary. Didn’t want to go back to that.

c' ' # He was running dope , too, no matter what FBI says."

We discussed that kidnapping for a while -- Him
and me discussed that -- That’s too rough*-- They never
Sc give up on you. v : ** ' v v

From time he got Chicago until he was caught ’ -

Porno was main thing on his mind. -*'-"7 ; : y

(Dancing School -- Bartending) * * - . ‘ * .Vi >•

Dancing School because he really wanted to learn.

He always felt uneasy about dancing. He’s not good at
meeting people. Ke said *- "I can’t dance, Jack^cnn’t v
dance, Jerry can’t dance.” He thought he’d blend in
better with people. It wasn’t just to meet ’em for sex.

348

Pago 7- -Jerry Ray--2nd Chicago—Tuesday , June 27, 1972

Didn't want to nix so much as to blend with them.
Baseball, sports, entertainment, he” didn't feel at
case, couldn’t get in Conversation-

Bartending kind of same thing Even if

you’ve got a withdrawn personality good place to
learn to talk -- people will talk to bartender --
ax especially women -- would resent other men getting
fresh and tale all kind of stuff from bartender.

(Women) - ' m .

» He was looking for a way to approach women.
It’s always been on him that’s its a kind of task to
meet women -- He’d like to meet better women.

He wanted to be able to get a woman on his own — -
.who liked him — it’s bad on a person's ego just to
always be getting a woman from a bellhop. _

/ (Girl at Grey Rocks)

Girl at Grey Rocks -- he was using her for
•information — -she worked government. Had Head job
wasn't main thing. Reason he broke off with her he
was getting serious. lie really liked her. She
wouldn’t give him head job. He screwed her. He got
afraid and broke off her. First time since early
Chicago days that he liked a girl.

That wasn’t his aim in life, to' s any stay
with woman. He wanted more than that. The

• * Only 2 things lie did (in 12 months) was dope
business and porno business — he didn’t roll nobody,
hustle nobody.

(Porno in Birmingham)

Kfxxy Jerry vent down there -- JER wanted
Jerry to go in with him -- talked about having to
make own movies, pix of everything, girls with girls,
boys with boys, in the rear, animals — had to have
everything -- talked in his motel room --

Atlanta police 404-659-1513 .

~ (Birmingham Meeting JER 5 Jerry, Pcmo)
JEiTTjnet Jerry at plane ar3 we went his motel .

He wanted me for Porno -- But he had these
2 or 3 runs from New Orleans to L.A. Then 1 was gonna

349

Page S--Jcrry Ray- -2nd Chicago- -Tuesday , June 27 , 1972

stay put in L.A. and handle porno business — for he
might like to travel some, -Tn l *

He had wanted me to go down Birmingham in I
Chicago but I was getting divoTce- |

But I went Birmingham shortly after he got 1
there- He paid' for trip to and from- -

Porno was main thing- Dope thing was just
temporary --He was gonna get away from that entirely
iatcr on.

me -•-**-

lie wanted nna make dope runs with him -- go to
Mexico with him to make movies.

. Jerry doesn’t know of any dope or jewel
smuggling across Mexican border. . . > • - *

I might make first dope run to L.A. and stay there.

1 wished I had gone with him. He could have
done porno if he could have had just one thing on his/
mind- If I had gone with him, if money had really
started rolling in it’s possible he could have forgot
about THE BIG BOY- But I don’t know. If I’d gone with
him (to Mexico, etc.) he might not have done anything.

But he- couldn’t keep his mind just on Porno.

He did get pix in Mexico, a lot. He sold a few
in L.A. Nothing to amount to anything.

He didn't make any movies. Just pictures (stills)
and this vaan’t of him. It was somebody. Women and
women — that stuff takes time -- You take even lot of
prostitutes won’t take stuff like that. .

He mixed that with a kind of vacation. Just
enjoyed himself- - .

Carried on experiments in porno — how to
set stuff up. ' *

Cot pix of woman and a a woman. -

Didnt ask me come L.A- because he had just
about given up on me and he didn’t have anybody else
he could trust.

(Mexico -- Los Angeles)

When he got kxSx L.A. he started working like

fell ftr ValTa&2;h^4op2"W'T» , £ 0 / 2 .

39-935 0 - 79 - 23

350

Pace 9- -Jerry Ray--2nd Chicago --Tuesday, June 27, 1972

It would h drive him almost crazy to see King
on TV but I don't think he was stalking him then.

What doing Wallace was people in

. Mustang to sign petition for Wallace -- Cot people ±h
around hotel, in bars, maybe as many as 300 people.

He never rang doorbells, just talking that stuff to
people he ran into. ONly thing on his mind from time
he got up until time go to bed. -- He .wasn't quiet
about his ideas either. *

NOTE: Did

He still Ax talks about that till today —
how he helped Wallace get on ballot* He thinks a± if
Wallace president would put heat on governor Tenn* and
commute sentence to 10 years.

- First thing he- did in Mexico was to get lay of
land — (this typical criminal approach, to stop and -
think) . Went” there big reason was to make contact —
see what he could do.

. Same as. Canada -- to make contacts fi — to
look situation — to feel it out — to -line things up

He didn't mean to marry girl in Mexico -- 5 k He
just meant to use her. He would never get married to no
woman I /

When he came back from Canada to Chicago he
said he had some with him. More than enough for him —
but don't know whether $200 worth or $2,000. lie didn't
talk about any business in Canada then.

He tried to talk me into going into business
with him and when I wouldn't he left car with me.

. The whole thing about Raoul and running drugs
from Canada was bullshit. He didn't go Canada for
porno either.

It was just to Zook Canada over — see what
things were like.

351

Pago 10--Jerry Ray- -2nd Cliicago--Tuesday , June 27, 1972

But from tine he escaped until time he vas
caught in porno.

Raoul was to throw HUIE off. — For some reason
he didn't want HUIE to know about porno -- He would
laugh in his cell about how he was throwing HUIE off.

All the Windsor- Detroit thing DOPE was BULLSHIT.

Mexican DOPE also bullshit.

& ' : V

Only thing Jerry knows about for sure about
DOPE business is from New Orleans to L.A. . -

It .is dangerous down there in New Orleans.

They get pretty mean down ther.

Stuff about in the tire — BULLSHIT — kept ‘ _'V .

dope Tight in glove compartment. ,

. Way from New Orleans to L.A. — well, because .
important thing, is contacts . / ->i--

Dope vas a minor thing to him -- I don't know - -

exactly how much he made. It was hard stuff --’He V.

picked up from guy a named Eddie and delivered. I

When I called, I said: . • ■ * - • j -v

. "Eddie?" ’ ‘ ’

\ .

"Who do you want?" he said. * -

/Then I told him JER's brother, etc.

'•Everything's all right. Nothing for you to
worry about." . ^ - 1%

A very short conversation. * _ f - *' v \ i -' r ? : ;

Usually when guys get picked up they tell everything
Jimmy just wanted guy to know he^ hadn't talked.

Jimmy was making run the time he came to Chicago
from New Orleans -- He left and vent California. v

He told me had a run to make --

Divorce was big (obsessive! thing to Jerry --
had wi tneTs eT^Tineci up, everything . Told him I*d go
Tn with KlcPwhen I got divorce but he never asked me
again.

352

Page ll--Jerry Ray--2nd Chi cago--Tuesday , June 27, 1972

He must have made drug contact In Canada, h’e
knew it before he went Birmingham. * When Jerry went
Birmingham -- JER already knew about runs.

I think he made between $3,500 and $5,000 each
run for two runs.

He spent quite a ia bit of money -- hotels,
whores, food --

If killed King, he didn’t figure be that much
heat. He was going to Rhodesia. He was desperate m
London. Had "more heat on him than he ever dreamed of .

- He would never have been caught (he told JER)
if he had enough money --He expected make big score
in U.S. before he left but too much heat, he couldn't.

If he had four thousand dollars he wouldn’t have
been caught to this day. : .

- He figured tine was right. Everything jelled.
Although newly broke, he figured he could make some'
money -- didn't realize be so much heat on him.

Things falling into place, moved King from
Rosemont.. .

He knew he was coming back to Memphis. Though
that would be a good place -- Memphis police up in.
arms about King, town against him.

Situation -- V /allace OK on ballot -- Porno lit,
a flop -- only on hisHmJ- nd was King -- only

See, it wasn’t necessarily that he would have
to leave country after killing King — he didn’t see
how much heat there would have been. His main idea
was not going Canada but Mexico. He had it on his mind
that he might have to leave country and Canada was
best wasy to go. But if hadn't had all that heat on
him lie would probably be living in Mexico today.

It wasn’t his plan to abandon his car and every*
thing. His ACTUAL - PLAN was after Memphis was to go to
Atlanta, pick up his stuff and go to Mexico. It was all
over news, FBI came into it right away. He heard it
while he was leaving Memphis.

353

Page 12^-Jerry Ray — 2nd Chicago- -Tuesday , June 27, 1972

By time he got Atlanta ditched car and caught
bus for Canada.

He never smoked a cigarette in' his life.

He didn’t get lost. . Took Interstate out of
Memphis *■ — vent over into Mississippi and then turned
west.

Ha d King been to Memphis first -time by March 17?

Kosc operation . He could blend into crowd in
looks -- except tor two things; his ear and his nose.

Laws on, asked King come -- extended invi tation. --
a t end of February. Did he announce it at this time? *

"Ask him? " ' ~ ‘v *• ’

Lawson telephoned King on March 17 to Rive

in hos~7Qigeles. Did King announce
aF licTwas %oing Memphis? That day? Same day

- briefin

there

~jT ElT leTt Los Angeles 7"

. King arrived Memphis March J L8 .

A nnounced that night he was returning Memph is
March 22hg l ~~ ~ . .. • ” . .* . 1

Rnt^pwing March 21st and postponed morning of
21st to lf8thT

But 2Sth was bad day, riot -- King announced
would return .

What did King sav about his plans on March J.6
or 17 in L.A.? ...

Jimmy told Jerry that something went wrong in .•>
Alabama. . . \

He wanted cut King off before Poor People 's March--
That if King went, some strong laws would be passed.

Also he figured wouldn't be all-out manhunt
because. Hoover hated King, didn't want him come Washingtpn

But it worked just opposite, hated King so much
was forced to go out and catch Jimmy.

Even though Jimmy breaks law all the time, he goes
by that law book. If King got laws changed, that threat
would” - Have upset Jimmy -- more than King's publicity or
appearance.

354

Page 13-“Jerry Ray- -

2nd Chicago-Tuesday , June 27, 1972

The main thing was Alabama -- but if not there,

Memphis.

(He didn't have right gun, did he, to shoot in
Selma, didn't buy rifle until after. Selma.)

left los Angeles he knew he was

Rising gonna do it.

'phone call from Memphis was only one when
he really said anything about doing anything.

He bought rifle because he knew it was. gonna
have to be from a distance. .

He took rifle out and target-practiced’ that
day he bought in Birmingham at Aero marine *

Also he wanted rifle* do it in one shot.

He's an expert shot.

Call day before -- Je just acted excited,.

• jubilant . .

He called Jerry about 9 (nine) times — once
from Mexico, Memphis, Texas, New OrleansX&W/

That first meeting in Chicago — he wouldn't
even talk much about N's or MLK in front of Jack.
King didn't even come up -- if it had. Jack would
have stopped it. *.-

First time anything serious about King was
that time I went to Alabama but it hadn't jelled then,
no definite time and place. But when he talked about
him his whole face changed.

He had mentioned King in prison when I visited*
him. . "Somebody ought to kill that coon." .

He talked f definitely about killing King that -
* tine he came Chicago from New Orleans and we talked
Cypress Gardens.

Still had Porno on mind when he left L.A. So he
did still have two things on his mind even then -- ,when
MLK had* become main thing.

SEX MANUALS -- g Going back years, since he first
mentioned sex, he only talked about head job.

He night have wanted know how, in case he had to
screw a woman -- he probably hadn't had.

He talked about leaving country even before'
Jeff City -- where he could start new.

Thought about leaving country even, x before
he had King in mind.

■ * Mexican girls give best head jobs in the world.

He said best he ever had.

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 2S t 1972

i „ If H£R could have got in touch with Perez --
he could have got money for killing MLK. Trouble is
to get to those people -- you can't just walk in.

Never did talk about making money from killing .-' , -
King. Didn't try get money from Courtney. : " i:

He said sent Jerry $1,000 and I gave 'him $900.

Jack gave him $3,S00.

Kept some money on him — couple thousand --
when he travels doesn't spend as much as people think

he does.* , *./ ;■

Only money JER had: ' : ,.i * V

1) what Jerry and Jack gave him, -

2) Klingeman's restaurant, . v .

3) dope. ■_ v'.- - ’-V;. v •

$4,600 ' from prison " J '

7,000 drugs \ * -•

$11,600

Kent to Birmingham, establish residence, live
there while drug runs. It was to be like Germany. He'd
brag about being from "Wallace Country.” -

' Jerry gonna take week off in August and visit
JER and Jack. • ; . v ..

About being broke at time killed MLK — he didn't j|
realize how much heat. Thought he could go Mexico, if if
necessary sell car.

, Kent to Canada first time to look the place out.'*

How to get out of country.

Met at Cypress Tavern three times -- once before
he went L.A., twice while working Winnetka. tec might talk
baseball.

39-935 003 :

356

Pago 15--Jerry Ray--2nd Chicago --Wednesday , June 25,1972

He was gonna leave country. ? *!le just didn't
like United States. Not the way it was going- Way
back in Fifties when first civil rights.

He didn't leave from Canada first time because
he wanted to get Wallace in and kill King.

I don’t believe he escaped" for just that one
thing -- killing King. He felt everybody had respon-
sibilities -- if you don't do your duty it's not worth
living. But he had several things on his mind.

He had everything set up in Mexico for a life

after killing King.

■ •

He must have studied photo in Birmingham.

Porno — trace ads Toronto FLASH. He must have
had postoffice box. hould have had to give name. Could
check that way.

But. he didn't place any ads to sell his pictures.
Didn't consider Xh himself set up nor ready to go into
business of selling. .

What happened pix? Does FBI have any? Ste in?
Were any in Mustang? :

He hadn't reached stage of placing ads
customers only for participants .

for

Grace Weiss -- Neighborhood Bar — 20th and
Hickory, St. Louis. Homer Townsley, bail bondsman,
owned bar.

Lonely Hearts Club was to get people for
pictures Porno.

/ punning is bullshit — ''comedy stuff.” ‘

Porno in L.A. -- made some pix in.L.A. as
result of Free Press ad.

Cable release was so he could have pix of
himself getting head job. But he would never let pix
be taken of his face.

Call New Orleans number 3S5-7581 cited by
We is b e rgj p V ^536^

He got sex magazines, sex manuals for porno
business, studying up on all that stuff.

He never liked sex maeazines in orison -- didn't

want any.

He didn’t rob market in Montreal*

New O rl e ans police dept. 504-S21-2000 *

April 0

Officer BOU gfglilS
" " Carol Goman

Info. ofHS — SH^OOQ

11 ao_CST. %

* "No recordd in our detective bureau of any
such meeting . " :

THURSDAY. JUNE 1Q7 7: Phone conversation, office

^aroX~G qm ^ "information office, New~Or leans police dept* •

358

/k.TfrttrJ

NOTES

July 12. 1975 Interview with Jerry Kg

Jerry bed an account at Wheeling State Bank, 111., with - ^ '**-

$2,900 in it when Jmiomy escaped. -- : - L

He had teen getting money from Snitty, the Jeff City guards ;
from lo65 to 1967. That is, for. two lyezara. And it came to
stout $2,900* • • ; . ■ ; .

Before that. Jack got the money from Smithy. That want on ;
atout Ivo years. Jack had something between $2,000 and $2,500
to give Jimmy in Chicago. NOTE: Was any of thia money in Caol's '

tank account? #

Smitty sent the money in* postal moneyd orders, usually
$100 ata a time. Tbpy were togut and malledfrom Jeff City. - -
Sometimea Smitty ^sent cash ~ a $100 till usually when be eent * ^ .

cash'. \ ™y. : *

It was all this one guard, Smitty. He got shook down later, an
tit* Stadbt fired. ■ r . * ... .-4: . ..

1 Jjmniy , s hustling wasn't all drugs. It was anything. Sandwiches,
magazines, books drugs. SSame guard bro ght drugs in. Smitty
hustled for about 10 gos^R-guay guys. JER paid guys in the v
kitched for goedr-e^ food, etc.

Jerry took the moneyd got to the Wheeling bank and
deposited it in an account in Jerry's real name. Jerry thinks
the-PBI knows about the account because they asked him about It-
But in Jerry's eyes it was always, "Jimmy's account," and he
never took any money from it for has his own use, he says.

When they et at the Atlantic, Jerry was there only one night,
be only had one night off. "I gave him everything in the
Wheeling account excpt for two or three hundred," Jerry says*.

This, later turned out to be $300. ' r

Account name was Jerry William Hay.

He handed JER aroynd $2,000 in $100 bills.

. ; v

Snitty had been sending money out to Jack before me. Probably
from 1963. JER was hustling whole time be was in Jeff City.

And thru the same guard. Jack at the time he received money was
in Benaonville, Illinois, working at White Pines Gold Club. He
had a postoffice box there. Jack handed Jimmy about §2,000 in .

$100 bills, a few $50* s. Jack never handled any more money after
that.

Pepper Printing didn’t have anythnignto do with J ia~7 T 3
hustle. Carol didn’t over, known that jimmy sacared until after he

<Hr*.

359

pace 2 — notes on July 12 .

Int e rvl ew -with Jerry Kav

Jimmy carried the money on him, either in hia suitbasa ax or
in his paitta.

Remember that he had the money he made in the £ Winnetka
restaurant — on top of vhat Jerry and Jack gave him. That vould
mean that he had between {4,500 and $5,000 when he vent to
Canada.

He called Jerry up when he got back from Canada, surprised
Jerry — which means that he had not called Jerr y from^J Ianada.

Told J erry^to^eet^im at a place that Jerry was not f amilSr " !

with, on North AVenue. Jeryy was living at Nort brook then,
said he had got married, told me that h&s wife was now living in ' ' ^

a samall town near MorriBtown, Tennessee, and thzt ha had a
13 - 7 ear-old son there. V : v

The night the two of themd met on North Avenue, Jimmy did not /
say anything about the Gray Hocks woman which makes Jerry think
that shax he did like that woman, and he told Jerry later that he
drid. . - .

When Jimmy was ready to leave
Chicago for Birmingham, he dro've them down to the Greyhound
bus station in Chicago, got out and turned the car over to Jerry,

NS* and left.

In Chicago, Jimmy did tell Jerry that he had a contact in
Montreal who put him in touch with a guy in Birmingham who put him
in touch eventually with The Fence in New Orleans.

In the Birmingham safe deposit box Jimmy put ^jaoney, car
title, plus "Raynax I. D." "Remember he was switching I. D.*a
right then," says Jerry. ... .

The Fence offered Jerry a Job. He appare Titly estimated Jerry
as a somewhat less high-powered operator than Jimmy. He offered*
the job of simply pikcing up a car someplace and driving it to
Los Angeles, or someplace else. The car would alreadyd have te
drge drugs in a tire. But Jimmy carried the* deugs on his
person, said Jerry, and delivered them to someone at the St.
Francis in Los Angeles.

Jerry said The Fence really liked Jimmy, and they got close.
Jerry talked with ihax&sHxax The Fence twixe, the se ond time
for more than 2 hours. He said The Fence had lots of confidence
in Jimmy. And Jimmy had confidence in him, talkdd with The Fence
about hustling in prison.

About the ?Grey Rocks girl: "He had feelings for her. I

know because he dldn f t mention her to me."

360

pace 3 -- notes on July 12. 1Q75 Interview with Jerry Rav

The gu ys name

Reynard J. Rochon

246 Crowder Road
Orleans, La.

Jerry gave m e t he address as 7080 Dr eux Avenue, but wh en
Tc flTled gava na_t. be Crowder Ro ad- address •

T~waa pleased to~find this confirmation, that the" guv actually
g xl a t ed7 aft e r~^ t r o helm .

The way a fence works. If you brought him §10,000 in
Jewelry he would pay you §3,000 cash. Jimmy would bring in. enu£
for §600, §800 or even §1,000. ' * .. . *

Jimay hauled dope to Loa Angeles.

Tfte last time Jerry went to see The Fence, he gave Jerry
§1,0C0. That was January 20, 1975 — this year 1
"Jimmy wasn' t putting heat on hio, M says Jerr jr. ne ’just asked .
him. 11 Of c our se _ t here is an implied threat that, Jimmy will
expaoss" The ffgnce^

The F^nce gave Jerry §800 the first time he went to him, this
was the time that Jerry saw Courtney, in I969 (check Courtney
interview for exact date).

J^mmy hauled dop9 to Los Angeles. . '

He knew Jimmy es Harvey Lowmeyer. *

Of courae he, the Fence, didn't know that Jimmy meant to kill
King.

When Jerry went down the second time they met at Howard
Johnson's motel. That is where Jerry was supposed to have stayed,
but he couldn't get a room and stayed Instead at The Tamanaca
Downtown Motel. .......

Jimmy saw The Fence about 15 times. Sometimes he'd get only
two or three hundred. When you're in them places, Jewelry stores,
you don't pick iip no §20 watches. You don't g9.t nothing out of tba t.

Call from Mexico* He called^He was high. How youi daf?
doin T , flavin 1 a ways. You ought be over here laying out
with these senSrltas.

Jerry confirmed many telephone calls. Apparently in most qf
them Jimmy did n't say anything much more than he did from Mexico.

It was the same kind of Jazz, nonsense, Ju9t wanting somebody to
talk to.

He didn't call Christmas: "Christmas was Just another day to

him."

Ther e wasnt anyone else that Jimmy had deals with in the time
he was an escaped convict before he killed King. "Jimmy didn't

have anything to do with anybody else but thia guy in Kev Orleans.

v-v * rO ■;* > ~ * M

361

pa ge 4 — notea on July 12. 1975 Interview with Jerry Hag

We knew ( Jerry knew) that he went twice to New Orleans*-'

He went more than that. He would get In that car and drive and
crlve and drive. He was a good driver*

He sent money from Birmingham In 1?67. Sometime between
September 15 and October 15. He sent § 1 , 500 * Jerry kept It In
a safe deposit box at the Wheeling state bank. This money kep
by Jerry for his expenses? after Jimay^ capture. It wass this
money that Jimmy was talking about when he told people in London
jtfcai to see hla brother Jerry if money was needed. The sum
was actually §1,800, for Jerry still had §300 In bank account*

* NOTESc: On July 1$, 1975» I called the Conti nental Bank

jr ancb^t~0~ f Har^_alr poi: t "and £s±x as kad the nota ry thereof the

^6at~docua9nt~ha_d Il3eQn found* This 1 a ..the p_owe r 0 f attorney ^

Jerry gave me^fcoexamlne his bank records at th e JW.h eellng bank *
T^talk ed rwi'tb M ia s Wendv^Roaenberpc. 0 1 Hare branch , Contin ental
Bfl ak*~Box' gSoq7~Chlcaso, Illinois* She told me that someone
hair found and turned . In the document, and that, after a couple
of _daya f ah a had destoryed It, because it was a ”elgal~]
docu ment. 11 - .•

"5inmy kept New Orleans srfe deposit box in name of Harvey
Lovmeyer*. It must have “just expired. 11 Might have taken it
out Just before went Selma, that is the money in it* Jimmy
vent to New Orlenaa Just before he vent to Selma*

Jimmy held lup Jewelry stores. In prison he was known
as The Hole, and The Roofer. He liked 3o go in over the roof.

He would choose a placw ehre it looked like that e¥e»-in- even
if the burglar alarm w nt off it m would ' take the npolice
a few mintues to get there. You know, he considers himself a
xp professional.

The Fence told Jerry .that Jimmy was Just about the best
all-around hustler he lhad ever met.

Jerry opened the Manufacturers Trust account (of which I
have his savings book) on February 1969 with the §300 that was
left over from -the Wheeling Trust account. -

362

/}L77>iA\)

Jerry Ray Interview \ -

Monday; Memorial Day, May 29, 1972
Page 1 .

. Jeff City Integration- JER told Jerry on visit that
he had been involved Incident -with Burns- Poiry had control
prison that tice-He was con-wise# He really knew* JER •
told Jerry Menards involved* Burns* brother was detective
city police St. Louis-hated each other.

JER only Drake, Burns, one of Menards was only one
he would- Drake got out before JER escaped- Drake looked
Jerry up-He was in that money business with JER
** Drake in St# Loui3 now unless back in. Mother lives there*
got out 1966# His brother in Terre Haute*

Somebody to contact Incident had Just happened-
n *That ends integration here, " JER

Germany* 1948 or 19^9-made trips to Quincy from ^

Chicago living Quincy 214 Spring St.

Before I went St. Charles 1950/ Ceal and old man lived
downstairs, drahk alot so I moved upstairs, rented out
upstairs front rooms. I lived in 2 rear rooms, also Jack.
Little kid3 stay downstairs. I used set pins. Wouldn’t
wake up old man- sleeps all time but can hear needle drop.

Every time came Quincy give me a few dollars. Kidded me
I was from mixed parents, might not be his brother*

Would call me Nigger# Because dark complexion*

When drinks he warms up to you lot more. Him and
old man go out drink quite a bit. Sometimes Willie with them*
- Came upstairs M my half-brother” He was drinking.

Old man must know, old man end Lucille don’t go for that
stuff (nazl) Never forget that name-Strohelm

Told how he had worked some niggers over-Stroheim used
go in bar where JEE went on duty KP, That * s when brought ■
Emmet Daniels up-They had worked some blacks over. JEE
and Daniels got 2 Black guys in Tavern, told them to leave,
he and Daniels worked them over.

Jack and Jimmy didn’t see each other until I960-
10 or 15 years later, none during Fifties

We knew even before he went in that he meant to . % '

stay in Germany-old man knew that

Stroheim asked him to Join some kind of org. * Ee
told Stro. he was coning back U. S. disillusioned*

Changed his whole llfe-the Army, his disillusionment.

He was behind Stumm 100 % JEE never went to hi 3 house.
When JER drinking he run around with Old Kan-He
Wouldn’t see Carol if sober. He get old. man drunk*

He don’t tell a woman nothing.

Girl friend Chicago. Engaged. Took stock car races. #
He talked to Mabel quite a bit until he started getting
in trouble, still her favorite. She was high-toned. f

I got Jail 1954. I wrote her a letter. Please send §10 v
if you don’t I’m going tell all*

JER told JErry at Menard Jerry tried black-nail her.

He always had strong beliefs. Believed Germans getting r
raw deal.

363

Jerry Hay Interview '

Monday* Memorial Day, May 29, 1972
Page 2 -

Luoille told him he gonna get killed with his Ideas *
even before he got in Army while working at Tannery.

Mabel used send cigarettes

He used gamble a lot over there-poker-good gambler-
win money

Sent money back to Mom- she took care of his money.

She nut it In her name (in Alton bank?)

Bought car when he got out of service (less than a' .
year old )-ganbled, drank some-it wasn't long before money was
gone-take old man out, play pool- . >

He doesn't drink beer-those days nothing but whlskey-
Screwdriver-he used to have pint of whiskey with him-mlx
it with water-

Only pills -goof balls -unt il after got out -of Army #

1st "i knew was when went Jeff City-

Jeff City- guard who used to bring JEH stuff got *

caught-was fired-guards bring in stronger staff at Jeff City
Number of hustlers at Jeff City. Some are known.

They eventually get busted* If too much heat on you,
guards don't like to fool with you. JER had hard stuff.

Stuff yousilff, all kind of stuff. Just 2 people,

the guard and Jimmy- JEH always known, nobody wanted

to mess with- he's not gonna give anybody trouble, nobody gonna

trouble him

Guard bring stuff-in socks-JER kept stashed in. cell-
only shakedown if under suspicion and JEr so quiet.

When guard bring something he wants cash-Mo ney
outlawed in 1950 *s-but all kinds money in prison
If customer didn't have cash, JER would take
cigarettes but charge more. . .

$1 green worth $L .50 commissary or 6 packs cigarettes
Little pills $1 benzies -

Hard stuff was expensive
. Guard only take cash ’

Guard could be in kitchen, in yard-
but JER's was in cell block. _

No money in Kenard, can't make anything
If hustling you first live good-keep clothes pressed -
extra candy, orange drinks, radio, ice cream yards-
A good hustler had everything, steaks, different
kinds soups-lf you're a good hustler if a guy wants something
you're supposed to have it.

That's Jimmy's llfe-he's got to have something to do- *
if he wasn't hustling, he’d go crazy,

You only have so many hustlers-not everybody's got
it in them- I haven' t-but everybody in prison knows the hustler
in whole. prison 12 or 15 hustlers- v

If no money in prison, no hustllng-
as Poatiac, Menard

364

Jerry Ray Interview . V.

Monday, Memorial Day, May 29* 1972 3

Page 3

^X5*LiLi5Qni?h 1800 a Year
_12_ ' „2_ Yea rs

^55ZT 127550]

tioo

tfhat_throws_ pe°pl e off-why _^lld h e . go tojgork ft, 'f' £t,i
wfren^ heZ^etUSSz — He h ad h is/^re a s a na.

John had around $3*000^' 'i&OO • *

I had §1,000 V when JER escaped

Guards send Jerry money Box 22, Wheeling, HI*- send
In §100 hills In mall, nothing else in envelope

He was el so paying lawyer in A Columbia, Mo. -Jerry
would send him §100 or so — ^ J Xoo

You're horn hustler, like baseball player-ever^*-
body's born to be something-he's born to be one-

Hustle2>-31fe a good one, he has lot of bullshit
Jimmy quiet -everybody, bkack white know they can
trust you -some people got that little extra- He can. get
you this, he can get you that "" ’

Main thing trustworthiness

Menard has good hustlers but there's nothing to -
hustle

. In prison everybody would like to be one- but only
a select few can make it. It's Just in you

Main thing Is for guard to trust you- They
could shake JER down sad nobody could break him—

He wouldn't talk

That's key-the guard's trust. # -

You have to close-mouthed
lazy person can't be hustler

You have to get out -Jimmy talked to lot of people
but he didn't have friends.

little Menard is a hustler
Call then Hustlers-not Merchants
. The Hole sounds right for him
lot of hustlers put on show-No t JER he Just wanted
money, didn't put on no show-didn't want anybody to know hi?
business

• Pill man

-But JER dealt in everything. . --

probably started drugs Le

JER sold Mustang to guard

365

Jerry Ray Interview

Tuesday, May 30, 1972 * - ;

Page 1

Some questions to aski A

— — Qv&Tio N£_^

What were his reasons for working even though he

had s fash

he develop as hustler? Got Jils

s tart at Jeff City? ___

If he told Iinc llTft his whilft at tannery, wha t

were tHey~~ t h ecu^gtlthat pointy - .

Wha t exactly

Wh at Exactly was h is p lan?

D id the old man heah ^Ilmmy? *

Wha t was Old Mani l a exact abjection, to Nazi stuf £2
luolj jg*!^

Did JER cheat? How exactly ? .

- More det^ l about - how^ uaT^'^ co ntact worked with JER?
D id JER~want^to be in Tap T pn? SKTT
H ow much did JER get from guard for MUSTANG?

Why did he get discourag ed about going straight?
Chicag o pe riod~^rl l7~193^May 19 52- Get more about this ,
W ^ did~5etake Spanish Leavenwort h? T-Tq-rlca?
What~~dld he do after ^Hl7^958-paiut for Willie?
Until ~Octo ber~T9^9T ^ ~ : ~
sentenced 2o yrs* Jeff City from March I960, *

gjggff53-1 96l» 1965^ ;

Was on librisa bypre script log
^d^Jerry^ reoort p. 18-1 Q Tt n i A - fomaght? .

-waa-he going ta do?

Comment on Hule P» 24 » 25
Xt he had §5.QO0t ~whv_fll d he think he needed Eorft?
Rule 25

JER at 2731 jforth Sheffield, Chi April . 1967
At Indian Trail S8 _I376j> .

WhaS about nhone calls at Indian Trail p* 33 Hule

was JER snuggling In Canada ? *

Who was RaouS

Honey from Jeff City-

The Pepper print ing account was set up as a trial to
.get money out hut it didn’t work so It was given up-
never more than. couple hundred dollars in it* Came to rely .
on guard- who also kited letters out* • SS:

» »What did he say in these letters? . . * • ■

frame of _guard? * : ‘ :

Guard was called Smitty* Would put §100 hill between
pieces paper Eos 22, Wheeling, 111* no return address* *

He also sent some to Jack. Then Jerry write short let ter v saying
everything OK.

Started latter part of 1963.

I960 and 1961 Jerry and Jack worked together rolling
Green. Jack worked on until 1965-1966 White Plains,

Bensenvtlle, 111*

39-935 O

79 - 24

366

Jerry Ray Interview*
Tuesday* May 30* 1972
Page 2

Jack met JER In Chi and gave mon/ey- f
Jerry gave JER money In La Salle Street hotel' next door
Vlotorla-gave It to him Just way it had come to me- 1
had kept It In my room.

Jack saw JER day before he escaped.

Jimmy asked him to come-you knew something up- Jack called •
Jerry that night told him to expect to see Jimmy couole
days. Prison not bugged. He told Jack where he wanted
him to pick him up. Jack gave him phone number in case
something went wrong. Jack went down to pick him up about
40 miles from prison. He’d drive by right on highway,
flash his headlights, drive on by, go on a mile and Jimmy
come out- He did that twice. Then realized something
went wrong. Went back St. Louis. Waited far call and
JER did call hlm-and he picked him up. Went to East St. .
Louis and came right up Chicago. l_me_t J.n .Chicago

it was the next day after the escape. I was ready ^rith
moneys PitlMh* £a$*f{e>

We* met at/vHatel next to Victorian on South ^St. went
in Victorian and couple drinks-down State Street* couple
games pool. I went back Worth Brook. Jack stayed
with him at that Hotel.

Next night I came in and all 3 spent night together.

Went around bar^-hopplng. JER talking about-he had bum feet*
Said gonna rest up. Then make some plans.

JER asked JErry-did I want to make some money.

I knew illegal. I was gonna get divorce. Didn’t want
to leave state said he wasn’t gonna do anything right away*
said gonna look for a Job, get straightened out.

We spent night together-got three separate rooms.

We talked ’legal stuff H , Jobs we might do to make some
money-he’d been thinking a long time-my. time hasn’t been
wasted. He thought best way to make big bundle was kid-
napplng-He had been over every kind to commit- safest '
dope but not as big money as kidnapping. . Not kidnap no name
person with big heat. A banker, a few hundred thousand
dollars. Told Jerry was in good position to finger somebody
at golf course. Told me I wouldn’t have to be involved
JER did most of talking. Jack didn’t talk much.

Ee^din’t like dope, didn’t take it, didn’t sell it.

JER stayed away from that while Jack was present. ^

X hung around Caravelle at Northbrook.

Jack left and went back to St. Louis.^-^ (C
Then me and JER would meet at tavern .(by train depot dt
Northbrook. The only one where I didn’t know anybody.

I knew everybody at Caravelle.

FBI sent notice to Jerry telling him get in touch
of JER

Met several times- JER and Jerry- at Northbrook Tavern
JER wanted know if Jerry had figured out anybody on whom
they could make big score. I told him several people but I

367

Jerry Ray Interview
Tuesday, Hay 30, 1972
Page 3

didn't know anything about, family, only one I know
anything about whose got lot of money, married, old, no kids,

1 gave name and where he lived

JER kept all money we gave him, didn't spend any of
It. He was Just killing time, getting a car, title, driver* s
license, he's not a bit lazy and he wanted to save what he
had his stash. ' - .

JER called Jerry many times-Jerry called JER- week
before he left-last time saw him about 9 days before
left

Said going Canada, might not be back, hadn't decided whether
to work out a hustling angle or get passport and leave
country-Hated to try some strange country without more morfey#

He knows those countries don't have that much money flowlng-
can't hustle. V : *

Called him one time to let me know when he was leaving
said he wasn't posit lve-then they asked him to stay at
rest# another week.

Called him day before left, said he was gonna leave,
didn't know whether come back or not, depending how things - *
go in Canada#

Then he took off, never phoned from Canada* * -

When he came back he* had a lot more money-he had
me come back Chicago hotel next Victorlan-we went out /; L -

for few drinks-we spent night at hotel, said he had
run into some good money# Asked me if I wanted to go
Ala# with him# Told him about my divorce, after hire
two witnesses# Said I wouldn't go. .

Next day he caught bus for Ala. * -

Made mon/ey in dope. Told me he had contact, made
it in prison. In Montreal# Some guy who had been in Jeff
City# Guy would supjdy JEr with dope-JER had contact
Dstroit-ran It back and forth. Dstrolt-Montreal.

Red Plymouth, 1962. I gave It to girl I was married to.

But before he wnet Canada, he went Quincy and seen some
old friends- Crowley-Ted' s Place^They' ve been fliends
for years- Also went East St# Louis and bought Plymouth
there# . -

Ted has connections all over. He used to run
whore houses in Quincy, Xou can dways get a gun off Ted.

JER has got guns off Ted in past, many times. Ted doesn't
fool with dope. JER wanted to check on some guy who could
be trusted-to get contacts before he went Canada.

1 don't know how much he had when came back Canada-but -
said plenty more to be made.

Whore house robbery Is bullshit. What he did was
run dope. He had decided kidnapping too risky. v

Said he was gonna get late model car in Ala# wanted
get car there, plates there, license-

He had HLK on his mind. Crime is state Crlme-Wallace
was governor-

Killlng KLK Just didn't pop in his head. But he didn't
talk all that much to me- Not about anything.

368

Jerry Ray Interview

Tuesday, May 30, 1972 7

Pas® ^ •

He knew there wasn # t any money In It, He told me
I'd make money on dope stuff* Ee figured he was gonna
be in Ala* long tlme-that thlnss would work out (note 1
be_£ard pncd ) I was figuring to go with him.

~ILLs plan was to make stash for defense, etc*
then eventually get pardoned and remain resident of Ala*
permanently*

He had contacts down there-Underworld-

He had between ? and 10 thousand when he went Ala*
and he had that much when he left even after buying
Mustang, etc#

He called MLK BIG NIGGER-Talked about going to get
BIG NIGGER*

In Bird, not Just stalking MLK. making money, also
campaigning Wallace

His 2 main things MLK-keeplng his eye on BIG NIGGER
and working Wallace

• He had contact In New Orleans

I even flew down there my self- went for 2 reasons
to meet this one guy- JER gave me phone number# X .met
Courtney In park-JER told me to contact Courtney#

Courtney, it was right after JER had plead guilty, wanted *
Courtney to recommend lawyer, a good conservative# Courtney
had photographer* Jerry wouldn't go pis* Said no lawyer
touch case until Stoner withdraws#

The other name-just a phone number-call guy tell
him (Eddle2 everything okay from James. That * 3 all
there was to that* This was after JER plead guilty*

The $500 Jerry wanted from Foreman was for New
Orleans*

Eddie was his dope contact in New Orleans* He
wanted Eddie to know. he hadn't talked, wasn't going
to talk*

This was about 5 days after plead guilty*

JER didn't say anything about MLK when he got Chicago*

So happy to be out.

JEE had woman sent up to his room. Want head Job,
hardly ever screws 'em.

JER didn't talk one line all the time* Mentioned
MLK only 4 or 5 times. What really used to tear him
up was seeing him on TV-l-iLK like Wallace on other side-
get Blacks rlled-JER said he should have been killed
long ago. This when JER in Chicago.

But he would never talk that way In bars* He never
ran off at head. Not even when crinklng. In Calif- bar
It was girl who did talking. ^

First time Jerr y got feeling JER w as aerloua Ahonh ^
klllln^MLK wai^after _ “he left Blrm (Oct 7, 19o7) -He
went directly New Orleans - and then up to Chicago where
Jerry saw him at Northbrook station tavern. They talked
3 hours. JER looked good, good complexion, dressed wall, had
all his color back, he colors good, tie on, sun glasses,
dark-complected.

369

Jerry Ray Interview
Tuesday, May 3°» 1972

Page 5 / S .

His coming surprised me. He said BIG NIGGER not
gonna be around many more months. He was serious in
way he had never been before. More sure of himself-
business-like. Self- as sure d-knew what he was gonna do-
sure of what he had In his mind-not in no Joking mood-
about

That night he was talking about how gonna make mon^y
Calf. ...

I wouldn't go with him. I only do stuff for money.

I don't oare that much about Wallace. Didn't want to get
mixed up with him. Trouble was money wasn't his sole interest.
Money not his interest. Ail that dope taking them chances ...
for another reason-reason was King.

At first I was serious about not going because divorce*

But 'later, I might have done it, if looked easy. .1
didn't ’see light. I just didn't like doing time. By time
I got divorce I knew what was on his mind and I wouldn't go*

He never did pressure me. He knew I didn't want to go.

He talked that night about Wallace-How everybody ought
to work for him.

He had 2 reasons go Calif-l* to carry dope, .2. to
work for Wallace. "* r

He made at least 2 trips if not 3 between New Orleans .
and Calf .-He was hauling dope and his supplier was in New
Orleans-Eddle

When 1st got out didn't say anything about Canada.

Jerry went Birm. flew down there- JER told could
make §300 a week-spent nite motel near airport.

He had contact in Birm. who supplied him-he said could
make §300 a week.

But there wa3 more on his mind than meking money.

He was popping pills but he was always same, talked same

way.

300 was good to me and I would have gone Birm. with him
except I knew he had something else on his mind.

He thought HLK situation getting worse all the time-
too many rights for Blacks, getting them jobs -what bugged
JER Pore than anythin/? was hearing him talk ana seeing^ nfeu ‘

That Big Nigger has to go-more end more on his VindT

itegaa to menolbn 1 'iLK more than Wallace- I knew some-=»
thing changing.

He called me all time-called me from Texas. Feeling
good-not drunk-how's things-would ask me if I had changed
my mind about coming with me.

He called me one time from Mexico- before he got
where he wa3 going, he was supposed contact me from.

Acapulco v -

No money in speed, bennies-they don't do that much for
you-it was herion-that * s where money is.

He had planned to kill MLK in Atl. by Blowing up house-
some other guy with him-he didn't trust guy. That's why -
house was circled.

JER was waiting for his (JER's) time to come

370

■fr*

Jerry Ray Interview

Tuesday* Ray 30* 1972 Q

Page 6 , ”

Never thought about doing anything King In Calif *-
gonna do it in South-so get “trial right H -he'd rather
for it to happen in Ala. Don't know why didn't wait*

Talked 2 hrs Memphis after JER plead guilty.

He said plead guilt y-fre was gonna fire Foreman
in Court -but was afraid would have made him take public
defender

Was supposed take place ALa. little bit before that
(Selma) something went wrong had to postpone

Ala was supposed to be state where everything happened
buying gun* and to have been killed in Selma.

"No Jury would ever convict one in Ala for shooting
the Big Nigger" - .

. . _ What could have gone wrong in Selma? MLK changed
some Qians there?- Chec k out MEK’s movements In Selma *^

He brought up house circling at Petros^ Was HLK^
in ATL at sane time JER was there-right before Memphis
As time passed he was getting more det ermlned-you
could see that -that's why he went ahead In Memphis

Finally it became all King-no more ball games, nothing
Called. Jerry core thanJack-feel closer to me-Him
and Jack both hot-tempered-He might write Jack sarcastic letter
Jack would never write him again* He knows I'm not gonna
get mad at him no matter what he says Jer knew better than
talk to Jack about it* Jack would try to talk him about it
iJack gets his steam off by talking about it-Jimmy keeps it
inside-JER did not tell Jack-Jack's a racist* Jack
would help if you're in trouble-but would have tried to
argue JER about it* Jack wouldn't object to job-but not getting
anything out of it* Jack sore because he (jack) had put
himself in position to get back in prison by going down there
and getting Jimmy out* Jack's as strong against dope as
Ted Crowley* Wouldn't allow it in tavern* JER never was in
Grapevine. Jack never saw JER after 3 brothers in Chicago.*

Jack a/nd Jimmy don't get along fcogether-They never got
In fight* It would have been bull of a fight if they'd
ever gone up against each other-

jack did hard time-laid in deadlock-lay in cell
all day-get out once a week-to exercise* take a bath* •• :

In that cell 14 months* wouldn't take no orders. _ V

Mabel Ray Quincy Earl’s dtr Cannon's night club .
on 4th between Main and Jersey, She was pet of Frank Fuller-
got everything from him*

get m ug shot Earl and others from jdt ! son authorities
After Eric Galt announced Jerry went dovrn see Jack
on his day off* They talked in Grapevine how to help
JER, what they could do- they knew who it was* But there Was
nothing they could do-didn't know where to get in touch
with hlm-Jerry wasn't sure going Mexico or Canada* Told
FBI Mexico to throw them off. I told Jack I hope I never
hear from him again-knowing then he'd escaped-he knew
better /than get in touch with us-

371

Jerry Hay Interview
Tuesday r May 30, 1972
Page 7

we didn't know how much money he had, weren't sure how much
he had spent

I wasn't even sure when I went St* Loui3 Jack knew
Jack sore as heU-a fellow In that long-tried so hard
to get out- then go and do this-bound to catch him-too
much heat-been OK If he had killed ordinary white man
When JER returned Canada to Chicago he told Jerry-
Now I'm- gonna be Eric Starvo Galt

■ L hm 4 ^ me

LETTERS

From James EsdrX'i^ay- -t o -J erry- Ray

rfZjas

tSv/V"

M emphis- 20 letters- 8/1 2/68- Z/17/&?

8/12/68-Why he want Jerry go Bin s?
"9/9/6 3 What kind of^iobZ
^9/19/tb asked Jerr^ talk Percy F* ■>..
Stand

9/25/68 doesn't t hing "t hat guy in Ga
Jack*" s — -—al go' ^he Tiaathat racial thing against him

opinion about JER taking

that much of a lawye r"

Letter

bad right tnere^

That loo k

No remorse of any kind- instructions to Jerry-running the
ca se^ ^KoTlie^n't a bit sorry for that* " . . .

"Signs "Jimm y* ■ ■■ ’ - . .-■•••

10/24-asks Jerry to find names of book authors admite d to
tria l "I suppose peonle _JLhat were red<^endgd^y'"^stlaa. Dept*.
No ^fear^ nor jCrlghL* - . . . , ■ -

Has Jerry told JER he Is talking to me, this timaj
He. says no* -

* Nashville - 2k letters 3AV69-3A3/70 .

3/20/ 69— What Almanac? watch? _ . . * •'

* 4/7/69 H If they ca n outsmart me. as smart a3 they sav I aa>
then you don* t~ have a chance** 7 - : .

Who I s the real estate tycoon? Jack* Grapevine?

"I learned when I was about 6 yrs old that envelope s V
can be~~steaaed open" ~

Who I s the Budwelser King? Jerry
Who is She ppard woman? Sb* Louis TV,

Size 9 shoe

372

Jerry Ray Interview
Tuesday, May 30, 1972
Page 8

Jerry may have s

E ls concern for Jerry-* about a Job*

McMillan i “That character must be nuts*

McMillan i “Se nt me a c-ra gy He*s b een talking

t o -

H e cal l s old man

McMillan “is the worst of the lot*

tayed with Stoner to work on e scapes

373

daa from Betel Mot el- to help quarters Jerry worked '

11 pm to 7 am* First time he had called couple of weeks*;

Didn't surprise me too much . *;_*>;•

"Tomorrow it wlH&l be over* he told Jerry v V

Ee was excited, wouldn't let me talk* ^

SThe Bis Nigger has one more day. " he. said - . -

Talked about Z\ minutes. He paid call*

. Said he might not see me a while- Bruiser, Jack
"Don't worry about me."

I was expecting something to happen jfext day*

Usually he talk, I talk. If I tried to tell him „

anything, he'd not let me. I tried tell him about trying
to switch to bartending-Eut he wasn't wanting no small talk
He'd repeal himself

. "The Big Nigger has had it." - * : '

I knew he didn’t bullshit around. .But didn’t have
full effect till next •

Call was between 9 and 11 in morning. Wasn't from bar.

No noise in background. . ...

Harvey Lowmyer was friend from Quincy- ex- convict Menard
Monday Atlanta- checked Rebel Wednesday 7i20 p.m.

.Thus call was Wednesday morning April £3-

He sounded as If he had Just worked it out, excited^
all happy about it

It wasn't on road, no sound of cars, no tavern, 'no
sound of voices- Just his voice end my voice
He had fired rifle at Corinth.

374

Jerry Ray Interview •

Wednesday, ■ May 31, 1972

Page 2 * 13

Two’ weeks before he said things going according to
plan* That was last call before the last one* It was
probably from Alabama, Selma area

Lot of people talk that stuff I knew what was on hi a
mind* He was past making money to get by on and do the
other thing. But he didn't give me any details

I first knew he had a definite idea when he got
Blm* and when I weftt down there. That's why I wouldn’t
go down there.

he'd say- "somebody got to stop him-, the sooner, the
better" I knew him-knew he was thinking that he was the
one who was gonna stop him

• only time I ever left Chicago in period between Jeff
City and gemphis was the time I went Birm*

They J&R a loner but he likes to have people around-
Wanted me in 3 ira* Had Bife at Leavenworth* Has one at
Brushy Mountain* Bums, Brake arfi one of the Menards
at Jeff . City

Jack never saw him between Chicago and Memphis* May -
have talked phone but not often.

_Hbw did t h ey have money at Jeff City? Well, when -
outlawed money, cons Just didn't turn it in, declare it*
“There was a helluva lot of money in there”

Money comes in thru guards, they bring it ln-Guards
don't giake a damned thing, have to make money on side*

Be began send money out 19 63 , for about 4 yrs. §500
a year* Sent little under $4,000 to Jack in 4 yrs.

Mate t ime not 7 years _but 4 years* ;> .

T^tHinkTl handedQ §100 bills-I had. sent $200 to Lawyer*

First meeting Chicago / ; .

He talked about Canada, Bhodesia-which best route to
leave country. Said Canada easiesk passport, learned prison*
He 'never talked Mexico at ell. He said "you two should
have passport" I said "can't get one-my name's too fouled
up" He explained to us exactly how get passport.

Midnight -Insider News-two pubs where put ada about
pix-got some replies and one reason went Kex was to get
whore pose cheap-wanted typewriter to correspond with
people who answered ads. Couldn't answer longhand. If
you can get it down pat, get good names, guys who really
pay for stuff* You have to run ads in every tabloids,
with pir, they cost. Then you have to pay girls* *

They talked this over in Chicago

Customers have diffenent things they like-some- ^
body beating on somebody

To do business you've got to have everything
every kind of thing going on- Black and White-head Jobs
Whipping, everything, queers, lesbians-

When people write in for picture you send him something
legal, girl, then,- ask him if he wants more-

/Mude\

375

Jerry Ray Interview
Wednesday, May 31» 1972
Page 3

Keep teasing him, give him something better* on up to movies
To be careful (we discussed this a long time in
Chicago that night) make guys send cash and when send stuff
wipe fingerprints, no return address*

Buzz used to cut guys, keep money when he gets deep
enough in*

JER said he was gonna study-would go in it all the way
But" he didn't" stay any place long enough to work . : ; ' ~

the business. He took box in LA • . V -

He had skill-he could make the movies*

That night Chi it boiled down to two thlngs-dope
end porno plx-It was porno that took Mexico

He might harc sent some pix out when he had Box in
LA* - but no big money

All those moe/ths he was free he was torn between different
ldeas-porno pix, dope, killing MLH, Wallace-

He had as much pro-Wallace on his mind as he did anti-

King* . ■ V v;

When we met Chicago I hadn't seen him since 1949 _

or 1950# since I was 13 * Xou're so happy to see somebody*. ~
Also first time Jack had been around him since 1948 or 1949
Why help hjm- "Hell, he # d help us*

lie probao!y _ made $7000 out of dope* He spent about $12,000
He was broke la London .

Way it happened was ”lt kept on his mind, kept bn his
mind, kept on his mind, getting stronger and stronger** , '

When he left LA "he was on King” **'«; ‘

Jerry always asked if OK on money .and he never asked -/
for a nickel. . 1“

Bart endlng-he' talked about that In Chicago that ,
night* - John told him he was gonna open grapevine. JER said
always get Job as bartender, any country, place to make contacts,
prostitution, dope. * *. ■

(remember Sneedy's advice-show business, easy work ,

. sta yjtS XeanT •

'“Dancing school- If you want to go out with girls. It
was to meet right girls-like he did in Canada*

(He dl dalt just have one thing on his mind)

He had"ltinEiindrto get rl ch wo man-y ou * ve got know
right talk. Try to con them

That night Chicago went over everything from snatching,
purses to rolling drunks- .

Locksmithlng-thls don't sound sensible but main reason-
he's paranoid about one thing-about licking himself out of
car-he must have done It once-come in handy other things*

Mention that many times-Llke on a robbery where you have to
get in car quickly v -

Kose changing. GXasses-dlsgulse- M He knew what he was
doing then.

The thing was supposed to have happen before t hat -means
1st time in 31rm. not Selma-too many people around, didn't
Tiave~ right - opening- NOTE- check MLK's visits to Ala during time
JER Birmingham —

376

Jerry Hay Interview
Wednesday* Hay 31* 1972
Page 4

That's table stuff-a girl

The Jig Is up-when 1st man on moon*

DOPE RACKET-Met 3 times In 2 months in Northbrook* Tavern
Went to Quincy, E. St. Louis before going Canada
(Hule p» 391 and that was to contact Ted- to get info and
contacts

When went Canada it wasn't to leave country then-
went to work dope racket H I*m positive of that*”

Did not try to get seaman's Job

Did not hold up who re house- JER now laughs about it
Did not hold up food store Montreal
Spent $300 on new clothes, trying get rich girl at
Grey Hocks. Not ID. It was the money he wanted*

In Canada h ad suit (48 ) sent Blrm-thus must have
kno wn from _then-obvlousl v fro mltlme he esc aped- thathe
was going kill KLX and intended do It AIa*-Blrm»

• DOPS-his first time in H. 0. was first I knew he was
working dope-He ran stuff from N. 0. to Callf-at least'
twice* maybe 3 times ' * •••'•• : - -

He was in 3irm for other (than dope) reasons-to *
watch HLK's movements, to buy car and make his plans* Get
ID

He didn't contact anybody Blrm. Wouldn't have trusted*
People can be die-hard segs and still turn you Into the
police when you talk about killing MLK

Dope! and: dirty pix-these only secondary- Just ways •
to get money-to keep alive until right moment came to kill
MLK - ■ ■■■’; * ‘ - • * * :

He didn't know he was gonna do Memphis thing until
couple days before-lt Just clicked off perfectly for him
These things, (assassinations) not easy if you really
mean n ot t o get caught-Thls is the big difference between
JEH~andTother ass ass in s re a l lv^tho u^ht he was golng~ fro_

get^a^ayT He hadTIcavefullv planned esca pe aa had.
other ass a ssin. . • • . . ■ . . . • •

. CIPHE33 INN is Northbrook Tavera-that was meeting place
That's why he 'didn't do Birm. He could have shot
MLS if he hadn't cared being caught like Bremer, Sirhan,
Oswald. . * V ^

He didn't go Mexico escape route-He had that figured V
out exact ly-knew the route-that Canada would be it- . v

Went Mexico for fun but mainly to make money on
dirty pix.

Everything second to King-even Wallace-he'd see
something in paper about HLK, he'd take off- v

NOTE-This is more honest version than I was getting this
morning^

Be left Mexico when he had taken his dirty pix
Went LA because he had dope run from N* 0* to Calif.

377

Jerry Ray Interview
Wednesday, Hoy 31* 1972
Page 5

He wasn’t following MLK, not
In fact and JER did nothing,
where he killed KLK#

While In LA he went on with his preparatlons-nose*
bar lessons, dance lessons

Put French culture ad in hippie paper to find girl
who would pose for dirty plx, Not for himself*

DO PS- Ml gilt have made as much as $5,000 dope-running
across border T . . V

$1,000 a trip

Probably had $6,000 when went Bira.

Next dope was trip to New Orleans and made run to C aLlr .
before went Mexico

Probably made $2500. Not too much chance getting caught
but a bad rap. He would get maximum. . ^ . -

Went from LA to Mexico *'•--*

JER had had experience dope with Elf e
He went Mexico In Interlude when no dope run to be
made "Went to Mexico when he had time to kill.**

Worked When had stash-but usually doing something
else-preparatlons for Big Nigger

Staying In Germany —wh e n came home on fu rl o ugh— He helled
Hitler. Then, even before he went to Germany# He said
he’d like to live over there-ln a white country.

- • - L ater told me Stro heim asked him to stay.

Speedy beat children? Never with fist. Slap me across
face. Lucille would do any whipping had to be done with switch
off tree andshe seldom did It.

* He wasn’t a dirty kid-never see his face dirty-
kept clean what he could keep clean.

Speedy would be same If he had 1 or 20 children—

Just didn't pay no attention to ’em-show nothing one way
or the other. Lucille show affection for all kids

Escaped attempts 19 6 l and 19 66

I96l-He got kite out to John, long letter, to pick him
up certain tlme-John working Arlington Hts. So John took off,
went down. But JER caught.

1966-got caught out again to John. . Then at Grapevine*.
John went to pick him up. Meanwhile we had been visiting,
him#

F*d planned one for 1965 which didn’t work out.

Another guy with him. some way to go over wall. If things
go right I’ll get kite out But he kited that if fell thru.

When I’d go down there main thing he’d talk .about v
wa 3 escape, drivers* license, where to pick him up, clothes
shoes

•frrAflrt h-rnek 13 the corraet story.

'Eetalked about Wallace some when I went down there.

- 16

stalking there-HLK wa3 out there
It Had to be a southern State

378

Jerry Ray Interview

Wednesday, May 31* 1972 17

Page 6

Wrote to me Sportman's how "big he was for Goldwater-
only 3 of us there for him-telllng me to vote for him, every—
body in family should vote- but Jerry didn't even, vote

Goldwater sparked hlm-flr3t time he showed any strong *
Indication for any candidate.

GOING STRAIGHT 19 5 0-19 52- Why did he give up? Jerry J Ln
St^Ch^lej^ SXthat Eime- Kg_ didn't gothat straight 'T'7
ar^wayT^ge~T ro^STy d id othe r^robberles.~^^ve r same
afteF^ r g g^Ne ver did tha t, t allT anymore ahout_iiot_ robblng

MEXICO-rlght after Leavenworth-made §4000 score and
went down-even came see John a/nd I Kenard-t allied to us
about Mexico

• He never thought Wallace be presldent-We started vote
for Nison to keep Humphrey out.

Began to write out of Jeff City about headaches*

Had them practically every day* Wanted outside doctor. I*
.figured they came from that dope stuff-taking bennies
not hard stuff

After Leavenworth fooled around Willie a few months,
painting signs roads. He stayed Willie, .Kotels-ma&e pretty
good money. .

Headaches etc. Jeff City-in last year he in Jeff City
he wrote more and more about headaches

379

SUBJECT: Telephone call from Jerry Ray

This ia one of several C9II9 I*ve bad from Jerry
about Eugene Straub(Gilbert LeRoy Cameron).

He's still trying to get additional §250 out of ns —
v - a ich I have refused to pay hia unless he gives me way
to prove out Gilbert Cameron is Eugene Straub.

Jerry insisted that guy in North Carolina ie the
fettsx same Cameron who was in Jeff City. He does seem
to know the gguy who was ia Jeff City.

What be told me NEW 2 today was that he cou Id
give me ltters from Cameron to himself, Jerry. These
he said, I believe he said, v re signed Straub.

He said he would give tfcax me the guard* s name who
had cazrried money out of Jeff City and drugs in. for
Jimmy.

He said he would show me two cancelled checks
Slxsnxx paid to Straub — one for §3,000 and one for
§2?&x §2,500. . This raises questions, if it ia true.

I have checks already for §3,300 ia listed in Carol Ray’s
cash register for her aacount at the Mercantile Trust
Co. That would come to a total of §8,800. I believe
Jerry said these two new* large checks were written in March
1967 and April 1967.

Is it possible monies above were involved in Carol's
purchase of own home in St. Louis? Check dates.

Jery said also that he had three plx of Cameron, one
of which had straub written on theback. One of these pix
was taken at Jeff City, one in Milwaukee, one at some
spot that Jerry can't identify. *

He also this time offered pix of whole family together,
taken in 1°45 approximately when J^mmy was on furSLOUgh from
the Army, mprobatly Just before he went overseas.

Jerry said he had a letter from Cameron written to him
Jerry from pison in Asheville Just nine monthsx ago.

380

381

Also he told me that JKR had some thing
on his mind each time he tried. to escape from
Jeff C ty — and thaWthe time he succeeded
was his third try. . ihad thought there were

only two- attempts. . ■:

■ • .

He said would, tell! me why the map had - v .
those particular-rc lr cl e a on It, the map of

*r~- r : ; • »: - " • "• T ^ r 1 . ~ • ^ v- ' -> - •

39-935 0 - 79 - 25

382

383

? w&if&Y y

S^. IJe i/VM Ji£i/\wwy to k/tfyz ^9 r — t7~ i t/£Ld c 1 ^ .

✓w, )_i/\Wif cti ._ e/iYt/ij /r.j _ V/J&li t7n& J r . /

-j ^/? tn0l_wirue^ _ *?

$*d„AU JV£^- -MWtlMf .?- " •-' r.:'— ‘-^,

- - " yvirfut w * • ^

^/r* w 8 ir to : A, f

c^w y~A?c. z.v. ; -.j- »

^ f r Le ft Wit iftl gfl|

_$.t t _. whu /> / fa &JV'C&

/ 7^7 ‘

„>> PLnTJ -T /Zgr * » ir*UAJYtU/\ If M /TjT

& ar! a 'jZmto l**JtAf2... J?~ 1 j./ / /X.

^ 7 . / ^o 7 ^g fa\el H t .A- ■ * 9 ■■"Htj.

~^MML

/.wit. &tms oL lA

385

389

Chairman Stokes. Has counsel been provided with a copy?

Mr. Speiser. Do you have a copy of that, Mr. Pepper?

Mr. Pepper. We are going to object to the admission of author
McMillan’s notes until we have had an opportunity to look at them
and see specifically which notes the counsel is referring to.

We are doing that particularly because of the enormous discrep-
ancies and considerable question that has been raised about author
McMillan’s objectivity and the facts in his work.

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Pepper, if I may respond to that, I do not choose
at this time to question Mr. Ray about all of the notes of Mr.
McMillan. I am going to direct his attention to certain pages and I
am here not to test the credibility of Mr. McMillan. I am here to
question Mr. Ray, your client, as to whether or not he did or did
not tell Mr. McMillan what is reflected in Mr. McMillan’s notes. If
he feels he did not say that to Mr. McMillan, all he has to say to
me is no.

Mr. Pepper. We are going to object to the inclusion of any of
author McMillan’s notes out of context. If the author’s notes are to
be admitted into the record of the proceedings of this committee,
we will request that the entire vestige of his work be admitted;
that nothing be taken out of context, and we will request to see all
of those notes ourselves.

Now, to do otherwise, to take an author or investigator’s partial
research and to put it in is highly prejudicial, particularly in line
of the total scope of Mr. McMillan’s work.

Chairman Stokes. Does counsel for the committee want to be
heard?

Mr. Speiser. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Again, as I just stated to Mr.
Pepper, I am not going to question Mr. Ray about the entire notes
that are contained in Mr. McMillan’s manuscript. I am only going
to question him about certain portions.

Now, it is Mr. Pepper’s position that these portions may be taken
out of context. Assuming Mr. Pepper is arguing accurately, I am
not interested in whether Mr. McMillan is accurate or inaccurate. I
am interested in hearing Mr. Ray’s position here as to whether or
not he did or did not tell author George McMillan what I am going
to question him about.

If he did not tell him that, all I want to hear is a no. If he did
tell him that, in jest, I would like him to explain that. That is the
sole purpose of questioning him about the notes. Not for substance
but for credibility.

Ms. Kennedy. One of the disadvantages, Mr. Chairman

Chairman Stokes. The Chair is going to suggest to counsel that
you put all of the notes into the record as requested by Mr. Pepper,
if you are going to examine the witness from any of it, and that
those portions of the record which you are going to examine the
witness from be furnished to counsel at this time.

Mr. Pepper. Mr. Chairman, we appreciate that, and we would
appreciate it further if counsel would advise us as to how the
authenticity and the time frame in which these notes were written
has also been verified for counsel and the committee’s satisfaction.

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Chairman, F-599, which I choose to have en-
tered into evidence, contains all the notes of author George McMil-

390

lan. I was about to direct Mr. Ray’s attention to one page concern-
ing the question I propounded to him.

These notes have been furnishd to us by Mr. McMillan, and Mr.
McMillan represented to us that these notes represent all the notes
he took in his interviews with your client, Jerry Ray.

I would like to question Mr. Ray about one page in those notes at
this time if you will permit me.

Mr. Pepper. Counsel, I will certainly permit you to do that, but if
you will just bear with me, I am sure you appreciate the concern
that we have with respect to the authenticity in verifying the
authenticity of those notes with respect to the time in which they
were written and we would like to know if Mr. McMillen under
oath has dated for you effectively and verified for you the time in
which he took these notes.

Chairman Stokes. All right. Perhaps it can be stated by counsel
questioning the witness with reference to whether he did have such
conversations with him within that frame of time.

Ms. Kennedy. Sir, on this same point, I am really not trying to
be contentious, but it is extremely important to note that where
you have a committee hearing which relies so heavily on hearsay,
people who no one has an oppportunity to cross-examine, there
must be some effort on the part of this committee to establish the
authenticity, the bias, the political conflict of interest that might
obtain between a writer, a journalist, a witness in these circum-
stances.

We have no opportunity to confront this witness; we have no
opportunity — and this is a part of the nature of this survey and
this inquiry, and it is just that a witness without all the facilities of
government is confronted with all kinds of prejudicial hearsay and
with no opportunity to cross-examine or check the authenticity or
any political conflict of interest or any other attempt to cover what
we believe perhaps is a situation which will be prejudicial to the
Government.

We just feel that this is typical of the kind of disadvantage that
this and other witnesses before this or any congressional subcom-
mittee has.

Chairman Stokes. Ms. Kennedy, I think you have stated your
objection adequately.

Will counsel make a further statement for the record?

Mr. Speiser. Ms. Kennedy and Mr. Pepper, Mr. McMillan has
represented to us that these notes were taken contemporaneously
with his interviews with Jerry Ray. Now again, we are here just to
find out whether in Mr. Jerry Ray’s opinion these notes are accu-
rate or inaccurate.

I am not here at this point trying to test the credibility of Mr.
McMillan. Indirectly that may be the result, but directly what I am
trying to do is question your client.

Now, you have a copy of those notes and now I would like you to
turn to page 25.

Now, on page 25, beginning in the second full paragraph, accord-
ing to Mr. McMillan, on the May 30, 1972 interview with your
client, your client indicated that Jack — and Jack presumably refers
to John — is your brother John also known by the name Jack?

Mr. Ray. Yes.

391

Mr. Speiser [reading]:

Jack saw James Earl Ray day before he escaped. Jimmy asked him to come— you
know, something up— Jack called Jerry that night told him to expect to see Jimmy
couple days. Prison not bugged. He told Jack where he wanted him to pick him up.
Jack gave him phone number in case something went wrong. Jack went down to
pick him up about 40 miles from prison. He'd drive by right on highway, flash his
headlights, drive on by, go on a mile and Jimmy come out. He did that twice. Then
realized something went wrong. Went back to St. Louis. Waited for call and James
Earl Ray did call him — and he picked him up. Went to east St. Louis and came
right up Chicago. Then all three met in Chicago. It was the next day after the
escape. I was ready with money.

Now, is that information accurate or inaccurate in your opinion?

Mr. Ray. There is no way possible I can remember everything
George McMillan said because he hounded me since 1968 and to us
he was just a joke. He was a joke writer. So I can’t tell what he’s
got down here. I don’t remember.

Mr. Speiser. Well, Mr. Ray,

Mr. Ray. I am going to have to invoke the fifth amendment on
all this stuff because I can’t remember all this stuff and this has
been going on since 1968 with McMillan.

Mr. Speiser. Is your answer that you cannot remember or are
you saying that you are asserting your fifth amendment privilege?

Mr. Ray. I am going to take the fifth amendment privilege.

Mr. Speiser. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to note for
the record that committee counsel secured on November 8, 1978, an
order from the U.S. district court Judge Charles Bryant. Judge
Bryant ordered as follows:

That Gerald (Jerry) William Ray, in accordance with the provisions of Title 18,
U.S. Code, Sections 6002 and 6005, shall not be excused from testifying or providing
other information before the Subcommittee on Assassinations of Dr. Martin Luther
King or of the Select Committee on the Assassinations or the full Select Committee
on the grounds that the testimony or other information sought may tend to incrimi-
nate him.

It is therefore ordered further that Gerald (Jerry) William Ray appear when
subpoenaed by said subcommittee or committee and testify and provide such other
information that is sought with respect to matters under inquiry by said subcommit-
tee or committee.

And it is further ordered that no testimony or other information compelled under
this order or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or
other information may be used against Gerald (Jerry) William Ray in any criminal
case except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement or otherwise failing
to comply with this order.

Now, Mr. Ray, I understand you have just asserted your fifth
amendment privilege.

I would like to have the chairman at this time — first of all, I
would like to have this immunity order entered into the record as
MLK exhibit F-589.

Chairman Stokes. Let’s also furnish the witness and his counsel
a copy of it.

[The information follows:]

392

MLK Exhibit F-589

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

In the Matter of the Application of )

)

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES )

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS )

)

; - )

OKDJjK m v?c p r* *‘-£y C

CONFERRING IMMUNITY UPON AND * """ '

COMPELLING TESTIMONY FROM GERALD (JERRY) WILLIAM RAY

The United States House of Representatives Select Committee
on Assassinations having made written application, pursuant to Title 18,
United States Code, Sections 6002 and 6005, for an order conferring
immunity upon Gerald (Jerry) William Ray and compelling him

to testify and provide other information before the Subcommittee on
the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. of the Select

Committee on Assassinations or the full Select Committee, and the
court finding that all procedures specified by 8 6005 have been duly
followed, it is hereby, this ^ X). day of 1978,

ORDERED, that Gerald (Jerry) William Ray in accordance

* District

; • ** * v '*Srfcfc of Col 5 :!*'..

\ copt

Misc. No. 78 — d 3 &

F i L U. D
HOI s 1273

393

ORDERED FURTHER , that Gerald (Jerry) William Ray appear

when subpoenaed by said Subcommittee or Committee and testify and
provide such other information that is sought with respect to matters
under inquiry by said Subcommittee or Committee.

AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no testimony or other information
compelled under this order (or any information directly or indirectly
derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against
Gerald -(Jerry) William Ray^ in any criminal case, except a

prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement or otherwise failing
to comply with this ORDER.

Baited States District JpOge

Dated! NOV 6 - »78

Chairman Stokes. I would also request the clerk to do that,
please.

Mr. Pepper. Mr. Chairman, as a matter of clarification with
respect to our client asserting his fifth amendment privilege, let us
just state that is being done with respect to the specific material
and questions being advanced by the committee’s counsel due to
the extraordinary period of time that has elapsed and the rather
understandable difficulty that our client has in remembering very
specific kinds of details.

Our client is also very wary of the possibility of informants
coming in before this committee and attesting to things which are
untrue which might set him up for perjury charges and is highly
suspicious of the activity of author George McMillan in the entire
affair.

Chairman Stokes. Is it the intention of your client, counsel, to
assert his fifth amendment privileges on each and every succeeding
question or is it as to this specific question?

Mr. Pepper. Our client is going to cooperate with this committee
to the fullest extent it is possible for him to do so with respect to
what is available to his memory. He is going to answer as candidly
and openly as he can.

The difficulty is with respect to specific details of matters alleged
to have taken place 6V2 to 10 or 11 years ago. He has to be
protected with respect to that.

He is not going to assert the fifth amendment with respect to
every single inquiry of this sort. If he doesn’t remember, he is
going to say: “I don’t remember.”

If he does remember, he is going to set forth his position.

394

He has the desire to be candid and open with this committee. He
is very wary of being set up in terms of perjury and we have to put
that on the record.

Chairman Stokes. Counsel may proceed.

Mr. Speiser. At this time I would request the Chair to confirm
the fact that the order of immunity has now been bestowed upon
Mr. Ray.

Chc.irman Stokes. Mr. Ray, have you received a copy of the
immunity order?

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Ray, before I have you respond to the pending
question, I would like to advise you that despite the fact you have
been granted immunity that you must be cautious and leery, that
immunity does not protect you from possible prosecution for per-
jury under title 18, United States Code, section 1621, or for obstruc-
tion of justice, which is title 18, United States Code, section 1505,
or for contempt, civil or criminal. Do you understand that?

Mr. Ray. Yes.

Ms. Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, will we have an opportunity to
confront McMillan who, without going into great detail, is very
well known and very well connected with cover stories written by
his wife and him on the Kennedy

Chairman Stokes. Ms. Kennedy, there is no basis for this com-
mittee to afford a confrontation. The witness was merely being
asked a question as to whether the statement was true or not,
which was read to him, and he has now asserted his privilege. We
are now in the process of conferring immunity upon the witness if
he refuses to answer. That is all that is before the Chair at this
time.

Ms. Kennedy. Sir, is there a record in executive session of any
establishment of the political commitment of McMillan? Has there
been any examination in executive session

Chairman Stokes. Ms. Kennedy, you are entirely out of order.

Ms. Kennedy. Well, Your Honor, I feel this witness has a right
to place the question on the record and obviously it is within your
discretion to deny it.

Chairman Stokes. At this time, Ms. Kennedy, we are going to
ask you to please refrain from these type of statements.

Ms. Kennedy. Sir, I would ask you to exert some kind of control
over counsel in his bringing before this committee and before the
public this kind of far-reaching hearsay.

Chairman Stokes. Ms. Kennedy, you are out of order.

Would you proceed?

Mr. Speiser. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ray, let me repeat the question to you. Did you state the
information that I just read into the record on page 25 of Mr.
McMillan’s notes? Did you state that information precisely or sub-
stantially to Mr. McMillan?

Mr. Ray. I don’t have no idea what all I told McMillan. I seen
him since 1968 and — what day was that?

Nineteen hundred and seventy-two; I don’t even think he was—
in May 1972 he wasn’t even writing about the crime back then, I
don’t think. He didn’t even want to discuss anything about the
crime. He said his book was ending when James escaped from
prison. So I don’t remember saying anything like that.

395

Mr. Speiser. So your answer is no, you did not state that to— —

Mr. Ray. I am saying I don’t remember saying anything like
that.

Mr. Speiser. You have no recollection of saying that to Mr.
McMillan?

Mr. Ray. No, I don’t remember saying anything like that.

Mr. Speiser. Is it your statement also that you did not know who
assisted James Earl Ray in escaping from Jefferson City?

Mr. Ray. I don’t.

Ms. Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, that question has already been
asked and that question has already been answered.

Chairman Stokes. Proceed, counsel.

Mr. Speiser. Did you also tell Mr. McMillan that on the two
prior attempts of James to escape from Missouri State Prison that
John attempted to pick him up and had planned and intended on
picking up James, had he escaped?

Ms. Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, I object to the form of the question
and the use of the word “also.”

The witness has denied any recollection of this. The use of the
word “also” implies that there has been an admission which has
not been made by this witness and I ask that the question be
rephrased.

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Chairman, I don’t agree with Ms. Kennedy, but
I will be more than happy to rephrase the question.

Chairman Stokes. Please do.

Ms. Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Speiser.

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Ray, did you tell Mr. McMillan that your broth-
er John assisted James in his escape plans in 1961 and 1966 from
the Missouri State Prison?

Mr. Ray. I don’t ever remember telling him anything like that. If
I did, it was false because I didn’t know anything like that.

Mr. Speiser. Have you furnished Mr. McMillan with false infor-
mation?

Mr. Ray. Have I furnished McMillan with false information?

I think Hon. Walter Fauntroy and everybody knows what type
guy McMillan is. He is just a leech and he hounded me since 1968
and so I would feed him a few lines now and then just to get him
off my back. You can read his book; his book was a joke.

Mr. Speiser. Is your answer yes, you did provide Mr. McMillan
with false information?

Mr. Ray. I led him along a few times.

Mr. Speiser. Excuse me?

Mr. Ray. He kept following me and he was always hounding me,
coming to see me in St. Louis and Atlanta and Chicago and every
place.

Mr. Speiser. Your answer is yes?

Mr. Pepper. Counsel, the witness has indicated, I think twice
now, that what he has attempted to do at various times was get
Mr. McMillan off his back, and whether it is false information to
say that he was not going to be in a particular place

Chairman Stokes. We can’t have counsel to testify here.

Mr. Pepper. I think the witness has answered the question.

Chairman Stokes. It was a very simple question and I think the
witness ought to answer the question.

396

Ms. Kennedy. He did.

Mr. Pepper. My suggestion, Mr. Chairman, is that he has already
answered it twice.

Mr. Speiser. You have indicated that Mr. McMillan hounded
you. Did you ever attempt to set up interviews with Mr. McMillan?

Mr. Ray. Seemed like one time I met him at the airport in St.
Louis.

Mr. Speiser. So your recollection is that only on one occasion

Mr. Ray. Only one I can remember, the one I can remember.
Seemed like we met at St. Louis for a while a few years ago before
his book was published.

Mr. Speiser. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would request that
MLK exhibit F-96A be marked for evidence and be introduced into
the record and a copy be furnished to Mr. Ray and his counsel.

Chairman Stokes. What is the exhibit?

Mr. Speiser. MLK exhibit F-96A, of which we have a blowup, is
a record of entries made into the bank account of Carol Pepper in
1967-68.

Mr. Ray. That is when we met in St. Louis. That is when he
came to St. Louis.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection they may be entered into
the record.

[The information follows:]

398

Mr. Pepper. Question, Mr. Chairman, on pertinence.

Chairman Stokes. Counsel will reply to the question put to the
Chair.

Mr. Speiser. By responding to the objections raised, I will be in
effect indicating to Mr. Ray what my question is, but I have no
problem in doing so and what the gist of the questioning is intend-
ed to elicit.

Mr. Pepper. Mr. Chairman

Chairman Stokes. He is trying to answer your question.

Mr. Pepper. I know, but we could probably eliminate further
objections along this line if the Chair would direct counsel to
advise Mr. Ray explicitly — with clarification as to what, in fact, is
the objective and what is the overall goal of this line of question-
ing. Client is entitled to this under the Watkins ruling as well as a
number of others with respect to the investigatory proceedings, and
so I think we can save a lot of time if counsel would in fact set out
explicitly what is the purpose here of this line of questioning.

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Chairman, if I may respond, I don’t think it is
necessary and incumbent upon me every time I ask a question to
Mr. Ray that I set forth the background for the question and what
my objective is.

I am asking Mr. Ray a question that I feel is relevant to the
scope of this inquiry. It is directed toward the credibility of Mr.
Ray and some of the statements that he has made which would
cast and create the impression that perhaps a conspiracy existed.

Now, I want to know from Mr. Ray whether, in fact, the informa-
tion which I am about to question him upon, was intended to be
conveyed to Mr. McMillan for the purpose of creating the impres-
sion that a conspiracy existed.

If I may proceed, Mr. Pepper, that is the gist of what I am trying
to establish.

May I proceed?

Mr. Pepper. Yes, so long as you are operating within that con-
text you just set out.

Chairman Stokes. Counsel may proceed.

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Ray, what has been furnished you and what
appears on the easel are three statements taken from the bank
records of Carol Pepper. Now, on these bank records which we
obtained from Carol Pepper and not from Mr. McMillan, there are
certain entries, three in number.

These entries are made under the name of Eugene Straub and
the entries appear in the amount respectively of $1,000, $2,000, and
$300.

Now, did you sell these bank statements to Mr. McMillan?

Mr. Ray. Well, to tell you honestly how it came about — McMil-
lan— we talked on the phone from Carol Pepper’s house in St.
Louis and Carol Pepper and her husband was supposed to be down
at my dad’s house. He lived on a farm by Hannibal, Mo. So when
they was out, McMillan knew that she kept pictures of James and
bank records and that, so he told me if I would get them out— that
she had them hid someplace in luggage— if I could get them out he
would buy the pictures and the bank records. So actually what he
was doing was being involved as an accessory to a burglary because
he thought I was burglarizing her house to get this stuff out.

399

He said he would pay for them if I got the stuff. So I met him at
the airport. Of course, they wasn’t even down at my old man’s
house. She was there, see, so I just got the books and added a
couple numbers on them and took them out. It was his idea to pay
me for the books.

Chairman Stokes. Would the counsel establish for the record
who Carol Pepper is?

Mr. Speiser. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. Carol Pepper is the
sister of James Earl Ray, Jerry Ray, and John Ray. Is that correct?

Mr. Ray. Yes, that’s right.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you.

Mr. Ray. So it was his idea and actually he was promoting a
burglary. He was trying to get me to burglarize her house to get
these bank books and the pictures.

Mr. Speiser. I am asking you, Mr. Ray, at the time these records
were transferred to Mr. McMillan, did Mr. McMillan know that
these entries had been made by you at a subsequent time and were
in fact false?

Mr. Ray. I don’t know. I don’t think so. Well, he should, though,
because he came to Chicago to see me and he had all of her bank
records. I don’t know how he got them. He had all her bank
records from different banks and she kept the money spread out in
savings and loan. He had them all and shown them to me in
Chicago so he should have known they were false from looking at
his own records.

Mr. Speiser. Did you tell him you made these entries?

Mr. Ray. I don’t remember saying anything like that.

Mr. Speiser. Did you receive any money for these statements?

Mr. Ray. I don’t know if he give me money for the statements or
for the pictures, because also he had some pictures.

He had one picture of John Ray when he got out of jail back in
1960.

Anyway, he give me $250 for the pictures and the bankbooks.

Mr. Speiser. Why did you make these three entries in this bank
ledger for $1,000, $2,000, and $300 under the name of Eugene
Straub? What was your purpose in doing that?

Mr. Ray. Mainly because he is a leech and like I say, I strung
him along every once in a while and just used him.

Mr. Speiser. So, it was false information that you furnished Mr.
McMillan?

Mr. Ray. Well, it’s not all — the bank records and everything was
true except a couple entries and the pictures — they had one picture
of John Ray, so it wasn’t all false. He got some information for his
$250.

Mr. Speiser. So, Mr. McMillan paid you $250 for these three
bank statements and you are admitting here that these three en-
tries were made by you after the fact?

Mr. Pepper. Objection, Mr. Chairman. The witness has stated
that he received some money from Mr. McMillan but that he
provided material other than the bank statements and he is not
sure and neither can anyone be sure as to what the money was for,
whether it was for the package of the material or the photographs
or what, and we are not in a position to say that the money at all
was received in exchange for the bank statements.

400

Chairman Stokes. Counsel will confine his questioning then to
the statements as made by the witness.

Mr. Speiser. What was this money for that Mr. McMillan paid
you, this $250? Was it for these records?

Ms. Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, I object to that question as having
been answered already, sir.

Mr. Speiser. Your cocounsel requested me to restate the ques-
tion, Ms. Kennedy, and that is what I am doing.

Ms. Kennedy. I ^apologize.

Is that what you want, Bill?

Mr. Pepper. I just objected to counsel’s question which related to
the receipt of money for the bank statements when Mr. Ray had
indicated that he had provided photographs and other materials as
well.

Ms. Kennedy. My objection was to a different aspect and it was
as to the question of whether or not the misleading entry— in the
first place, it obviously wasn’t under oath and I am just trying to
interest this committee in the importance of this— the witness has
already indicated he wanted to throw the guy off the track.

Chairman Stokes. That is the purpose of counsel’s question, so
that the committee can get at the truth, Ms. Kennedy.

Does the witness understand the question?

Mr. Ray. Being as McMillan is an FBI writer, a pro-FBI writer,
and his wife is a CIA writer, he didn’t have no trouble getting the
stuff he wasn’t supposed to get.

See, he had all my sister’s bank records. Well, it was illegal for
him to get it, but the prosecution, they worked with him 100
percent. So he wasn’t actually paying for the bankbooks or bank
statements; he was paying for the pictures, the way I took it.

Mr. Speiser. What was your purpose in making these entries in
the record?

Mr. Ray. Just to confuse him.

Mr. Speiser. To confuse Mr. McMillan?

Mr. Ray. Yes; he is confused anyway and I wanted to confuse
him a little bit further.

Mr. Speiser. Was your purpose to try to create the impression
that there was a conspiracy in the assassination of Dr. King ?

Mr. Ray. I always thought it was a conspiracy myself. He always
said there wasn’t because that is what he wanted to believe, but I
always thought there was a conspiracy. I knew he wouldn’t go
along with no conspiracy anyway, because he said from the start
that he just decided there wasn’t no conspiracy from the day it
happened and he wasn’t going to go along with no conspiracy.

Mr. Speiser. Who is Eugene Straub?

Mr. Ray. I think it was a landlord my sister had years ago.

Mr. Speiser. Did you tell Mr. McMillan that this money that had
been paid allegedly to Mr. Straub was in fact money connected
with the assassination?

Mr. Ray. I can’t remember. Sure I remember that name Straub.
I think it was her landlord back in 1968 or 1969 or something, but I
can’t remember all my conversation with McMillan.

Mr. Speiser. I would like to return to another area of questioning
at this time, Mr. Ray.

401

I would like to focus at this point on the contacts that you had
with your brother, John Ray, during the period between James’
escape from Jefferson City and the date of his capture in London,
England on June 8.

Now, do you have any recollection of meeting with John during
this period of time?

Mr. Ray. From his capture

Mr. Speiser. Between the date James Earl Ray escaped from
Jefferson City and the time he was captured in London.

Mr. Ray. I met him one time, I can’t remember the month, but
after he, you know, had opened that tavern up I seen him one
time. On my day off I spent a day down in St. Louis and went back.

Mr. Speiser. John Ray’s tavern, you are referring to the Grape-
vine?

Mr. Ray. Yes, the Grapevine.

Mr. Speiser. That was opened in Christmas of 1967?

Mr. Ray. I don’t know when it was opened. I can’t remember
when it was opened because I always worked in Chicago, but after
it was opened I think I was there once before King got killed. It
wasn’t on vacation, just a day off. On my day off I went down
there.

Mr. Speiser. In July of 1967 do you have any recollection of
meeting with your brother John in Chicago and exchanging cars
with him?

Mr. Ray. No.

Mr. Speiser. Are you denying that you did or is it that you do
not have any recollection?

Mr. Ray. I am almost positive I didn’t because a guy by the name
of Jack Gawron picked up a car for John but I don’t remember
seeing John at all in July.

I remember a guy by the name of Jack Gawron picking up a car
for John.

Mr. Speiser. You think it was Jack Gawron that picked up the
car for John?

Mr. Ray. Yes.

Mr. Speiser. I would like to direct your attention to MLK exhibit
F-601, a copy of which I would request the clerk to furnish Mr.
Ray with at this time, and I would request the chairman to have
this marked into evidence and introduced into the record.

This is an interview of Mr. Ray by the FBI on May 13, 1968.

Chairman Stokes. Which Mr. Ray?

Mr. Speiser. Excuse me, Mr. Jerry Ray.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the
record.

[The information follows:]

402

MLK Exhibit F-601

' FbdERAl BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION '

JBBBX WILLIAM /R AY i m shown the new photograph bf'blsr
’'brother, JAMES EARlTRATr; IBTE bus Iness salt taken sometime la ^ *
January or February, 1968. After viewing the photograph,
f JESSY stated that tfeg photograph Is a good likeness of his
/ brother except tbt~fce remembers him being thinner In the r

face. In fact, this particular photograph depicts JAMES
fuller in the face, than JERRY has ever seen him.

•- v--..

JESBT advised that his father, JERRY BATHES,

Cente r, M isso uri , left bis Bother in 1951 to live with RUBY
CARPENTER. RUBY has a son, JEROME, who is presently in -

prison, Jeff arson , City , Missouri, and la acquainted with
the subject. JERRY also knows JEROME since he wee in the .
reformatory at St. Charles, Illinois, with hla. JERRY
classified JEROME as being "off mentally" and a person who
v er y seldom talks to anyone. JERRY believes that JEROME
may have been In the hospital for the criminally Insane
Fulton, Missouri, when the subject escaped from prison. ,' v
JEROME Is presently doing time for the murder of a Negro.

JERRY also related that when bis father left, JERRY was .
la the Boys* Reformatory at Sheridan, Illinois.

JERRY said that he does not know HEAL EDGAR ASBY,

JAMES DAVID DAILEY, nor is be acquainted with the Half Way
Restaurant at 1549 South Jefferson, St. Louis, Missouri.

Be said that he never heard bis brother mention DAILEY nor
does he have any information that DAILEY had ever hidden .
his brother from the lav. JERRY also advised that he never V
beard of an organisation named the "Coolies" nor did be ever.
hear his brother mention that organization. JERRY said ' y :

that when he was la prison, he was Involved In a fist fight ' ** '

with (First Name Unknown) MENARD, who worked with him .la
the shoe shop. Be said that he could not recall this
Individual fs first name and that there would he no record \
of the fight at the prison since It was not reported nor
were they observed fighting. Be said that on one of the -

occasions when be visited with his brother In prison, be told ~~
hlm about it and JAMES was joking with him because JAMBS

403

.i$rnkld

that

to was close friends with the MENARD brothers
then la Jefferson City, Missouri, prison with

JERRY said he visited his brother shout three
or four times while be was In prison la Jefferson City,
Missouri, the last time being around 1964. JAMES case tb
Menard prison to visit JERRY on one occasion. JERRY again
stated that the last time be saw bis brother JAMES outside .....
of prison was In 1931 in Quincy, Illinois, and JERRY. was
fifteen years old at that time. The father was still . .v.„
living with his mother then. _ . . ■ .

Be said that he believes that VALTER TERRY REPS and
JAMES vent to Leavenworth together but that LOHNIE RITE . .

never did time with JAMES. Be said- that if he bad given .
the impression that LONNIE did do time with JAMES In the ‘ ^

previous Interviews, this was In error. JERRY again stated
that to himself has done time In Menard, Illinois, with ; /•-
both RIPE brothers.

r • ’ : -t

Be stated that to has so idea as to the present
whereabouts of "BLACKIE" AUSTIN and doubts if his brother ~
has maintained contact with AUSTIN nor would be la contact
with him since his escape. Be said that of all of the .
persons that be knows of, JAMES was the friendliest and
closest with AUSTIN. JERRY pointed out, however, that his •
knowledge of this is limited since JERRY was In prison
when both AUSTIN and his brother were on the street. Be
does know that "BLACKIS" liked bis brother and has always
talked about him. ‘ ’

la clarification, JERRY advised that his brother.

JOHN first came to Chicago s onetime around July, 1960, and
to, JERRY, came to this area around September, 1960. JOHN
first worked at MUfrpby’s Steak Bouse, H» also worked at
the White Plato Country Club and JOHN'S last employment in
the Chicago area was the Indian Hills Country Club, Bloomlagdale
Illinois. JERRY advised that be was employed with his
brothers JOHN and FRANK at the Rolling Green Country Club
beginning In September, 1960 and JERRY stayed there for
about sixteen months and JOHN for eight or nine months. --.- -yVyr
He was uncertain to ‘ -a length of time that his brother ^^3*5*
FRANK worked there 1 • believed be had left a good length***'

404

prior to bio death in September, 1903.

JERRY advised that somatime during June or
July, IBB7 P when he was living at 2897 Techny Road, Northbrook,
Illinois, JOHN drove here in a 1961 Plymouth vblcb he had ^ ^
bought from the father, JERRY RAYNES. At t his time, JERHt
owned a 1962 air-conditioned Rambler* JOHN was having
trouble with the transmission in the Plymouth and they
switched cars* He does recall that JOHN transferred some

clothes and other items from the Plymouth to the Rambler*
Also, that JOHN left some old shirts and pants and some ;

other papers in the garage at Techny Road and JERRY hid - '
these items above the rafters in the .garage* He said that
JOHN stayed a couple of days and vas in either an apartment •
or a hotel in Chicago and did not reside at JERRY 9 a residence
while here. JOHN left with the Rambler and both cars gre .
presently at his father's farm i n Cen ter, Hissourl* JERRY
said that his wife did not meet JOHN on this occasion but*
did meet him at Christmas time, 1967, when JERRY and his» M >
wife went to St. Louis where they had dinner at CAROL ** !

PEPPER # s house and JOHN vas present* JERRY advised that
JOHN did not know how to find his residence in Northbrook,
Illinois, and that he, JERRY, net him in the town of _

Northbrook and then JOHN followed him to the residence. '
JERRY also advised that his brother JAKES did not ever know
that JERRY resided at this address in Northbrook.

In previous interviews, JERRY advised that he
borrowed somewhere between $40 and $50 from his brother _ j
JAIIES while JAKES was in prison. He reiterated that state- :
sent in this interview at which time the financial trana- / ~
actions from his brother's account at the Inmates Bank, ’ • *
Hissourl State Penitentiary# Jefferson City, Hissourl,* were
discussed with JERRY. It was pointed out to him that this
list shows that his brother bad sent him $266.25. JERRY
advised that this must be an error since the only amount
he recognized vas $55.25 which was sent to him on June 22,
1964* He stated that at this time, he, JERRY, was in
St* Louis, Hissourl, and needed moony to return to Chicago --
.to obtain employment# Be wrote to his brother requesting .a*;
this loan and vas in the process of paying JAKES back when 7$

■

405

JAKES escaped . JESSY suggested that the money listed to’^fc.
his was instead paid to his brother's attorney, name unknown',
in Jefferson City, Missouri. JESSY advised that he himself
did not receive money from his brother to be sent to the *
attorney or anyone else. JEBB7 advised -that this attorney
had been hired by his brother to handle his appeal and that '/
he believed the attorney did visit with JAMES while JAMES ■■•*■■***-■
was la prison. JESSY said that his brother never mentioned
anything concerning Benzedrine inhalers or any type of
"bennies" or dope. JAMES never mentioned being involved
in any illegal drug selling while in prison nor did he
ever mention that be was involved in any type of racket
with a guard. Be also never mentioned any guard that he
was particularly friendly with and in fact, made no comment
whatsoever concerning the prison officials that JESSY can

* te ■* '

JBB87 also advised that his brother never r
mentioned reading any of the James Bond novels and In -
fact, JESSY did not believe his brother was much of a
"reader." The only location that he can recall his brother
making a comment as to bow much be liked it was Tijuana,
M ex ico, and be believes his brother was there sometime in
1991. The brother made no mention to him at anytime as
to the identity of any persons with wham be was acquainted
in Mexico.

JESSY advised that when he left Chicago on this
latter occasion , he stayed with his brother JOHN for two
nights, with his father one night, with his sister CAROL .
one night, at the St. Begis Hotel one night and at the ' V
Mac Arthur Hotel one night. In conversations with his !. v
brother JOHN and sister CAROL, they both stated that they
believe, from newspaper stories, that the subject is the
victim of a frame-up or being used as the "fall guy." He
also stated that CAROL is concerned over the newspaper
articles speculating that the subject is dead and she has
that opinion. Be said that JOHN told him that some people .
came to the tavern at the time of the KING funeral request-
ing him to close down for that day which he did sot do.

406

'$JQHV also aald that If ha himself receives aay publicity
Jha will close does the tavern and leave because he feels
*^that people will throw flrebonbe la his place. JERRY
related that one of the newspaper reporters located «■<»
Interviewed a woman named RUBY who works for his brother
•lace JOHN had use d th at woman's address about three or
four years ago. RUBY told the newspaper people that she
did not know the whereabouts of JOHH. JERRY also said that
in conversations with JOHN, JOHH told him that the subject
would be "craxy" to give himself up because even If be
Is not guilty of the KX2IG murder, he still would have .
eighteen years to do In the penitentiary at Jefferson City.
JERRY explained this by stating that bis brother has
thirteen years left on bis previous sentence and that
he would get at least an extra five years for the escape.

JERRY again speculated that If his brother
Was OHC's murderer, he would have had to have been paid
because be could not see bow his brother would have obtained
enough money to purchase the 1966 Mustang, take the trips* •
he was supposed to have taken and to pay $150 for the * "v:'*
telescope used la the murder. He said that there was Just ' '**
too much money coming la and la response to a direct ques-
tion, he said that be did not think his toother would have .
been able to steal this much money because he would have fr*d «
"slipped up and been caught." He explained that in bis
opinion, his brother was not an accomplished thief and that
most of his previous scores were "nail time."

JERRY advised that be Is presently residing la''
Apartment 14, 314 Wisconsin Avenue, Lkke Forest, Illinois,
which rooming bouse was recommended to the Sportsman's •
Country Club by WAYHE CUMStSS (phonetic). JERRY noted '
that his ex-wife DJBRDIS also used to reside at this rooming
. house. Be said that he Is not listed as a tenant and that -
the rent of $60 per month Is being paid by the country club.'
He advised that there Is no phone at the building with the
nearest one four blocks away. He said that be plans to ■
continue bis employment at the Sportsman ’s Country Club .
and will contact SA REHS J. DUMA IKE on a dally basis.

407

H» advised that his ex-wife presently works at '

* restaurant near tbe expressway and is living in a motel
In Vbeeling, Illinois. He vent on to say that yesterday .
there was a knock on tbe door of bis apartment and wben
be opened it, bis ex-wife was there. She said that she
had found him by inquiring of tbe rooming bouse manager,
tbe room numbers of tbe last two tenants and then came to
talk with him. He said that they talked of personal matters
with nothing of interest in this case. JESSY advised that
he may have to move from this address since bis ex-wife
might Inadvertently give out bis whereabouts. He said that
he was not concerned with the problem of people making *
threats against bis safety because of what bis brother did
but that be was most concerned of tbe people who would
attempt to barm him without making threats. In explanation,
he made tbe comment, "Like that guy who shot King, be
did not make any threats." *

* V -

— - JESSY advised that be : will continue to cooperate

with the Bureau in furnishing information.

Mr. Speiser. This is a six-page report on the interview with Mr.
Jerry Ray. I request that you direct your attention to page 3.

The first full paragraph indicates as follows:

Jerry advised that sometime during June or July of 1967, when he was living at
2897 Techny Road, Northbrook, 111., John drove here in a 1961 Plymouth which he
had bought from his father, Jerry Raynes. At this time Jerry owned a 1962 air-
conditioned Rambler.

In going a little bit further down in the paragraph, it reads as
follows:

He said that John stayed a couple days and was either in an apartment or a hotel
in Chicago and did not reside at Jerry’s residence while here.

Does this refresh your recollection about meeting with John and
exchanging cars with him in July 1967?

Mr. Ray. I don’t remember. I don’t even remember — if they got it
written down, I must have made a statement, but I don’t remember
it and I don’t remember seeing John up there. I remember a guy
by the name of Jack Gawron picking up a car around that time.

I don’t know how it would get — John actually picked it up be-
cause a guy by the name of Jack Gawron picked the car up. I
remember I had a car like that — a Rambler like that, and picked it
up

Mr. Speiser. Let me ask you for your answer. Is your answer
then you did not make this statement or did you make this state-
ment?

Mr. Ray. I don’t remember. I must have made it because it is
written down there, the FBI wrote it down there, so I don’t know. I
don’t remember ever making the statement.

Mr. Speiser. As of July 1967 had you met your brother James
following his escape from Missouri State Prison?

Mr. Ray. Did I meet him? I met him about 3 weeks afterward,
after the escape when he went to work in Klingman’s Restaurant
in Winnetka.

Mr. Speiser. When is the first time you met James?

408

Mr. Ray. The first I remember meeting him was a few weeks
afterward. That is the first I can remember meeting him, is when
he went to work at Klingman’s Restaurant.

Mr. Speiser. You don’t have any recollection of meeting James
following his escape within several weeks after his escape?

Ms. Kennedy. The witness has already said he met him 3 weeks
after the escape. It is already on the record.

Mr. Ray. I ean’t remember meeting him no sooner than that.

Mr. Speiser. So you do have recollection of meeting James within
3 weeks after the escape?

Mr. Ray. About 3 weeks.

Mr. Speiser. James escaped on April 23, 1967, so that would put
your meeting with James prior to the July meeting with John,
would it not?

Mr. Ray. Oh yes, before. Yes.

Mr. Speiser. So that prior to your July meeting with John you
had met James at least once?

Mr. Ray. Yes, I had met him several times.

Mr. Speiser. Several times.

By the way, when you were first interviewed by the FBI, did you
tell the FBI that you had not seen your brother James since he had
been incarcerated at the Missouri State Prison?

Mr. Ray. Read that again?

Mr. Speiser. My question is, did you tell the FBI when they first
interviewed you, when James was identified as a suspect in the
assassination, that you had not seen — and, by the way, the date of
that interview was April 19, 1968.

Did you tell the FBI that you had not seen your brother James
since he was incarcerated in the Missouri State Prison?

Mr. Ray. I can’t answer that because I don’t remember what all I
told the FBI or people. That has been too long ago.

Mr. Speiser. Your recollection is that you do not recall at this
time telling the FBI you did not meet with James?

Mr. Ray. I don’t recall our conversation as to what we said. I
can’t even remember who I met him with.

Mr. Speiser. When you met John in July 1967 as you have
testified, you had previously met James at least on two occasions.
Did you tell John that you had met James and that James was out
of jail; that he had escaped?

Mr. Ray. I didn’t even admit to meeting John in July. I said —
you got it down some place reading the statement, I said I don’t
remember meeting him. I said it is possible I met him but I said I
know a guy by the name of Jack Gawron is who picked up the car.

You read off where he met me on Techny Road and 1 don’t even
remember meeting him in July. I remember meeting Jack Gawron
and he picked up the car for John. It was a 1960 or 1961 red
Plymouth.

Mr. Pepper. The witness has been consistent, Mr. Chairman. He
has answered that question already and he has been consistent in
the answer.

Mr. Speiser. Mr. Chairman, I am just trying to assist Mr. Ray in
refreshing his recollection. I know he has responded that he does
not recall meeting John in July 1967, but I have introduced initial-

409

ly one FBI report which reflects that Mr. Jerry Ray advised the
FBI that he met John in July 1967.

Mr. Pepper. I object to the phrasing of counsel. It doesn’t do
anything of the sort. There is a statement here that Mr. Ray said
that, but there is no authenticity attached to that statement.

Mr. Speiser. Well, I am solely trying to refresh Mr. Ray’s recol-
lection, if I may.

Now, here we have one FBI report in which the agent who wrote
that report purportedly was advised by Jerry that Jerry met John
in July 1967.

Now, at this time, if I may continue, I would like to introduce
another FBI report.

Ms. Kennedy. Excuse me a moment.

Chairman Stokes. The witness can testify as to whether or not
the document has refreshed his recollection.

Has it, Mr. Ray?

Mr. Ray. No.

Ms. Kennedy. Just for the record, could I ask when this FBI
document was prepared and how long this information has been
available to the Government?

Is this a recent preparation or has this been in the hands of this
Government for 10 years or 11, 12?

Chairman Stokes. The document is before counsel and the docu-
ment should speak for itself preferably.

Ms. Kennedy. We haven’t had a chance to study it and confer
about it and I thought maybe Mr. Speiser could just answer that
for me, but I will look. 1968. So it was 10 years ago. Thank you.

Chairman Stokes. Proceed, counsel.

Mr. Speiser. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would request the
witness be shown MLK exhibit F-602 an FBI report dated May 22,
1968, of a May 17, 1968, interview with John Ray.

I request that this document be marked into evidence.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the
record.

[The information follows:]

410

rtMoa (n~. i^hsi -05RAL SUREAU OF INVESTIGATtOK

JOBS lAFfflY RAT was Interviewed at the Grapevine Tavern/

1&S2 Arsenal Street, St. Louis, Missouri.

He stated that with regard to bis belief that his brother,
JAKES EARL RAT, had plenty of money on him at the time of his escape
from prison was based on the fact that he had been questioned regarding
his knowledge of his brother's dealing la amphetamines while In prison*
He stated that- It was pure guess work on his part and he merely felt
this way because he recalls that from his experience In prisons
that usually the people who deal In narcotics in prisons are among
the wealthhr Inmates. He stated he has no Idea how JAMES EARL
RAT wMild have spent any money he earned In prison, either while
In prison or subsequent to leaving prison. He reiterated that
he ha* not seen or heard from JAMES earl RAT since his escape and
has never heard anyone say that he was in Chicago, parti cul&ry In
the summer of 1987. He recalls that In the summer of 1987 he was
I n Chi cago himself at which time he traded cars with his brother
JERBT.

Q> 5/17/Pfl. at 3t. Louis, Missouri FlU #ST.: 44-i77S

| br 3A PATRICK T. BHABLET/lMb -i 8/80/88

! ~ ^

MLK Exhibit F-602

Chairman Stokes. I would like to direct your attention to

Mr. Pepper. Just a minute more, please.

The special agent’s name in this statement, Mr. Chairman, is
special agent Patrick Bradley. Is that correct, counsel?

Mr. Speiser. The document reads for itself, Mr. Pepper.

Mr. Pepper. Has special agent Bradley been called before this
committee and testified under oath?

Chairman Stokes. That is certainly not pertinent, counsel. I am
sure counsel knows that.

Mr. Pepper. I do, Mr. Chairman

Chairman Stokes. The document, counsel, has been furnished
you and the witness, for the purpose of the counsel being able to

411

examine your witness regarding that document. It is not appropri-
ate to pose questions

Mr. Pepper. Mr. Chairman, we certainly will do that. We will
examine it and appreciate it, but we are concerned, Mr. Chairman,
about the credibility of the document that is being put forth here.

Chairman Stokes. The committee will ultimately decide the
credibility of all documents in the record.

Ms. Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, is there any possibility that those
FBI or other documents will be relied on by the committee and
counsel could be available to this witness so that we don’t have
pages and pages of materials thrown at us on such short notice so
we could have a recess and an opportunity to examine these docu-
ments, because it does seem tremendously unfair for this commit-
tee to collect incredible volumes of information that covers a great
deal of territory, and then to have us sit here and have to respond
or in any way relate to representing this way on this sort of ad hoc
instant hearsay evidence.

Chairman Stokes. Ms. Kennedy, any document that counsel de-
sires to examine the witness from will be furnished to counsel and
counsel will be given adequate time to read and confer with the
witness on that document.

Mr. Speiser. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have already shown
you, Mr. Ray, the FBI report in which the agent writing that
report notes his recollection that you advised him that you met
John in July 1967, in Chicago, to exchange cars.

Now, you have before you MLK exhibit F-602 which is an FBI
interview of your brother John.

Now, if you look at the last sentence, let me quote that: “He
recalls in the summer of 1967 he was in Chicago himself, at which
time he traded cars with his brother Jerry.”

Does that serve to refresh your recollection as to whether or not
in July 1967 you met with John and exchanged cars with him?

Mr. Ray. The only thing I know definitely and the only thing I
can make a definite statement on is that a guy by the name of
Jack Gawron picked up the car — we switched cai s for Jack. Jack
wanted another car, something wrong with his car, and I had to
take and get a transmission job done on it, and anyway we
switched cars. It was for Jack but Jack didn’t switch cars with me.
He had a guy by the name of Jack Gawron who picked the car up
and give me the other car.

Mr. Speiser. I just want you to know, Mr. Ray, I am not trying to
trick you or trap you. I am asking a very simple, innocuous state-
ment to try to determine whether or not you met John in July of
1967.

Now, I understand your testimony is that you have no recollec-
tion; that you think you met Jack Gawron, is that right?

Mr. Ray. I know I met him. I know I met Jack Gawron, but
John — I just can’t remember meeting him.

Mr. Speiser. Now, I asked you previously whether or not you
advisea the FBI when they initially interviewed you as to whether
or not you had not seen your brother James since the first time
you visited him at Missouri State Prison, and that you had no idea
as to his whereabouts.

412

Now, I would like to at this point introduce into the record, and
a copy be furnished to you, MLK exhibit F-615, which is an FBI
report dated April 29, 1968, and reflects an interview with you on
April 24, 1968.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, MLK F-615, will be accept-
ed into the record at this time. Would the clerk please furnish Mr.
Ray with that document?

[The information follows:]

MLK Exhibit F-615

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

.' 4 r : the- outsat of th« interview, JERRY william '

RAY was advised of the provisions of Section 1001 , Title IS; ;
United States Code*. Ha was advised that he did not . have
to talk to the interviewing Agents but that they wished : •
to stress to him the importance of his coopera t ion an d
truthfulness in the matter of the murder of MARTIN LUTHER
- RING . Jr . v : ..’ . , ;v

It: was-- pointed out to JERRY that he had lied to
the Agents in the previous interviews in that the FBI
bad located his- brother, JOHN, and that it would have bean . : j
impossible for JERRY not to have known his whereabouts. .

He* then stated that: he had lied but only in an effort to
protect his brother JOHN’S, investment in a bar in St*

Louis. JOHN had put up S2SOO to purchase the bar and JERRY ..*•
was of the opinion that if FBI Agents harassed JOHN, he wou Id ; V
;> lock up the bar, take a loss and leave* The bar, known as
Grapevine”', Is-, located in; St. Louis; '.’Missouri,;, and. -
: licensed . in 'the: name of -CAROL, gffgP ER ; . their sisterv-t- Ife>4f^^

said' ; that : he . ha s* no' informat ion nor does - he. be^leve : ^ thatr'-5;;^^;^

:■ ;HATT has bee%:-is: ; contact- w-ith JOHN since. hisr escape

from. - prison in April r .1967. JSUIY went on • to : say t hat

doubted very much- that JAMES RAT was aware of . the present >

^/ whereabouts- of JOHN: si nce JO HN was classif ied aa a '•drifter’*’?^

. It. was. pointed out to JERRY that JOHN bad been a visitor th-^r
the Missouri Prison on the day before JAMES RAY’ s'- esc ape .

■'■-■ [ .'In answer to a direct question, JERRY then admitted that.

it would-be possible for JAMES RAY to know the location of Vj ;C:
his- brothe r’s ta vern. He said that he doubted if JAMES RAY
.'rS^ : ;^fenew- his-, JESRT’s; present, employment at the Sportsman *s<

-OClubv Northbrook, Illinois, but that he* might -be aware.

•;./ it; since he had.. written a letter to; the Parole Board In which- -:’V
oaotionod his present employment saying that; !>?
;-;.;he' possibly, could obtain employment . for his brother-, JAME5--.- v -
^ : ;;>^^RAT^:either at: the country club or in the immediate neighbor-..^
hood^-Hd^ denied that he had ever furnished JAMES RAY with:
present; employment. He said, that to- his positive : : ;> ■

> ^•.■ "knowledge, the- only way, t^t JAMES could get v in : touch* wlth^^vg-

413

him was through P; O- Box 22, Wheeling, Illinois. since .
he. JERRY had obtained this box for the specific use of
his brother since he did not want mail from the penitentiary
coming; to the country club. ,

JESSY related that JOHN came to this area sometime
around 1964 and stayed for about 2 \ years. To the best of
JESSY* s recollection, JOHN first worked at Murphy's
Steakbouse, then went to the Soiling Green Country Club
and from there to the White Pines Country Club where he
was employed as a pot washer.. JOHN then went to bartending; ....
school in Chicago and went to work for the Indian Hills
Country Club in Itasca, Illinois. JESSY is of the opinion
that his brother, JOHN, uses the name RYAN. '

? " ‘ JESSY said that on April 20 or 21, _19 68, he T'Uir.

; telephonic ally contacted his sister, CAROL PEPPEE, and
' explained that the uncooperative attitude of both CAROL and . ^
JOHN 'arose, from the harassment 'of the newspaper reporters-,

In the neighborhood and that both were afraid of unf avorabler^
•publicity, which would, adversely effect : the tavern business ^
causing them to sell out and move. He said that his ' V

. sister, CAROL v has told him that she feels that she now : has;;>%
to move from the particular neighborhood where she resides
in St; Lou is Missouri. CAROL has commented to him that
the picture tn the newspaper of JAMES RAY does look something
like him. JERRY said that he - agrees with this but that felt ■;
it could not be his brother because hd read in: th.e newspapers
that the person* sought by the r 31 for the KING murder had ^ -

attended dancing school in New Orleans, Louisiana, in 1964
and 196 3 v. but since his brother was imprisoned during these
years , he • knew it. could no t be. ; him . . 1‘; ' /. ' ; v •; r

. :-;i: jrv ‘v'-^S^Cbnceraing ’ his trip to St. Louis;- Missouri, in* ^ :
February. 1 ;!' 1968. JERRY advised that he stayed at the Mac Arthur
Hotel for one night ; he believes the date to be February 2, ;
1963 , and that- : hiS brother ,,, JOHN, either stayed, in an
apartmen c . over" th e t avern or nearby , . but; not at "the; hot el
as he previously implied ;>•’ He said that about every six: or ^
seven: weeks ‘ he % drives ' to St ^ :Lou is v V Missouri, to vis it^ith-^ < }

§p|p^^

39-935 0 - 79 - 27

414

CAROL and sometimes J0H2T sineo they aretheonlyfaaily
he his. He denied that his brother r JAMES RAY, had been
at this /family reunion at this last or any other tine,/ v

JERRY advised t hat he owns two automobiles, one .
a 1360 light green four-door De Soto which presently is
parked in front of the cottage at the Sportsman r s Country
Club. ' The other v a 1961 two door white over red Plymouth,

Both of these cars were purchased from a stepfather, ^ JERRY ^
RAV»gs «ho resides on a farm in Center, Missouri, Re
exhibited a receipt from the Dunhurst Currency Exchange
showing that Missouri driver's license R250-6227-822-98-473UO t
plus title and registration for 1960 De Soto bad been turned ; •
in. The receipt was in the name of JERRY. WILLIAM RTAK^ .

2B9T Techny Road ^ JERRY said that he' had turned over
these items April 24 r . 1968, and expected to obtain his ^
Illinois drlver^s license and license tags within the next >
several’ days. .. Z

: Z fiprt her . ; related that he paid S200 f or thexT;
iSSl Pljrmouth and has owned it fbxf about -"six' months
car is presently at his stepf ather 's farmland “is.
regist ered'iv: The;.* reason it is , no t • registered ; is that • t he. /> V
title -to this car via filed by his stepfather in St . Louis,
Missouri, but. was^ not ^returned. Both he and' his stepfather -hZfi-
made- icpu iiry cocicerning t he ri tie;' but -it was e video t Xy ; :
lost. JERRY said that he has driven the car ! to* Chicago and ZZ- ; ;
to- this/ area on one; occasion utillalng- license plates from
•^a Junk cari; CAROL PEPPER has also driven the ear; on several
occasions with the same plates. However , : the plates have ;
-‘^iids.-beea^rwbve^ 'fromY-tbe- .cra/and^deg t r oy ^:.^:^^

Z : response to cfuestions coaceming Post Off ice' >

: Box* 22 V; Wheeling^; Illinois', JERRY reiterated that ; the onlyxr
! person whe has ever written to him was his brother JAMES - RAY-.'
with the rare exception that be might receive some
Cad^ert is ihg:; 1 iterators, of n& cooseq u ence v ‘He pers is ted.
r in stating- that ; that 'he had .received no comsunicat leas at this
v Post Of t ice box «it bid- recent weeks Af ter f urther auestxbn ing.'

C JERRY admitted: that bit April 23, 1968,; he received a telegram ,
: : addressed-, to’ him : ar.;S;yO:^Bo^

415

JERRY advised that sometime axoundSeptember; I960,
shortly if ter his release from prison , he was unemployed
ta S tv Louis and he was contacted by his brother , JOHN ,.
who told him to cone to the Chicago area which JERRY did-,

He commenced employment at the Rolling Greens Country Club,
Arlington Heights, Illinois, from September, 1960, until ’ •
January, 1962. He then returned to St. Louis, Missouri,
and returned sometime in April, 1962, where he obtained
employment at the North Shore Country. Club, Glenview, Illinois.

He also worked for the Olympia Fields- Country Club for 13.;
days and then went to work for the Medlnah Country Club
until sometime in December,; 1963, when he was hit by a car - ;
as he was walking along a highway. JERRY apent some time in , ^
the hospital as a result of these injuries and then went back ^
to Sb. : Louis, Missouri, with JOHN. He again returned to this,
area and was employed at the Flossmoor Country Club, from ;

Apr il un til September, 1964 At that time , : he commenced
his" present, em ployment •- at Sportsman Country ..Club .rj : ; • v

T " , v ^ JERRY said that he^ had resided at the Sportsman
Country Club except for a short period of time from. Mares ;to; : ^^^
September ,1967, when he resided at 2897 Tec hay Road,

Northbrook, Illinois, with bis wife GJERD IS STREET who presently
resides on Wisconsin Avenue, Lake Forest , Illinois.- He .said -v;;
that while they were married,; she had a child, however, this ; v
child was by : her: p